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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between crucial board characteristics and firm 
performance in certain industries in Nigeria. We examine the business case for the inclusion 
of women and ethnic minority directors on the board. Specifically, we investigate the 
relationship between the number of women directors and the number of ethnic minority 
directors (Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa) on the board, important board committees and financial 
performance measured as Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q. 
Unlike most studies on board which focus on developed markets, this study was conducted in 
an emerging market and the focus was on diversity using a pragmatic approach. Most study of 
this kind are pure empirical studies. To have a broader perspective on the subject we 
employed a mixed method approach. Employing a fixed effects model for our panel data and 
a semi-structured interview through a snowballing approach, we explore diversity and firm 
performance.  
Different theories such as resource dependence theory, agency theory, and stakeholder theory 
suggest that gender and ethnic diversity may have either a positive, negative, or no effect on 
the financial performance of the firm. Our statistical analysis supports the aforementioned 
effects. Our research results are consistent with what Carter et al. (2010) describe as a 
contingency explanation because the effect of the gender and ethnic diversity of the board 
may be different under different circumstances at different times.  
We found a positive and significant relationship between some ethnic groups and firm 
performance. However, we do not find a significant relationship between the gender, 
important board committees, or non-executive female board member and financial 
performance for a sample 190 firm on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The results of our 
analysis do not support the business case for inclusion of women on corporate boards but it 
also does not deny it. This is linked to how we found that social networking, regionality, 
social acceptability, double shifting for women and minorities play important roles in 
determining the effectiveness of women and ethnic minorities on the Nigerian corporate 
board in our interviews, which may help to explain the limited numbers and the lack of 
impact of diversity on board performance in this developing country context. The developing 
country context also theoretically demanded a more integrated use of corporate governance 
thinking around agency, stewardship and resource dependence to help explain how 
governance operates in emerging economies like Nigeria. 
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1  Introduction  
1.1 Background 
For a long time boards have been the subject of management research and the attention paid 
to corporate boards has increased in recent years (Daily et al., 2003, Rhode and Packel, 2010, 
Gregory et al., 2013), with a particular focus on the board composition and its relationship to 
company performance (Pettigrew, 1992, Zahra and Pearce, 1989). With women and (ethnic) 
minorities continuing to become a larger proportion of the workforce in Nigeria, corporations 
are beginning to have an increasingly diverse pool of potential candidates for decision-
making positions (Burke, 1997, Conyon and Peck, 1998, Erhardt et al., 2003, Carter et al., 
2010, Ujunwa, 2012). As a result, these changes in the labour market may influence the 
composition of boards of directors and subsequently corporate governance (Shrader et al., 
1997).  
The demographic diversity of corporate directors is receiving increased attention due to the 
changing cultural, political, and public views of corporate board membership. Furthermore, 
the worldwide aspiration for better corporate governance is a principal issue. Different 
corporate governance catastrophes have led to reforms such as the Cadbury Report in the 
United Kingdom, the General Motors Board of Directors guidelines in the US, the Dey 
Report in Canada and the Central Bank initiative in Nigeria. Hence, legislative action by, for 
instance, the US government i.e. the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002. Other countries have passed 
legislation and guidelines regulating corporate governance as well (Carter et al., 2010). Rose 
(2007) reports a serious interest in Scandinavian countries to improve the number of women 
on corporate boards. For instance, the Norwegian government passed legislation requiring 40 
per cent of the directors for a company to be women (Rose, 2007).  Following after Norway is 
Spain who also passed legislation requiring a quota for the number of female directors 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). According to the Higgs Report, they opined that demographic 
diversity increases board performance and encourage firms to increase the number of women 
on boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
It is often argued that diversity on boards, which may include members from different 
backgrounds, race, ethnicity, language, skills and experiences, will improve organisational 
value and performance by providing the board with different initiatives, perspectives, 
enhanced creativity and innovation resulting in clearer decision-making process and improved 
performance (Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012a). According to Carter and Wagner (2011), the 
gender and ethnic diversity debate in the literature on corporate governance covers two major 
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propositions. The first perspective is that skilled women and ethnic minorities with the human 
capital, networks, information, and other managerial characteristics are worthy of 
opportunities to serve on corporate boards. The second suggestion is that gender and ethnic 
diversity of directors’ result in better governance that causes the business to be more 
profitable.   
Ujunwa (2012) claims that a more diverse board is likely to challenge previously held 
assumptions resulting in a more pro-active board, which leads to an improvement in the firm's 
image, which causes a ripple effect on performance. In another major study Erhardt et al. 
(2003), board diversity positively impacted on return on investment and return on assets. 
Similarly Lincoln and Adedoyin (2012a) argues that board diversity will also help reduce 
nepotism, promote fairness and ensure various stakeholder interests are well represented in 
corporate decision making. This view is supported by Nielsen and Huse (2010) and Torchia et 
al. (2011a) in a survey of Norwegian firms who writes that board diversity indicates that 
companies are showing an obligation to promoting people from various ethnic backgrounds 
and a commitment to a policy of non-discrimination against gender or ethnic minority 
executives. Diversity on board may also lead to a positive impact on the external talent pool 
for the directorship, i.e. top female managers may influence career trajectory of women in 
lower roles, provide mentoring and networking opportunities for junior level women staff and 
possibly contribute to increased retention of women (Bear et al., 2010). This ideology has led 
to the proponent of the quota system (Hughes, 2011, Teigen, 2012, Terjesen et al., 2013) 
which has been the most successful way of increasing the number of women and minorities 
on corporate boards until date.  
An empirical study into the relationship between the gender and ethnic diversity of the board 
and firm financial performance would influence both public policy and the governance of the 
corporate organisation. If according to empirical finding there is no difference between 
women and ethnic minority directors and other competent directors so that gender and ethnic 
diversity on the board is of no consequence on shareholder or stakeholder value, then the 
allure of gender and ethnic minority diversity is principally a public policy issue. However, if, 
according to Carter et al. (2010), there is a positive relationship between the gender and 
ethnic diversity of the board and firm performance, the economic implications of board 
diversity are important.  
Most literature on the subject of gender and ethnic diversity have been written in developed 
economy context (Carter et al., 2010, Desvaux et al., 2007, Erhardt et al., 2003, Terjesen et 
al., 2015b, Bourne et al., 2011) ranging from corporate governance issues such as: gender and 
ethnic diversity among UK corporate boards (Brammer et al., 2007), gender diversity and 
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financial performance (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008), gender and ethnic diversity and 
firm performance (Carter et al., 2010), gold skirt (Huse et al., 2012), independent and female 
directors impact firm performance (Terjesen et al., 2015b), trajectory of careers and identities 
through various strands of equality and diversity (Bourne et al., 2011). A few have been 
written in Africa and particularly Nigeria (Ujunwa, 2012, Adebowale, 2012, Adekoya, 2011, 
Adesua Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012). However, in most of these studies an essential 
component – ethnicity - is not empirically studied in the Nigerian context. Approach to the 
study of corporate governance in Nigeria as either taken a quantitative or qualitative 
approach. Therefore, this research fills this void in the research design in the Nigerian 
literature by using a pragmatic approach. Characteristics of corporate governance in 
developing countries are often different from those of developed countries. As a result, an 
empirical study of each society is required to understand the effects of diversity indicators 
(like gender and ethnicity) on corporate board on firm’s financial performance and Nigeria 
presents an interesting case for several reasons (see chapter 4).  
The current research focuses on the Nigerian context and can contribute to the literature by 
constructing a model with established theories like the agency, resource dependence and 
stakeholder theories to check if they might play differently in the Nigerian context and that 
diversity (gender and ethnicity) play a prominent role for different reasons on company 
boards. 
Moreover, this research can demonstrate evidence of the impact of ethnicity on corporate 
boards that empirical study alone cannot provide by employing qualitative techniques to study 
the experience of Nigerian board members; thereby discovering any points of difference with 
that found in the developed world. Furthermore, the influence of social issues such as gender 
stereotypes, regionality, language and ethnicity are thoroughly tested in this research. Finally, 
this research can verify the impact of various policies or interventions in the Nigerian 
financial sector regarding gender parity and check for its effectiveness. 
 
1.2 The purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research is to explore the relationship between the diversity indicator in 
board composition and the financial performance of all firms on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. 
Our research is unique because we consider both ethnic diversity and gender diversity in this 
analysis that is not common in the literature. We found only one other empirical investigation 
that directly measured the link between the ethnicity of the board and financial performance 
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of the firm (Ujunwa et al., 2012), however, the research employed a dummy variable 
construct, which takes a value of 1 if the board is made up of people from different tribes and 
0 if otherwise. There have been more research in the literature on the empirical relationship 
between the gender of corporate directors and financial performance more than any other 
aspects of the demographic diversity of corporate directors. 
However, we believe like Carter et al. (2010) that gender diversity and ethnic diversity are not 
the same ideology and will not affect the company in same ways. We consider evidence from 
the resource dependency theory that suggests significant differences between women 
directors and ethnic minority directors. We also find previous empirical evidence on the 
nature of board diversity, which distinguishes gender, and ethnic diversity (Hillman et al., 
2002, Carter et al., 2010, Ujunwa, 2012, Brammer et al., 2007, Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). 
Finally, we drawn from the evidence presented in this analysis, which suggests a difference 
between women directors and ethnic minority directors. 
Furthermore, our study explores the relationship between the gender and ethnicity of the 
members of important board committees and financial performance, which has not been done 
in the Nigerian literature. We investigate the hypothesis of Carter et al. (2010) that an analysis 
of committee membership and financial performance provides a relationship between board 
diversity and firm performance. Our third contribution is that we implement a mixed method 
approach that has not been used in previous investigations, which might apply to other 
African countries or developing countries with the same demographic construct. As the 
analysis of board diversity and firm performance has progressed, more and more 
sophisticated analytical methods are being applied to new data sets. Our research contributes 
to this research stream by using mixed methods and different ethnic variables, which split the 
effect of the three major tribes in Nigeria.  
 
One major limitation with current research on diversity and performance is that they have 
been undertaken in the context of developed economies and the limited research conducted in 
the Nigerian economy (Ujunwa, 2012, Mikailu, 2005, Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012a) has not 
examined the diversity of boards using mixed method analysis, they have not examined the 
effect of different ethnicity, as forms of diversity, and finally most of the existing research 
have also employed only one measure of performance. This research also did a sector analysis 
of the two major sectors (Finance and Oil and Gas) using same parameters given their 
importance to the economy. We chose the financial sector because of the recent reform in the 
sector regarding gender diversity on board with the aim to see its effectiveness before and 
after the reform. We compare the financial sector with the oil & gas sector because Nigeria is 
an oil dependent nation with the large portion of its budget dependent on proceeds from the 
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sale of oil (see chapter 4 page 47 for further justification).  Furthermore, we constructed 
models to check for a before and after effect of diversity on firm financial performance for the 
banking sector about the CBN recapitalisation policy and the introduction of gender quota on 
bank boards. 
 
1.3 Research question 
This study aims at raising awareness and understanding of gender and ethnic minority 
influences on corporate boards for all firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. In South Africa, 
the King III code emerged and in Nigeria, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
code was revised. While these changes were aimed at making corporate boards more 
effective, there are still challenges as to how these boards are composed, how human capital 
is fully utilised. This can only be done by using all available resources without biases for 
gender, ethnicity. Then optimum firm performance can be reached. This research, therefore, 
explores the following questions: 
In summary, our research hypotheses are that: 
Hypothesis 1:  Ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm performance 
Hypothesis 2: Board gender is positively related to firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between non-executive female director and 
performance. 
Hypothesis 5: The number of women directors on a major board committee is related to the 
financial performance of the company. 
The first research question is to what extent a gender and ethnicity play a significant role in 
board composition and how does it affect firm financial performance. In other to answer this 
question we explore the question quantitatively by checking the effect of each gender 
grouping on firm financial performance in our fixed effect model, and qualitatively we ask 
interview questions of our research participants to know their personal experience of the firm 
procedure for appointment to board membership and if gender and ethnicity are crucial. 
We also ask the question of the importance of the size of the board. The resource dependency 
literature argues that the bigger the board, the more the possibility of a diverse board (Hillman 
et al., 2009). Others argue that a large size could be ineffective in decision-making (Drees and 
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Heugens, 2013, Xia et al., 2014). We, therefore, test to see how much the size of the typical 
board in Nigeria affect firm financial performance. 
This research explores empirically the effect of non-executive female directors on the Nigeria 
boards. According to the literature, board appoint a non-executive director to serve or play the 
monitoring role, thereby representing the interest of the firm's stakeholder (De Haan and 
Vlahu, 2016). We test for this idea in the Nigerian context and particularly because we see 
that, the majority of women on the Nigerian corporate boards are non-executive members. 
We construct a model also to test for the importance of gender and ethnic minority on a major 
board committee.  
Several related theories of social groups examine how people seek to have people with the 
same demographic profiles, perspectives, and values, which are then reinforced in intragroup 
communication (Terjesen et al., 2015b). We, therefore, ask the question of how social 
network affects the performance of women and minorities on board. 
Finally, using semi-structured interview question and a snowballing approach, we ask further 
questions about the influence of politic on board and how government monitoring agencies 
affect the board composition of Nigerian firms. Also we as our interview respondent about 
the following topics: regionality and local content, work/life balance, double shifting for 
women and the importance of the leadership structure on firm performance.  
1.4 Organisation of the study 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This chapter, chapter one, gives an overview of the 
research and explains the importance of the study. The research is discussed in brief and the 
contributions that this research hopes to achieve to contribute to the knowledge in the 
corporate governance literature.   
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 starts off by explores the different models of 
board directors. We further explore existing literature concerning the formation of corporate 
boards and how these characteristics affect firm performance. 
Chapter 3 explains the theoretical framework used in this research. It clarify the model 
formulated with the Nigerian context in mind but with the idea that, using this model, further 
studies could be replicated in other developing economies with similar socio-economic 
characteristics like Nigeria. 
Chapter 4 gives a comprehensive description of Nigeria as a means of having a sound 
understanding of the research context. This research starts by explaining the concept of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. This study further looks at the history of corporate 
governance in Nigeria, the background and the socio context in which it operates. There is a 
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section comparing other African countries and how corporate governance works. The chapter 
ends with recent initiative and policies already implemented and proposed or prospective 
policies.   
Chapter 5 gives the pragmatist approach as the research methodology adopted for this 
research, along with the research design. It describes the sample, data sources, data collection, 
variables and the statistical tools used for data analyses. The pragmatism paradigm is 
employed in this study to investigate the diversity and its effect on Nigeria’s boards because 
of its ability to examine a range of micro and macro phenomena in which women and 
minorities operate in the Nigerian context. The chapter ends by confirming that all ethical 
consideration have been met undertaking this research. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables employed in this research. The 
chapter goes on to report the results of the correlation and regression analyses of the data and 
implications of all-sector analysis, comparative analysis of the banking and the oil and gas 
sector and finally, the pre and post 2009 analysis of the banking sector. This chapter discusses 
the result by trying to explain how the result reflect and affects corporate governance in 
Nigeria. The chapter ends by summarising hypothesis tested and our research findings and 
questions explored in the qualitative research.   
Chapter 7 explored qualitatively, using semi-structured interviews and snowballing 
techniques, the characteristics of board members. The chapter analyses the responses of our 
interviewees. It looks at the experiences of board members and how these experiences answer 
our research questions about firm performance.   
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings and the 
contributions for practitioners and academia. This chapter also identifies the strengths and 
limitations of the current study and ends with a set of recommendations for future research 
and policy implementation.  
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2  Literature review 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the literature relating to corporate boards, different forms of diversity, 
the various board models and their effectiveness. The literature review has been divided into 
the following sections. The first section discusses the various models of boards and the 
corporate governance implications, then a review of previous studies that have been 
undertaken on boards of directors in the second section. In addition, this chapter discusses 
boardroom characteristics such as leadership structure, quota system and diversity on boards. 
2.2 Models of Board of Directors – Governance Structure  
In literature, there are three top methodologies to the organisation of corporate boards: the 
Anglo-US one-tier board model, the continental European two-tier board model, and the 
Japanese model (Yermack, 2006, Yermack, 1996). The Anglo-Saxon model is used in the US, 
the UK and Canada (also adopted by Nigeria), while the continental European model is 
employed in European countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Finland and 
Netherland. The Japanese model is used mainly in Japan and some other Asian countries such 
as Korea. Each type decides the number and size of the board, the ownership structure and 
business structure, which are part of corporate governance. The differences in legal and 
political institutions of these corporate governance systems will affect managerial behaviour. 
2.2.1 Anglo-US Model  
Share ownership of persons is the identity of the Anglo-US model, and increasing 
institutional investors that are not affiliated with the corporation.  The model also includes a 
well-developed legal framework defining the rights and responsibilities of three key players, 
which are management, directors and shareholders and an uncomplicated procedure for 
synergy between shareholder and firm as well as among shareholders during or outside the 
annual general meeting (AGM) (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
An attractive means of raising capital in the UK and US is equity financing (Hall, 2002). 
Hence, it is little wonder that the US is the largest capital market in the world, followed by 
Tokyo and third in rank is the London Stock Exchange (regarding market capitalization). 
According to the literature, "there is a determinant relationship between the significance of 
equity financing, the proportion of the financial market and how a corporate governance 
system (Porta et al., 1997). This is evident in the US as it is both the world's largest financial 
market and has the world's most advanced system of proxy voting and shareholder activism 
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by institutional investors. In the UK also, institutional investors play a significant role in both 
the financial market and corporate governance. 
Major participants in the Anglo-US model include management, directors, shareholders 
(especially institutional investors), government agencies, stock exchanges, self-regulatory 
organisations and consulting firms which advise corporations and shareholders on corporate 
governance and proxy voting. Of all those mentioned above, the three top players are 
management, directors and shareholders. They form what is typically referred to as the 
"corporate governance triangle" as seen in figure 1 (Tricker, 2015). The interests and 
intercommunication of these players may be depicted as follows:  
 
Figure 1: Corporate governance triangle 
 
The Anglo-US model, from which many elements of governance are taken and imitated by 
others (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), emphasises the primacy of shareholders and presumes 
that top executives‘ primary responsibility is to maximise shareholder wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This Anglo-US model focuses on some governance mechanisms including 
the separation of ownership from control, financing through the stock market, and the use of 
independent directors (Dalton et al., 1998).  
In this system, the board of directors' main tasks are to appoint and dismiss the managers, 
approve payments and acquisitions and decide on important strategies. Executive directors 
(who are members of management) and non-executive directors (who are outsiders) operate 
together in one organisational layer that constitutes the board. The shareholders at their 
annual general meetings elect boards. As a result of the various corporate governance 
regulations in these countries, the non-executive directors constitute the majority on the 
board. However, many of the companies still have boards that operate with a board leadership 
structure that combines the roles of the CEO and the chairperson (called CEO-duality). While 
most businesses in the UK have board leadership structure that separates both positions, there 
still a few boards in the US that practice CEO-duality. One-tier boards also make use of board 
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committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees. In addition, the board of 
directors is in charge of both decision management and decision control. 
This system of corporate governance is also referred to as stock market capitalism, and it 
relies on external monitoring mechanisms. However, the Cadbury-type scandals1 have shown 
that these external control mechanisms are not sufficient for controlling the discretionary 
power of top executives (Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012a). Managers tend to be disciplined by 
market-based rewards and punished through capital markets in this system.  
2.2.2 German Model  
There are vast differences between the German corporate governance model and both the 
Anglo-US and the Japanese model, although some of its components may be applicable to the 
Japanese model. 
There are three unique features of the German model that distinguish it from the other models 
of corporate governance. Two of these functions are concerning board composition, while the 
other is about shareholders’ rights. First, the German model is split into two separate boards 
with different members. German firms adopt a two-category board structure consisting of 
management or executive board members and supervisory or non-executive board members 
(composed of labour/employee representatives and shareholder representatives). The two 
boards are entirely distinct; no one may serve simultaneously on a corporation's management 
board and supervisory board. This form of corporate governance is also referred to as welfare 
capitalism (Buck and Shahrim, 2005). Second, the size of the non-executive board is set by 
law and cannot be changed by shareholders. 
Third, in Germany and other countries following this model, voting right limitations are legal; 
this means shareholder can only vote a certain percentage of the corporation's total share 
capital, regardless of share ownership position. 
The supervisory board plays the role of outside directors of U.S. and UK companies, and it 
has a limited range of rights. It can only control managers of the corporation in extreme 
circumstances by not renewing their contract or block proposed mergers. 
In countries that practice this model, bank financing is traditionally preferred to equity 
financing, and so banks and corporations are the dominant shareholders. The major players in 
this model are banks, corporate players and labour unions. In Germany, the banks have a 
                                                          
1 For example, the exposure of financial accounts manipulation perpetrated by executives in Cadbury Nigeria Plc. in 2006 leading to over N13 billion balance sheet 
overstatement and profit to shareholders over a number of years and an operating loss between N1billion and N2billion in 2006. Investors and other stakeholders were 
severely affected as the exposé of unethical practice of the executives led to panic in the Nigerian stock markets as investors began to dump their shares on the stock 
exchange OKARO, S. & OKAFOR, O. 2009. Creative Accounting. Corporate Governance Watch dog Institutions and Systems-The Case of Cadbury (Nig.) Plc. SSRN, 1-
12.. Market information showed that there was a N7.56 fall in Cadbury share prices between the 22nd of November 2006 and the 15th of December 2006. The company 
executives responsible for this unethical behaviour, including the auditors involved in the account manipulation were not prosecuted and no sanctions taken against many of 
them under the Nigerian legal system. In fact, the sacked CEO of Cadbury Plc. was successfully able to sue Cadbury for unlawful termination from office. 
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strong influence within firms as they carry out lending activities and sometimes act as agents 
for other shareholders (Vitols, 2005). According to Vitols (2005), German banks, therefore, 
play an important monitoring role in corporate governance, at least when compared with the 
UK or the US. This prominent role by banks is attributable to their importance in corporate 
financing, particularly for capital-intensive manufacturing, significant direct share ownership 
in nonfinancial firms, proxy voting on behalf of their customers, and to the nomination of 
bank managers as directors to the supervisory boards of nonfinancial firms. However, such a 
role may not be in the interest of shareholders as the bank’s main interest is not likely to be 
the maximisation of shareholder value. This is a very important difference between the 
German model and the Anglo-US model. 
2.2.3 Japanese Model  
Corporate ownership in Asia is typically concentrated, with controlling owners (Porta et al., 
1997) who usually have voting rights over cash flow rights. The Japanese model is denoted 
by a sizable level of stock ownership by her patronising banks and firms.  
According to the literature this banking is identified "by secure, long-term connection with 
bank and corporation; a legal and industrial policy structure designed to support and promote 
“Keiretsu” (a conglomeration of businesses linked together by cross-shareholdings to form a 
robust corporate structure); boards of directors composed almost solely of executives; and a 
comparatively low level of input of outside shareholders, caused and exacerbated by 
complicated procedures for exercising shareholders' votes" (Tricker, 2015, pp. 154)  
In Japan, conglomerates, called Keiretsu, are important and the companies that make up a 
conglomerate are linked together through interlocking directors. These companies are 
supported by cross-holdings of one another’s shares. Financial institutions or banks belong to 
the conglomerates that hold shares in those companies. Furthermore, the main bank and some 
other financial institutions are represented on the conglomerate’s supervisory board. An 
important aspect is a multi-directional control, where each company belonging to the 
“Keiretsu‟ can exercise some control over the companies that control it (Rychlewski, 2010). 
Additionally, there is a single board of director that is dominated by managers. Over three-
quarters of a board’s members are managers. 
In this model, the four major players are the main bank (a major inside shareholder), affiliated 
company (a major inside shareholder), management and the government. The conglomerate‘s 
(keiretsu’s) main bank will become important when a company of this conglomerate has a 
problem, with a cash infusion, restructuring plan, or engineering management change (Gugler 
et al., 2004).  The same model is also found in South Korea, where the business groups are 
characterised by controlling owners known as chaebols, which are legally independent sets of 
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firms that are bound together by formal and informal ties (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The 
global performance of big Korean companies such as Samsung, LG, etc. has generated more 
interest in the Korean model.  
Gugler et al. (2004) describe the Korean model as being “a hybrid between the German 
corporate pyramid and the Japanese keiretsu”. The top position of the structure consists of 
the founding family, who can perpetuate their empires through cross-shareholdings among the 
member companies that result in an imbalance between control and ownership rights. 
Furthermore, the founding families can maintain their power, thus control by the fact, that 
banks and other financial institutions do not play a monitoring role in the company. In such 
firms, the controlling owners tend to exploit minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008) and 
this constitutes a serious governance problem. Claessens et al. (2000) found that in over 80 
per cent of the major Korean firms, the largest and controlling shareholder or family members 
were also represented among top executives. Controlling shareholders also selected most of 
the directors on the board (Young et al., 2008), thereby rendering the internal governance 
system ineffective. The selected directors are not likely to oppose the views of the controlling 
shareholders.  
Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the popular ownership structures in the region - the 
chaebol ownership structure - and Korean legal institutions supported functional corporate 
governance. According to Kim and Kim (2008), in 1996, the controlling shareholders of the 
large chaebol owned an average of 23% of the outstanding shares, but actually controlled 
68% of the votes through various forms of cross- and circular-holdings in subsidiaries and 
related firms (Young et al., 2008). Such disproportionate control gave the chaebol owners the 
power to appoint the top managements and boards of their affiliated firms. This meant that 
minority shareholders could not be protected and insider trading was more likely to take 
place. Chizema and Kim (2010) found that Korean firms, which are known for adopting the 
Japanese board-model, now appoint outside directors to the boards. They also found that 
larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have a more significant 
representation of outside directors on the board. This is an example of corporate governance 
confluence on the Anglo-American model, where higher levels of non-executive director 
representation on the board are the norm.    
The idea of non-executive directors has been mostly questionable in Korea, particularly 
whether it is effective (Kato et al., 2007), others arguing that non-executive‘ directors help to 
monitor owner-managers and to minimize agency problems (Kato et al., 2007) of the 
principal–principal form (Young et al., 2008). Opponents of this innovation have argued that 
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because Korea has a different institutional environment to the USA or the UK, outside 
directors would be ineffective in Korea (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  
2.3 Research on Board of Directors  
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 brought into question the effectiveness of the 
governance mechanisms in many large companies. Less than ten years after Enron scandal, 
the world was faced again with the fallout of bad corporate governance, particularly in the 
financial services industry. The consequences of poor governance practices in the financial 
services industry had a harmful effect on many other industries. This was not a surprising 
outcome as the financial industry is a cornerstone of the economy of most countries (Gray et 
al., 2007). These corporate failures have often been blamed on the board of directors, and 
many governments and investors have put the board on their search light. The board of 
directors is at the apex of the organisation and plays an important role in the affairs of a 
company.  
According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004), the board of directors is the organ of a company 
vested with the complex task and power over overseeing a company‘s strategy and leadership, 
monitoring its financial results and ensuring compliance with regulations. The board of 
directors is undoubtedly one of the main mechanisms for controlling a company. It has all the 
powers necessary for managing, directing and supervising the management of the business 
and affairs of the company. How boards interpret their roles and how they operate are key to 
their effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003, Adesua Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012).  
Corporate governance codes, governance experts, institutional investors, and activists have 
long advocated changes in the board structure (Yermack, 2006) that will enable them to be 
more effective as governance agents. The changes include, among others, the appointment of 
independent directors, having board committees that could check conflicts of interest, and a 
separation of the roles of CEO and chairperson of the board (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004). These structural measures are presupposed to be important ways of enhancing the 
power of the board, protect shareholders‘ interest and hence increase shareholder value 
(Becht et al., 2003).  
Boards of directors are of interest to scholars, the investment communities, the business 
world, regulators and society as a whole. According to Cadbury (1999), this notice is 
understandable, given the fact that boards of directors serve as a link between the 
shareholders, who provide capital, and management in charge of running the company. At the 
heart of the corporate governance, the argument is the perspective that the board of directors 
is the custodian of shareholders‘ interest (Dalton et al., 1998). However, over the years, 
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boards are being criticised for failing to meet their governance responsibilities. Major 
institutional investors put pressure on directors they perceive to be incompetent and have long 
advocated changes in the board structure that will ensure better performance (Yermack, 
2006). Their voice has been amplified by many corporate governance policies resulting from 
major corporate collapse. These policies put great emphasis on formal issues such as board 
independence, board leadership structure, board size and committees (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004, Yermack, 2006, Ujunwa, 2011).  
These structural measures are assumed to be necessary ways to boost the power of the board, 
protect shareholders' interest and hence increase shareholder value (Becht et al., 2003, 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). The executive remuneration scandals that emerged from the 
2008/09 global economic/financial crisis were to some extent blamed on the ineffectiveness 
of boards. Over the years the performance of boards of directors has been studied extensively 
from an agency theory perspective (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dalton et al., 2007) and also 
from resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1978). However, some empirical works are available on the governing performance of 
boards.  Most of them measure board performance by the company‘s financial performance 
using different financial indicators (Erhardt et al., 2003, Daily et al., 2003, Carter et al., 2010, 
Carter et al., 2003). It is therefore not likely that a company’s financial performance is 
dependent solely on board performance as there are numerous endogenous and exogenous 
factors that influence a company’s financial performance.  
The interest of the investment and business community and regulators in the effectiveness of 
corporate boards has stimulated academic research in this area. Empirical studies on boards of 
directors are largely driven by the need to find out whether the board of directors can 
influence a firm’s performance. These, however, have been met with mixed results (Daily et 
al., 2003, Kang and Sorensen, 1999). Early research on US boards concluded that boards of 
directors were rather passive and dominated by management and as such had minimal impact 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989, Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Some researchers have examined the 
direct impact of board attributes on firm performance by using a firm’s financial performance 
as a proxy. However, many of these studies have shown inconclusive results (Dalton et al., 
1998, Brickley et al., 1997, Coles et al., 2008). Another group of researchers has investigated 
the impact of board characteristics on the performance of board functions, suggesting an 
indirect causal relationship between boards of directors and company performance (Yermack, 
1996, Deutsch, 2005). A typical feature of all these studies is the focus on some 
characteristics related to board composition namely outside directors, board size, board 
diversity and CEO duality. There are other studies which try to examine the impact of board 
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committees (Dalton and Kesner, 1983, Carter et al., 2010, Klein, 2002), director 
characteristics (Klein, 2002), ethnicity on board (Carter et al., 2010), gender on board 
(Boulouta, 2013) board processes (Joseph et al., 2014, Denis et al., 2012). More of the 
literature focuses on structural factors and only a few on process factors. 
There seems to be some agreement in literature, over the years, that progress in the field will 
largely depend on a greater understanding of the inner workings of a board of directors 
(McNulty et al., 2013, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001). Already a small number of empirical 
studies have attempted to understand actual board conduct by exploring the dynamics of 
power and influence as well as the behaviour of board members and their relationship with 
management (Huse et al., 2012, Huse and Solberg, 2006, Iannotta et al., 2015, Johannisson 
and Huse, 2000).  
Researchers have made efforts to gain sufficient insight into the complex web of criteria, 
which enables boards of directors to be effective in performing their roles and ultimately 
ensuring positive firm performance thereby creating shareholder wealth. In this respect, Zahra 
and Pearce (1989) contend that there is an emerging consciousness of the need to understand 
better how boards can enhance their effectiveness as an agency of corporate governance. 
There is the need for more research that entails extensive fieldwork to understand better, 
document and operationalize board variables. 
A review of the various theories that attempt to explain the operations of boards could 
provide real insight into how to tackle the research questions. 
2.4 Board Characteristics  
Researchers over the years have established that the performance of a board is influenced by 
the characteristics of the board. These characteristics include board size, CEO duality 
(leadership), board composition (independence), board committees and diversity.  
2.4.1 Board Composition (Board Independence) 
Board composition, in this case, refers to the distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors, and this is traditionally measured as the percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board (Goergen et al., 2005). For Gompers et al. (2001), the composition may be easily 
differentiated into executive directors, affiliated directors and non-executive directors. This 
distinction is derived from the extent of their participation in firm management. Executive 
directors are those directors that are also managers and current officers in the company while 
non-executive directors are non-manager directors. Among the executive directors, some 
directors are affiliated, and others are independent. According to Ogbechie and Koutopoulos 
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(2010), executive directors are board members with vested interest in the company while non-
executive directors are board members that have no personal nor business allegiance to the 
enterprise.  
Although executive and non-executive directors have their respective merits and demerits, 
most authors favour boards that are dominated by non-executive directors (De Andres et al., 
2005). It is argued that non-executive directors provide superior performance benefits to the 
firm as a result of their independence from firm‘s management (Gompers et al., 2001). They 
can bring the board a wealth of knowledge and experience, which the company's management 
may not possess (Daily et al., 2003, Dalton et al., 1998). Guest (2009) examined the impact of 
board size on firm performance for a large sample of 2746 UK listed firms over 1981–2002 
and found that board size has a substantial negative impact on profitability, Tobin's Q and 
share returns. They can increase the element of independence and objectivity in board‘s 
strategic decision-making, and also help in providing independent supervision of the 
company‘s management (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Table 2.1 below shows a compilation of 
studies on the effect of board independence on firm performance. 
Proponents of executive directors have posited that a board that is dominated by executive 
directors has some advantages, which include having access to important and relevant 
information about the operational activities of the company and industry environments in 
which the firm operates. Also, their vast industry experience can help improve firm‘s 
performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).  
While the independence of the board is considered a key criterion in the governance of firms, 
there is no robust evidence that board independence improves firm performance (Adams, 
2012). (Larmou and Vafeas, 2010), Dalton et al. (1998), and Zahra and Pearce (1989) each 
found that board composition is not significantly associated with firm performance. Randøy 
and Jenssen (2004) found that board independence (board compositions) is not associated 
with firm performance based on accounting measures. However, in a difference-in-
differences estimation, Duchin et al. (2010) found that increases in director independence 
improve performance in those firms in which the costs of obtaining information are low, 
while performance worsens in firms in which information costs are high.  
An important issue that is highlighted in recent research on board independence is that 
increased independence also comes at a cost – the possibility of breakdowns in 
communication between the CEOs and directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  
A few recent papers also challenge the notion of independence, and document that boards that 
are independent on paper can be ineffective monitors when the directors are socially or 
professionally connected to the CEO (Otusanya et al., 2013, Ujunwa, 2011).  
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Table 2.1: Board independence and performance 
Study Country Time Period  No. of Firms Results 
Hashim and Devi, 2008 Malaysia  04 200 Find a positively significant result of 
board independence when firms 
undershoot target earnings 
Khan and Awan, 2012 Pakistan 10 91 Find that having independent 
directors in board composition 
ensures greater ROA and ROE (firm 
performance). 
Sarkar et al., 2008 Indian 03 500 Find that board independence has a 
significant influence on 
opportunistic earnings 
management 
Bhabra and Li, 2009 China 01-03 929 Find positive relationship board 
independence between firm 
performance for both SOE and non-
SOE 
Kajola, 2008 Nigeria 00-06 20 Finds no significant relationship 
between ROE and board 
composition (independence) 
Bermig and Frick, 2010 Germany 98-07 294 Find that board composition have 
no pronounced effect on firm 
valuation and performance 
Vafeas, 2000 US 90-94 307 Finds that board composition is not 
significantly associated with firm 
performance 
Randoy and Jenssen, 
2004 
Sweden 96-98 120 Find that board independence is 
not associated with firm 
performance based on accounting 
measures 
Dey and Liu, 2011 US 97-06 200 Find that firms with directors on 
the board and audit committee 
who have social and professional 
connections to the CEO are 
associated with lower operating 
performance, lower value 
relevance, lower accruals quality 
and higher probability of 
restatements 
Singh and Davidson III, 
2003 
US 92-94 118 Firm performance is increased by 
smaller boards 
Yermack, 1996 US 84-91 452 Positive relationship between 
board size and a firm‘s market 
value 
Zahra and Stanton, 
1988 
US 80-81 100 Board size was not significantly 
associated with financial 
performance 
Source: compiled or adapted the catalyst, (Terjesen et al., 2013).  
Prior research finds evidence consistent with the influence of CEO bargaining power over 
board independence: Gompers et al. (2001),Boone et al. (2007) and Ryan and Wiggins (2004) 
find that successful CEOs can bargain for less independent boards.   
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A reliable and meaningful measure of board independence is difficult to obtain. Some 
previous studies consider the proportion of outside directors on the board as only a proxy for 
independence. Given the importance of board composition according to the various literature 
reviewed, we hypothesise that: 
Board size is positively related to performance  
  
2.4.1 CEO Duality (Board Leadership)  
CEO duality exists when a firm’s CEO also serves as the chairperson of the board of 
directors. Holding the highly symbolic position of board chair would provide the CEO with a 
wider power base and locus of control (Boyd, 1995). A couple of decades ago, organisations 
across the globe usually combined the position and functionality of the chairperson and CEO 
of the board of directors but now some firms favour the CEO and chairperson as the same 
person. 
In the UK for instance, it was commonplace for leading firms to have a chairperson on the 
board who also doubles as the CEO until recently. While some organisational scholars 
advocate the combination of both positions (Elsayed, 2007, Chen, 2014, Finkelstein and 
D'aveni, 1994), others propose the separation of both positions (Adams et al., 2005, Krause et 
al., 2014). The proponents of this duality role believe that allowing just one person to function 
as the chairperson and CEO of the board will provide a beneficial platform that is not 
potentially detrimental (Krause et al., 2014). For example, the greater levels of information 
and knowledge possessed by a joint CEO/Chairperson will enable him or her to better manage 
and direct the board‘s discussions and agenda (Adams et al., 2005). Studies have found out 
that such strong and unambiguous leadership can help a firm to easily adapt to changes in 
environmental demands (Rechner and Dalton, 1991, Guo et al., 2013). Others have suggested 
that this duality role is more efficient and therefore, a more sensible form of governance 
((Tuggle et al., 2010).  
Because of the recent corporate scandals, regulators and reformers are increasingly 
demanding that the role of the CEO be separated from that of the Chair (Wilson (Wilson and 
Altanlar, 2009a). This demand had been on for over 20 years, for moves aimed at separating 
the roles and functioning of these two positions had received considerable attention (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992, Daily et al., 2003) in the UK, US and Australia. In the UK, the Cadbury 
Committee report of 1992 recommended that there should be a clear division of 
responsibilities at the head of the company, implying that the roles of chair and CEO should 
not be combined. As Jensen (1993) noted, for the board to be effective, it is very important to 
separate roles, as it avoids CEO entrenchment. It establishes independence (autonomy) 
between the board and corporate management. Without an independent chair, a board will not 
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be able to perform its monitoring role effectively (Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994, Wilson and 
Altanlar, 2009a).  
Advocates claim that CEOs become more effective leaders when the two positions are 
separated because it allows them to concentrate on the firm‘s operations while empowering 
the board Wilson and Altanlar (2009b). Kajola (2008) also argued that concentration of 
decision management and decision control in one individual hinders boards’ effectiveness in 
monitoring top management.  Stakeholder theory holds that duality seriously impedes the 
overall stakeholder orientation of Board members (Elsayed, 2007). Separating the functions 
of CEO and Chair of the Board may enhance the Board of Directors‘ monitoring and control 
ability, and improve Directors‘ information processing capacities (Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001). CEO duality may reduce the effectiveness of the board and may create a conflict 
between management and the board (Brennan et al., 2008) and hence reduce the board‘s 
ability to exercise its governance function. Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) found that firms 
separating the positions of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair perform better and 
are more highly valued by the market.  It is likely the benefits, if any, of having a separate 
board chair depends on the characteristics of the firm. For example, Palmon and Wald (2002) 
find that small firms benefit from the transparency and purposeful of decision-making under 
one executive, while “large ﬁrms beneﬁt more from the checks and balances of separating the 
CEO and Chair positions” (Li and Naughton, 2007). 
2.4.2 Board Committees  
The effectiveness of boards will also depend on the quality of board committees that are 
operational. Corporate governance best practices suggest that at least the following board 
committees should be in existence in a firm: Audit Committee, Corporate Governance or 
Nomination Committee, and Remuneration or Compensation Committee. In addition, any 
business exposed to the high risk that could quickly destroy it can make a case for a specialist 
board committee to focus on that risk. 
Audit Committees  
In the USA, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) first suggested in 1940 that all 
public companies should have audit committees (SEC, 1985). In 1972, the SEC endorsed the 
establishment of audit committees in all public companies (SEC, 1972), and in 1978 the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) recommended that its member firms establish audit 
committees made up of outside (non-executive) directors. This is also established in the 
Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 1990) in Nigeria.  
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An audit committee has been defined as a subcommittee of largely non-executive directors 
whose work encompasses matters relating to audit, financial reporting and internal control 
(Spira, 1999). The audit committee’s role is perceived as undertaking a detailed review on 
behalf of the main board of directors, both to free up main board member’s time and to enable 
the particular expertise of non-executive directors to be usefully employed. During the last 
two decades, audit committees have become a common mechanism of corporate governance 
internationally. The audit committee has been looked upon as the body that can check the 
excesses of top management and ensure accurate financial reporting. According to Reinstein 
and Weirich (1996), many large firms use audit committees as protection against fraud, 
mismanagement and financial liability.  
Two monitoring advantages can be gained from having audit committees, namely, 
independence and board efficiency. Independence is achieved by having both the external and 
internal auditors report to the audit committee. This reporting relationship will ensure that 
management will not have undue influence on the internal and external auditors and so are 
likely to be more objective in discharging their duties. The efficiency of the board of directors 
can be improved by assisting the board in monitoring management performance.  
The spate of financial reporting scandals in the US in the early 2000s led to the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a sweeping federal law with broad corporate governance implications 
(Sarbanes, 2002).  
2.4.2.1 Remuneration Committee  
The remuneration committee is one of the powerful monitoring mechanisms for controlling 
the excesses of dominant CEOs and fostering good corporate governance (SEC, 2011). Its 
absence throws up an avenue or opportunity for senior executives to award themselves pay 
raises that are not congruent with shareholders’ interest. The absence of this committee 
according to Williamson (1988) is akin to the chief executive writing his employment 
contract with one hand, and then signing it with the other. The role of remuneration 
committee is basically, to determine the appropriate design of reward structures for 
management and aligning management and shareholders’ interests (Council, 2013).  
To protect shareholders from managerial self-interest, the members of the remuneration 
committee should be independent directors who are not managers of the firm (Dalton and 
Kesner, 1983). These non-management board members are expected to act as objective 
decision makers who will ensure that the CEO and the other directors' compensation are set at 
appropriate levels (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). Indeed, the argument by many analysts that 
the remuneration committee should be composed largely of non-executive directors is 
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consistent with Agency Theory, which advocates the separation of management from control 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a).  
On the contrary, however, Finkelstein and D'aveni (1994) posited that the number of outside 
directors in the remuneration committee has no bearing with the structuring of the pay 
package for the top executive officers in an organisation. To them, chief executive’s 
compensation is not related to the percentage of outside directors on the remuneration 
committee or even the board as a whole. Many authors and analysts have however posited 
that the effectiveness of the remuneration committee could still be undermined even if it is 
largely composed of non-executive directors. For instance, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) 
noted that the CEOs might offer non-executive directors attractive contracts and consulting 
agreements so as to build personal relationships with a stronger sense of obligation with these 
directors. Elson (1992) opined that remuneration committee’s objectivity might be 
undermined when the component directors feel as if they owe their board seats to executive 
privileges, as may be the case with independent directors. Elson (1992) clearly asserted that 
non-executive directors feel some sense of loyalty to CEOs because they feel that these CEOs 
largely influence their nomination to the board. Indeed, some CEOs are taking advantage of 
their position to influence boards to award excessive salaries (Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994). 
Such an action is likely to set back the oversight function of the board. 
2.4.2.2 Nominating Committees  
Having the right calibre of directors regarding skills, knowledge, experience, and social 
capital is essential for the effectiveness of the board in adding value to the firm. The 
nominating committee is the body that can make this happen. The nominating committee, 
through its selection of directors, will also provide checks and balances and avoid any flawed 
and self-fulfilling CEO-led selection process. This will inject a greater degree of 
independence in the board itself. The process of nominating and selecting directors is one of 
the critical factors in determining how effectively a corporation is governed. If the process is 
handled well, an active board will be built, and the organisation’s long-term interest will be 
well served. But if the process is poorly handled, as it too often is, the organisation ends up 
with a weak, insulated and self-perpetuating board that leaves the organisation vulnerable to 
catastrophic decisions and losing strategies (Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2007).  
The independence of the nominating committee is the key to this process. In recent times, 
some US State laws have come up with provisions that allow shareholders to affect board‘s 
composition of the nominating committee by conducting an election contest, upon which a 
candidate is recommended by the nominating committee or nominated at the Annual General 
Meeting (SEC, 2011). The composition, mandate and operation of the nominating committee 
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should, at all times, be subject to transparent and open terms of reference. This is because the 
nominating committee is a key board committee and a key to sound corporate governance. 
Firms benefit more from the checks and balances of having two executives.  
It therefore, could be argued that the combination of the role of the Chairperson and the Chief 
Executive is a considerable concentration of power that could endanger the effectiveness of 
the Chairperson and whole board, with the potential adverse effects on the interests of the 
other stakeholders. In this regard, many codes of corporate governance, including the 
Nigerian code, recommend that the two roles should be separate, and where the Chairperson 
is also the Chief Executive, it is important to have a strong independent element on the board. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) found that homogeneous top-management teams 
outperformed mixed ones. They also reported that diverse teams were slower in their actions 
and responses and less likely than homogeneous teams to respond to competitors' initiatives. 
The explanation they offered was that in a heterogeneous group individuals were more likely 
to disagree, thereby weakening the team consensus. The board of directors can, therefore, be 
regarded as a top management team and so Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)‘s findings can 
apply to the board. The implication of this result for boards is that a highly diverse board 
might not lead to better board effectiveness. 
Erhardt et al. (2003), in their research with Fortune 1000 companies in the United States of 
America, concluded that diversity was associated with effectiveness in the oversight function 
of boards of directors. They opined that the supervisory role might be more efficient if a 
conflict emerges which allows for a broader range of perspective to be considered. 
Boards exhibit a considerable degree of diversity on the dimensions of functional 
background, industry background, and educational background. In their review of the 
literature on the effects of diversity in organizational groups, Huse (2005) note that diversity 
is a double-edged sword for groups; although it increases the aggregate level of resources at 
the group‘s disposal, it is also associated with higher levels of conflict interaction difficulties, 
and lower levels of interaction. Table 2.3 below shows a compilation of various studies on the 
impact of board diversity on firm performance. 
Several scholars have emphasised that one of the primary functions of the board of directors 
is to provide quality support and counsel to the CEO otherwise unavailable from other 
corporate staff (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Daily et al., 2003, Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The 
effectiveness of the role of the board depends on the board’s cumulative human capital that is 
often linked to various board demography characteristics, such as tenure, professional 
diversity, etc. Boards that are composed of directors with different backgrounds may be more 
efficient regarding bringing significant expertise and skills to facilitate advice and counsel. 
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Some studies argue that board diversity regarding directors‘ professional skills should lead to 
more effective service and counsel roles of the board and, as a result, to better performance 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001, Carter and Wagner, 2011). 
Given that, most studies in the literature provide some evidence that board committee have an 
impact on company performance, either negatively or positively, we also hypothesise that: 
Women directors on major committees is related to firm performance 
2.4.3 Quota System 
There has been a concern about the failure of women attaining equal representation on 
corporate boards of directors, and this has attracted considerable practitioners, policy and 
scholarly interest (Adams and Ferreira, 2009, Africa, 2012, Hughes, 2011, Lord Davies of 
Abersoch, 2014).  
According to (Terjesen et al., 2013), across 67 countries, females comprise only 10.3% of 
board directorships, with some of the lowest rates in Morocco (0%), Japan (0.9%), and Chile 
(2.4%) and some of the highest rates in Norway (42%), Sweden (28%), Finland (27.2%) and 
France (22%). The low level of female board representation is surprising giving various 
studies linking women on board to higher return on equity increased operating profit, share 
prices, better governance, etc.  To this end, most countries have enacted the quota system into 
legislation. The quota system since its implementation has generated the most substantial 
change to the representation of women on boards (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013). 
Across countries, the enacted legislation takes a variety of forms but generally consists of a 
set gender quota (usually 33–50 %), time period (often 3–5 years), and penalties for non-
compliance (e.g., in Spain, any board appointment that violates the quota is considered null; 
in Norway companies are dissolved). The Norwegian government was the first to establish a 
40% female quota in 2003, for compliance by 2006 for state-owned firms and 2008 for 
publicly traded firms. Spain established a 40 % female quota in 2007 for compliance by 2015, 
and only for publicly traded companies with more than 250 employees. Eight other 
countries/regions with recent quota legislation are Belgium, Finland, France, Iceland, Israel, 
Italy, Kenya, Nigeria (banking sector) and Québec. 
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Table 2.2: Countries with gender quota 
Country Quota PTFs SOEs Passage date Compliance Date Sanction 
Norway 40% Yes Yes December 19,2003 2006: SOEs; 2008: PTFs2 
(40%) 
Refuse to register 
board; dissolve 
company; fines until 
compliance 
Spain 40% Yes No March 22, 2007 March 1, 20015: PTFs 
(40%) with 250+ 
employees 
Lack of gender 
diversity will impact 
consideration for 
public subsidies and 
state contracts 
Finland 40% No Yes April 15, 2005 June 1, 2015  
Quebec (Canada) 50% No Yes December 1. 2006 December 14, 2011  
Israel 50% Yes Yes March 11, 2007: SOEs; 
April 19, 1999: PTFs 
201: SOEs; None for 
PTFs 
 
Iceland 40% Yes Yes March 4,  2010 September 1, 2013: 40% 
for firms with 50+ 
employees 
 
Kenya 33% No Yes August 28, 2010   
France 40% Yes No January 13, 2011 January 1, 2017: 500+ 
employees or €50m 
revenues 
Fees will not be paid 
to directors 
Italy 33% No Yes June 28, 2011 Not set Fines; directors lose 
office 
Belgium 33% Yes yes June 30, 2011 2011-2012: SOEs; 2017-
2018: PTFs 
Void the 
appointment of any 
directors who do not 
conform to board 
quota targets; 
suspend director 
benefits 
 Source: Compiled by the researcher from the website of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
The debate over board membership, however, is mainly about whether quotas will reduce 
efficiency. That is if the presence of women on company boards will enhance share value if 
women bring an additional perspective to board decision-making; otherwise, women may 
have a negative impact if the decision to appoint female board members is inspired by public 
scrutiny of top corporations to ensure greater equality of the sexes. 
While quotas may help to increase the number of women on the board over time, they do not 
necessarily result in improved numbers of women in senior management roles. For example, 
Women currently hold 4.8 percent of Fortune 500 CEO positions and 5.1 percent of Fortune 
1000 CEO positions (Catalyst 2014). Various writers, however, suggest that having women in 
top management can result in higher earnings, greater shareholder wealth, better corporate 
governance and increased competitive advantage (Bernardi et al., 2002, Wilson and Altanlar, 
2009b). Furthermore, research in the UK shows that having at least one female on the board 
                                                          
2 Notes PTFs publicly traded firms, SOEs state-owned enterprises, adapted or directly quoted from TERJESEN, S., 
AGUILERA, R. V. & LORENZ, R. 2013. Legislating a woman’s seat on the board: Institutional factors driving gender 
quotas for boards of directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-19, TERJESEN, S., AGUILERA, R. V. & LORENZ, R. 
2015a. Legislating a woman’s seat on the board: Institutional factors driving gender quotas for boards of 
directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 128, 233-251. 
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of directors helps reduce the risk of bankruptcy, enhances accountability and ensure more 
effective communication between the board and stakeholders (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009b). 
Research carried out by Carter et al. (2010), (Carter et al., 2003)  show that female presence 
on the board leads to better performance of Fortune 500 companies, primarily through the 
effect on the audit function of the board.  
2.4.4 Diversity on Board 
Gender Diversity  
The empirical evidence on the link between female representation on the board and firm 
performance is controversial. While some studies find the relation between women on boards 
and firm performance to be positive, others provide evidence of a negative link, and still 
others do not find a link at all. Differences is results may be due to the data stemming from 
different countries (with differing board systems) and different time periods Campbell and 
Vera (2010) or the use of different performance measures and estimation methods (Campbell 
and Mínguez-Vera, 2008, Rhode and Packel, 2010). Furthermore, study results may be 
affected by differing ratios of women on boards, i.e., there may be studies with overall rather 
low female representation and others with rather high female representation. If the link 
between gender diversity and performance was non-linear and, e.g., U-shaped, the first group 
of studies would most likely find the relation between gender diversity and performance to be 
negative, the latter group would find it to be positive. To the contrary, a study that covers 
boards with very low and very high female representations and that searches for a linear 
relation between gender diversity and performance would most likely find no link between 
the two. 
In Kanter (1977a)’s seminal work concerning gender diversity in groups: critical mass theory 
she constructs four different categories of groups according to their composition: uniform 
groups, skewed groups, tilted groups, and balanced groups. Uniform groups are groups in 
which all members share the same (visible) characteristic. That is, concerning gender, all 
members of the group are either male or female (Kanter, 1977a). Skewed groups are groups 
in which one dominant type (e.g., the males) controls the few (e.g., the females), and 
therefore controls the group and its culture. The few are called ‘‘tokens.'' Tokens are not 
treated as individuals but as representatives of their category (Kanter, 1977a). Kanter (1977a) 
suggests that a male dominated skewed group consists of up to 20 % women. Tilted groups 
are groups with a less extreme distribution. Unlike in skewed groups, minority members can 
ally and influence the culture of the group. They do not stand for all of their kind. Instead, 
they represent a subgroup whose members are to be differentiated from each other in their 
skills and abilities (Kanter, 1977a). According to (Kanter, 1977a), a male-dominated tilted 
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group consists of 20–40 % women. In a so-called balanced group, majority and minority turn 
into potential subgroups where gender-based differenced become less and less important. The 
focus turns to the different abilities and skills of men and women (Kanter, 1977a). A balanced 
group concerning gender representation has 40–60 % women. 
Concerning group interaction processes, Kanter (1977a) regards skewed groups to be 
especially problematic: Either the tokens are in focus, or they are overlooked, and they may 
be subject to stereotyping (Kanter, 1977a). For women, there are different strategies to cope 
with a token status (Kanter, 1977b). Either they pretend that differences between women and 
men do not exist, or they hide their individual characteristics behind stereotypes (Kanter, 
1977b). The incumbent men, too, will also behave differently in skewed as opposed to 
uniform groups leading skewed groups to be outperformed by uniform ones. With an increase 
in their relative numbers from a skewed to a tilted or even a balanced group, women are more 
likely to be individually differentiated from each other. Consequently, they might then also 
bring in their different knowledge bases and perspectives. As is well documented in the 
literature, men and women differ in a whole range of respects. Women are more risk averse 
than men (Matsa and Miller, 2013, Adams and Ferreira, 2009, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008, Campbell and Vera, 2010), they are less aggressive in their choice of strategy, and 
Table 2.3: Gender diversity and performance 
Study Country Time 
Period  
No. of 
Firms 
Performance measure Results 
Ahem and Dittmar, 
2011 
Norway  01-09 248 Tobin’s Q Negative link 
Lindstaedt et al., 
2011 
Germany 2002-
2010 
160 ROA, ROE, price to book 
value 
Positive link for firms with a 
high ratio of female employees 
and for B2C- business 
He and Huang, 
(2011) 
US 2001-
2007 
530 ROA Negative link 
Haslam et al., 2010 UK 2001-
2005 
126 ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q No link (ROA and ROE); 
negative link with at least one 
woman on board (Tobin’s Q)  
Miller and del 
Carmen 
Triana (2009) 
US 03 326 ROI, ROS No link 
Smith et al., 2006 Denmark 93-01 2500 Gross profit, net sales, 
contribution to margin 
sales, 
operating income/net 
assets, 
net income after tax/net 
assets 
Positive link depending on 
education of women and 
performance measure 
Carter et al. 2003 US 97 638 ROA, Tobin’s Q Positive link (Tobin’s Q) 
Erhardt et al., 2003 US 98 112 ROA, ROI Positive link  
Ujunwa Nigeria 91-08 122 ROA Negative link 
Boulouta US 99-03 275 ROE Positive link 
Source: compiled and adapted from various literature 
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more likely to invest in a sustainable way (Apesteguia et al., 2012, Joecks et al., 2013). 
Women may hence, add value to a male-dominated boardroom by providing new perspectives 
and by asking different questions (Farrell and Hersch, 2005, Burke, 2000). While in a skewed 
group, these new perspectives may not be either adequately expressed by the female tokens or 
not spotted by the dominant males. In a tilted or balanced groups, the combination of female 
and male attributes will more likely allow for productive discussions and will hence 
positively affect team performance (Apesteguia et al., 2012, Yap and Konrad, 2009). 
Resource dependence theory does not explicitly predict a link between board diversity and the 
financial performance of the firm, but they are highly suggestive of a positive relationship 
(Hillman et al., 2002, Hillman et al., 2009). According to agency theory, there may be a link 
between female directors on board and firm performance (Carter et al., 2010, Erhardt et al., 
2003, Terjesen et al., 2015b). Traditionally, women compared to their male counterparts are 
said to have fewer investments in educations and work experience, and this reflects in their 
lower pay band and their ability to progress in the workplace (Chovwen, 2007). Terjesen et al. 
(2009) argue that evidence from the US and the UK refutes such claims that women lack the 
right human capital for board positions. 
In summary, different theories incline us to believe there is a link between board diversity and 
firm financial performance although the relationship may be mixed. Furthermore, the limited 
amount of empirical evidence on the relationship does not provide clear support for the 
direction of the link being either positive or negative. As a result, hypothesise that: 
The number of women on board is positively related to firm performance 
2.4.4.1 Ethnic Diversity 
Resource dependence theory and human capital theory do not speciﬁcally predict a link 
between board diversity and the ﬁnancial performance of the ﬁrm, but they are highly 
suggestive of a positive relationship. Furthermore, the type of diversity should be important 
based on resource dependence theory and human capital theory. Because women and ethnic 
minorities have different human capital and external connections to the environment, we 
expect that they will not have the same effect on board functions and, ultimately, ﬁrm 
performance. Brammer et al. (2007) analyse the gender and ethnic diversity of a sample of 
UK companies and conclude, “Board diversity is inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm’s external business 
environment and particularly an imperative to reﬂect corresponding diversity among its 
customers”. Brammer et al. (2007) found signiﬁcant cross-sector variation in gender diversity 
across industries while variation in ethnic diversity is much less pronounced. The empirical 
evidence developed by Hillman et al. (2002), Peterson Carter et al. (2010) supports the idea 
that women directors and ethnic minority directors may have different functions on the board.  
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According to Erhardt et al. (2003) studying the relationship between demographic diversity 
on boards of directors with firm financial performance using 1993 and 1998 financial 
performance data (return on asset and investment) and the percentage of women and 
minorities on boards of directors for 127 large US companies. Correlation and regression 
analyses indicated that board diversity is positively associated with these financial indicators 
of firm performance. Carter et al. (2003) examined the relationship between board diversity 
and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms where board diversity is defined as the percentage of 
women, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics on the board of directors. After 
controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, they found 
significantly positive relationships between the share of minorities on the board and firm 
value.  
In the Nigerian context, the empirical research presents mixed findings on the value of ethnic 
diversity. Ujunwa et al. (2012) research, using panel data from 122 firms on the NSE between 
1991 and 2008, they found a negative relationship between board size, CEO duality, gender 
diversity and firm performance, although board nationality, board ethnicity and the number of 
board members with a PhD qualification were found to impact positively on firm 
performance. Watson et al. (1993) report that homogeneous board is better in the short-term, 
while the heterogeneous board is better in the long-term regarding achieving corporate goals. 
However, Pelted et al. (1999) found that heterogeneous board results in emotional conflict 
that ultimately harmed firm performance. In Nigeria, according to Chovwen (2007), (Adesua 
Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012), the majority of board composition is homogeneous (male 
dominated). However, extensive research has examined gender diversity as it relates to 
different measures, not much research has been undertaken involving an empirical study that 
examines diversity along ethnic tribes in Nigeria. 
Agency theory offers the possibility that diverse directors may be better monitors of 
management. While agency theory suggests a link between board diversity and ﬁrm 
performance, the nature of the link is not clear. More and tougher controls may be either 
positive or negative as suggested by Adams and Ferreira (2009). Theories from social 
psychology indicate that diverse (out- group) directors may not have an inﬂuence on board 
decisions due to the internal group dynamics of the board. Furthermore, more diverse 
members on the board may promote creative and innovative ideas, but decision making may 
be slower and more conﬂicted with diverse directors. 
In summary, an interdisciplinary set of theories provides a reliable indication that a link 
between board diversity and ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance is a realistic possibility. However, the 
relationship may be either positive or negative based on the theory. We believe that there is a 
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positive link between ethnic diversity on board and firm performance. Given the 
cosmopolitan cities of Lagos (former capital and economic capital of Nigeria) and Abuja 
(capital) are the centre of most companies in Nigeria it would be important to have key 
resource personnel from various key states in the federation as most resources are not 
concentrated in Lagos or Abuja. We, therefore, hypothesise that: 
The number of ethnic directors on board is positively related to firm performance 
2.5 Summary  
This chapter looks at the three types of governance models- Anglo-Saxon, European, and 
Japanese and explores the various empirical studies on the performance and effectiveness of 
boards. It shows that the board of directors performs the pivotal role in any system of 
corporate governance, which makes its composition imperative for the overall performance of 
the firm. The corporate board is accountable to the stakeholders, governs, and controls the 
management. It leads the company, sets its deliberate and calculated aim and financial goals, 
and oversees their execution, puts in place adequate internal checks and periodically reports 
the activities and progress of the company in a transparent fashion to the partners and 
associates. 
The chapter further covers the various theories that explain board performance such as, 
agency, resource dependency and stakeholder theories. Its goes on to look at how different 
countries have employed quota system and how it had improved performance. 
It goes on to review the impact of diversity on board and how it affects firm performance by 
analysing literature side by side theories.  
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3 Theoretical Framework  
Several theories have been developed by researchers over the years to explain the roles of 
boards and performance of the board. The theories discussed in this research include agency, 
stewardship, stakeholders, and resource dependence. 
3.1 Agency theory 
In the early literature, classical economics considered that the majority of corporations were 
not only owned but also controlled by the shareholders who have funding proprietors. With 
respect to the standpoint of separation of ownership and control, this was firstly pointed out 
by Adam Smith in 1838. In the later work of Berle and Gardiner (1968), they hold the view 
that as countries industrialized and their market developed, the ownership and control of 
corporations has become separated. The purpose of this chapter is to give an important 
explanation for corporate behavior and the problems confronting owners (fragmented and 
dispersed shareholders) who attempt to exert their rights over the managers who have gained 
control in the 'modern' corporation. 
According to Arrow (1971), the origins of agency theory can be traced back to the 1960s and 
the early 1970s was a time when more economists detected and paid attention to the risk 
among individuals or groups. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined an agency relationship as 
"a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent". For example, it is widely accepted that the agency relationship 
is between the owners (as the principal) and the managers (as agents).  
The focus of Agency theory is to find ways to make the governance system of corporations 
more efficient so that shareholders' interests and performance expectations are given every 
chance to be realized by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). An agency problem may arise 
between managers and shareholders because the shareholders cannot adequately monitor the 
actions taken by the managers. Subsequently, the agent can have an incentive to pursue his or 
her own interests, rather than the best interests of the principal. Most business concern is 
focused on profit maximization. However, profit maximization fails for a number of well-
known reasons, it ignores the timing of returns; the cash flows available to shareholders; and 
risk, which shareholders may not be willing to bear thereby creating friction between the 
manager and shareholders.   
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Table 3.1: Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumption Self-interest, Bounded rationality, Risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumption 
Partial goal conflict among participants assumptions  
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion Information 
asymmetry between principal and agent  
Asymmetric Information  Information as a purchasable commodity 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Contracting problem Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and domain agent have 
partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle 
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: compiled and adapted from (Terjesen et al., 2013).  
 
Damodaran (2003) explains that, in the real world, managers perform the decision-making 
function with four factors or linkages in mind: shareholders, bondholders, society and 
financial markets. Competitive market conditions place significant pressure on agents and 
managers who may be tempted to resort to unethical means to portray a positive picture. It is 
acknowledged that the profit maximization objective is not always compatible with a firm's 
social obligations, and it usually involves an agency problem which arises when the managers 
fail to act in the best interests of the shareholders and stakeholders, preferring instead to 
benefit themselves (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Differences in the objectives of ownership 
and management lead to agency costs3; if these are to be controlled, the shareholders must 
maintain a strict watch over the functioning of the company. The managers should be 
rewarded for acting in the interests of the shareholders and the managers should maintain a 
balance between the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders. In this context, the 
global financial crisis highlighted the important influence that board composition and 
stakeholders have on risk-taking and financial performance of a firm. According to Claessens 
                                                          
3 Agency costs are internal costs incurred from asymmetric information or conflicts of interest 
between principals and agents in an organization. There are three common types of agency costs: 
monitoring (appointing board of directors), bonding (committing to contractual obligations that limit 
or restrict the agent’s activity), and residual loss (costs incurred from divergent principal and agent 
interests despite the use of monitoring and bonding). CHEN, C. X., LU, H. & SOUGIANNIS, T. 2012. The 
agency problem, corporate governance, and the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general, and 
administrative costs. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29, 252-282. 
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et al. (2010) during the great recession of 2008 there was large reliance on wholesale and 
short-term funding in many advanced countries and emerging markets which created systemic 
fragility. A relatively small shock quickly triggered severe liquidity shortages; a cost that a 
properly monitored board could have thwarted. Supporters of agency theory underscore 
among its positive features, the realism with which it describes relationships among 
individuals in a company (Eisenhardt, 1989). The firm is now presented as a nexus of 
contracts between principals and agents (Steger, 2010, Shankman, 1999). 
Typically, there are different goals and interests among individuals involved in an agency 
relationship. Agency theory presupposes that individuals are opportunistic, that is, they 
constantly aim to maximize their own interests (Bøhren, 1998). Thus, there is no guarantee 
that agents will always act in the best interests of principals. Rather, there is a constant 
temptation for agents to maximize their own interests, even at the expense of principals. For 
example the agency problem as it arises in the Nigerian context is exemplified by the case of 
Lever Brothers Nigeria Plc. (hereinafter “LBN”). LBN is a public listed company in Nigeria. 
According to Ahunwan (2002) the Unilever Group U.K. had a 52% stake in the company. 
Between 1996 and 1998, there were reports of abuses by senior management, including 
insider dealings, shares racketeering and the awarding of supply contracts to companies in 
which senior management had interests (Ogbu, 1998). Sources also disclosed that one of the 
key officers of the company had up to 18 official cars, while a company registered in his 
wife’s name handled almost all of the company’s major contracts. The reports further 
revealed that employment and other management decisions were based more on ethnic 
solidarity than efficiency considerations (Ogbu, 1998). Corporate abuse in Lever Brothers 
culminated in serious financial irregularities. The Nigerian Stock Exchange suspended the 
company in 1998 for submitting an annual return with irregularities. 
This divergence between the interests of the principal and the agent unavoidably generates 
costs. Agency costs are residual costs that result in a failure to maximize the principal’s goal. 
These may be incurred by the principal - through measures to control the agent’s behavior - or 
by the agent - through efforts to demonstrate his or her commitment to the principal’s goals. 
The whole point behind agency theory is to identify mechanisms that ensure an efficient 
alignment of interests between agent and principal, thereby reducing agency costs 
(Shankman, 1999). One of the key elements of an agency view of the board is that outside 
board members will not collude with inside directors to subvert shareholder interests because 
the directors have incentives to build reputations as expert monitors. Board independence is 
critical for boards to function in the best interests of shareholders. The central question for our 
analysis is the impact that board diversity would have on board independence. In other words, 
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should we expect a more diverse board to be a better monitor of management and less likely 
to subvert the interest of shareholders? 
One argument is that diversity increases board independence because people with a different 
gender, ethnicity, or cultural background might ask questions that would not come from 
directors with more traditional backgrounds. In other words, a more diverse board might be a 
more activist board because outside directors with nontraditional characteristics could be 
considered the ultimate outsider. However, a different perspective may not necessarily result 
in more effective monitoring because diverse board members may be marginalized. We can 
see no a priori reason to expect diversity to affect the incentives for directors to build their 
reputations as expert monitors. 
The failure to find a consistent link between executive compensation and a firm's 
performance has motivated some authors to supplement agency theory with other theories 
originating in psychology and sociology (Filatotchev and Wright, 2011, Gomez‐Mejia et al., 
2005, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Jensen (1993) argue that high equity ownership by 
directors is a more important factor in increasing the willingness of directors to monitor than 
independence while Ozkan (2011) concluded from comparison to findings for US CEOs (Bell 
and Van Reenen, 2016, Albuquerque et al., 2018), pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs 
seems to be lower. Thus, recent corporate governance reports (Perryman et al., 2016, Fortin et 
al., 2017) emphasizing the link between CEO pay and corporate performance do not seem to 
be totally effective in practice which could be as a result of context specific conditions. In 
general, we can conclude that agency theory on its own does not provide as strong support for 
the financial benefits of board diversity as does a resource dependence perspective (below) 
but agency theory does not rule out the possibility that board diversity is beneficial. 
3.2 Stakeholder theory  
A useful way to begin the discussion of stakeholder theory is to reflect briefly on the 
limitations of agency theory. In agency theory, the key players are the principals 
(shareholders), agents (mangers), and the board of directors (who represent the principals). 
This conceptualization applies primarily to corporate governance and restricts the governance 
relationship to these three groups. Aguilera et al. (2008) view this approach as narrow and 
restrictive, noting that governance should incorporate wider inter-dependencies that capture 
other groups in both the internal and external environment. Therefore, agency theory, when 
viewed strictly as an agency-shareholder relationship, is bereft of the full range and 
complexity of relationships around which governance should be structured (Clarke, 2004). It 
is advocated that a wider environmental set of claims exists, built around social obligations, 
and also that third party interests impact on the governance of organizations (Christopher, 
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2010). The recognition of this extended group of parties/claimants has led to an emphasis on 
stakeholders rather than just shareholders. 
Executives and managers are now more acutely aware of the importance of stakeholders to 
organizations. The emergence of stakeholder theory, according to Harrison and Wicks (2013) 
was prompted by the growing recognition by boards of the need to take account of the wider 
interests of society. They know that stakeholders can impact the organization negatively or 
positively and these stakeholder groups have to be managed carefully. Much of this 
awareness came following landmark book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach 
(1983). According to Freeman, to manage their organizations effectively, managers must 
become more aware of the multiple constituents on whose support the organization depends 
and attempt to satisfy their demands or build relationships with them. The importance of 
stakeholders to organizations has become a quite commonplace assumption in the 
management literature. 
Freeman (1983) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p.46). Stakeholders have a 
legitimate claim on an organization but are also affected by the organization’s actions. Theses 
stakeholder groups can be internal, external, or an interface group (Savage et al., 1991). In a 
university, the internal stakeholders are faculty and staff. External stakeholders are the 
government, nongovernmental organizations, students, and private citizens. There are also 
private enterprises with a legitimate stake in a university, including entities that fund research 
or make other contributions to the university. An example of an interface group would be a 
board of directors or, in the case of a university, a board of governors who serve a bridging 
function between the organization and its external environment. Hence, stakeholder theory 
helps to define influencing and influenced groups and the extent of accountability that will be 
recognized and discharged by an entity (Gray et al., 1997). 
Groups or individuals in the corporation, whose interests and benefits have a close 
relationship (gains or loss) with the corporation action, are called stakeholders. Sometimes, 
the concept of stakeholders is a generalization of notion of stockholders who can propose 
some special claim on the firm (Freeman et al., 2004). Stockholders are given the right to 
demand certain actions by management; similarly, stakeholders can also make claims. 
According to Charron (2007), it is imperative for managers to observe the following 
principles: (1) Monitor and respond to concerns and interests of all legitimate stakeholders. 
(2) Communicate with stakeholders about their concerns, contributions, and risks. (3) Act 
with sensitivity to each stakeholder group. (4) Attempt to achieve a fair distribution of 
benefits and burdens. (5) "Insure" that risks are minimized and harms are compensated.  
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(6) Never jeopardize "inalienable human rights" or deceive concerning risks. (7) The Value 
Based Management theory pointed out the effects of stakeholders toward the firms cannot be 
ignore and more importantly, there is a positive relationship between the wealth of 
stakeholders and that of shareholders. Therefore, this approach is different from agency 
theory, which focuses exclusively on interests of shareholders. The stakeholder theory 
concentrates on the interests of all the parties in the corporation. Stakeholder theory is 
considered a theory of organizational management and ethics. Under this theory, what the 
managers should do is to not only maximize shareholder value, but also meet the objectives of 
the stakeholder group. 
The assumption of stakeholder theory is that value is imperative and a tangible part of doing 
business. Freeman et al. (2004) propose that stakeholder theory is managerial, and it reflects 
and directs how managers operate rather than primarily addressing management theories and 
economics. Two key questions of stakeholder theory are mentioned in Freeman's article. The 
first question is the purpose of the organization. This is very helpful and useful for managers 
in making them aware of the value they create and what brings its major stakeholder together. 
The second question posed in stakeholder theory is what responsibility management has to 
stakeholders. These responsibilities clarify how managers want to do business. In particular, 
they are looking for an appropriate kind of relationship with stakeholders to achieve their own 
interests. The core of stakeholder theory, that economic value is generated by the large 
numbers of people who come and work together to advance their situation, is in accordance 
with fundamental modern economic realities. In order to motivate workers to do their best for 
the firms, it is necessary and crucial for managers to develop relationships and create 
communication with stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2004, Freeman, 1983). It is widely 
accepted that stakeholders are a significant party in the firm and their interests are a critical 
characteristic. However, in terms of profits, meeting all stakeholders interest are not 
necessarily drivers in the process of value creation. 
The pressure on firms to have gender parity in director or senior management positions comes 
from a broad set of stakeholders, which includes shareholder activists, large institutional 
investors, politicians, and consumer groups (Fields and Keys, 2003). The emergence of 
stakeholder theory, according to Harrison and Wicks (2013) was prompted by the growing 
recognition by boards of the need to take account of the wider interests of society. Jones and 
Wicks (1999) believes that the key assumption upon which the stakeholder theory is founded 
is that the firm has links or association with many stakeholders that affect, and are impacted 
by its resolutions. They believe that the theory is concerned with the nature of these 
relationships concerning both processes and outcomes and focuses on managerial decision-
36 
 
making – to which the interest of all stakeholders has inherent value and no such value is 
imagined to subjugate the other. 
The stakeholder approach according to Phillips et al. (2003), holds that a range of corporate 
constituencies – customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, communities – should have a say 
in the running of the firm. A stakeholder, according to this point of view, is one who has an 
interest in the enterprise and is at risk if the firm fails. The corporate enterprise cannot be 
maintained without the inputs of a series of constituencies i.e. investors, lenders, suppliers, 
managers, workers, unions, communities. Thus corporate governance is an exercise in "team 
production, in which the issue is how voluntary cooperation between the different stakeholder 
groups is to be achieved" (Blair and Stout, 1999). This theory maintains that the objectives of 
the firm should be derived by stabilising the different goals of the various stakeholders in the 
company: managers, workers, stockholders, suppliers, vendors. This theory implies that a 
board will be mainly interested in the performance of the company in terms of pleasing all 
stakeholders. Such board composition should include directors with the right background and 
experience for the effectiveness of their service function. Consequently, both human and 
social capitals of a board become imperative with the stakeholders' theory approach to 
corporate governance. 
Stakeholder theory breaks through the traditional framework. The maximization of the 
interests of shareholders does not mean the maximization of corporate value, which may even 
damage the interests of other stakeholders, for instance, a hostile takeover. Stakeholder theory 
suggests that the other characters should also be considered stakeholders, such as creditors, 
employees, suppliers, customers, government and community, corporate governance duty 
therefore is to balance and coordinate conflict of interest to all stakeholders to maximize the 
benefits (Jensen, 2017). 
From this viewpoint, the central proposition to be tested is that if firms are conscientiously 
undertaking stakeholder management - by giving more voice to women, for example – will, 
other things remaining the same, that firm be relatively successful. Exploring this rationale, 
Dallas (2001) surveys some psychology research considering the effect of group member 
characteristics, such as gender diversity, on group decision-making. He concluded that to 
enhance the quality of decision making, the advantages related to the knowledge, perspective, 
creativity, and judgment brought forward by heterogeneous groups may be superior to those 
related to the smoother communication and coordination associated with less diverse sets of 
people. Dallas (2001) further argues that gender diversity would remain a sensible objective 
even if it does not necessarily lead to improved financial performance. Hence, even if no 
significant relationship – neither negative nor positive – were found between gender diversity 
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and financial results, the promotion of women in business can still be viewed as a good 
policy. 
A few authors have criticised stakeholder theory. For instance, Slinger (1999) posited in his 
work that: "Stakeholder theory discards the objective basis for evaluating business action. It 
provides no guidance at all as to how competing interests, are to be ranked or reconciled. And 
it consequently provides no adequate standard against which business can be judged". 
Accountability is one of the most important concepts in corporate governance. It consists of 
directors being accountable to shareholders, firm workers and other corporate agents being 
accountable to the corporation as well. The notion that the owner of a firm is sole responsible 
for their corporation is questioned in stakeholder theory. On the other hand, what stakeholder 
theory calls for is that all stakeholders are responsible for corporations. Such a key principle 
is not necessarily realistic nor does it work out wholly. Everyone taking charge of company 
runs the risk that no one will take charge of company. Critics argue that various 
accountability with a company hierarchy only makes sense if all the stakeholders have clear 
similar goals. 
Modern companies are characterized by separation between ownership and control; thereby a 
principal agent relationship is formed between the principal and the agent. Unfortunately, the 
interests of these two parties are not always consistent. The managers tend to misuse their 
power, which may lead to unfulfilled promises to shareholders by the reason of their ‘insider’ 
status. The agency cost problem occurs when an efficient monitoring system is needed. The 
main purpose of corporate governance is not only monitoring managers effectively but also 
minimizing agency costs. The traditional way to adjust the dimension of the structure of the 
board of directors are enhancing the independence of the board of directors; improving the 
control of shareholders in order to strengthen their position and develop institutional investors 
(Jensen, 2017). However, these ideas only deal with the problems partly. It is difficult to 
change the level of corporate governance fundamentally. Stakeholder theory suggests that the 
key point of corporate governance is as follows: it is unavailable to deliver much more rights 
and control to shareholders. On the contrary, managers should be separated from shareholders 
who usually give pressure and leave enough rights and interests to other stakeholders such as 
employees, creditors and so on. For instance, one important program is allowing the key 
stakeholders become the company’s board of directors and supervisors by increasing the 
ownership and control of the company (Jensen, 2002). 
The highlight of human capital is advocated in stakeholder theory. Traditional theory holds 
that the owner of firms is the investors who provide capital for firm; accordingly, the ultimate 
goal of company is to safeguard the interests of investors. Here the word “capital” is limited 
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to physical capital, but not human capital. This argument is acceptable and suitable in the 
early era of large-scale industrial machinery, while not appropriate and outdated in current era 
of knowledge economy. The existence and development of the organization is increasingly 
affected not only by the management degree of managers but also by the advanced 
technology of workers. Technology and other human capital contribution to the enterprise are 
far more than physical capital (Freeman, 2001). 
 
3.3 Resource dependence theory 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), ‘Resource dependence was originally developed to 
provide an alternative perspective to economic theories of mergers, and to understand 
precisely the type of inter-organizational relations that have played such a large role in recent 
‘market failures’ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003)p.25). The motivation of those running the 
organization was to ensure the organization’s survival and to enhance their own autonomy, 
while also maintaining stability in the organization’s exchange relations. These were the 
drivers behind many of the organization’s observed actions. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), argue that boards serve to link the corporation to other external 
organisations that is to address environmental dependencies. They believe that a firm gets the 
following benefits from the external linkages: (1) provision of resources such as information 
and expertise; (2) creation of channels of communication with constituents of importance to 
the firm; (3) provision of commitments of support from important organizations or groups in 
the external environment; and (4) creation of legitimacy for the firm in the external 
environment. In resource dependency theory, organisations attempt to exert control over their 
environment by co-opting resources needed to survive. This implies appointing directors that 
can bring their social capital and competence to the firm, which is one of the most valuable 
characteristics that a director can bring to a board (Hillman et al., 2002, Hillman et al., 2009, 
Stevenson and Radin, 2009).  
Social capital refers to a person‘s socially valuable attributes and network connections (Tsai 
and Ghoshal, 1998). These attributes and connections benefit the firm (Payne et al., 2009, 
Hillman et al., 2009). Proponents of resource dependence theory argue that organisational 
survival is dependent on the ability to access critical resources from the environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 2003, Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Firms actively manage their resource 
environments by maintaining external linkages to organisations on which they depend for 
critical resources (Hillman et al., 2009, Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Boards also react in the 
same way, for example by adding a representative of a critical resource to the board 
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constitutes a way of managing this dependence and benefiting the firm. According to 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), after the global financial crisis of 2008, most banks needed to 
include directors with risk management expertise on their boards. After appointment to a 
board, the directors will support, identify with, and work to assist the firm.  
Researchers argue that managers with high social capital can bring information about the 
external environment, other firms’ strategies, and prospective managerial talent to the firm 
(Beckman and Haunschild, 2002, Certo, 2003). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) in supporting this 
theory postulate that different types of directors will provide different beneficial resources to 
the firm. As a result, a more diverse board will provide more valuable resources, which 
should produce a better firm performance. In other literature, this is known as the access and 
legitimate paradigm where firms employ directors on boards to improve their standing in the 
market they represent (e.g. employing Yoruba indigene to the west of Nigeria). Differences in 
gender and ethnicity will very likely produce unique information sets that are available to 
management for better decision-making. This important link is crucial because in Nigeria the 
pool of human capital available to the firm is composed of men and women with three major 
tribes, other minority tribes and people with over 250 languages. Hence, a more diverse 
organisation has access to more talent, more market penetration potential and an increased 
share value. Ultimately, these ties can impact on the performance of the board and hence of 
the firm (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Modern boards are therefore composed on the basis of the 
resources the directors will bring to the board, and that is why diversity has become an 
important board characteristics.  
Another aspect of resource dependency theory is the level and use of human capital on the 
board. The standard of human capital on the board is also a resource that is available to the 
firm. Boards use their human capital to perform their roles of monitoring and resource 
provision. The resource provision role includes a variety of activities such as providing advice 
to management on the central strategic actions. Resource dependency theory also takes a 
broader view of organisational resources focusing on the firm‘s abilities to coordinate 
productive resources that are not transaction-specific (Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Rasheed and 
Geiger, 2001, Xia et al., 2014). Resource dependency theory implies that the skills and 
knowledge of directors are resources that could be used to help the firm perform better. They, 
therefore, have some impact on the effectiveness of the board. 
Resource dependency theory implies that for effectiveness a board should be composed of 
directors with the right background and experience, have the right social capital and are on 
other boards. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) propose a model that integrates agency and resource 
dependence perspectives. They argue that greater levels of board capital (a combination of 
40 
 
directors’ human capital and social capital) not only should enable boards to secure more 
resources and provide superior advice but also enable boards to be more effective monitors of 
the company. However, they contend that the extent to which boards exercise these capacities 
will depend upon the incentives given to directors, with greater pay in stock and more board 
independence predicted to generate increased attention to both monitoring and providing 
resources to the firm.    
3.4 Rationale for theories  
Each of the theories gives credence to aspects of the board’s activity or role. Table 3.2 below 
presents a summary of the three theories discussed above.  
Agency theory contends that an essential activity of the board is supervising management for 
shareholders and that adequate supervision can enhance firm performance by reducing agency 
costs. Resource dependence theory sees the board as a provider of resources, such as advice 
and counsel and links to other organisations, to management and the firm, for better 
performance. Stakeholder theory explores the dilemma regarding the interest of different 
groups of interested parties and it encourages the board to take account of the wider society. 
Among the various theories discussed, the agency theory is the most popular and has received 
so much attention from academics (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983b) as 
well as practitioners. It provided the basis for governance standards, codes and principles 
developed by many institutions (OECD, 2004, OECD, 1999, SEC, 2008). The shareholders 
appoint board members to monitor and control managerial decision making to protect the 
shareholders’ interest. In particular, this monitoring role is supposed to be carried out through 
independent non-executive directors and the seat of Chairperson and CEO should be held by 
different persons (SEC, 2008, Cadbury, 1999, OECD, 2004). An agency problem may arise 
between managers and shareholders because the principals (the shareholders) cannot 
adequately monitor the actions taken by the agent (the managers). Subsequently, the agent 
can have an incentive to pursue his or her own interests, rather than the best interests of the 
principal. 
Given the body of evidence, it would be naive to claim that agency theory has not made a 
significant contribution to the principal-agent literature. However, it does have its limitations. 
Broadly speaking, it does not provide as strong support for the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of board 
diversity as does a resource dependence perspective but agency theory does not rule out the 
possibility that board diversity is beneﬁcial. Also, while the logic of improving ﬁrm 
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Table 3.2: Summary of theories  
 Agency Stakeholder Resource Dependence 
Board Role Ensure match between 
managers and shareholders’ 
objective. 
Managerial control  
Inclusive pursuit of all 
stakeholder interests 
Reduce uncertainty; boundary 
spanning  
Co-optation 
Representative 
Studies  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
Fama and Jensen (1985) 
Kosnik (1987) 
Ang et al. (2000) 
Fosberg and Rosenberg (2003) 
Levrau and Van den Berghe 
(2007) 
RSA (1995) 
Blair (1995) 
Babic (2010) 
Pfeffer (1972) 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
Hilman and Dalziel (2003) 
Davis and Cobb (2010) 
Pugliese, et al. (2009) 
Nicholson and Newton (2010) 
 
Source: compiled or adapted from the catalyst, (Terjesen et al., 2013).  
performance by aligning the goals of the agent with the owner seems unassailable, a partial 
ﬁnancial ownership stake does not seem to necessarily spur an agent to behave in ways that 
an owner would (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). In Nigeria Ehikioya (2009) also concluded that 
his study does not show any link between board composition and ﬁrm performance. Hence, a 
new approach is needed to use the benefits of agency theory to its fullest. It is well 
documented that executive compensation packages should be designed to align the interests 
of senior management with those of the shareholders and thereby reduce the dysfunctional 
behavior of managers; this is typically done by rewarding executives for taking decisions and 
actions that increase shareholder wealth (Abernethy et al., 2014). Unfortunately, the 
shareholders (and directors) may have neither complete information about the actions of 
executives or the expertise to evaluate those actions, making it difficult to base compensation 
on actions alone. Instead, compensation in practice is often linked to measures that are 
positively correlated with managerial performance, for instance market share, share price or 
accounting profit. Given its limitations, we can determine that agency theory on its own does 
not provide strong support for the financial benefits of board diversity hence, we complement 
this research with resource dependence and stakeholder perspectives. 
Figure 2 shows how our research depicts the relationship between the agency, stakeholder and 
resource dependency theories. It explains how the agency cost is incurred by the conflict of 
interest between all key stakeholders in an organisation. It further shows how other key 
influences such as the government, unions, etc. influence the direction the firms go on key 
issues like shareholder value, gender equality, board representation etc.  
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Another deterrent to the efficacy of the agency theory in most developing economies is 
corruption as shown at the base of figure 2. Companies incorporated in any economy differ in 
size and structure. They range from multinational company that depends on funds from the 
capital markets that are then traded on the Stock Exchange platforms, to small enterprises 
with only one or two shareholders. Regardless of size and structure, there is the need for 
checks and balances to regulate firms to ensure they operate in the best interest of the various 
stakeholders. According to Okike (2007) governments are able to manage and control 
business enterprises through the declaration of various laws. Whilst the corporate governance 
legislation promulgated by the government may appear to be quite comprehensive, the 
mechanisms for enforcement and compliance are very weak or ineffective. The Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)(ADB, 2014) prepared by a team from the World 
Bank arrived at a similar conclusion. The Report notes, “The accounting and auditing 
practices in Nigeria suffer from institutional weaknesses in regulation, compliance, and 
enforcement of standards and rules”. 
Rotimi et al. (2013) presents Kpakpin’s corruption model comprising trio (Pressure, 
Opportunity and Action). According to them, the nexus within the trio is the channel through 
Principal i.e. 
Shareholder 
Agents i.e. 
CEO/Manager 
Stakeholder 
Conflict of 
Interest 
Agency 
Cost 
Increase firm 
Value i.e. 
Tobin’s Q, ROA 
Monitoring role 
 (Board) 
Business case for gender 
equality 
Government 
Employee, Union 
Religion 
Ethnicity 
Gender 
Corruption 
i.e. Bribe  
Figure 2: Relationship between Agency, Stakeholder and Resource Dependence theories 
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which fraud or corruption practices manifests and that for any form of corruption or corrupt 
practice to manifest, the trio channel must come to being and be realized (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 3: Kpakpin’s Corruption Model. Source: (Rotimi et al., 2013) 
For example, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is one of government’s monitoring 
agencies. The CAC require that all firm publish all financial statements no later than 42 days 
after the annual general meeting. However, small companies may deliver modiﬁed statements 
and balance sheets to the CAC. In practice, the role of the CAC has remained perfunctory and 
ineffective. There is evidence (ADB, 2014, Wallace, 1987, Okike, 2007), that some 
companies and even auditors do get away with ﬂouting company legislation. The Report on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ADB, 2014) came to the conclusion that the CAC 
lacks the capacity to effectively fulﬁl its monitoring function. Although there is the 
requirement for companies to ﬁle a copy of their audited ﬁnancial statements and directors’ 
report with the Commission, most companies do not comply with this requirement, and the 
CAC does not apply any sanctions. There is no rigorous enforcement of timely ﬁling and the 
ﬁnancial statements of non-listed public companies are not readily available.  According to 
the ADB (2014), “there are signiﬁcant weaknesses in the enforcement mechanism, which is 
accentuated by a degree of corruption and poor record keeping by the CAC” (p. 8). If the 
CAC is to fulﬁl its role of adequately promoting good corporate governance, its monitoring 
role needs to be strengthened, and sanctions that are more realistic applied to erring 
companies. This might require a revision of existing legislation.  
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Wu (2005) believes that policy makers around the world have another important reason to be 
concerned with corporate governance: poor corporate governance also breeds corruption. 
While much of the attention to the global anticorruption campaign has been directed toward 
the demand side of corruption, that is corrupt government officials, the supply side of 
corruption is just as important, and the role of corporations as the main contributors of bribe 
payment should not be underestimated as depicted in figure 2 above. Rules of corporate 
governance, such as accountability, transparency, and fairness, have profound impacts on the 
motives and constraints of both the bribe takers and bribe payers involved in corrupt 
practices. On the surface bribery seems to be cost effective for the firms because a bribe 
payment is often a fraction of the monetary value of the services rendered by the corrupt 
officials. However, bribery exposes the firms to substantial legal and financial risks in the 
future, second, firms opening their doors for corruption may find it difficult to resist demands 
for bribery payments in the future (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Perhaps the most indictable 
consequence of bribery for the firms is that it undermines the firms’ drive in developing long-
term competitive advantages. It is no coincidence that on average, Nigerians pay six bribes 
per year, or one every two months (Ujunwa et al., 2012). The United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime estimates the total amount of bribes paid to public officials in Nigeria amount to 
$4.6 billion in purchasing power parity terms—the equivalent of 39% of the country’s federal 
and state budgets for education last year (UNODC, 2017).   
Resource dependency theory is concerned with the relationship between an organization and a 
set of actors in the environment. Agency and resource dependency theories assume 
organizational choice is constrained by multiple external pressures and that organizations are 
concerned with building legitimacy and acceptance vis-a-vis external stakeholders. Resource 
dependency theory focuses on a ﬁrm’s need to access resources from other actors in the 
environment and describes how resource scarcities force organizations to pursue new 
innovations that use alternative resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1978). Consistent with the resource-based view of ﬁrms as bundles of unique resources that 
lead to competitive advantage, resource dependency theory focuses on the ﬁrm’s ability to 
establish relationships to access resources (Van Witteloostuijn and Boone, 2006). Resource 
dependency theory assumes that the organization makes active choices to achieve objectives. 
A major tenet of resource dependency theory is resource scarcity, resulting in multiple 
organizations competing for the same or similar sets of scarce resources. To survive, ﬁrms 
need to obtain resources from (actors in) the external environment. The focal organization 
will act to reduce or increase its level of reliance on those actors, through actions such as 
alliances or joint ventures. For example, as customers increasingly seek coordinated sourcing 
(Drees and Heugens, 2013), ﬁrms respond by creating alliances to strengthen relationships 
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with key customers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, Xia et al., 2014) and suppliers. This is why 
many of Toyota’s Japan-based parts suppliers set up operations in the proximity of Toyota’s 
automobile manufacturing facility in Kentucky. In Nigeria, for instance most of the top Oil 
and Gas companies set up operation in the Niger-Delta region of the country because most of 
the crude oil is extracted in this region of the country. One of the major concerns of the 
resource dependence theory efficacy in Nigeria however is the large concentration of its 
board composition skewed to directors from the Niger-Delta region which makes for an 
unbalanced board, over reliance in the catchment region and reduces the ability of such firms 
to understand how their products performs in other regions in the country. A more ethnically 
diverse board can easily solve this problem. Resource dependence theory and agency cost can 
be mitigated for by a gender inclusive board. According to the human resource literature and 
the business, case for gender equality a gender balanced board is likely to make better 
decisions than a gender skewed board thereby reducing agency cost and the reach of a 
gender/ethnically inclusive board into different market of interest of a firm is greater (Maume, 
2016, Cornwall and Rivas, 2015, Ujunwa, 2012).  
According to (Sternberg, 1997) stakeholder theory is not a model of, or even compatible with, 
business. Although it was originally proposed as a way of improving strategic planning in 
business, and more recently as a way of making business conduct more ethical, stakeholder 
theory in fact wholly precludes the activity of business as it has traditionally been understood. 
That is because the definitive stakeholder aim, balancing benefits for all stakeholders, 
precludes all objectives, which favour particular groups. Business understood as the activity 
of maximising long-term owner value is automatically ruled out. He also argues that 
balancing stakeholder benefits is itself an unworkable objective. First, since stakeholders are 
all those who can affect or are affected by the organisation, the number of people whose 
benefits need to be taken into account is infinite. For a balance to be struck, their numbers 
must somehow be limited. However, stakeholder theory offers no guidance as to how the 
appropriate individuals or groups should be selected. Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) write a 
great deal about the difﬁculty of resolving conﬂicts among stakeholders and ﬁguring out how 
to treat different people in an organisation.  
However, (Freeman et al., 2004) believes that not only is this concern overblown, it is not 
unique to the stakeholder view. On what terms are we going to get stakeholders to sign on and 
give their best for the ﬁrm? Ironically, we would argue that stakeholder theory gives 
managers more resources and a greater capability to deal with this challenge, because they 
can offer not only ﬁnancial reward, but also language and action to show that they value 
relationships with other groups and work to advance their interests over time. In an era when 
ﬁrms are relying on committed value-chain partners (e.g., employees and a whole range of 
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suppliers in the supply chain) to create outstanding performance and customer service, 
stakeholder theory seems to provide managers with more resources to ﬁnd success. 
Stakeholder theory claims that whatever the ultimate aim of the corporation or other form of 
business activity, managers and entrepreneurs must take into account the legitimate interests 
of those groups and individuals who can affect (or be affected by) their activities (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). It is quite natural to suggest that the very idea of value creation and trade 
is intimately connected to the idea of creating value for stakeholders. Business is about 
putting together a deal so that suppliers, customers, employees, communities, managers, and 
shareholders all win continuously over time. In short, at some level, stakeholder interests 
must be joint—they must be traveling in the same direction—or else there will be exit, and a 
new collaboration formed.  
Other scholars (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Boyd, 1995) have taken a different approach and 
have not limited themselves to a particular distinctive perspective. Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) combined the agency and resource dependency points of view and argued that each 
board has board capital which affects both board supervision and the supply of resources, also 
that board incentives moderate these relationships. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) explain that a 
researcher's choice of a theoretical standpoint depends on conditional factors such as board 
power, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry. Though there are different 
points of view concerning the company, many of these theoretical directions are used to 
support, but are not substitutes for, agency theory (Daily et al., 2003). A study of different 
theoretical standpoints elucidates the need to take a cohesive approach rather than a single 
perspective to understand the impact of corporate governance on board performance. As the 
literature suggests, agency theory primarily emphasises shareholders’ interests, while the 
stakeholder theory takes cognisance of the benefit of all interested parties and not just the 
shareholders. To have a better understanding of board process and dynamics, as discussed in 
this section, there is a need to integrate different theories rather than consider any single 
theory. Such an approach was supported by Stiles (2001) who calls for multiple theoretical 
perspectives and Roberts (2005) who suggests theoretical pluralism.  
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4  Corporate Governance and 
Gender/Ethnic Equality: The Nigerian 
Context 
4.1 Introduction  
Nigeria gained her independence from Britain in 1960 and became a Republic in 1963. 
Nigeria is located on the Gulf of Guinea, and her main cities are located in the southern 
lowlands. Nigeria is divided roughly into three by the Niger and Benue rivers, which flow 
through the country from the northeast and north-west, meeting roughly in the centre of the 
country near the new capital city of Abuja (Gibson, 2012).  
The oil-rich Nigerian economy, strangled by political instability, corruption, and poor 
macroeconomic management, is undergoing substantial reform under a new civilian 
administration. According to the corruption perception index, Nigeria ranked 136 of 167 
countries (International, 2013). The former military rulers of the country failed to diversify 
the economy away from overdependence on the blue-chip oil sector, which provides 20 
percent of GDP, 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65 percent of budgetary 
revenues. The mostly subsistent agricultural sector has not kept up with fast population 
growth, and Nigeria, a former significant net exporter of food, now has to import it. 
Nigeria is the most populated African Country and the 8th most populous country in the world 
and has over 500 languages of which there are three main languages: Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa 
(as shown in Figure 2 page 42). Persons of different language backgrounds communicate in 
the common language of English, although knowledge of two or more Nigerian languages is 
widespread (Ayeomoni, 2012) 
In the post-colonial period Nigeria, like many developing countries adopted an interventionist 
development strategy that involved restrictions on foreign ownership and an active role for 
government in key economic sectors, especially infrastructure and oil and gas. This 
development plan, operating in a context of weak market institutions and a lack of robust 
political democracy, did not result in responsible corporate governance. In recent years, 
international economic pressures from the IMF and World Bank have induced the country to 
adopt a program of economic liberalisation and deregulation (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-
Kwaako, 2007). Advocates of the reforms tout their potential not only for generating greater 
economic growth but also for contributing to more responsible corporate governance. 
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One of such reform is the 2004 National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(NEEDS), which focuses on Nigeria’s commitment to rapid and sustainable growth and 
poverty reduction. NEEDS is based on three pillars: (i) empowering people and improving 
social service delivery; (ii) fostering economic growth, particularly in the non-oil private 
sector; and (iii) enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of government and improving 
governance. This Joint Staff Advisory Note (JSAN) was prepared in response to two recent 
events: (i) the e-classification of Nigeria as an IDA-only country on June 2, 2005, and (ii) the 
authorities’ request for the IMF to support their reform program under a proposed non-
borrowing instrument (World Bank 2005). 
In 2010, the Government of Nigeria and the World Bank launched the Assessment of Core 
Competency for Employability in the Service Sector (ACCESS) program in Nigeria with the 
long-term goal to break into the international market for information technology enabled 
services. The objective of the program was to equip recent university graduates with 
sufficient skills to work in Nigeria’s ICT sector, and to certify these skills. They expected the 
training to improve skills in three competency areas: communication (oral and written), 
computers, and cognitive skills, which are considered “foundational competencies” for 
employment in the business processing outsourcing (BPO) sector. The program induced 
switching into the emerging ICT sector in Nigeria. Given the government’s focus on 
developing this sector and its identification of a skills gap as a major constraint to sectoral 
growth, this policy lever has proved somewhat effective in increasing the employment of 
people with relevant skills in ICT. The switching was more pronounced for women who held 
deep-seated biases against women’s professionalism and it induced their movement into a 
currently male-dominated sector, indicating the potential for this program to substitute for 
confidence in one’s place in the professional world. After the training, these women were 
three times more likely to find an ICT-enabled service job than women who has their roles in 
Nigeria to give them confidence to work in areas dominated by men such as it has been 
successful. This also shows the importance of challenging cultural stereotypes of women’s 
involvement in work (Corbett, 2016, Adams, 2016). 
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Figure 4: Map of Nigeria with Major ethnic groups Source: BBC News Africa 
 
The recently released Nigeria Biannual Economic Update: Connecting to Compete, says 
economic gains were largely driven by an expansion in oil output and continued steady 
growth in agriculture. However, the report notes, labour-intensive sectors remained weak, 
which contributed to an increase in the rate of unemployment and underemployment in 2017. 
Poverty is also believed to have increased slightly. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth, 
which reached 0.8% in 2017, is expected to hover just over 2% in 2018, according to the 
report. The report also notes that the federal government’s Economic Recovery and Growth 
Plan (ERGP) is a positive step towards macroeconomic growth efforts, if properly 
implemented. In recent times, the government’s focus on business regulations has paid off; 
Nigeria has moved up in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business 2018 report; however, the 
report says more intensive effort needs to be made to get the private sector energized. The 
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report says that most of the structural reforms outlined in the ERGP need to go beyond the 
preliminary stages to ensure the economic growth targets envisaged (World Bank 2018). 
This chapter provides an account of the nature of corporate governance in Nigeria and 
investigates the likelihood that recent reforms will contribute or lead to management that is 
more responsible. In taking up these tasks, I adopt a broad understanding of corporate 
governance, which includes not only the smooth running of corporate boards but also other 
key factors (e.g., the financial and banking systems and macroeconomic policy) which 
comprise the context in which boards make decisions. Underlying the investigation of this 
issue, of course, is concern about whether the reforms will have any significant impact 
regarding fulfilling the aspirations of the Nigerian people for economic, political and social 
development. This chapter also investigates gender and ethnic equality and the current 
corporate governance structure in Nigeria. 
This chapter is written in the following manner. The first section provides a short account of 
the context in which corporate governance occurs in Nigeria. The second section examines 
the ownership structure of the corporate sector. Next, an account of the problems of 
ownership and control, especially as they relate to minority shareholders, is provided. The 
following section investigates the role of gender and ethnic diversity in corporate governance.  
Finally, the nature of recent reforms in Nigeria is examined, including their prospects for 
contributing to a more responsible governance. 
4.2 Concepts of corporate governance in developing economies 
Opinions differ regarding the content and boundaries as well as the relevance of the theory of 
corporate governance in developing countries, more so because of the underdeveloped, 
unstructured and informal nature of their economies (Ibrahim, 2016a). Yet, the issues of 
corporate governance, investor protection and ethnic and gender inclusion are critical 
elements in the development and economic prosperity. Wherever there is a weak corporate 
governance environment such as in the developing countries (DCs), economic growth will be 
hampered but as most of them, such as Nigeria, attempt to formalise their underground 
economy, the clamour for tighter rules and sanctions becomes louder (Ahunwan, 2002). The 
divergence of the perspectives on corporate governance in DCs evidently derives from the 
numerous theories of the subject (Tricker, 1996) which includes the following: 
 Stewardship hypothesis with the requirement that directors show a fiduciary duty 
towards the owners of the company. Implied in this theory is the fact that the power 
of directors over the enterprise is derived from their democratic appointment by 
shareholders at the Annual General Meetings (AGMs). In most less developed 
51 
 
countries today, this largely remains a theory that has not and might not ever be 
practised especially in those nations with dictatorial regimes. In Nigeria, until 
recently, the AGMs of many of the large corporations were “fait accompli” (Yakasai, 
2001, Hopkins, 2014) just to rubber stamp government appointments and directives. 
 Organisational theory, which traditionally recognises the peak of organisational 
structure as the chief executive officer (CEO) and that the board of directors (BOD) is 
a mere imposition on such a structure. As long as functional reporting obeys such a 
structure, the BOD will remain a mere rubber stamp of the CEO's decisions. This 
theory draws its predominant application in developing countries due to the 
ownership and control structure of enterprises most of which are family businesses 
and too small in size to warrant the type of corporate democracy witnessed in 
multinational companies (Hopkins, 2014). 
 Stakeholder hypothesis, which gathered momentum in the 1970s reflecting a societal 
fear that the large multinational corporations (MNCs) had become too imperialistic 
and powerful to be held accountable solely through the classical stewardship 
hypothesis. The role of environmentalists in the oil-producing areas of the world such 
as the Niger Delta region in Nigeria is a classic example. Furthermore, the genesis of 
government's domineering investment in the oil sector in Nigeria is derived from the 
theory that oil was so strategic to the country that the whole nation became the all-
important stakeholder. The same arguments were proposed as the premises for 
promulgating Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Acts of 1972, 1977 and 1989 
(NNOROM, 2015). 
 Agency theory presupposes a different perspective of the nature of man seeking self-
interest rather than an altruistic goal and as such cannot always be trusted. This is a 
real problem in any un-transparent developing nation whereby corporate executives 
exploit their companies while the investors become anaemic, a situation very 
prevalent during the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP 1986-2008) years in 
Nigeria (Ifeanyi Chris et al., 2016). 
 Proponents of the theory of gender inequality maintain that gender is an important 
macroeconomic variable and that gender relations can affect economic development 
and growth. The state of gender relations, which frequently results in divergent 
outcomes by gender, is readily observable in several economic areas: (i) job 
segregation within the paid labour market (Kolade and Kehinde, 2013), (ii) the 
division of labour between paid and unpaid labour (Fapohunda, 2012), (iii) the 
distribution of income and resources within the household (Bobonis, 2009), (iv) 
access to the redistributions by the state, such as access to education and social safety 
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net programs, and (v) credit in financial markets (vi) board composition.  Nigeria has 
a National Gender Policy that focuses on women empowerment while also making a 
commitment to eliminate discriminatory practices that are harmful to women 
(NCAA, 2006). However, significant gender gaps in education, economic 
empowerment and political participation remain in Nigeria. Unfortunately there are 
no United Nations figure for Gender Inequality index for Nigeria but the closest 
African country ranked to Nigeria is Zimbabwe which has a ranking of 128 with a 
value of 0.534 while Algeria is ranked 100 the highest in Africa with a value of 0.442 
(UNDP 2017).  
4.3 The context of governance 
The concept of the corporation was unfamiliar to the indigenous customary business practices 
of precolonial Nigeria. British companies chartered in England were the first organisations to 
arrive in Nigeria in the second half of the 19th century. One of first and most powerful of 
these was the National African Company (later renamed the Royal Niger Company), which 
was chartered in 1886 (Akanbi, 2012). Between 1862 and 1912 - the foundation of colonial 
rule in Nigeria - most firms in operation in Nigeria were foreign companies registered in 
England and conformed to the law and ideology of the British corporate governance system 
(Ahunwan, 2002). The first corporate statute in Nigeria was enacted in 1912. 
However, the standard of corporate governance in Nigeria during the period of colonial rule 
was mostly of the British template. It is only in the post-independence period that we can 
begin to speak of "Nigerian" corporate governance. 
4.3.1 The post-independence development strategy 
Following independence in 1960, several factors affected the direction of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Perhaps, most important among these were the dominant ideological 
convictions of the post-colonial period, which stressed economic self-dependence. Economic 
self-dependence was primarily understood regarding indigenous ownership and control of the 
means of production and was operationalized into two basic broad areas. First, the 
government imposed absolute control over public utilities, infrastructure and social service 
provision by establishing state-owned corporations (Adeyemo and Salami, 2008). While there 
was significant interest among foreign investors, especially British corporations, in many of 
these areas, the state prohibited foreign ownership. In most cases, the state did not even 
permit participation by private, domestic companies. Activities in such areas as electricity 
generation and distribution, telecommunications, postal and telegraphic services, shipping and 
ports, and air travel, among others, were restricted to exclusively owned state corporations 
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which is not uncommon to developing economies as government monopolises element seen 
to be key to national security (Ahunwan, 2002). 
Second, the government promoted indigenous ownership in other sectors of the economy. 
Two pieces of legislation were key to this strategy, viz., the Foreign Exchange Control Act of 
1962 (FX Act) and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, No. 4 of 1972 (Odubogun, 
1995), often referred to as the "Indigenisation Decree" (NEPD). The FX Act prohibited the 
creation or transfer of any security or interest in security in favour of a person resident outside 
Nigeria except with the permission of the Minister of Finance. For its part, the NEPD Decree 
restricted foreign ownership by creating three dimensions of enterprises. The three 
dimensions are as follows:  
(i) Businesses solely reserved for Nigerians 
(ii) Companies in respect of which foreigners cannot hold more than 40% of the shares, and  
(iii) Enterprises in which foreigners cannot own more than 60%.  
This classification was based on the perceived financial and managerial needs of the country 
at the time. The second schedule was comprised of manufacturing companies where foreign 
participation was expected to bring foreign capital and managerial expertise. The third 
schedule included capital-intensive enterprises (Yerokun, 1992, Ahunwan, 2002). 
4.3.2 The social context 
Although there was a great deal of optimism in 1960 about the development prospects of the 
newly independent country, forty years in Nigeria is still largely underdeveloped. The country 
still lacks an efficient infrastructure (e.g., communications and transportation systems, 
electricity, water, etc.), unemployment rates are high and social needs far outstrip social 
programs. Also, the country is rife with corruption and divided by ethnic and tribal tensions 
(Statistics, 2016), religious rites, gender inequality, etc. 
These features of Nigeria socio-economic development have major repercussions for 
business, both in the private and public sectors (Akanki, 1994a). Citing Yakasai (2001) a 
former Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria expresses a frustration felt by many as regarding 
problems of the Nigerian economy: 
"There appears to be a certain built-in stubbornness in the attitude of the 
typical Nigerian economic agent. It manifests itself in a high propensity to 
circumvent laid-down rules of economic behaviour and to resist control 
and regulation. It tends to encourage a kind of softness and Luke 
warmness in the application and implementation of legal rules of 
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economic conduct. Hence it provides a fertile ground for bribery, 
corruption, idleness and the contrivance of get-rich-quick attitude which 
are antithetical to hard work and discipline" (Ahmed, 1996, p. 14). 
In investigating two cases of corporate failures4 in Nigeria, Okaro and Okafor (2009) 
identified a collusion of interest between the CEO and the owners resulted in syphoning off 
the company's assets thereby questioning the effectiveness of the board composition. In 
further investigation, interviews were conducted, and 20 employees confirmed that they 
respected and feared their managers in response to conjunctions in the Holy Koran and the 
Holy Bible. They averred that they had no need to disagree with them as the managers owe 
their appointments to God and can only be removed in God's appointed time. This shows that 
although corruption is not condonable, culturally it is not acceptable to question authority.   
Another key issue is that Nigerian culture assures men as the head and breadwinner of 
household who is prepared and groomed to take over from their fathers, while women are 
considered to be properties of men (Omotola, 2007a, Agbalajobi, 2010). Women had many 
social/political challenges from an early age as they were introduced into ‘female' roles.  
Women within their families were deterred as well as  in public, at school and even in the 
workplace from reaching their potential and rising to top positions in a traditionally ‘male' 
world (George and Ogunniyi, 2014, Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012a). This is consistent with 
social identity theory, which explains the exclusion of women from boardrooms because of 
many corporations' replication of male-dominated power structures. As such members seek to 
surround themselves with people who share similar demographic profiles (old boys club, 
same language, ethnicity, religion, etc.), perspectives and values, which are later reinforced in 
their group communication.  
This is linked somewhat to social network and cohesion, which views board membership as a 
privileged closed-group with its rules and ways of thinking. This has led to issues like 
nepotism, tokenism, golden skirt, etc. Vinnicombe et al. (2015) report that in the UK 
following the implementation of the Davies Report all-male boards have  been discouraged 
leaving only Glencore, the last, nominating a woman to its board. The percentage of women 
on FTSE 100 boards is 23.5% with the percentage of women in executive directorships on 
FTSE 100 boards is at an all-time high of 8.6% with 24 women holding such roles 
                                                          
4 Case 1: Five banks failed the CBN stress test in 2009, Afri- bank, Fin Bank, Union Bank, intercontinental bank and Oceanic 
bank. The banks had one thing in common. They were certified distressed by CBN barely few months after their auditors had 
given them a clean bill of health. Case 2: Perhaps, the greatest audit failure in Nigeria in recent times is that associated with the 
Cadbury (Nig.) Plc. accounting scandal, which came to the fore in 2006. This scandal has since been euphemistically dubbed 
Nigeria’s Enron equivalent OKARO, S. & OKAFOR, O. 2009. Creative Accounting. Corporate Governance Watch dog 
Institutions and Systems-The Case of Cadbury (Nig.) Plc. SSRN, 1-12..  
 
55 
 
(Vinnicombe et al., 2015). A World Development Report (Pande, 2012) also show a very 
high percentage of companies with woman directors in some countries (18.3% in France, 
17% in the U.S., and 14% in South Africa) compared to the percent of women directors 
overall in the other African countries (Egypt 7.1%, Morocco 0%, Nigeria 9.7%). However, 
this data reflects a large number of companies with only one woman on the board, which 
shows an alarming gender disparity on corporate boards and may indicate tokenism rather 
than substantive leadership success of women in most African companies, so the extent to 
which women have become involved can be questioned.  
Many developed economies have implemented quota systems or a voluntary approach 
(Terjesen and Singh, 2008) to increase gender diversity on the board. In the UK for instance, 
using a voluntary approach (Lord Davies of Abersoch, 2014, Vinnicombe et al., 2015), there 
has been a steady growth in gender diversity.  In 2015 women make up 27.7% of the 
members of the corporate boards of FTSE 100 companies; up from 12.5% in 2011 when the 
first Women on Boards report was published (Vinnicombe et al., 2015). According to the 
former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Mallam Lamido Sanusi, it was agreed that 
by 2014 at least 30 percent of the board seats in Nigerian banks would be occupied by women 
and at least 40 percent of senior management positions will be held by women in 2015 
(Sanusi, 2012). The then Governor of the CBN, Governor Sanusi, revealed that since the 
establishment of the CBN's only four women have held the position of the director even 
though there were women capable and qualified to fill directorial roles. However, since 2017, 
there are about seven female directors. This comes from a conscious policy of looking for 
qualified women to take these positions. One drawback identified in the literature, however, is 
that organisations only adhere to the quota system because of complying with legislation not 
because they want to improve the number of women and other minorities on boards. One 
consequence of this may be the ‘Golden Skirt’ which means a lot of multiple directorships for 
a small number of women (Terjesen and Singh, 2008, Hughes, 2011).  
Of course, the nature of Nigeria's problems is not only rooted in the attitudes of individual 
Nigerians but are also related to larger political and economic structures and practices. In 
what follows, one of these key structures, the ownership pattern in the corporate sector, is 
examined. 
4.4 The ownership structure of Nigerian corporations 
In Nigeria, as in many former colonies, the government of the newly independent country 
perceived need for greater local control over productive resources, which during the colonial 
period were largely dominated by foreign owners. It was in this context that the government 
enacted the Foreign Exchange Act of 1962 known as the FX Act and the Nigerian Enterprise 
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Promotion Decree (NEPD) in 1976 with the plan to effect a change in the ownership structure 
of Nigerian corporations. Some Nigerian scholars have expressed doubts as to whether the 
NEPD had any significant impact on corporate governance and, in particular, whether there 
were any effects on the ownership structure of Nigerian corporations (Yerokun, 1992). Such 
scepticism about changes in ownership is not completely unfounded as there have been many 
reported cases of Nigerian citizens endorsing foreign entrepreneurs to satisfy the ownership 
requirements of the NEPD (Ahunwan, 2002). It would appear to most commentators, 
however –the various efforts to circumvent the provisions of both the FX Act and the NEPD 
notwithstanding – that the enactments did have significant effects on the ownership structure 
of Nigerian corporations and corporate governance. 
The major way in which ownership structure was affected was through the provision that 
prohibited 100% foreign ownership in a variety of sectors. Many foreign corporations had to 
divest their shareholding to satisfy the new requirements. It was the Nigerian government that 
ended up buying a majority of the divested shares, as there were not sufficient domestic 
investment funds available (Yerokun, 1992). This further entrenched government 
participation with foreign partners in industrial and commercial ventures. Most of the 
divested shares that were not purchased by the government were bought up by a small 
number of very wealthy Nigerians (Akinsanya, 1983). The combined effect of the 
government's macro-economic policy objectives and its legislation on foreign ownership 
resulted in greater government involvement in the economy are easy to imagine. In many 
instances, the government became proactively involved in productive activities, owning 
industrial, commercial and service provision corporations, either solely or in joint ventures 
with other foreign or local investors. In other cases, foreign investors continued to operate as 
majority (or controlling) partners with the government and other local investors. Other local 
investors served either as (minority) partners with foreign investors or through small family-
owned corporations. The ownership structure resulting from government policy can be best 
classified under four categories. 
Type "A" can be conceived as composed of corporations wholly owned by the government. 
Both the federal government and state governments operate wholly owned corporations, 
including four major petroleum refineries (owned by the Federal Government), petrochemical 
plants, insurance companies, banks, hotels and a range of other enterprises. 
Type “B” comprises joint venture arrangements between the federal government and foreign 
crude oil producing corporations. Although the government operates joint venture 
arrangements in other sectors, it makes sense to include this sector as a separate category due 
to its immense importance to the national economy. A key indicator of the importance of this 
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sector is the fact that the government of Nigeria derives about 97 percent of its total revenue 
from joint ventures in oil and gas (Statistics, 2016).  
Type "C" consists of publicly listed corporations. Here foreign investors operate with local 
investors in the industrial and commercial sector. The foreign investors are mostly 
subsidiaries of multinational enterprises. Here the biggest nine most capitalised corporations 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange consist of: Nigerian Breweries Plc, First Bank of Nig. Plc, 
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, Guinness Nig. Plc, West African Portland Cement, United Bank 
for Africa Plc, Nestle Foods Nig. Plc, Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc, and Total Nigerian Plc. 
Finally, Type "D" consists of privately owned corporations that are not listed in the stock 
market. Most of the corporations are family owned. Most them are small companies, owned 
and operated by relatives and friends and lacking business sophistication. Some of these 
enterprises, however, are quite large, with a capital base comparable to many listed 
corporations. Banks, insurance and various industrial corporations come under this category. 
Both foreign and local entrepreneurs operate in this category. 
As the discussion above indicates, a prominent feature of the ownership structure of Nigerian 
corporations is majority (or substantial minority) ownership. Even apart from the 100% 
government- owned businesses in type "A," in groups "B," "C" and "D" majority (or strong 
minority) ownership is the norm. In-group B, majority ownership is exercised by the 
government. In the publicly listed corporations in Group "C," majority ownership may be 
vested in the government, foreign investors (especially TNCs) or local entrepreneurs. In 
group "D" corporations, family-control is the norm for domestic firms. 
4.4.1 Problems of ownership and control 
Traditionally the study of corporate governance has been closely linked with the abuse of 
shareholder rights. Initially, this issue was conceived of regarding a principal-agent problem 
in which the management (agents) of widely held companies were increasingly able and 
predisposed to maximise its interest rather than those of shareholders (principals). It has also 
been argued, especially in relationship to the analysis of developing countries, that a similar 
problem exists between majority and minority owners in which the former are largely able to 
ignore the interests and rights of the latter. A variation of this question involves government 
participation in the economy, where government, as an owner (or regulator) can adversely 
affect the interests of shareholders. In what follows, we will examine the nature of these three 
problems as they arise in the Nigerian context, characterised as it is by the concentrated 
ownership structure discussed above. 
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Management vs. Shareholders 
Although the recent literature correctly suggests that the predominant problem in most 
developing countries is a conflict between majority and minority shareholders, this does not 
mean that the classical principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) does not arise. 
In Nigeria, the problem occurs in and is exacerbated by the context of a political culture of 
corruption and bribery, ethnic tensions and rivalries, poorly functioning markets (e.g., 
information asymmetries) and a lack of adequate infrastructure. In this context, many 
managers and directors have been able to use corporate opportunities and resources for their 
benefit at the cost of the firm and its shareholders.  
The agency problem as it arises in the Nigerian context is exemplified by the case of Lever 
Brothers Nigeria Plc. (hereinafter “LBN”). LBN is a public listed company in Nigeria. The 
Unilever Group U.K. has a 52% stake in the company. Between 1996 and 1998, there were 
reports of abuse by senior management, including insider dealings, shares racketeering and 
the awarding of supply contracts to companies in which senior management had interests 
(Ogbu, 1998). Sources also disclosed that one of the key officers of the company had up to 18 
official cars, while a company registered in his wife’s name handled almost all the company’s 
major contracts. The reports further revealed that employment and other management 
decisions were based more on ethnic solidarity than efficiency considerations (Ogbu, 1998).   
Corporate abuse in Lever Brothers culminated in serious financial irregularities. The Nigerian 
Stock Exchange suspended the company in 1998 for submitting an annual return with 
irregularities. The company’s turnover in the first quarter of 1997 before adjustment stood at 
N4 billion, with a profit before and after tax at N791.3 million and N554.7 million 
respectively. After adjustment, there was a N5.8 billion turnovers, while profits before and 
after taxes were N351 million and N244.95 respectively (Yerokun, 1992, Ogbu, 1998, 
Ahunwan, 2002). 
The Lever Brothers case raises several issues, but most important for our concerns here is the 
inability of majority shareholders to monitor management in the Nigerian context. While the 
Unilever Group, U.K. exercised majority ownership, this did not ensure efficient monitoring 
of local management. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have argued that the effectiveness of large 
shareholders' control of the directorate is connected to their ability to enforce voting rights to 
remove management. In the Nigerian context, this factor is of minimal importance. The 
majority shareholders have the votes to remove local management without much resistance. 
The problem is that they are not able to monitor effectively management as a situation of 
endemic corruption, ethnic loyalty, and infrastructural problems make corporate abuses 
difficult to detect.  
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Many Nigerian commentators have argued that the Lever Brothers situation was further 
compromised by the inability of regulatory bodies to monitor the activities of listed 
companies. It is noted for instance, that for more than one year after the discovery of the 
financial irregularities, the Nigerian Securities Commission still had not commented on the 
case (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). 
Government ownership 
Another problem associated with majority ownership in Nigeria is government ownership 
(and influence). In corporations, wholly owned by the government, corporate governance and 
partisan political considerations merge. Several years of military rule and unimaginable levels 
of corruption have adversely affected the management of public sector corporations. 
Appointment to the board, senior leadership positions and even lower cadres is often based on 
political connections, ethnic loyalty and religious faith as opposed to considerations of 
efficiency and professional qualifications (Akanki, 1994b, Yerokun, 1992). Furthermore, 
coming under the authority of government ministries, these corporations are also subject to 
the rent-seeking behaviour (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1982) of politicians and bureaucrats, 
which further reduces the level of professionalism and productivity in these enterprises. In the 
Nigeria, political sphere those in power have used the machinery of the state both to enrich 
themselves personally and to aid the groups that support them. This was alluded to by the 
president Buhari who said we could expect those who supported his mandate to get more 
attention (Sahara Reporters 2015). Patron-client relationships have characterized all post-
colonial regimes, military and civilian (Herbst and Olukoshi, 1994). Herbst and Olukoshi 
(1994) argues that clientalism in Nigeria is not merely theft by individuals seeking “to raid 
the coffers of the state,” but is legitimated by political norms that view it as satisfying the 
short-term objectives of the winning coalition.  
These problems are also reflected in the Group B (and some group C) corporations where the 
government operates in a joint venture with foreign multinational corporations. Whether the 
extent of the problem is significantly mollified by the presence of private sector actors is 
unclear.  
4.5 Corporate governance in the Nigerian banking industry 
The main issues in corporate governance in any country are the composition of its board of 
directors (BODs), gender and ethnic diversity, the activities/responsibilities of members, the 
roles of nominal directors and the use of independent auditors. According to Ahunwan 
(2002), “the problem with most firms in Nigeria is that the managers work to the answer, 
mark their examination scripts, score themselves distinctions and initiate the applause” (pp 
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240). However, to the stakeholders (especially the equity owners), the pass report sheets are 
openly fudged or at best engineered and indeed, the activities of boards are so varied and 
deceptively intractable that the more critically you look, the less you see. "It becomes more 
elusive considering the corporate concept which assigns to the company, a status of a legal 
entity with statutory rights and responsibilities separate from the owners and executives" 
(Yakasai, 2001). Further problems arise when a comparison is made between the vastly 
unstructured private limited liability companies in Nigeria and the public liability companies. 
Whereas the former is known for its simplicity and efficient management, facilitating the 
provision of capital, encouraging business growth, inducing innovation in industry/commerce 
and creating wealth, the latter is fraught with lethargy, nonchalance and lack of personal 
touch due to the legal separation of ownership from management.  
In spite of this legal complexity, it is often the case even in Nigeria that ownership is the basis 
of power exercised through the annual general meetings of plc companies. This is an occasion 
where the shareholders wine and dine, nominate and elect their directors who, in the 
conventional wisdom and legal fiction provided by Company and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA), reciprocate through accountability as mirrored in their regular reports and audited 
financial statements (Okike, 2007). It is true today in developing countries and globally 
doubtful if the maxim of shareholder democracy is achievable in spite of the normative 
appeal. Particularly in Nigeria, the concept of shareholder democracy is an impossible 
concept in that individual shareholders are hardly able to exercise any influence unless they 
have sufficient and dominant shareholdings. Thus, the conventional wisdom that shareholders 
determine board membership and influence corporate direction is, by and large, false in spite 
of the constant call on shareholders by Nigerian media commentators and the various 
Shareholders' Associations to exercise their rights and power (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). 
Inference can then be made that given the Nigerian context, it is only the institutional and 
relationship investors that appear to have some influence on boards especially if several of 
them collude or act in congruence.  
Although corporate governance in the private sector is of public interests to the Nigerian 
people, the situation of the banking industry is of unique fascination because of the published 
figures and affairs of the financial corporation. Because most economies of the world have 
moved to a ``money and exchange'' economy, the primary tool to facilitate exchange and 
lubricate international trade is money. Due to the prominent place of financial institutions in 
any economy, how they operate is crucial to all stakeholders, which include government, 
depositors, shareholders and the public. While government and the public want a safe, sound 
and stable banking industry (Brownbridge, 1996), investors are keen on the safety and returns 
on their deposits as well as the quality of services rendered by their banks. On the other hand, 
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shareholders are more interested in their banks' profitability, soundness and good health while 
the workers are interested in their continued employment through the continued existence and 
profitability of their employer banks. Given this myriad of interests, it is not surprising that 
the governance of Nigerian banks has become very political and volatile. Management of any 
banking institution in Nigeria is centrally placed in the hands of the board of directors. Given 
the multiplicity of interests in any bank, much is expected of the board members, a situation 
which partly informs their sanctioning and approval by the Central Bank of Nigeria. It must 
be noted that although this research focuses on the banking sector it can be replicated with 
other sectors in Nigeria. The oil and gas, manufacturing, agricultural sectors, to name a few, 
are examples that face similar circumstances in the Nigerian context. Therefore, most points 
addressed in the banking sector can be generalised regarding other sectors in the Nigerian 
economy. 
In Nigeria, the economy faltered and was hit by the second-round effect of the global 
financial and economic crisis as the stock market collapsed by 70 percent in 2008-2009. This 
led to massive losses by Nigerian banks, mostly because of significant investment in the stock 
exchange and downstream oil and gas sector. Consequently, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(hereafter CBN) came to the rescue of eight Nigerian banks through capital and liquidity 
injections. This also led to the termination of their top executives by the then governor Sanusi 
and hence, prosecution of those who committed some infringement. These actions were 
appropriate to regain and restore confidence in the banking system (Sanusi, 2012).   
To this extent, appointment to the board of any Nigerian bank differs markedly from those of 
other private sector corporate institutions. To satisfy various stakeholders in the banking 
industry, there is little argument about the responsibilities of banks' boards of directors which 
include, amongst others, the following (NDIC, 2016): 
 Development of corporate vision, mission and business strategy 
 Ensuring that a strategic planning process is in place and producing sound choices. 
 Monitoring and supervising the implementation of current strategic initiatives to 
ensure effective results. 
 To ensuring that the bank has the highest calibre of CEO and management team. In 
this case, the board must find and groom the appropriate chemistry between the rare, 
critically important breed of internal entrepreneurs and the experienced operators to 
assume governance of the organisation in a succession plan. 
 Being the ultimate oversight body, it must be satisfied that adequate information, 
control and audit systems are in place in addition to its responsibility for corporate 
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compliance with legal and ethical standards imposed by the law and the bank's 
statement of values. 
 Preventing and managing crisis i.e. responsibility for risk management. 
 Must have a clear idea of how to differentiate the role of BOD from that of bank 
management. 
 It is the ultimate decision maker although from all practical purposes, much of the 
authority is delegated to senior and general management staff and in fact, amongst 
some new generation banks, this power has been completely abdicated. 
It is tempting, though premature to examine and present a straightjacket proposal about 
how a bank's board should fulfil its responsibilities. There currently exists very scanty if 
any official reports of what a Nigerian BOD does (should do) regarding their specific 
functions and tasks. The NDIC (2016) pocket guide only provides a ``quick'' manual. 
However, what can be done is to give the conceptual but feasible profile of members of 
Board, which must be composed of people of integrity and good judgement, whose 
knowledge/background and experience must match the strategic demands facing the bank 
(Ahunwan, 2002, Ujunwa, 2011, Ujunwa, 2012). 
4.5.1 Processes and problems of corporate governance in the Nigerian 
banking industry 
There is no doubt that the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1991 (CAMA) places 
enormous responsibilities in the hands of board members of any company. Similarly, the 
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (1991) has put additional responsibilities by spelling 
out the do's and don'ts of bank directors. The primary process of governance in Nigerian 
banks is three-fold: 
 composition regarding competence, knowledge, experience and business network 
 strategy concerning organising the board, running the board, teamwork and tenure of 
BOD members 
 action regarding responsibility, commitment, performance indicators, monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Regarding composition, the usual practice in nominating executive directors is to look for 
highly qualified and experienced people with business connections, initially from amongst the 
staff, if there are no suitably qualified candidates an external executive search is undertaken. 
This is commonplace for the big and medium-sized banks. As for the new generation banks, 
the composition is more aligned with ownership, including family relations and 
acquaintances. 
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Concerning organising and running the board, the process is first to determine the ratio of 
executive to non-executive directors. In the Nigerian setting, the big banks tend to have larger 
boards than small and medium size banks. Secondly, boundaries are set for the non-
executives; thirdly, they determine the committee system and decide which of the committees 
are not privy areas for the nominal directors including the chairperson. In other words, the 
managing director/chief executive officer leads the executive directors and the members of 
general management while the chairperson only leads the BOD. In some cases especially in 
the new generation banks, the chairperson is also the chief executive even though there is a 
managing director in place. In addition, part of the process strategy is the conduct and 
frequency of BOD meetings. 
According to Ahunwan (2002) for the top banks i.e. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, First Bank of 
Nigeria Plc, United Bank for Africa Plc and Afribank Plc, the BOD meetings are entirely 
regular (at least once in two months).  These frequent meetings are completely understandable 
given their network and the total share of the market, while the medium-sized and small 
banks meet less frequently. Recent development in the banking industry includes an efficient 
and enduring tenure system based on such parameters as age, length of service and a 
maximum number of terms on the board. Three of the biggest banks in Nigeria have 
introduced a tenure system of six years with a statutory age limit of 60 years for executive 
directors and 70 years for nonexecutive directors.   
A critical assessment would reveal that both endogenous and exogenous problems became 
institutionalised in the banking system as well as the society's core values which impinge on 
the proper governance of banks in the 1990's and such major problems include the following: 
 Pressure from the environment: There were two types of constraints, namely those 
from friends and relations and those from the underground or informal sector. On the 
one hand, it was usual to find friends and relations putting pressures on board 
members for favours such as business contracts, employment of incompetent and 
sometimes unqualified personnel as well as seeking loans/advances (Lincoln and 
Adedoyin, 2012a, Ujunwa, 2011, Ahunwan, 2002). This is linked to Nigerian cultural 
norms of kinships, which influence business relationships where family obligations 
are used to find employment, or favours within business (ref).  
 The other source of pressure was from business influencers who sometimes insisted 
on a ``price'' from a business relationship that developed between the bank and the 
third-party company. In this case, the agency fee was paid, though inconsistent with 
the bank's core values and practices. The lessons of experience in the Nigerian 
environment was that these types of rent-seeking quickly degenerated the level of 
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corporate governance of our banks which is indicated by our standing at the 
Transparency International which sits at 136 out of 168 for corruption perceptions 
index (International, 2015).  
 Government action: It was inconsistent whilst the government through its agency 
(NDIC) was interested in ensuring stability, safety and soundness of banks, their 
actions usually portended the opposite. This was particularly so when considering the 
massive amount of sovereign debts emanating from governments' direct loans while 
also guaranteeing several others for parastatals (Sanusi and Governor, 2011), all of 
which went sour and lingered for a long time before the resolution in 1998 which 
authorised the payment of only the principal sums. The real issue was the mismatch 
experienced in banks' asset/liability management and the consequent loss suffered by 
the industry for as long as the sovereign debt lasted(Ahunwan, 2002).  
 In addition to the unpaid sovereign debts, many state governments and sometimes-
federal governments too, were known for their over-bearing influence on the 
management and boards of banks particularly in controlling appointments.  They also 
direct a percentage of banks' loans/advances or a percentage of their profit before tax 
to government's priority sectors, often contrary to the banks' profitability objectives. 
Furthermore, it is known that in the past, states influenced the appointment of 
incompetent personnel to management positions, based on affirmative action based 
on ethnicity rather than competence. The consequences of all these actions are 
evident, leading to a vast accumulation of bad debts owed by the governments, lack 
of commitment on the part of directors, the ineffective output from incompetent 
workers, fraternising BOD members, etc. The corollary to government action is its 
inaction to the extent that at the point when either the NDIC or the CBN wanted to 
act to prevent a bank's wilting governance, they never got the acknowledgement of 
the government ostensibly because the situation was purportedly being studied 
(Sanusi, 2012, Sanusi and Governor, 2011). 
 Board/management relationship: The relationship between the board and 
management should be mutual and complementary to flag the right signals to the 
investing and consuming public (Warther, 1998). At the same time, the policing role 
of the BOD cannot be relinquished so as to ensure accountability (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992). A conflict between these two important governance functions would lead to 
waste of energies of the board and management and lead to operational and tactical 
problems. A rivalry may develop between the chairperson and managing director, 
between board and management as well as between executive directors and other 
directors whereby the executives see the non-executives as inter-loggers rather than 
65 
 
teammates and confidants. All these rivalries would lead to as many divergent 
opinions and behaviours as there are camps. This was the case in state-owned banks 
in the 1990's and continued until the year 2000 even though such banks have been 
completely privatised (Yakasai, 2001). 
 Insider dealings: In banking, a major component in the balance sheet is the 
loans/advances portfolio, and the occurrence of reckless approvals can easily lead to 
problematic governance by the board. By the provisions of Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID), Section 18(9) (FGN, 1991), bank directors 
are expected to declare to other colleagues on the board, their direct or indirect 
interests in any credit facilities being granted. The BOFID provision is to forestall 
conflict of personal interest with that of the bank. According to (Lincoln and 
Adedoyin, 2012a), there is no longer controversy regarding the bitter lessons of the 
1990s from the Nigerian banking industry when bank directors influenced the 
approval of credit facilities to their private and connected companies without 
declaring their interests and worse still with the expectation of defaulting in payment. 
Unfortunately, this is still the practice today. Furthermore, several companies were 
hurriedly floated by Chief Executives of some new generation banks for the primary 
purpose of passing several bank businesses through such enterprises (Okike, 2007). 
The consequence of all these was that in banks with very fragile governance 
processes and little or absent checks and balances, widespread distress ensued, the 
cost of which is enormous from the perspective of public finance. 
 The quality of bank directors: Literature suggests a correlation between the quality of 
directors and the board performance (Yermack, 1996, Lückerath-Rovers, 2013, 
Ujunwa, 2012, Carter et al., 2007, Carter et al., 2003). During the banking boom of 
the post-Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria, it was fashionable and 
rewarding to be called a bank director. Moreover, the government which then 
controlled the shareholding of the big players used the appointment of bank directors 
for patronage (Ujunwa, 2011, Ujunwa et al., 2012). The law stipulates that bank 
managers should be people of unquestionable integrity, knowledgeable with a 
considerable degree of experience in their professions and committed to excellence 
(Ahunwan, 2002, NDIC, 2016). Evidence from the industry of cronyism in 
appointments revealed that “unfit'' persons were appointed to boards of banks. Apart 
from the fact that they did not possess the analytical background, even where they 
were professionally sound on paper, the society was to learn very belatedly through 
their professional misconduct, about their lack of integrity despite the so-called 
quality control via their appointment sanctioning by the Apex institution i.e. the 
CBN. The consequence was the directors' lack of capacity to contribute to board and 
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board committee meetings, and at occasions when they did, such contributions were 
either pedestrian, below par or not relevant at all. These had a further consequence on 
the quality issues of governance and leadership by the board, a situation that further 
worsened the remaining fragile reputation of bank directors irrespective of their 
boards. 
4.6 Gender and board diversity  
There is agreement among stakeholders in various countries around the world that board 
diversity leads to transparency and improved corporate governance practice (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012, Adesua Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012, Ahunwan, 2002). Many countries in 
trying to improve the number of women in top management positions and board level roles 
have introduced various forms of affirmative action, legislations and quotas (Terjesen and 
Singh, 2008, Ujunwa et al., 2012, Vinnicombe et al., 2015). For example, the Davies Report 
(2014) and Cranfield report (2015) highlight the significant role women play in board 
diversity (Lord Davies of Abersoch, 2014, Vinnicombe et al., 2015) and plans to increase 
gender diversity on the corporate board further. Even more recently, the Hampton-Alexander 
Review 2016 showed that the UK have come a long way since 2011 when women held only 
12.5% of board positions in the FTSE 100, compared with 27.7% of women on FTSE 100 
boards today. Also, legislation enacted in Norway in 2008 required all listed companies must 
ensure that at least 40 percent of their board of directors are women or face dissolution 
(Machold et al., 2013). In addition the Spanish government in a bid to promote women on 
boards enacted a new law requiring companies to increase the number of female directors to 
40 percent by 2015 (Terjesen et al., 2015a) however, women’s presence in economic 
decision-making in Spain shows an extremely slow and small increase. In 2015, women only 
represented 17 per cent of corporate members of the publicly listed companies, below the EU-
28 average of 21 per cent. This underrepresentation is mostly because gender quotas in the 
economic sphere in Spain have been advanced through weaker policy measures than those 
adopted in the case of electoral quotas (Lombardo 2016). 
 While there is support in the academic literature about enhanced gender diversity, the use of 
quota systems and their effect is questionable. For example, Mychasuk, as cited by Lincoln 
and Adedoyin (2012a), casts doubts on the effectiveness of quotas in helping women climb 
the corporate ladder. Consequently quotas may help increase the number of women on the 
board over time, they do not necessarily result in improved numbers of women in senior 
management roles (Huse et al., 2012).  
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While women in Nigeria are regarded as independent beings, they are not well represented on 
decision making panels. However, when women make around 70 percent of consumer 
purchasing decisions then being  able to connect with the female workforce and consumer 
base can afford more opportunities for firms to understand their customer base and drivers of 
the decision-making process (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) so there is a business case for 
women’s involvement. Various writers suggest that having women in top management can 
result in higher earnings and greater shareholder value and improved corporate governance 
and increased competitive advantage (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, Terjesen et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, research in the UK shows that having at least one female on the board of 
directors helps reduce the risk of bankruptcy, enhance accountability and ensure more 
efficient communication between the board and stakeholders (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009a).  
Research carried out by Carter et al. (2010) show that female presence on the board leads to 
better performance of Fortune 500 companies, primarily through the effect on the board's 
audit function. Empirical research carried shows companies with more women on their boards 
outperform with a 42 percent return on sales, 66 percent return on invested capital and a 53 
percent return on equity (Carter and Wagner, 2011). Evidence suggests that boards with better 
gender balance pay more attention to audit, risk oversight and control. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) suggest that women give more attention to monitoring firms and appear to be better at 
explicitly identifying criteria for measuring and monitoring the implementation of corporate 
strategy as compared to all male boards. Also, they play a more active role in setting the 
strategic direction and weighing long-term priorities of the company (Nielsen and Huse, 
2010, Campbell and Vera, 2010). The main impact includes greater attendance and better 
board monitoring and increased diversity in the company's top management team (Post and 
Byron, 2015, Erhardt et al., 2003, Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012a). 
4.6.1 Cooperate Governance in Nigeria and gender discrimination 
There is evidence in the academic literature to suggest that effective corporate governance 
strategies positively impact on shareholders and the broader society. This is of vital 
importance especially in a country such as Nigeria where prevalent socio-economic 
turbulence coupled with an endemic culture of bad governance from both corporate and 
public entities has led to a widespread custom of unethical conduct (Ujunwa et al., 2012, 
Okike, 2007). This state of affairs has resulted in numerous corporate scandals affecting all 
investors and stakeholders. For example, the exposure of financial accounts manipulation 
perpetrated by executives Cadbury Nigeria Plc in 2006 leading to over N13 billion balance 
sheet overstatement and profit to shareholders over some years was in reality associated with 
an operating loss between N1billion and N2billion in 2006 (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008). 
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Investors and other stakeholders were severely affected as the exposé of unethical practice of 
the executives led to panic in the Nigerian stock markets as investors began to dump their 
shares on the stock exchange (Chukwunedu and Okafor, 2011). The market information 
showed that there was a N7.56 fall in Cadbury stock prices between the 22nd of November 
2006 and the 15th of December 2006. The company executives responsible, including the 
auditors involved in the account manipulation were not prosecuted and no sanctions taken 
against many of them under the Nigerian legal system. In fact, the sacked CEO of Cadbury 
Plc was successfully able to sue Cadbury for unlawful termination from office (Chukwunedu 
and Okafor, 2011, Okaro and Okafor, 2009). 
Such corporate scandals are further aggravated by the prevalent culture of institutionalised 
bribery and corruption in Nigeria. This culture has extended to the business sphere and 
MNC's operating subsidiaries in Nigeria are obligated to participate in the culture of 
corruption that exists within the country. The situation is worsened by recorded incidents 
where representatives of foreign companies have been exposed for exploiting the system of 
bribery and corruption in securing government contracts. For example, the N21 billion bribe 
offered by Halliburton's subsidiary, Kellogg Brown and Root, to government officials so as to 
ensure the continued existence of the Nation's liquefied natural gas plant in Bonney (Lincoln 
and Adedoyin, 2012a).The implications of such systematic unethical practices have profound 
effects on the economy as the cost of doing business in Nigeria and the associated risk 
involved remains high. Various policy initiatives in Nigeria highlight a commitment to 
removing gender discrimination and guaranteeing equal access to political, social and 
economic wealth creation opportunities for both sexes. As a member of the United Nations, 
Nigeria has ratified various international agreements, which have emphasised the adoption of 
mechanisms needed to eliminate gender discrimination in national and state statutes, 
customary and religious law. Also, in recognition of the unique role played by women, a 
National Gender Policy was developed in 2006 which aims to ‘build a just society devoid of 
discrimination and harness the full potential of all social groups regardless of sex or 
circumstances' (Chovwen, 2007). In-spite of such open commitment to equality the practical 
situation is different, and discriminatory traditions, customs sexual stereotyping of social 
roles and cultural prejudices continue to militate against the enjoyment of rights and full 
participation of women in national development (NCAA, 2016). Nigeria is a highly 
patriarchal society, and men still dominate all spheres of women's lives, and women are 
considered to be in a subordinate position to men (Chovwen, 2007). 
Women in Nigeria form an underclass and lack equality of opportunity both concerning their 
contributions to economic development and benefits received from it. They are confronted 
with a host of challenges due to systematic pervasive and deeply entrenched discriminatory 
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practices coupled with the practical impact on behaviour and outcomes of complex social 
institutions and formal and informal rules that reflect kinship patterns, constitutional laws and 
policies (Nigeria, 2012). 
Nigeria is some way short of  gender parity as evidence suggests Nigeria is ranked 79 out of 
86 in the 2014 Social Institutions and Gender Index (Branisa et al., 2014). The attitude 
towards women can be regarded as a traditional African attitude, which saps women's 
initiation in Nigeria. Also, access to equal opportunities between men and women are often 
hampered by socio-traditional constraints, religion, unemployment as well as the never-
ending household chores and responsibilities to which women are bound (Chovwen, 2007, 
Udegbe and Udegbe, 2003). Women are subjected to repressive poverty policies and are 
considered to be weak economic agents due to lack of employment opportunities, access to 
financial resources and lack of assets and property, legal discrimination, socio-cultural and 
religious issues (Woldie and Adersua, 2004, Aluko and Amidu, 2006). The Nigerian labour 
market is gendered, with women reported to earn consistently less than their male 
counterparts, in some cases, well-educated women are reported to earn less than men who 
have lower qualifications (Woldie and Adersua, 2004). According to the World Economic 
Forum's gender gap report 2017, Nigeria ranks 122 out of 144 for the overall gender gap in 
the economy. Kenya ranked 96, South Africa 19 (Weforum, 2015). This state of affairs is 
confirmed by Okpara (2006) who identifies significant pay gaps between male and female 
managers within the banking sector.  
4.6.2 Barriers to Gender and board diversity in Nigeria 
There is evidence to suggest a significant correlation between the number of women on 
boards and financial performance (Carter et al., 2007, Carter et al., 2010, Lord Davies of 
Abersoch, 2014, Vinnicombe et al., 2015). Failure of any firm or economy to maximise the 
full potential and talents of its entire human resource, including women, results in limited 
performance. 
Consequently, tapping into the underutilised pool of female talent at board level is vital if 
corporations in Nigeria are to be competitive and respond to rapidly changing expectations 
and market demands. More men than women feed through the corporate pipeline to the top 
executive levels, and Nigerian women are sparsely represented in corporate boardrooms. 
Some of the reasons for the disproportionate number of men on corporate boards stems from 
the fact that men in Nigeria often tend to occupy the senior managerial positions deemed a 
prerequisite for board membership. Cultural views and values as to women's participation in 
economic activities are contributory factors which account for the lower numbers of women 
in employment or executive positions (Kaufman, 2000, Norris and Inglehart, 2001). Social 
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norms about the role of the sexes in business circles also impact women's employment 
outcomes and their progression (Chovwen, 2007, Mordi et al., 2010). The supply challenge is 
connected to women's double shift as wives, mothers and career women, as well as the higher 
geographical mobility demanded at higher executive levels. 
Women tend to have different needs and orientation to work (Burgess and Tharenou, 2000), 
and they are more willing to move to new jobs that promise more fun and fulfilment 
(Chovwen, 2007). Studies have shown that despite the growing evidence that firms with high 
numbers of women executives tend to outperform their industry (Neck, 2015), women 
continue to leave their corporate positions and more women than men are leaving 
corporations (Mulcahy and Linehan, 2014). According to Neck (2015) in a research of 
finance sector in Australia, he opines that the decision of women to leave is related to be a 
combination of frustration, change and choice. Most women experience some form of 
frustration with her job, but this alone was not enough to cause a decision to leave. Women 
tend to leave at a time when they experienced some form of change - personally or seeking 
change in her life - at which time she considers her options. Choice was also important. It 
seems women have the option of leaving a senior role for a lesser paying one, or for a 
position with more flexibility – or even not to work at all (Neck, 2015). Nigerian women are 
reported to avoid promotion to executive positions if these involve working anti-social hours 
or frequent travel away from their families (NCAA, 2016). This is not surprising as Nigerian 
women endure the most of household chores and care responsibilities. To bring about real and 
practical change in this area, there is a need for a cultural shift in many corporations in 
Nigeria and in the home. Self-regulation or voluntary business-led strategies are largely vital 
to improving the situation and increasing the number of women reaching top executive and 
board positions. However, this may prove difficult in a country like Nigeria with weak and 
ineffective legal, regulatory systems and lack of accountability and transparency. 
Consequently, it seems more appropriate to adopt mandatory requirements like those passed 
in Norway and Spain. There is a need to ensure that selection of women on boards is based on 
merit and not tokenism (Kanter, 1977b). Women should be selected to reflect board strength 
and weaknesses and because they have the required skills and experience to do an effective 
job (Carter and Wagner, 2011). 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) advocates for the inclusion of more women in top 
executive positions and the importance of gender diversity in board positions. Statistics from 
the CBN shows that women occupy 27 percent of senior management positions and 15 
percent of board seats (All Africa, 2012). In a bid to deal with the gender imbalance, the CBN 
has set a mandatory target requirement through the Banker's Committee; the goal is said to 
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increase the number of women on the boards and ensure that women hold 40 percent of top 
management positions and 30 percent of board seats by 2014. Many corporations in Nigeria 
have set up committees tasked with oversight of the CBN Directive in a bid to ensure that 
they can meet the target and address the gender imbalance in their organisations. The CBN is 
also encouraging corporations to make sure that they monitor and report on the number of 
women and include in their annual report a summary of how they have complied with the 
policy initiative. Four years after the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) directed that women 
occupy 40 per cent of top management positions, and 30 per cent board positions across 
banks from 2014; only 22.3 per cent of women have attained that according to the Daily 
Trust. 
4.7 Ethnicity in Nigeria 
Between 1967 and 1970, a civil war ravaged Nigeria's eastern region after a failed attempted 
split by the Igbo people to become the "Republic of Biafra"(Horowitz, 1985, Osaghae and 
Suberu, 2005). In the years since the ethnic-motivated massacre and consequent bloody civil 
war, ethnicity and abuse of fundamental rights and freedom continue unabated. The 
permanent state of militarism that lasted for more than three decades in Nigeria worsens the 
situation. Even now, the ethnic segregation, sectionalism, and bitterness resulting from the 
civil war remain (Orji, 2001). It has become a way of life. 
Ethnicity refers to an adopted cultural and physical characteristic used to categorise people 
into groups considered to be significantly different from others (Lee, 1993). Defined as a 
subgroup that shares a common ancestry, history, or culture, ethnicity is determined by some 
factors: geographic origins, family patterns, language, values, cultural norms, religion, 
literature, music, dietary patterns, gender roles, and employment pattern (Kittles and Weiss, 
2003). Often, an ethnic group is oppressed, exploited, marginalised, or treated unfairly by 
leaders from the ruling ethnic groups politically, economically, or in social position. 
Resentment to such disadvantage, the resultant desire for justice and an ensuing struggle to 
have ethnically manifested wrongs righted is not ethnicity. 
The problems that result from the ethnic divide in Nigeria have been of immense concern to 
Nigerians both at home and away. Douglas as cited in (Orji 2001) outlines the theory of 
scapegoatism, which is the doctrine that a particular geopolitical group is responsible for the 
political problems of Nigeria whereas another group has been, at best, the victim of deliberate 
marginalization by the dominant group (Orji, 2001). 
The on-going agitations by various ethnic groups are a direct result of what has widely 
became known in Nigerian lexicon as "marginalisation." The Hausa/Fulani of the North 
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complain about exclusion in the areas of education and economic development. The Igbo are 
arguing that they are marginalised in almost every aspect of national endeavour, including 
political, military, appointments and promotions in the civil service, as well as economic and 
social development. The Igbo also believe all agreements after the civil war in 1970 about 
Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation program have not been met. The Yoruba 
people are displeased, among other things, with the early retirement of their qualified and 
experienced nationals from the civil services during the military dictatorships. The South-
South, which comprises the oil-rich states of Nigeria, are pushing for full control of their 
natural resources (Ukiwo, 2003). 
Nigeria is an interesting setting in which to study board diversity in the context of an 
emerging market because Nigerian society is culturally diverse. The Nigerian society 
comprises of more than 200 ethnic groups divided along three prominent groups, namely, 
Hausa, Yoruba and Igbos. 
4.7.1 Ethnicity and corporate governance 
The fundamental law that guides the operations of companies in Nigeria is the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. It clearly specifies the duties and responsibilities of 
directors and recognises the board of directors as the most significant body that can ensure 
good corporate governance practices in a firm. The CAMA 1990 requires every private 
company registered in Nigeria to have at least two directors on its Board (Kajola, 2008). The 
directors have a statutory duty to act at all times in what they believe to be the best interests 
of the firm as a whole so as to preserve its assets, further its business and promote the 
purposes for which the company is formed (Okike, 2007). They must prepare financial 
statements, which reflect a true and fair view of the company’s affairs during the fiscal year 
and must be presented to shareholders for their approval at the annual general meeting 
(AGM). 
The directors must also prepare a director’s report providing an overview of the company’s 
development, its primary duties during the year and any significant changes in those 
activities. These provisions are aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of boards and their 
accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders. An interesting thing about boards in 
Nigeria is the degree of diversity arising from the need to reflect a national character. In 
Nigeria, the agitation for even and fair distribution of state resources amongst the various 
ethnic groups transformed into the entrenchment in the constitution of the country the Federal 
Character concept. The concept implies that appointments in government organisations and 
institutions should reflect the diversity of the country as a whole, so all sections should be 
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represented. Federal character and quota system in Nigeria is similar to the affirmative action 
policy in America (Sowell, 2004).  
The spirit of Federal Character implies the composition of the government or any of its 
Bureau and the conduct of its affairs must be done in a way as to display the federal character 
of Nigeria and the importance of promoting national unity. It must also command national 
loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of individuals from a few ethnic 
groups in that government or any of its agencies. This should also be extended to the states of 
the country (Ekeh and Osaghae, 1989). This concept has also filtered into the private sector 
even though the constitution does not demand it (Adamolekun and Kincaid, 1991).  The 
importance of valid and effective enactment of federal character in government nominations 
to reflect the diversity of a multicultural, multilingual, multi-religious Nigeria’s national 
development cannot be exaggerated. It is imperative, particularly, in a diverse society such as 
Nigeria, that all inhabitants feel that they have an equal voice, representation and 
involvement. No one or group of citizens should feel marginalised. The sectional polarisation 
has in recent times manifested itself in what is now known as ―ethnic militias that have led 
to several social unrests in the country (Imobighe, 2003). These groups emerged to protect 
their collective ethnic or regional interests.   
The adverse effect of Federal Character is the promotion of mediocrity or neglect of merit in 
board appointments (Gberevbie and Ibietan, 2013). This is because professionals and 
experienced individuals could be overlooked because there is more of their kind in one part of 
the country than the other. In addition, ethnicity and religion are two issues that have also 
played dominant roles in the way of life and governance in Nigeria and Africa in general. The 
corporate governance implications of Federal Character in board appointments include having 
directors that are not competent and knowledgeable, and allegiance to shareholders that are 
responsible for their selection. 
Traditionally, in Nigeria, ethnic affiliation plays a significant role in the survival of any 
business. Though in the code of corporate governance conduct of 2005 there is no established 
grounds or emphasis made for the recognition of it (i.e. ethnicity), the fact, however, is that it 
diminishes the impact. For instance, in Nigeria, there are some companies in the East that no 
matter how much money they spend in the North, it may still not find its way in the market 
and vice-versa in the southeast, south south, and south-west. The reason thus lies in the 
composition of boards. If a particular ethnic group dominates a board, others may see it as a 
firm meant for that tribe and this makes it impossible for it to sell through in another tribe.  
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4.8 Corporate governance and the business environment in Africa  
Africa is traditionally viewed as a high-risk continent by international investors. Studies ﬁnd 
that cross-country differences in laws and their enforcement affect ownership structure, 
dividend payouts, market valuations, and the availability and cost of external ﬁnance (Kajola 
et al., 2015, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2015, Travlos et al., 2015). Many provisions in country-
level investor protection laws may not be binding, however, ﬁrms have the ﬂexibility in their 
corporate charters and byelaws to either choose to ‘opt-out’ and decline speciﬁc provisions or 
adopt additional provisions not listed in their legal code. Furthermore, using data on ﬁrm-
level corporate governance rankings across 14 emerging markets, including South Africa, 
past research indicates that there is wide variation in ﬁrm-level governance across countries 
and that the average ﬁrm-level governance is lower in countries with weaker legal systems 
(Nakpodia et al., 2016, Okeahalam, 2004). It was also found that better corporate governance 
is highly correlated with better operating performance and market valuation. Along similar 
lines, other research made a comparative evaluation of good governance in several countries 
and included Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe in their data sample (Porta et al., 
1998, Okiro et al., 2015, Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011, Nakpodia et al., 2016).  
According to Okeahalam (2004), in terms of shareholder rights, South Africa scored ﬁve 
points5 as against four. The other African countries in the list scored less than average (three 
out of X). In terms of creditor rights around the world, all the African countries included in 
the sample scored four, which is higher than the average (3.11), except for South Africa, 
which scored three. In terms of the rule-of-law, Kenya scored 5.42, Nigeria 2.73, South 
Africa 4.42 and Zimbabwe 3.68 all of which fall below the average for the English origin 
group (6.46). There are several other key factors, which broadly characterise the business 
environment in Africa. One is that in most African countries there is a preponderance of 
closely held family owned and managed businesses. This is signiﬁcant because, for example, 
in Nigeria, the informal nature of most businesses and the high level of government 
ownership of enterprises pose challenges to the practice of corporate governance. Indeed, past 
research indicates that in a survey of enterprises in six randomly selected states in Nigeria 
conducted by the Development Policy Centre in 2011, only 13.3 per cent of Nigerian 
companies were listed on the stock exchange, and only 48.5 per cent were limited liability 
                                                          
5 The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is used to build a measure for the regulatory state. The ICRG 
began in 1982, covers over 100 countries. It contains five variables that provide information about key aspects of 
the regulatory state, its professionalism, stability and reliability: Government Repudiation of Contracts, Rule of 
Law, Risk of Expropriation, Corruption in Government, and Bureaucratic Quality etc. These are scored on 0-6 or 
0-10 scales with higher scores indicating lower risk to private economic activity. 
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companies (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011). Based on these ﬁgures, therefore, close to 38 per 
cent of businesses may be operating outside the purview of the company law provisions (by 
operating as partnerships or sole proprietorships), while close to 87 per cent of businesses 
operate outside the scope of stock exchange regulations. A second key factor is that the 66% 
of Africa’s enterprises are still informal (Angus 2018). 
4.8.1 Internal and external monitoring of the corporate governance in 
Africa.  
As mentioned earlier, integrity in modern corporations is induced by both internal and 
external factors. In this section, some key issues are explained. 
The role, size and diversity of the board of directors  
A board of directors is an essential mechanism that can enhance and create the coalitions with 
the stakeholders controlling resources required by a ﬁrm. Each director brings a collection of 
unique and different experiences, attachments and points of view to a board (Terjesen et al., 
2016, Harjoto et al., 2015). A number of studies suggest a diversiﬁed and well-balanced board 
of directors can signiﬁcantly enhance a ﬁrm’s performance. For example, empirical results 
from a study of 84 South African publicly listed ﬁrms indicated a positive association 
between the percentage of female and non-white directors on the boards of directors of South 
African publicly listed status and a ﬁrm’s intellectual capital performance (Williams, 2001). 
In 2017, 31% of South African companies have no female representation in senior 
leadership1 roles. The latest Businesswomen’s Association of South Africa (BWASA) census 
on women in leadership indicates that 22% of board directors are women, but only 7% are 
executive directors. Furthermore, only 10% of South African CEOs are women, and if we 
look solely at companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), this number drops 
to 2.2% according to the BWASA census. 
A research study ﬁnds that boards which have a more diverse mix of members will be more 
able to address the challenges of an uncertain and dynamic business environment (Sila et al., 
2016, Terjesen et al., 2016). Directors with diverse backgrounds (gender or ethnicity) can 
make different valuable contributions to the decision-making process (Ujunwa et al., 2012, 
Carter et al., 2010). As a result, a board is better able to instigate comprehensive policies, 
strategies, activities and projects. Greater ethnic and gender diversity enhances the board’s 
ﬂexibility in its decision-making process. This enables ﬁrms to better facilitate strategic 
change. Okeahalam (2004) showed that the average size of board directors varies from four 
for South Africa to 12 in Botswana and Namibia respectively. The average number of board 
directors in the other countries was as follows; eight in Côte d’Ivoire, seven in Ghana, eight in 
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Kenya, ten in Mauritius and Nigeria respectively, eight in Zambia and nine in Zimbabwe 
(Okeahalam, 2004). The relatively small size of board of directors in South Africa is 
particularly highlighted by the fact that on average companies in South Africa are larger than 
companies in other African countries. Accordingly, the difference in the size of the board 
raises issues about the correct number of directors on a board and whether it should reﬂect the 
size of the company. (Bergh et al., 2016, Huang and Hilary, 2018). In addition, the 
signiﬁcance, which has been attached to board size, has perhaps dissipated the importance 
that should be placed on independence. The independence of directors and boards of state 
enterprises, in their various forms, in many emerging and transition economies, especially 
those in Africa, remains a challenge — not only for the directors themselves but also for those 
with whom such enterprises contract. There is a problem associated with the shortage of skills 
and lack of familiarity with board functions and ﬁduciary responsibilities. Board members in 
some parts of Africa, especially those on the boards of state-owned companies have limited 
understanding of their roles, and are usually open to manipulation by the management, 
chairperson or principal shareholders (Rotimi et al., 2013, UNODC, 2017). While non-
executive directors in Africa need to play a more meaningful role in the governance of 
business enterprises, many simply act as rubber stamps for decisions taken outside the board. 
 
Internal and external audit  
The Audit Committee plays a vital role in ﬁnancial and operational controls in the whole 
system of corporate governance. It performs its role by making recommendations to the board 
concerning the appointment and remuneration of external auditors, reviewing auditors’ 
evaluation of the system of internal control and accounting, and considering and making 
recommendations on the conduct of any aspect of the business of the company which should 
be brought to the notice of the board (Rossouw et al., 2002, Cohen et al., 2002). The 
establishment of an audit committee is a listing requirement of many stock markets in Africa 
including the Ghana Stock Exchange, the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. In practice, the nature of internal auditing functions can differ by the size of 
the ﬁrm. Most African listed companies are too small to sustain their own internal audit 
department. In such circumstances, services provided by third parties may be the only means 
of obtaining auditing support. Internal auditors may fail to expose wrongdoing in the 
company for fear of losing their jobs or incompetence. 
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4.8.2 The ﬁnancial system and external monitoring of corporate 
governance in Africa  
As noted earlier, the external drivers of good corporate governance are laws, rules and 
institutions that provide a competitive playing ﬁeld and discipline the behaviour of managers 
and shareholders. Experience from developed market economies indicates that the legal 
framework for competition policy, the legal framework for enforcing shareholders’ rights, 
systems for accounting and auditing, the bankruptcy process, the market for corporate control 
and an eﬃciently regulated ﬁnancial system are among the institutions that discipline 
corporations. Some branches of the ﬁnancial economics literature have focused on examining 
the relationship between how ﬁnancial development stimulates economic growth and 
concludes that ﬁnancial development enhances eﬃciency in the allocation of resources and 
thus stimulates economic growth (Valickova et al., 2015, Menyah et al., 2014). This evidence 
also suggests that an eﬃcient ﬁnancial system reduces liquidity risk and facilitates the 
management of risk by savers and investors. Yet the corporate governance beneﬁts which an 
eﬃcient and well-regulated ﬁnancial system can provide at present do not fully accrue to 
many economies in Africa because their ﬁnancial systems and capital markets are still illiquid 
and do not convey information eﬃciently (Allen et al., 2011, Okeahalam, 2004). This makes 
external monitoring more costly and prone to error (Laoworapong et al., 2018). According to 
an analysis by Okeahalam (2004) from seven stock exchanges in the 1980s, there are now 
about 20 stock markets at various levels of development in Africa. Data by Nairametrics 
(2017) show that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange accounts for nearly 90 per cent of the 
total value of the region’s market capitalisation ($987bn). Even the Nigerian Stock Exchange, 
ranked second among sub-Saharan exchanges in 2017, had a market capitalisation of just 
US$44bn. In the case of West Africa’s other exchanges the eight-country regional exchange 
in 2018 Côte d’Ivoire and the Ghana Stock Exchange had market capitalisation of just 
US$12bn and US$15bn, respectively. In 2018 only 38 companies are listed in the Botswana 
Stock Exchange (African'xchanges, 2018). The issue of size is not the only problem because, 
until the early 1990s, capitalisation and turnover on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), 
the largest exchange on the continent, was ‘dominated by a small set of very large companies 
whose principal assets are shares in other listed subsidiaries and associate companies’ (Barr et 
al., 1995). In South Africa with its pyramid or group system a few key shareholders are often 
able to control companies via a series of ‘holding companies’(Gerson and Barr, 1996). While 
ownership is now more widely diffuse, control of companies that account for a large 
proportion of the capitalisation remains fairly concentrated in the hands of a number of 
founding families of large companies. Where ownership and voting rights are concentrated, 
the situation affects the balance between preserving and transferring control rights. In the 
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presence of large block holders, transfers and control can only take place with their 
agreements. The incentives for owners to monitor and control are greater where ownership is 
concentrated and where ownership is more concentrated we often observe a greater degree of 
commitment to other stakeholders than dispersed shareholders. In other parts of Africa, 
indigenous companies tend to be small and medium-sized and have so far made relatively 
little use of stock exchanges, in part because they lack experience and resources for issuing 
shares, but also because their managers fear losing control after going public. In West Africa, 
all three exchanges have been trying to attract more companies by setting up over the counter 
markets and secondary and tertiary markets with less strict listing requirements. They also 
have given increasing attention in the last year or so to educational and promotional 
programmes to inform the public and attract more investors. The failure of more private 
companies to go public is partly due to the lack of trust, which investors have regarding the 
transparency of company records and market transparency. Finally, the commercial 
advantages of large incumbent ﬁrms are not lost on the banks, who play a dominant role in 
ﬁnancial intermediation in developing countries. Banks maintain close relationships with 
established and often well-connected businesses — a natural outcome in a protected and 
proﬁtable business environment in which both the borrowers and the lenders operate. In some 
countries, commercial ﬁrms also own and control major domestic banks, creating business 
conglomerates with ‘in-house’ sources of easy ﬁnancing for themselves. Moreover, bank 
lending is often determined by political directives, which generally favour incumbent ﬁrms 
and reduce the need for these ﬁrms to rely on securities markets that often demand 
transparency and accountability. On aggregate, this has an adverse impact on corporate 
governance. 
4.9 Corporate governance and disclosure challenges in Africa 
4.9.1  Corruption and corporate governance  
A KPMG survey of more than 400 chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs) and chief ﬁnancial 
oﬃcers, released in June 2014, strongly suggested that fraud and corruption in business are on 
the rise in East Africa. Fraud was considered a major problem by 61 per cent of respondents 
and 88 per cent said their companies had suffered from fraud during the previous year. Weak 
internal controls and corporate governance were seen as a key factor (International, 2015). In 
Nigeria, the US oil services giant, Halliburton, admitted that a subsidiary paid a US$2.4m 
bribe to an oﬃcial to obtain favourable tax treatment (Anaeto, 2015). According to (Justesen 
and Bjørnskov, 2014) corruption was the single greatest obstacle to economic growth and 
development in these countries. Another World Bank survey of 400 entrepreneurs in 69 
countries found corruption to be one of the three most signiﬁcant obstacles to conducting 
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business in developing countries (Batra et al., 2003). Corruption and bribery are particularly 
problematic for the development of small to medium enterprises, whose very existence may 
depend on winning a single contract. 
4.9.2  State-owned enterprises and corporate governance  
Another major factor that needs to be borne in mind when discussing corporate governance in 
Africa is that despite considerable efforts at deregulation, most African economies are still 
largely state controlled. Once the ownership of a state-owned enterprise is transferred to the 
private sector through privatisation, concerns for investor and consumer protection become 
non-convergent and public interests about the performance or conduct of the privatised 
enterprise is expressed through a regulatory policy framework. In many instances corporate 
governance has been overlooked and privatisation on its own is expected to improve 
managerial incentives and raise corporate eﬃciency (Estrin, 2002) particularly in the 
developing context. In Africa, however, many examples of the inherent conﬂicts and 
problems associated with the corporate governance debate have been found to occur 
immediately pre and/or post-privatisation. There has been an apparent lack of independence 
and evidence of cronyism in the sale of enterprises and nepotism in the appointments of 
people to the boards of many state enterprises (Ujunwa et al., 2012). Secondly, the 
determination of the value of the ﬁrm during privatisation is essential for ﬁxing the price and 
for avoiding overvaluation or under-valuation. In many countries of Africa, determining the 
ﬁnancial value of a state enterprise is not easy because there are no mature market 
mechanisms to rely on. The issue of how to evaluate companies and which method to use is 
essential for successful and transparent privatisation of enterprises and corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the capacity to support the implementation of good corporate governance during 
and after privatisation is undermined by the existence of weak monitoring by watchdog 
organisations. Government ministries responsible for actively monitoring state-owned 
enterprise boards and other mechanisms such as independent regulators, do not as yet fulﬁl 
their role as overseers. Many are generally weak and subject to external inﬂuence by 
politicians. Community watchdog organisations such as consumer bodies are not well 
developed in most parts of Africa. 
4.10 Recent developments and prospects 
Nigeria, like most developing countries, is facing pressures to become more integrated into 
the global economy. What integration requires in practical terms is adopting programs of 
economic liberalisation and deregulation. As a result of these pressures, the government has 
introduced reforms in several key areas related to corporate governance. In what follows, we 
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examine these recent changes in public policy as well as other some other changes that may 
affect corporate governance practices. 
4.10.1 Deregulation of foreign ownership 
In 1995, the restrictions on foreign ownership of shares were removed with the repeal of both 
the FX Act and the NEPD (Reed, 2002). These enactments were replaced by foreign 
investment friendly legislation in the form of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
Decree (Ayanwale, 2007). The new law effectively abolished all restrictions on foreign 
ownership, with a few key exceptions. These regulatory reforms, especially in the area of 
corporate governance, are aimed at attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs), which was at 
its lowest level during the military regimes that prevailed in the years between 1979 and 1999 
(Okike, 2007). There had been a realisation on the part of the political class that conducting 
business in line with international best practices is the most reliable way of building 
investors’ confidence and attracting the much-needed FDI (Quadri, 2010). Okpara (2006) 
observed that the need to promote measurable international standards for best practices in 
Nigeria was urgent. One of the immediate reforms was the creation of a national committee to 
assess the corporate governance issues in the country (Uadiale, 2012), 2010). The committee 
was given the responsibility of evaluating the efficiency of existing corporate governance 
mechanisms, identifying their weaknesses and recommending the changes required to 
improve the process (SEC, 2011). The committee submitted its report, and, by 2003, the 
Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission, in conjunction with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC), had issued the first ever code (herein, the SEC Code) of corporate 
governance in Nigeria (Bello and Bello, 2016). The SEC Code was targeted at companies 
listed on the NSE. 
Most significantly, the oil and gas industry still operates in accord with the old joint venture 
arrangement between the government and foreign corporations. In addition, the electricity and 
telecommunication sectors are still limited to government providers in the new Act. 
Restrictions have also been placed upon foreign participation is in the manufacture of arms 
and ammunition, as well as in the production and sale of narcotics and psychotropic 
substances. Another investor friendly provision of the legislation is that it prohibits the 
nationalisation or expropriation of any foreign corporation operating in Nigeria. 
4.10.2 Foreign exchange control 
Foreign exchange control in Nigeria was deregulated in 1995. The new foreign investment 
rules are contained in the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring & Miscellaneous Provision) Decree 
of 1995. The new legislation allows for private foreign exchange dealers (bureau de change). 
In addition, Nigerian companies can now hold domiciliary accounts in private banks and have 
81 
 
unfettered use of their money. Foreign companies may also bring foreign capital into the 
country unhindered, provided they obtain a certificate of capital importation from their 
Nigerian banks. They may service loans and remit dividends. 
4.10.3 Privatisation 
Nigeria commenced a program of privatisation of government corporations in 1988 (Igbuzor, 
2003). The Nigerian Privatisation and Commercialization Decree, 1988 sets out the 
principles of the privatisation program. The focus of the privatisation program is to afford 
core foreign investors/strategic partners the opportunity to hold up to 40% of the shares of 
privatised companies. The rationale for this policy is that such investors will be able to 
provide a much-needed injection of capital as well as management that is more professional. 
The guidelines define core/ strategic investors as: 
"Formidable and experienced groups with the capacities for adding value 
to an enterprise and making it operate profitably in the face of 
international competition... They must have technical knowledge...  
possess the financial muscle not only to pay for the enterprise but also to 
turn around the fortune... have the managerial know-how to run the 
business" (Azubuike, 2009) 
In line with its priority of encouraging greater participation by core/strategic investors, the 
government intends to sell 40% of its equity to strategic investors in the following areas: 
telecommunications, electricity, petroleum refineries, petrochemicals, coal and bitumen 
production and tourism. The government will retain 40% of the equity, while the remaining 
20% will be sold to the Nigerian public through the stock exchange (Lincoln and Adedoyin, 
2012a). In some sectors, the government intends to sell all of its holding (Enterprises, 1999).  
Progress with privatisation has begun, with all the major corporations, such as the electricity 
and telecommunication commissions, privatised which has led to MNCs like MTN, Glo, 
Airtel, etc. in Nigeria. While the privatisation exercise accelerated following the installation 
of democratic rule in 1997, economic and political controversies are still inhibiting rapid 
movement. Between 1988 and 1999, about 57 government corporations have been privatised. 
These were in the agricultural, insurance, banking, brewery, shipping, petroleum marketing, 
hotel, and food processing sectors. 
While privatisation of government-owned corporations may change the composition of 
ownership of Nigerian corporations, it will not alter the pattern of concentrated ownership. 
This raises the question, then, of whether privatisation will benefit minority shareholders (or 
whether majority owners continue to exploit minority owners). The possibility is that a 
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greater participation by institutional investors will help protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. At this stage, however, there is little data on which to make such an evaluation. 
4.10.4 Capital market reforms 
Originally known as the Lagos Stock Exchange, the Nigerian Stock Exchange was set up in 
1960 and at present operates six branches in the country. As of December 2000, the total 
market capitalization was approximately US$4 billion. There has been an increase of firms on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange. According to Olaniyi et al. (2016), then Director General of the 
Exchange, several reasons help to account for the rise in listings. These include the ongoing 
deregulation and liberalisation policies of the Government, the privatisation of government 
corporations and the introduction of prudential guidelines for banks and other financial 
institutions (Sanusi, 2012). 
Several improvements have also been made regarding the services of the exchange. These 
include an automated central security clearing system in 1997, reduction in the costs of listing 
and the introduction of the Second Tier over the Counter Exchange for the trading of 
securities of small companies. It has also improved its market oversight and information 
(Exchange, 2002). 
In addition to the above, a second Stock Exchange, the Abuja Stock Exchange was stablished. 
Incorporated on June 17, 1998, the Abuja Stock Exchange was established as a floor-less, 
technology driven exchange with facilities to provide electronic, screen-based trading 
systems. This exchange, which started trading in April 2001, is equipped to provide dealers 
from across the country with on-line access to the trading system (Lincoln and Adedoyin, 
2012a). 
In spite of these reforms, the Nigerian capital market still falls short of the developments in 
other countries. As noted above, it remains relatively small and illiquid when compared not 
only to developed countries but also to other developing countries. Additionally, the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange still suffers from problems of poor and non-functioning infrastructure, which 
haunts the country generally (Abubakar et al., 2014). 
4.10.5 Gender and equal opportunities bill 
Nigeria has rejected a gender and equality opportunities bill because it is an attack on its 
religious beliefs (Independent, 2016). The bill was expected to protect Nigerian women from 
violence and provide them with the same marital rights as their male partners including the 
right of widows to inherit their husband's property. The bill was intended to incorporate the 
UN Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. The bill 
declared that women "shall not be subjected to inhuman, humiliating or degrading treatment 
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and shall have the right to an equitable share in the inheritance of the property of her 
husband" (Payton, 2016).  It also indicated how women should be entitled to participate fully 
in all political activities, which included the franchise to vote and be eligible for all publicly 
elected offices without any restrictions. Voters criticised the rejection of the bill by a Senate 
with only 7 of the 109 members being women. Muslim senators declared their opposition 
because the bill contravenes Sharia law (Quranic adopted the law in Islamic states) which the 
Nigerian constitution recognises. The bill has been revised and would be presented to the 
Senate again (PremiumTimes, 2016). 
4.10.6 Recapitalization of the banking sector 
The banking sector reforms in Nigeria were engineered by the need to reinforce the financial 
sector and set up the Nigeria economy for growth; to become part of a global economy, they 
were intended to design and develop a financial powerhouse that confirms with regional 
integration requirements and international standards. These reforms were also instrumental in 
addressing problems such as poor governance, risk management and operational 
inefficiencies. The centre of the reforms is around firming up capitalization. According to 
Adegbaju and Olokoyo (2008), "capitalization is a major component of reforms in the Nigeria 
banking industry because a bank with a strong capital base can absolve losses arising from 
non-performing liabilities". To attain the capitalization requirements, there would be a 
consolidation of existing banks or using the stock market to raise additional funds. 
In 2004, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Soludo, announced a 13-point 
reform program for the Nigerian Banks (Adegbaju and Olokoyo, 2008). The main objective 
of the initiative was to guarantee an efficient financial system. The changes are designed to 
help the banking sector to develop the necessary flexibility to assist the economic 
development of the country by efficiently performing its functions as the pivot of financial 
intermediation (Adegbaju and Olokoyo, 2008). Thus, the reforms were to make sure of a 
diversified, robust and reliable banking industry where there is the safety of depositors' 
money and position banks to play active developmental roles in the Nigerian economy. 
Of all the banking reforms the plan to increase bank capitalisation to N25 billion cause huge 
controversy among the stakeholders and the need to comply before 31st December 2005. 
Soludo (2004) observed that many banks appear to have abandoned their essential 
intermediation role of mobilising savings and instilling banking habits at the household and 
microenterprise levels. The complacency of banks towards small savers not only heightened 
the issues of low levels of local savings and large bank lending rates in the country, but also 
lowered access to cheap and steady funds that could provide a reliable source of credit to the 
productive sectors at affordable rates of interest. Immediately after the recapitalisation 
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deadline of December 31st, 2005, the number of operating banks in the country reduced from 
89 to 21 banks.  
4.11 Conclusion 
In an age of globalisation, governance reforms are critical. Nigeria has been undertaking a 
program of reforms for more than two decade now. The nature of the reforms has been 
largely determined by developments in the global economy (Stephen, 2014). As a result, the 
reform process does not so much involve choosing the best form of corporate governance, as 
it does adapting existing structures and practices to the exigencies of competing in a global 
economy (Okike, 2007). To compete in the global economy, developing countries are 
increasingly being forced to introduce programs of economic liberalisation and deregulation 
(e.g., tax cuts, privatising state-run industries, reductions in government spending, etc., 
(Arowolo and Ologunowa, 2012, Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012b). In addition, Nigeria has 
introduced other reforms that more directly affect governance. They include strengthening 
company law (to provide greater legal guarantees to investors), improving the legal system 
(so that shareholders' rights can be enforced) and liberalising capital markets ((Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2011, Chukwunedu and Okafor, 2011, Ibrahim, 2016b). 
This chapter has shown the corporate Nigeria context, gender and the relationship with 
corporate Nigeria, reforms. The reforms have not been without some success. Privatisation 
and reforms in the capital market have increased activities in the stock exchange. Privatisation 
of state enterprises and the liberalisation of foreign investment laws are facilitating the inflow 
of foreign capital, which is likely to monitor managers much more efficiently than the 
government has in the past. Recapitalisation has improved the quality of banks. In addition, 
competitive pressures from other African and Western countries seem to be inducing a 
change in the "entitlement culture" of the indigenous management in large corporations. 
However, while there has been some progress, the governance problems that the reform 
process seeks to address are deeply rooted in a socioeconomic and political context 
characterised by ethnic and religious tensions, gender inequality, poverty and a history of 
military rule and human rights abuses. As we noted above, passing formal laws in such a 
context does little to ensure that shareholder rights are protected. Such reforms need to 
address the deeper causes of the problem (e.g., an ineffective legal system, the ownership 
structure, gender inequality, etc.). Similarly, reform efforts in other areas (e.g., capital 
markets, the legal system) are unlikely to be successful unless other fundamental problems of 
Nigerian society are addressed (e.g., the lack of vibrant democratic political culture, ethnic 
and tribal tensions, poverty, gender inequality, etc.). Ultimately, the success of corporate 
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governance reforms is linked to broader governance reforms of the Nigerian state and, one 
might argue, of the international economic order, which sets the context in which states like 
Nigeria have to compete in the global economy. 
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5 Methodology  
The purpose of the research is to explore the ways that firms can fully utilise existing human 
resources and reap the benefit of diversity in the boardroom and to identify appropriate 
corporate governance methods that improve productivity in the Nigerian context. Incompetent 
corporate governance is capable of adversely influencing corporate performance and 
shareholders' value. Hence, it is important that the firm have the right board composition to 
achieve higher performances and thereby improve share value and attract further investments. 
This chapter presents a pragmatist approach as the research methodology. This research will 
combine a quantitative and a qualitative approach (Creswell, 2013) to understand the impact 
or gender and board composition on the financial performance of firms on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE hereafter). This research will utilise mixed methods, it will use qualitative 
methods to test findings uncovered in the quantitative research. The qualitative analysis will 
try to understand the experiences of board members in the decision-making process in their 
organisation. This chapter also details the design of data collection, the process by which the 
research participants are selected, the administration of the fieldwork and the techniques with 
which data were analysed. 
5.1 Research Paradigm   
This research analysis contributes to an understanding of the corporate governance literature 
by examining the Nigerian corporate behaviour and how boardroom characteristics e.g. 
gender, ethnicity, regionality, age, etc., given the socioeconomic peculiarity of the Nigerian 
context, affects the financial performance of 190 firms on the Nigerian stock exchange. In 
doing this, this research employs the pragmatic approach. The pragmatic approach involves 
using the method which appears best suited to the research problem by focusing on what 
approach works as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 2010). Pragmatic researchers, therefore, grant themselves "the freedom to use 
any of the methods, techniques and procedures typically associated with quantitative or 
qualitative research". (Johnson et al., 2007). This approach is particularly relevant for 
emerging countries such as Nigeria where there is limited research on composition of boards 
and access to range of diverse board members is challenging.  
According to the literature of traditional research paradigm, the positivist approach involves 
confirmation and falsification yet disregard any points for understanding an individual 
phenomenon. The qualitative approach has been criticised for not providing an adequate 
rationale for generalisations in wider contexts (Johnson et al., 2007). For this reason, the 
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pragmatic paradigm affords the researcher the opportunity to combine both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods (Johnson et al., 2007) to explore gender and ethnic influences on 
firm's financial performance on the NSE.   
5.2 Research approach 
5.2.1 Deductive Research Approach 
Deductive reasoning is a theory testing process which commences with an established theory 
or generalisation and seeks to see if the theory applies to specific instances (Hyde, 2000). A 
deductive approach uses an existing theory to develop an hypothesis and then designs a 
research strategy to test the hypothesis  (Wilson, 2014). 
According to the literature, deductive research means reasoning from the subject matter to the 
general. If a causal relationship or link seems to be implied by a particular theory or case 
example, it might be true in many cases. A deductive design would test to see if this 
relationship or link can be supported under more general circumstances”(Gulati, 2009).  
This research has formulated a set of hypothesis (Chapter 5) that needs to be confirmed or 
rejected during the analytical process which is established in theory (Burney, 2008). Research 
with deductive approach follow steps in figure 5 below: from our main theories, we deduce 
hypothesis, which would be tested and analyzed for confirmation or rejection. 
 
 
Figure 5: Research path 
5.3  Research Design 
 This section focuses on the research design with a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to investigate board composition and performance of Nigerian firms on the NSE. 
According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010), the mixed method design has stressed the use of 
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component models in which different elements are kept separate. In this study, the 
quantitative approach is suitable to answer the research question asking whether gender and 
ethnicity on boards of Nigerian firms have an influence on the financial value (accounting 
based and market-based values) of the firm on the NSE. Though there are different points of 
view concerning the company, many of these theoretical directions are used to support, but 
are not substitutes for each other. A study of different theoretical standpoints clarifies the 
need to take a cohesive approach rather than a single perspective to understand the impact of 
corporate governance on board performance. The quantitative section in this research would 
employ the framework as seen in figure 5 to answer questions about the board composition 
and how its characteristics affects performance. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, 
is appropriate to investigate of individual experiences of men and women on the influences of 
culture, leadership structure, etc. on their impact on the decision-making process on board. In 
parallel, this can provide abundant evidence which may deepen some fundamental 
understanding of the occurring phenomena (Wilson, 2014). The qualitative research further 
explains some of the results in the quantitative research. Questions like how the dynamics on 
the board in influenced by external influences like culture, tribalism, regionality, political 
affiliations, mentorship, double shifting etc.  
This research uses two main types of data: primary data gathered via the annual reports of 190 
firms on the Nigerian stock exchange for a period of 2004 to 2013 and a semi-structured 
interview with the board members of Nigerian companies. The first phase of the study 
involves the quantitative analysis of data collected from the firm's annual report and fact-book 
from the NSE to measure the impact of a diverse (gender and ethnic) board on financial 
performance. This quantitative procedure is an approach well established in the literature 
(Carter et al., 2010, Carter et al., 2003, Ujunwa, 2012, Adams and Mehran, 2012). The second 
phase involves a qualitative method using semi-structured interviews with participants in the 
oil and gas, financial, service and conglomerate sectors to examine issues related to gender, 
ethnicity, leadership structure, regionality, double shifting, etc. and how they influence 
appointment to board membership and the decision-making process on corporate board.  This 
method supports the researcher in indicating a range of topics as well as revealing how a 
situation may arise (Rubin and Rubin, 2011, Seidman, 2012). In this research, the mix method 
works because each approach is not independent of itself in answering the research questions. 
The composition of the board and what group on board influences the decision making 
process can be explained by the questions asked in our interviews.   
The key problem encountered using a multiple methods approach is the increase in time 
required to complete the study and the cost of conducting the study. Since most of our 
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interviewees were in Nigeria, we have had to travel to complete them. The data for 
quantitative analysis is of a panel constructs which is time consuming too.  
5.4 Research method 
Drawing on the theoretical approaches discussed in the framework, we use this section to 
explain how the research project was planned and then carried out to explore the 
characteristics and experiences of women and men on corporate boards of Nigerian firms 
given their peculiarity. It also describes the research setting and methods used in the 
fieldwork. The interview question, from the selection of project participant to analysis. We 
also discuss the quantitative data from the collection from the annual reports to data analysis. 
5.4.1 Setting 
This research focuses on the experience of men and women from different ethnicity and 
regions on boards of Nigerian firms. Our research is, therefore, a nationwide analysis. The 
NSE as at June 2014 has 190 listed companies operating in 12 Industry Sectors: Agriculture, 
Construction/Real Estate, Consumer Goods, Financial Services, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, 
Information & Communications Technology (ICT), Natural Resources, Oil & Gas, Services, 
Utilities and Conglomerates. However, the interviews were specifically limited to the 
financial and oil & gas sector. We have chosen the financial sector because it is one of the 
highest employing sectors in Nigeria and the oil and gas industry as it contributes 9.67% to 
the to Nigeria GDP (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). We also exclude on ethical grounds 
interviews/travels to the Northern region of Nigeria due to the ongoing terror threats being 
experienced there and did not want to put the researcher or the interviewees at risk. 
Nigeria is the most populated African country and the eighth most populous country in the 
world and has over 500 languages of which there are three main languages: Yoruba, Igbo and 
Hausa. Although the official language of communication is English the influence of culture, 
religion and ethnicity cannot be ignored in the corporate world (Ayeomoni, 2012). Hence, this 
research would be contributing to research by investigating ethnicity, gender and performance 
using the Nigerian context. However, gendered values in society as a whole, norms and 
religion are not the only focus of this research because the organisation is also a society in 
itself. In this sense, employees’ experiences are not only associated with social values in 
wider contexts, but also with the perceptions of their organisations’ practices (Minichilli et 
al., 2012). This research investigates the status of men and women and ethnic minorities on 
corporate boards to see whether they make a difference in organisational practices impact on 
gender and career advancement. A purposive sampling method is considered suitable for this 
study because the researcher “needs to find a definite cultural domain with experts within" 
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(Tongco, 2007). The research also used a snowballing approach to get access to respondent 
which according to  Noy (2008) when snowballing sampling methods are employed in 
qualitative research, they lead to dynamic moments where unique social knowledge of an 
interactional quality can be fruitfully generated.  
The banking sector went through a major regulator induced consolidation in the industry 
under Prof. Chukwuma Soludo who led Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, in 2004 – 2009 
(Vanguard 2015) and industry analysts believed Governor Soludo would shake up the 
banking sector and make it better by increasing capitalization of banks. The intention of these 
reforms was for Nigerian banks to be structurally ready to support economic development and 
be less vulnerable to the risks of bank failures, which had almost become the common 
phenomenon of Nigerian banks. Soludo thus pursued aggressively the plan to recapitalize 
Nigerian banks by increasing the minimum capital base from N2billion to N25 billion, which 
was achieved in December 2005. A few years later, the Nigerian banking system and the 
financial market experienced a major shock because of the 2008 global financial crisis and the 
decline in world oil prices on the international stage and poor corporate governance, weak 
risk management framework and significant exposure to margin loans on the domestic front. 
However, during this period the new CBN governor, Sanusi, advocated for a 30% 
involvement of women on every financial institution’s board, which was in line with wider 
global initiatives to improve the gender diversity of corporate boards (Sanusi, 2012) 
The Nigerian oil and gas industry has boomed since the Shell Group located crude oil in the 
Niger-Delta in 1956. However, the Oil and Gas sector were mostly dominated by 
multinational corporations until the early 1990s when Nigerian companies started infiltrating 
the oil and gas industry (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011). There was an increase in local 
participation after the enactment of the Nigerian Content Directives provided by the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 2010, and eventually, by the dissemination of the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development (NOGIC) Act in 2010. The Act seeks to 
promote the use of Nigerian companies/resources in the award of oil licences, contracts and 
projects (Ross, 2003). Since the discovery of oil the Niger-Delta (the oil-rich region in 
Nigeria) has been plagued with espionage as a result of bad exploration practices that has led 
to gas flaring and oil spillage destroying the livelihood of the citizens of the Delta (Kadafa, 
2012). One of the initiatives since Nigeria's democracy is to increase the involvement of 
indigenes from the catchment area of exploratory firms in the Delta. This research, given this 
context, which seeks change in diversity of boards, wants to answer questions about the 
impact of gender, ethnicity and regional quotas on boards. How it affects effectiveness and 
the degree to which the catchment policy changes the dynamics on corporate Nigeria? The 
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research also seeks to understand corporate practices regarding recruitment to board 
membership to improve gender and ethnic diversity.      
5.4.2 Sample and data 
The study sample includes firms in the NSE for 2004-2013. Listed companies on the NSE are 
required by law to deliver the "printer's proof of its annual report and accounts prior to 
publication, notice of annual general meetings of the company held in the financial period 
under review, all circulars and notices sent to shareholders together with accompanying 
documents, quarterly reports and forecasts, bi-annual and annual reports and accounts for the 
financial period under review" (Anikwe, 2014). Therefore, all annual reports of these firms 
are available online and can be confirmed on the NSE. We obtain data on directors and other 
corporate governance variables from the NSE fact books and annual reports of firms during 
the research period. The NSE as at June 2014 has 190 listed companies operating in 12 
Industry Sectors: Agriculture, Construction/Real Estate, Consumer Goods, Financial Services, 
Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Information & Communications Technology (ICT), Natural 
Resources, Oil & Gas, Services, Utilities and Conglomerates.   
This research will be looking at the firm effect of board composition; hence, data set will 
include 190 companies on the NSE multiplied by years (i.e. i*t) 2004-2013.  The interview 
sample size includes 32 board members of firms on the NSE split between regions in Nigeria. 
This would help understand the effect of languages and regional split on boards and help 
understand the unique experiences of men and women in different regions. 
Semi- structured interviews were conducted using a purposive sampling method (Tongco, 
2007). The targeted sample is boardroom level employees of Nigerian banks, Oil and Gas, 
service and conglomerate companies in Nigeria.  
The semi-structured interviews and official documents were utilised for gathering data to 
explore the research questions of this study. In order to achieve transferability, the researcher 
has attempted to provide rich descriptions of design, data collection, data analyses, and the 
findings in order to enhance the readers’ understanding of this study. Creswell (2013) state 
this procedure as another method for establishing credibility.  
Finally, this study was conducted under the supervision of the researcher’s supervisors, 
Professor Sara Connolly and Dr Susan Sayce, who are familiar with the research area, 
therefore providing feedback to the researcher or serve as a sounding board for ideas to 
enhance the research credibility (Creswell & Miller, 2000).  
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5.4.3 Tools and Materials 
To understand the intricacy of gender and performance of firms on the NSE in the Nigerian 
context, multiple instruments and materials including interviews and quantitative data were 
collected and used in this research analysis.  
Semi - structured interviews 
The most used type of interviews in qualitative research are semi-structured interviews 
(Matthews and Ross, 2014, Holloway and Wheeler, 2013) and it involves the use of 
predetermined questions, where the researcher is free to seek clarification. According to 
(2002) and Kvale (2008) the interview can be flexible, with open-ended questions and the 
chance to explore issues that arise spontaneously. The researcher is free to vary the order and 
wording of the questions (Seidman, 2012), depending on the direction of the interview. As a 
result, semi-structured questions exploring the influence of gender and ethnicity on firm 
performance were conducted in this research. The semi-structure question were based on six 
main themes: social network, regionality/local content, social acceptability, quality vs 
diversity, double shift for women and ethnic minorities and leadership structure which were 
derived from existing literature (Carter et al., 2010, Cotter et al., 2001, Ely and Thomas, 
2001, Maume, 2004, Adesua Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012). The research particularly 
examines regionality and ethnicity, which have not been previously explored regarding its 
implication for financial performance for firms on the NSE. Given the flexibility of the 
interview, this research allows the study participants to recall their experience on the board 
they represent and how their ethnicity or gender plays a role in board composition and how it 
affects career progression and productivity on board. All respondents discussed the same 
semi-structured questions and had an opportunity to talk about any relevant issues. 
Data collection 
At the initial stage, the researcher contacted a few organisations about the proposition of 
conducting interviews with their board members, but the researcher could not get in touch 
with sufficient respondents. The researcher had to travel to Nigeria to establish contact. There 
was a delay in travel for almost four months due to visa renewal, which slowed down the 
process. While the permit renewal was in process, however, the research employed someone 
to send his research proposal with invitation to prospective interviewees (see appendix 1.1). 
The proposal included a brief statement about the research project, its aim and objective.   
When they agreed to work together in the research, they received a cover letter describing the 
study, assuring the confidentiality of all information collected, and the benefit of the research 
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to the respondent and the organisation they represent. A date, time and place were 
consequently set at the convenience of the interviewees. 
A snowball effect took place, with interviewees suggesting other potential informants, and 
others were contacted through networks of friends and colleagues. It is noteworthy that while 
the snowball technique with a chain-referral sampling may cause a potential sampling bias 
(David and Sutton, 2011), the method is efficient in terms of an access to the well-known 
informants that are difficult to interview such as those in the top management (Bernard and 
Bernard, 2012) i.e., managers, board members in the research case. 
With the permission of the research participants, all interview sessions were digitally 
recorded, and notes were taken except one where only notes was taken. The meeting starts 
with an introduction to the researcher and the research, a reminder of the confidentiality of all 
information obtained through the interview process that they could stop the interview at any 
time they do not want to continue and it was explained to the respondents how the findings 
would also be utilised. By the confidentiality agreement, interviewees were given code names 
keeping their identities anonymous in the recording, transcript and analysis. The interviews 
took approximately 30-60 minutes. They were asked to describe their work experience from 
their first employment to boardroom membership from where the semi-structure prepared 
question was investigated. At the end of each interview, the researcher asked if they have 
anything they would like to say or anything they found interesting that was not covered in the 
questions posed. The researcher summarised the key issues raised and then had them re-
checked by the research participants to confirm the accuracy of the data (Creswell, 2013). 
Sample size for quantitative and qualitative analysis 
The researcher interviewed 32 board members across four major sectors in the Nigerian 
economy and are on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. With the advice of the supervisor and 
because of time constraint (due to visa and access issues in Nigeria), the researcher was 
advised that the 32 respondent were sufficient for the research. Furthermore according to 
Guest et al. (2006) any sample size can be sufficient as long as the participants can provide 
complete and accurate information about the inquiry domain. Further justification for the 
number of the respondents is found in Morse (2000) who indicated that a sample of 30 is 
sufficient to obtain the data richness required for qualitative analysis when using semi-
structured interviews.  
5.4.4 Data analysis 
Following the pragmatic research approach of a mixed method, the quantitative and 
qualitative data were separately analysed, and the results from each type of analysis were 
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interpreted after both sets of data analyses were completed (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004). The quantitative analysis focused on measuring the effect of boardroom characteristics 
like gender, ethnicity, etc. on both accounting and market value (performance) of the firm 
while the qualitative research focuses on the experience of boardroom member on themes 
identified in this research. In the first phase of data analysis, the quantitative data were 
analysed using STATA a general-purpose statistical software package. Descriptive statistics 
were used to examine personal data and variables for comparison of the different forms of 
board diversity and how they affect company's performance on the NSE. The research 
estimated a pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression equation, and panel fixed and 
random effects models. Following the example of Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Carter et al. 
(2010) this research employ firm fixed effects for firm and period in its analysis to 
demonstrate that firm fixed effects have a significant impact on the results. The research also 
does an analysis of the two sectors (oil & gas and finance) in the qualitative study 
In the second phase, the qualitative approach probes the different question posed by the 
previously discovered themes. According to Holloway and Todres (2003), thematic analysis 
is a qualitative analytic method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data. "It minimally organises and describes your data set in detail. However, frequently 
it goes further than this and interprets various aspects of the research topic" (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). In this study, thematic analyses were employed to derive and analysis themes 
from the interview discussions concerning diversity and performance for all members of 
Nigeria' company board.  
Finally, a comparative analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis to validate or 
refute theories of corporate governance using the Nigerian context (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The process of analysis is presented in the next section. 
The Quantitative Analysis 
This section illustrates the research hypotheses in the quantitative phases. Then, the process 
of data analysis including descriptive statistics, pooled OLS, fixed effect, random effect, and 
the Hausman tests of endogeneity.  
In the quantitative analysis, there are hypothesis that board characteristics such as endowment 
variables as the number of female, male and ethnicity, leadership structure, board committee 
membership by gender, the quota on board etc., have an influence on firm financial 
performance: 
Hypothesis 1:  Ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm performance 
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Hypothesis 2: Board gender is positively related to firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between firm size and performance. 
Hypothesis 5: The number of women directors on a major board committee is related to the 
financial performance of the company. 
Model 
The main model to be tested is: 
Performanceit = α + β1 Dit + β2 PPit+ β3 FSit+ β4 Git + β5 Fi + β6 T + εit 
βi = the regression coefficient  
ε = the composite error terms 
D = Diversity 
PP = Previous Performance 
FS = Firm size 
G = Governance 
F = other unobserved Firm characteristics 
T = Time period 
 
Performance Variable 
Performance represents the financial performance of the firm measured by both Tobin's Q and 
the return on assets. These measures are commonly used in governance investigations as 
measures of performance, but they are not interchangeable or identical. They each measure a 
significantly different aspect of firm performance. Tobin's Q in its original formulation is the 
market value of the firm's assets divided by the replacement value of the firm's assets. The 
calculation of Tobin's Q popular in the literature today is often the Chung and Pruitt (1994) 
which is calculated as the market value of the securities issued by the firm divided by the 
book value of the assets. This measure is an indication of the wealth position of the primary 
providers of funds to the company: shareholders and creditors (Carter et al., 2010). If Tobin’s 
Q is greater than one, then the market value of the shareholders and creditors investment is 
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higher than the remunerated historical cost of the assets. According to Carter et al. (2003) “in 
theory, Tobin’s Q is a more complex measure of performance than ROA”. Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) argue that stock market-based measures are susceptible to investor anticipation. They 
believe that if investors anticipate an effect of a governance characteristic on financial 
performance, "long-term stock returns will not be related to the management component, 
even if a real association exists" (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).  
On the other hand, the ROA is an indication of the ability of the firm to produce accounting 
based revenues more than actual expenses from a given portfolio of assets measured as 
amortised historical costs (Carter et al., 2010). ROA is an indication of the accounting income 
produced for the shareholders if according to David (2010) ROA is calculated as net income 
divided by the book value of total assets. In summary, Tobin's Q measures wealth (accounting 
value) and ROA measures income (the market value).  
Independent Variables 
Diversity in this analysis is a measure of gender diversity, ethnic diversity, region/language 
diversity and the existence of a quota on board. Firm size is the log of the total assets of the 
company, Governance is a corporate governance characteristic of the firm, Firm is a unique 
time-invariant unobservable firm characteristic based on firm-level fixed effects in the 
regression estimation, and Time is the period observed in this research. 
The research creates three measures of women's participation on the board for each firm in 
the sample from the NSE Fact Book, and annual reports gathered – the number of women on 
the board of directors, percentage of executive and non-executive women on board and the 
percentage women on the audit committee. Similarly, the researcher creates three ethnic 
minority variables – total number of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa directors on firm board and the 
audit committee. 
Control Variables 
The size of the firm is often used as a control variable in an analysis of financial performance 
and is shown to be related to market returns by Fama and French (1993), among others. Few 
studies show that asset size is related to Tobin's Q (Faleye, 2007, Prevost et al., 2002). This 
research includes the value of the natural log of total assets in the regressions to control for 
the size of the firm. 
Yermack (1996) found that board size and Tobin’s Q are inversely related. However, Jackling 
and Johl (2009) find a strong positive relationship between board size and financial 
performance that supports evidence from Dalton et al. (1998) and Zahra and Pearce (1989). 
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The argument for a positive association between board size and financial performance is that 
there is the expectation that a big board will acquire better information because of greater 
knowledge of a significantly larger number of directors which would inform decision making 
(Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
The positive association between board size and financial performance flows from resource 
dependency theory while Yermack (1996)'s study makes an agency theory argument for a 
negative relationship. Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that we should include the 
number of directors on the board in the financial performance equation. The number of 
directors on the corporate board is also important as a control variable because of the 
inclusion of the number of female directors and the number of ethnic minority directors. 
The method of estimation is the Panel estimators with firm fixed effects. Hermalin (2005) 
argue that the relationship of most board characteristics and firm performance are jointly 
endogenous. Traditionally lagged dependent variables are used to address the problem of 
endogeneity. To this effect, Adams and Ferreira (2009) employ firm fixed effects in their 
analysis and they demonstrate that firm fixed effects have a significant impact on the results. 
We follow a similar approach with lagged dependent variables and add fixed effects for the 
firm because they help to mitigate omitted variables and address unobserved changes over 
time. The firm fixed effects account for differences in the industry and financial leverage used 
by the firm, among other firm-specific dimensions.   
According to Poole and O'Farrell (1971), when a regression is estimated, some underlying 
assumptions should be met such as the absence of multicollinearity, normality of residuals, 
and homoscedasticity of residuals as well as linearity to generalise the model. In a regression 
analysis, according to (Field, 2009), if there is a strong correlation between independent 
variables, the dataset may not be reliable for analysis. One way to assess multicollinearity 
among independent variables is to perform correlations. If a correlation coefficient illustrates 
a correlation of 0.80 or higher, this may demonstrate multicollinearity (Field, 2009). In this 
study, the assumption that normality amongst the residuals is indicated by differences 
between the model and the observed data, which are most frequently zero or close to zero, is 
tested by a correlation matrix (Field, 2009).  
Qualitative analysis  
Interviews were conducted with 32 board members across four major sectors in the Nigerian 
economy and are on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The sector selections were informed by 
their importance to the Nigerian economy and the availability of respondents. According to 
the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, the Oil and Gas industry accounts for 70% of the Nigerian 
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wealth. The Oil and Gas, finance, service and conglomerate sectors are also the employers of 
highly skilled workers in Nigeria (Vanguard 2015) and are the drivers of the Nigerian 
economy, hence, their importance in this research.  
The analysis employs a content analysis using a thematic approach (Creswell, 2012). Themes 
are drawn from the literature review and a study of the Nigerian context (see chapter 3). The 
themes of the interview questions are as follows: 
 Social Networking reducing chances of women and minorities from reaching 
boardroom appointment 
 Regionality/local content and a biased board composition 
 Social acceptability: its effect on board composition 
 Quality versus Diversity  
 Double Shift for women and minorities 
 Leadership Structure  
The research seeks to establish what boardroom characteristics affect financial performance 
on the NSE, get a sense of boardroom culture and how diversity influences the outcome.  The 
research also looks at the impact of government agents and geographical location of firms on 
the financial performance. A snowballing approach (Seidman, 2012) as earlier described was 
employed in this section of the analysis.  
The qualitative data took a systematic approach to collecting, handling and storing the data 
for easy analysis (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). The interviews were conducted within firms 
from two main sectors - banking and oil and gas - across a sample of 10 boardroom 
employees each. These sectors have been chosen because there is a high concentration of the 
Nigerian labour force in these sectors and they represent a huge part of the Nigerian economy. 
The interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of the participant, which was later 
transcribed and used for analysis that would be done using Excel (Gibbs, 2002). 
A code was assigned to each participant. The interview provides detail, depth, and an insider's 
perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing and the quantitative analysis 
of interview response hence, the interview being semi-structured (Leech, 2002) giving the 
interviewer flexibility in discussing ideas brought up in the discussion with the responder. 
The interview (Tracy, 2013) seek to explain how government, religious and ethnicity affect 
the stature of men and women concerning boardroom level appointment. 
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5.5 Ethical issues 
The Faculty of Social Sciences Ethics Research Committee of the University of East Anglia 
(UEA), United Kingdom, approved this study proposal in November 2016 
(https://www.uea.ac.uk/education/research/research-ethics). A letter written by the researcher 
with the backing of the Norwich Business School was sent to the Nigerian firms involved in 
this research study to assure them of the approval of this fieldwork by the Faculty of Social 
Sciences Ethics Research Committee of the University of East Anglia (UEA), United 
Kingdom. The letter sent is to guarantee that their personal information is treated with 
complete confidentially, and this will not be used for any other purpose other than this 
research (see appendix 1.1 page 214 for details). 
5.6 Conclusion 
Using the fixed effect regression model analysis (Allison, 2009) this research will be able to 
find a link between boardroom characteristics particularly the forms of diversity and 
performance of firms on the NSE. The methodology design is based on the research questions 
and the theme derived from the interviews to contribute to literature given the Nigerian 
context. The pragmatism approach was deployed as a research philosophy because it could 
provide ample opportunity to examine a range of micro and macro phenomena (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004) by which women and ethnic minorities on board are helped or hampered 
in the decision-making process of the firm they represent.   
According to the mixed method design, the quantitative and qualitative data collected from 
the annual report of 190 firms on the NSE and the fact books of the NSE and the interviews 
conducted were analysed separately, and then drawn together in the interpretative phase. This 
helps to have a robust research with empirical study and qualitative analysis to confirm the 
study 
In the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistics, ordinary least squares regression analysis, 
fixed effect regression analysis with tests for best fit model were employed to measure the 
effect of gender and ethnic minorities on the financial performance with Tobin’s Q and the 
ROA as proxy for performance (which are used to calculate accounting and market values of 
a firm).  In the qualitative analysis, thematic analysis was used to analyse interview data. The 
results were then compared in the interpretative phase of this study (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
The next two chapters, present results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
 
100 
 
6 Diversity and firm performance: 
quantitative analysis 
This section outlines the quantitative results which investigates the effect of board 
characteristics particularly diversity on corporate performance. The aim of this chapter is to 
analyse panel data for firms on the NSE, by understanding the relationship between diversity 
variables, and board composition variables and firm financial performance as discussed in 
chapter 4.  This will inform ways that firms can fully utilise existing human resources and 
reap the benefit of diversity in the boardroom thereby, identify appropriate governance 
methods that improve productivity in the Nigerian context. Incompetent corporate governance 
is capable of adversely influencing corporate performance and shareholders' value. Hence it is 
important that the firm has the right board composition to achieve higher performance and 
thereby improve share value and attract further investment. 
A performance regression model was employed to measure how diversity and other board 
characteristics affect the firm’s financial performance which is measured by Tobin's Q and 
the Return On Asset (ROA). We begin with a pooled regression of all observations together 
and run the regression model, ignoring the cross section and time series nature of the data 
thereby not giving special treatment for firm and time in the model. We then run a  fixed 
effect model which allows for heterogeneity or individuality i.e. firm specific effects which 
would remain constant over time. We also run a random effects model which assumes the 
individual-specific effect is a random variable that is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. We apply the Hausman test to check which model (fixed or random effect) is the 
best fit and also test the fixed effect against the pooled regression model.  
As discussed in Chapter 2 the literature suggests a relationship between board characteristics 
and firm performance, making them jointly endogenous. Adams and Ferreira (2009) believe 
that endogeneity problems may arise because of omitted variables that affect both the 
selection of diverse directors and firm performance over time which they mitigate for by 
employing firm fixed effects. Hence, we also consider the fixed effects estimates critical 
because they help to mitigate omitted variables and address unobserved changes over time.  
The research models include a range of explanatory variables such as the number of female 
directors, the percentage of female executive directors, minority directors (Yoruba, Hausa, 
and Igbo), International directorship, the quota of female director on board, log of firm asset, 
the number of directors on board. 
101 
 
This research also compares two important sectors in the Nigerian economy the financial and 
the Oil and Gas sectors because of their importance to the GDP of the economy and where 
most of our data are collected. We undertook a before and after comparison with the changes 
in legislation in the banking sector in 2005 (the recapitalisation of the banking industry) in 
order to see how performance is affected and whether this changed after 2005. We start with a 
summary of data used from companies annual reports, data screening and present the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
6.1 Sample and data 
This research includes firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the nine year period of 
2004-2013. Listed companies on the NSE are required by law to deliver the printer's proof of 
its annual report and accounts prior to publication, notice of annual general meetings of the 
company held in the financial period under review, all circulars and notices sent to 
shareholders together with accompanying documents, quarterly reports and forecasts, bi-
annual and annual reports and accounts for the financial period under review. Therefore, all 
annual reports of these firms are available online and can be confirmed on the NSE. We 
obtain data on directors and other corporate governance variables from the NSE fact books 
and annual reports of firms during the research period. The research involves Nigerian 
companies quoted or listed on the NSE. The NSE as at June 2014 has 190 listed companies 
operating in 12 Industry Sectors: Agriculture, Construction/Real Estate, Consumer Goods, 
Financial Services, Healthcare, Industrial Goods, Information & Communications 
Technology (ICT), Natural Resources, Oil & Gas, Services, Utilities and Conglomerates.   
Data to compute the natural logarithm of total assets, the return on assets, and Tobin’s Q are 
taken from the annual reports [see appendix for Tobin’s Q and ROA formula (Chung and 
Pruitt, 1994)]. Table 6.1 provides a description of each of the variables. Each company's 
annual report contains information on all directors and committees which might include 
information about their career till date. A majority of the sample firms appear each year, but a 
few businesses migrate in and out of the NSE over time due to mergers, spin-offs, 
bankruptcy, etc. hence we decided to restrict time between 2004 – 2013 to mitigate for that.  
The annual report data for the gender of a director is complete. Gender is relatively easy to 
determine from information in the NSE fact book and statements and company annual 
reports. In most cases, the annual reports do specifically identify gender, and in cases where 
this is missing, there are photographs of Directors either on the statement or available on the 
internet which can be used to determine that. The researcher completed and cross-checked all 
data with a search through LinkedIn, Google, Bloomberg, company websites, annual reports, 
and phone calls to companies. 
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Data collected on ethnicity is collected from annual reports, and other external sources. Like 
gender, the ethnicity of directors is not a part of the statement or other NSE fact book, but the 
proxy statement may contain information that indirectly suggests ethnicity. However, 
ethnicity is more difficult to determine. The research, therefore, uses other indirect evidence 
to determine ethnicity such as the peculiarity of the name to certain tribes in Nigeria. The 
researcher as with gender completed an exhaustive search through LinkedIn, Google, 
Bloomberg, company websites, annual reports, and phone calls to companies to compile a full 
dataset on the ethnicity of the directors in the sample.  
Table 6.1: Variable Definition 
VARIABLE DEFINITION  
 
Dependent Variables Financial Performance  
Tobin’s Q 
Return on Assets (ROA) (%) 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q (Chung and Pruitt approximation) 
Annual net income divided by the book  
value of total assets at the end of the year 
 
Independent Variables of Primary Interest 
Diversity 
Total Number of Female Directors 
Percentage of Executive Female Directors  
  
 
Number of Females on Audit Com 
 
Number of Minority Directors  
 
 
 
 
Quota of Female Directors 
 
 
 
 
Total number of female directors on board 
Percentage of Executive Female Directors on board 
 
Total number of female directors on the  
audit committee of the board  
Total number of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa directors 
Total number of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa 
directors on the nomination committee of  
the board 
 
 
Total number of female quota (critical mass  
on board) 
Control Variable 
 
Natural Log of Firm Total Assets 
 
 
Governance Control Variables  
 
Total Number of Directors  
 
 
 
Natural logarithm of the book value of  
year-end total assets 
 
 
 
Total number of directors on board 
 
 
6.1.1 Variables and methods used in the analysis 
Dependent variable: Performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA 
Performance represents the financial performance of the firm measured by both Tobin's Q and 
the return on assets (ROA). These measures are commonly used in corporate governance 
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research as measures of performance, but they are not interchangeable or identical. They each 
measure a significantly different aspect of firm performance. This research uses the Chung 
and Pruitt (1994) calculation for Tobin's Q - that is the market value of the securities issued 
by the firm divided by the book value of the assets. This measure is an indication of the 
wealth position of the primary providers of funds to the firm: shareholders and creditors 
(Carter et al., 2010). The decisions that affect Tobin's Q are primarily taken by the boards of 
the firm. Hence we can assume that a good board composition will affect Tobin's Q 
positively. 
On the other hand, ROA is an indication of the accounting income produced for the 
shareholders if ROA is calculated as net income divided by the book value of total assets. In 
summary, Tobin’s Q measures wealth (accounting value) and ROA measures income (the 
market value).  
Explanatory Variables 
Diversity is a measure of gender diversity, ethnic diversity, region/language diversity and the 
existence of a quota on board. Previous performance is a lagged value of Tobin’s Q or ROA 
and Firm size is the natural log of the total assets of the company. Governance is a corporate 
governance characteristic of the firm, while Firm is a unique time-invariant unobservable firm 
characteristic based on firm-level fixed effects in the regression estimation, and year is the 
time observed in this research.   
The research creates three measures of women's participation on the board for each firm in 
the sample from the NSE Fact Book, and annual reports gathered – the number of women on 
the board of directors, percentage of executive and non-executive women on the board and 
the percentage women on the audit committee. Similarly, the researcher creates three ethnic 
minority variables – total number of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa directors on the firm board, the 
percentage on the board and the percentage on the audit committee. 
 
Control Variables 
The size of the firm is often used as a control variable in an analysis of financial performance 
and is shown to be related to market returns by Fama and French (1993), among others. 
Multiple studies show that asset size is related to Tobin’s Q (Faleye, 2007, Prevost et al., 
2002). This research includes the value of the natural log of total assets in the regressions to 
control for the size of the firm. 
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Yermack (1996) found that board size and Tobin’s Q are inversely related. However, Jackling 
and Johl (2009) find a strong positive relationship between board size and financial 
performance that supports evidence from Dalton et al. (1998) and Zahra and Pearce (1989). 
The argument for a positive association between board size and financial performance is that 
larger boards will bring better information because of greater knowledge from more directors 
to firm decision making (Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
The positive association between board size and financial performance flows from resource 
dependency theory while Yermack (1996) makes an agency theory argument for a negative 
relationship. Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that we should include the number 
of directors on the board in the financial performance equation. This variable is also 
necessary as a control variable because we use the number of women directors and the 
number of ethnic minority directors.  
We also have a control variable Sector which is a control for sector-specific issues in the 
model. We create ten dummy variables for sectors which include the ten sectors reviewed in 
this analysis found on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
 
Random and fixed effects models 
We estimate both a fixed-effects model and a random-effects model using the nine-year panel 
data set because they are alternative approaches for the panel data that we have bearing in 
mind the assumption that each approach carries. 
Our study is based on a panel dataset, which allows us to mitigate a possible endogeneity 
problem by estimating fixed-effects models.  According to literature if there are omitted 
variables, and these variables are correlated with the variables in the model, then fixed effects 
models may provide a means for controlling for omitted variable bias. In a fixed-effects 
model, subjects – or firms in this case - serve as their controls. The idea is that whatever 
affects the omitted variables have on the dependent variable at one time, they will also have 
the same effect at a later time; hence their effects will be fixed (Stata 2015). However, for this 
to be true, the omitted variables must have time-invariant values with time-invariant effects. 
Modelling an effect as random usually – although not necessarily – goes with the assumption 
of a normal distribution for the random effects. Sometimes this is not in conformity with 
reality, which may lead to skewed results. Also, the assumption is made that the random 
effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  
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We would carry out both the fixed and random effect model and then we carry out the 
Hausman test to test which model is the best fit i.e. the null hypothesis would be that the 
random-effects model is appropriate and the alternative hypothesis is that fixed-effects model 
is appropriate. If we get a statistically significant p-value for the Hausman test of < .05 then 
the random-effects estimator is rejected making the fixed effect estimator the best fit. We also 
carry out a test to confirm that time fixed effects are needed in for our panel data. To do this 
we employed the syntax "testparm", if coefficients for all years are jointly equal to zero, time 
fixed effects are not needed and the pooled model is preferred. 
6.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics; an overview of the data collected from 190 firms 
quoted on the Nigeria stock exchange as at June 2014 operating in 12 sectors of the Nigerian 
economy. See Table 6.2. 
The measures of financial performance indicate that the firms in the sample were financially 
successful on average over the ten-year period investigated, but there was wide variation in 
the performance variables. The mean for Tobin’s Q was 0.36, which is below one and 
suggests the market value of the firm is less than the book value of the assets. However, the 
variation in the sample is significant with the minimum for Tobin’s Q -6.16 and the maximum 
is 18.49. The ROA reveals similar changes. The mean ROA is 0.34 percent, with the 
minimum is -2.56 percent and the maximum is 17.30 percent. 
The average percentage of women directors on a board is 8.09 of which 6.68 are non-
executive board members. This indicates that in every 22 board members, only one is a 
woman. Unsurprisingly, the average percentage of men on a board is a high 91.95% of which 
62.67% are non-executive members. The average percentage of ethnicity directors on a board 
is 37.69 for Yoruba, 27.79 for Igbo and 14.78 for Hausa. There is a small share of 
international (non-Nigerian) directors on board which constitute 19.74 percent over the nine-
year period of the sample. These numbers are influenced by the ownership of firms on the 
Nigerian stock exchange. For example, according to Ujunwa (2012), about 50 percent of the 
firms in the conglomerate, petroleum, food/beverages and tobacco and construction industries 
are foreign owned. Finally, the average size of the firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange is 
8.29 with the maximum 24.9 and the minimum 2.23 of any firm in Nigeria based on our 
sample. 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
No of Directors 
%Women onBD  
NonExe Women 
% Men on BD 
NonExe Men 
Sector 
Audit Women 
Audit Men 
Yoruba Directors 
Igbo Directors 
Hausa Directors 
Int. Directors 
Log of FirmAsset 
Quota 
NewID 
 
1,460 
1,322 
1,336 
1,301 
1,301 
1,297 
1,301 
1,278 
1,460 
1,121 
1,123 
1,269 
1,269 
1,269 
1,269 
1,335 
1,460 
1,460 
 
2008.5 
0.36 
0.34 
9.30 
8.09 
6.68 
91.95 
62.67 
4.95 
20.32 
100 
37.69 
27.79 
14.78 
19.74 
8.29 
0.41 
74.38 
 
2.87 
1.15 
1.19 
2.73 
9.49 
8.54 
10.03 
18.31 
2.91 
71.18 
0 
24.77 
24.71 
16.29 
22.99 
3.93 
0.49 
43.00 
 
2004 
-6.16 
-2.56 
3 
0 
0 
33.33 
0 
1 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.23 
0 
1 
 
2013 
18.49 
17.30 
22 
42.86 
37.5 
100 
133.33 
10 
600 
100 
100 
100 
75 
100 
24.94 
1 
148 
 
Source: Computed from handpicked data from the annual reports and accounts of 190 quoted companies and the 
NSE Factbook (Stata analytical software result 
6.1.3 Correlation matrix 
Table 6.3 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables in our model. The correlation 
between firm size and the board size is 0.59, which is both positive and significant. This 
finding is supported by the literature. Most firms choose to expand or decrease the size of 
their board based on any changes in the size of the firm. For example, as the complexity of 
the firm increases, board size may increase due to the need for advice and environment 
monitoring (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Obviously, these changes in the firm size are likely to 
affect different characteristics of the board. Hence, the result justifies the inclusion of firm 
size as one of the control variables. In Lückerath-Rovers (2013) they included firm size 
(natural log of total assets) as a control variable in their OLS regression analysis and found 
that firm size was significantly larger for companies with female directors. 
We also found a negative correlation between the number of women on board for Tobin's Q 
and ROA although the relationship is not significant. We found a positive correlation between 
all ethnicity variables (Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa) and performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
Ethnically diverse boards requires representation from different segments of society and is 
found to be positively but insignificantly associated with board size except for the Yoruba and 
107 
 
Internationals on board which could be as a result of most firms used in this analysis are 
mulltinational firms based in Lagos which is also a Yoruba state. 
As the firm increases in complexity, the board size also increases (Boone et al., 2007). The 
greater the representation, the larger will be the size of the board. This result implies that an 
ethnically diverse board is made possible by increasing the board size. When the board size is 
increased by increasing representation to outsiders, it is likely that there will be a greater 
ethnic diversity of board members in general. The research is mostly interested in the 
importance of ethnicity on the financial performance of Nigerian corporate firms because the 
literature suggests that diversity is considered to be a strategic resource and provides a link to 
different external resources which might in return increase the market value of the firm. 
According to Rhode and Packel (2014), one of the most significant constraints is the shortage 
of studies on racial and ethnic diversity. Most of the modern research as discussed in the 
lieterature review is focused on gender, from which commentators often generalise about 
other forms of diversity without qualification. This study therefore provides a valuable 
addition by employing variables of gender and ethnic diversity using the three major tribes in 
Nigeria – Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa. 
Most of the correlations, as observed in Table 6.3, whether positive or negative, significant or 
non-significant are weak. This indicates at first glance, that although probable cases of 
multicollinearity may exist, the degree of such may be too remote to affect the results of the 
regression estimates. This is therefore, no case of multicollinearity in our variables. As 
explained in chapter 4 we expect normality amongst the variables which is indicated by 
differences between the model and the observed data.  
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Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix 
Variable Tobin’s 
Q 
ROA No. of 
Directors 
% of 
Women 
on Board 
% of non-
executive 
Women on 
Board    
% of 
Men 
on 
Board 
% of 
non-
executiv
e Men 
on 
Board    
No. of 
Yoruba 
No. of 
Igbo 
No. of 
Hausa 
No. of 
Internatio
nal 
No. of 
Audit 
women 
Sector Log of 
firm 
asset 
Quota Firm ID 
Tobin’s Q 1.0                
ROA 0.00 
(0.87) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
              
No. of Directors -0.02 
(0.57) 
0.13 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
             
% of Women on 
Board 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
            
% of non-
executive Women 
on Board    
-0.07 
(0.01) 0.07 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
 
0.90 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
           
% of Men on 
Board 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.95 
(0.00) 
-0.84 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
          
% of non-
executive Men on 
Board    
0.09 
(0.00) 0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.54 
(0.00) 
-0.50 
(0.00) 0.53 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
         
Yoruba 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.22 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
        
Igbo 0.02 
(0.55) 
0.01 
(0.78) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.48 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
       
Hausa 0.03 
(0.26) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
0.088 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.27 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
      
International -0.10 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
-0.37 
(0.00) 
0.42 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
     
Audit Women -0.05 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
-0.00 
(0.88) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
    
Sector -0.09 
(0.00) 
.-0.01 
(0.67) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.62) 
-0.01 
(0.69) 
0.02 
(0.49) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.9) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
   
Log of firm asset -0.05 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.59 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
-0.89 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.29 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
  
Quota 0.13 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.52) 
-0.03 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(0.83) 
0.01 
(0.84) 
0.01 
(0.79) 
0.00 
(0.97) 
0.08 
(0.072) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.95) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.46 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00 
 
Firm ID -0.08 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
-0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
0.32) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.96) 
0.01 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.74) 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(0.00) 
-0.43 
(0.00) 
-0.45 
(0.00) 
1.0 
(0.00) 
The table presents correlation coefficients and test statistics are in brackets 
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6.2 Hypothesis tests for diversity and performance for firms on the 
Nigerian stock exchange. 
The aim of this section is to find out empirically if diversity and other board characteristics affect the 
performance of firms on the Nigerian stock exchange. The growing consensus within the corporate 
community is that diversity is an important goal (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013, Carter et al., 2010, Maume, 
1999, Maume, 2004). The case for diversity rests on two important claims according to Rhode and 
Packel (2014). The first is that diversity provides equal opportunity to groups historically excluded 
from positions of power (Chovwen, 2007). The public has a strong interest in ensuring that 
opportunities are available to all, that women and ethnic minorities entering the labour market can 
fulfil their potential, and that we make full use of the wealth of talented women and minorities 
available for board service (Rhode and Packel, 2014). The second claim is that diversity will improve 
organisational procedures and firm performance. Rhode and Packel (2014) further argue that this 
"business case for diversity" tends to dominate debates in part because it appeals to a culture steeped 
in shareholder value as the measure for corporate decision making. We focus on this claim in this 
research by empirically finding out if board room diversity on Nigerian firms improves the market 
and accounting value of the firm.  
To test this claim the following hypothesis were formulated: 
Hypothesis 1:  Ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm performance 
Hypothesis 2: Board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between non- executive female director and 
performance.  
Hypothesis 5: The number of women directors on a major board committee is positively related to the 
financial performance of the firm. 
6.3  Empirical results 
6.3.1 Performance analysis for all firms 
Performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
Table 6.4 present the regression results. 
 Hypothesis 1: In the pooled OLS regression, the coefficients are close to zero for both Igbo 
and Hausa directors. In model 1 – the fixed effect estimators - the coefficients for the 
indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo or Hausa) are positive, with the proportion of 
Igbo director being positively and significantly related with our financial performance 
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indicator Tobin’s Q for Nigerian firms. There is a negative and insignificant result for the 
proportion of international directors in Model 1 (fixed effect) but a negative yet significant 
result in the pool OLS regression while in Model 2 (Random effect) there’s a negative but 
significant coefficient. In Model 2 – the random effect estimators – the coefficients for the 
indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo and Hausa) are also zero. 
 Hypothesis 2: The pooled OLS result indicates a negative relationship between the percentage 
of women on boards and Tobin's Q although statistically insignificant. Model 1 – fixed effect 
estimators - reveals that the coefficient for the percentage of women on board is zero. Finally 
Model 2 - the random effect estimators - show a similar effect as the fixed effects estimators 
but the results are not statistically significant.   
 Hypothesis 3: According to the pooled OLS result the coefficient for the number of directors 
is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Models 1 – the fixed effect estimators 
– however, reveals that the coefficient for number of directors is negative but statistically 
insignificant. Model 2 – the random effect estimators is positive but statistically insignificant. 
The size of a firm's board indicates a positive coefficient but is statistically insignificant. 
 Hypothesis 4: The pooled OLS result indicate a negative and statistically insignificant 
relationship between non-executive female board members on board. There’s a negative but 
stistically significant relationship found for Model 1 and Model 2.   
 Hypothesis 5: The pooled OLS result and model 1 (fixed effect) indicate no relationship 
between women on board committee and firm performance except model 2 (random effect) 
which shows a negative coefficient however all coefficients are statistically insignificant.  
Performance measured by ROA 
 Hypothesis 1: In the pooled OLS the coefficient is statistically insignificant, model 3 (fixed 
effect) and model 4 (random effect) - the coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically 
diverse board (Igbo or Hausa) are positive and statistically significant.  
 Hypothesis 2: The pooled OLS result and the random effect estimators (Model 4) indicates a 
negative but statistically insignificant realtionship between gender and firm performance. 
Model 3 however, suggests a positive relationship between the percentage of women on board 
and the firm financial performance indicator ROA but statistically insignificant. 
 Hypothesis 3: The pooled OLS result, model 3 (fixed effect) and model 4 (random effect) all 
indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship between the ROA and board size.  
 Hypothesis 4: Results for the coefficients of the pooled OLS and model 4 (random effect) for 
the relationship between non-executive female directors and firm  are negative  and 
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Table 6.4: Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Firm Performance and Board Diversity 
Dependent 
Variable 
Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
Model 1 
Fixed Effect 
Model 2 
Random Effect 
Pooled OLS 
 
Model 3 
Fixed Effect 
Model 4 
Random Effect 
Variable Names Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef.  P value Coef. P value Coef. P value 
No of Directors .03  (.08) -.00  (.98) .03  (.18) -.11  (.00) -.20  (.00) -.14  (.00) 
% Women on BD -.01  (.38) .00  (.69) .00  (.96) -.00  (.75) .01  (.59) -.00  (.83) 
Non-Exe Women -.01  (.35) -.03  (.04) -.02  (.06) -.01  (.29) -.04  (.01) -.02  (.17) 
Igbo Directors .00  (.55) .01  (.04) .00  (.44) .00  (.08) .02  (.00) .01  (.02) 
Hausa Directors .00  (.04) .00  (.38) .00  (.89) .00  (.59) .00  (.69) .00  (.66) 
Int. Directors -.01  (.00) -.00  (.59) -.01  (.03) -.00  (.04) .00  (.71) -.00  (.18) 
Audit Women .00  (.61) .00  (.18) -.00  (.92) -.00  (.38) .00  (.11) -.00  (.48) 
Log of Firm Asset -.06  (.00) -.26 (.00) -.74  (.00) .02  (.10) .17  (.02) .03  (.06) 
Quota .00  (.98)  .24  (.13) -.25  (.11)  -.26  (.12) 
Sector 1 .08  (.75)  .08  (.86) -.07  (.79)  -.14  (.69) 
Sector 2 .72  (.00)  .59  (.06) .15  (.50)  .11  (.68) 
Sector 3 .14  (.59)  -.06  (.87) .10  (.72)  .05  (.88) 
Sector 4 .09  (.63)  .13  (.72) .46  (.04)  .43  (.15) 
Sector 5 .39  (.03)  .37  (.21) .06  (.75)  .02  (.95) 
Sector 7 .13  (.45)  .14  (.65) -.06  (.77)  -.09  (.73) 
Sector 8 .27  (.34)  .26  (.58) -.34  (.28)  -.34  (.39) 
Sector 9 .64  (.00)  .59  (.13) .19  (.41)  .16  (.60) 
Sector 10 .08  (.65)  .08  (.80) -.11  (.58)  -.14  (.60) 
Intercept .49  (.03) 2.34  (.00) .47  (.17) 1.37  (.00) .39  (.58) 1.48 
Firm-Year Observation 1,101 1,101 1,101 1,102 1,102 1,102 
Firms in Sample 148 130 130 130 130 130 
Adj. R-square .05 .00 .06 .04 .00 .05 
F-Statistics       
 Prob>chi2 = 0.0077 
 
  Prob>chi2 =     0.0001 
 
  
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result
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statistically insignificant while coefficient for Model 3 (fixed effect) are negative but 
statistically significant.  
 Hypothesis 5:  The pooled OLS result and Model 4 (random effect) indicate a 
negative but statistically insignificant relationship between women on board 
committee and firm performance while Model 3 (fixed effect) has zero coefficient 
which is also statistically insignificant. 
Testing for time-fixed effects and the Hausman test 
We perform the Hausman test of endogeneity between our random and fixed effects model to 
decide which model is the best fit. Our result (see Appendix: Table 5.5) showed significant 
support for the fixed effects regression model for our financial performance indicators –
Tobin's Q and ROA. The p-value was highly significant at the 5 percent level. The null 
hypothesis of an equality of fixed and random effects regression estimations was rejected. 
The result confirms that the fixed effects regression captures both the firm and year effects.   
Furthermore, we carried out a test for time-fixed effects. To see if time fixed effects are 
needed for a dataset it is important to have a joint test to see if the dummies for all years are 
equal to zero. If they are all equal to zero, no time fixed effects are needed. To do this we 
employed the syntax "testparm", and with a F= 0.000, we reject the null that the coefficients 
for all years are jointly equal to zero, therefore time fixed effects are needed in this case. 
On the basis both tests, we conclude that our preferred model is the fixed effect regression 
analysis – indicated by the box highlights in Table 6.4. 
Fixed effects regression result discussed (Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
For hypothesis 1 the coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo or 
Hausa) are positive, with the proportion of Igbo director being positively and significantly 
related with our financial performance indicator Tobin’s Q and ROA for Nigerian firms.  This 
result is consistent with the literature that implies that having an ethnically diverse board is a 
knowledge-based asset that creates value for shareholders by linking an organisation to its 
external environment, thereby promoting firm performance. This result supports resource 
dependency theory which views ethnic diversity in a corporate board as an economic resource 
to the organisation that help firms comprehend the dynamic industry context of a country.    
Therefore, there is evidence to accept Hypothesis 1. 
For hypothesis 2 the fixed effect estimators- reveals that the coefficient for the percentage of 
women on board is zero. Therefore there is no relationship between gender and firm 
performance for the both financial performance indicators - Tobin’s Q and ROA. Therefore 
we cannot accept hypothesis 2 that there is a positive relationship between gender and firm 
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performance. This is against the business case for diversity which suggest women increases 
the financial value of firms. 
Again, in hypothesis 3, there is no impact of board size on firm financial performance for the 
financial indicator Tobin’s Q. However, fixed effect model indicate a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the ROA and board size. Therefore, we reject 
hypothesis 3. Our result implies that as the size of a firm’s board increases, the less the degree 
of its impact on the financial performance of the firm. This result is consistent with literature, 
which suggests that as board increases in size; free riding increases and reduces the efficiency 
of the board in monitoring management and providing a strategic human resource for the 
organisation. This result is supported by Guest (2009) who found that board size has a strong 
negative impact on profitability, Tobin’s Q and share returns, thereby supporting the 
argument that problems of poor communication and decision-making undermine the 
effectiveness of large boards.  
Non-executive female board members have a significant negative effect in both of our 
preferred fixed effects model. Therefore, we concluded that there is a negative relationship 
between non-executive female directors on board and firm performance. This result cannot 
support the findings of Carter et al. (2003) and Smith et al. (2006) who report a positive 
relationship in the U.S. This result also refutes the resource dependency theory.  
Finally, our preferred regression model – fixed effects - showed no relationship between 
women on board committee and firm performance.  Whilst these results do not support 
Hypothesis 5, they do not refute the business case for diversity even if we have not empirical 
evidence to back it up. Our results of no empirical relationship are consistent with the social 
psychological theory because there could be offsetting effects of having women and ethnic 
minority directors. According to Carter et al. (2010) for example, innovation and creativity in 
decisions might be nullified by group conflict. Our results are also consistent with a 
contingency framework because women and ethnic minority directors may be a positive, 
negative, or neutral influence on financial performance according to the special conditions at 
the time. Across various firms and years, the effects may cancel out so that no effect is 
noticed.  
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6.3.2 Finance and Oil & Gas sector comparison 
We have chosen to compare these two sectors because they are the two principal drivers of 
the Nigerian economy.  Nigeria is dependent on oil and gas for 95 per cent of its export 
earnings, 35 per cent of its GDP and three-quarters of government revenue while the banking 
sector is a top employer of labour (York, 2019). A comparison of the two major sectors could 
help see how much influence diversity play a role on corporate boards and how much it 
impacts firm financial performance.  
A quick glance at the descriptive statistic of the banking sector on Tables 6.5 & 6.6 shows 
that the measures of financial performance indicate firms in both the financial and oil and gas 
sectors were financially successful on average over the nine-year period investigated but there 
was wide variation in the performance variables. The mean Tobin's Q was 0.62 and 0.59 for 
finance and oil & gas respectively, which is below one and suggests the market value of the 
firm is less than the book value of the assets. However, the variation in the sample is 
significant with the minimum Tobin's Q zero (0) and the maximum 14.22. The ROA reveals 
similar variation. The ROA is 0.31 and 0.37 percent, with the minimum at -2, -0.65 percent 
and the maximum is 17.30 and 12.15 percent.  
The average percentage of women directors on board is 9.49 of which 7.57 of which 7.72 and 
7.45 are non-executive board members for the financial and oil & gas sectors respectively. On 
the other hand, the average percentage of men on board is 90.65 and 92.95 of which 60.45 
and 57.60 are non-executive board members for the finance and oil & gas sectors 
respectively. The average percentage of ethnic directors on board is 40.40 and 44.78 for 
Yoruba, 31.30 and 22.53 for Igbo and 15.53 and 13.60 for Hausa. For internationals on board, 
we have 12.77 and 18.09 percent over the nine-year period of the sample. 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for Banking Sector 
 
Variable                           Obs           Mean              Std. Dev.           Min Max 
year                                  480           2008.5              2.875278          2004 2013 
Tobin’s Q                        436          .617884              1.542475              0 14.22002 
ROA                                  450          .3076491              1.33103                  -2.558213 17.30288 
No. Of Directors             431         9.983759              3.319038              3 22 
% of Women on Board  431         9.496273              10.30481              0 42.85714 
Non Exe. Women           430         7.723915              9.251033              0 37.5 
% of Men on Board        431        90.65129              11.11035     33.33333 100 
Non Exe. Men                 427        60.45178              19.52877             0              133.3333 
Yoruba Director              419        40.40154               23.33688              0 100 
Igbo Director                   419        31.30077              24.36193              0 92.30769 
Hausa Director                419        15.52563                16.1797              0 75 
Int. Director                     419        12.77206              19.00961              0 100 
Audit Women                 372        11.96941              14.83683              0 75 
Audit Men                       374         100               0                           100 100 
Log of Frim Asset           449        10.75104               5.823071    3.658326 24.93765 
Quota                               480          .83125               .3749217              0 1 
Firm ID                             480            29.4                13.8711              5 53 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
 
 
Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics for Oil and Gas Sector 
 
Variable                           Obs           Mean              Std. Dev.           Min Max 
year                                 80    2008.5              2.890403       2004 2013 
Tobin’s Q                        79 .5903715              2.402252 -.1103005 18.493 
ROA                                 79 .3707328              1.414977 -.6453287 12.15244 
No. Of Directors            79 8.481013              1.831776              5 12 
% of Women on Board 79 7.957605              9.341941              0 30 
 Non Exe. Women         79 7.451276              8.338635              0 30 
% of Men on Board       79 92.94655              9.377425            70 100 
Non Exe. Men                 79 57.59996              15.37428           25 85.71429 
Yoruba Directors            75 44.78413              24.94673 8.333333 88.88889 
Igbo Directors                 75 23.53228              20.15165              0 71.42857 
Hausa Directors              75 13.59471              13.69757              0 44.44444 
Int. Directors                   75 18.08889              19.63638              0 55.55556 
Audit Women                  53 7.726864              8.756967              0 20 
Audit Men                        53 100                              0                         100 100 
Log of Firm Assets           79 7.992068              .9079169            6.146128 9.702687 
Quota                                80 .1                            .3018928              0 1 
Firm ID                              80 126.4                            2.325424          122 13 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Comparative analysis: financial sector and oil and gas sector 
Performance measured by Tobin’s Q  
 Tables 5.7 present regression result for the financial sector using the 10% significance level. 
 Hypothesis 1: Coefficients for the pooled OLS are positive and significant for Hausa 
Directors, but in Model 1 and Model 2 in the financial sector they are close to zero 
and statistically insignificant for our financial performance indicator – Tobin's Q.  In 
the oil and gas sector, the coefficients for the pooled OLS, Model 1 and Model 2 are 
all statistically insignificant – Tobin’s Q.  
 Hypothesis 2 test that board gender diversity is positively related to firm 
performance. In the financial sector, the pooled OLS results are positive and 
statistically significant (only at 10%). However Model 1 (fixed effect) show a 
coefficient close to zero while model 2 (random effect) indicates a statistically 
insignificant coefficient. All models for the oil and gas sector indicate a positive but 
insignificant relationship between gender on board and financial performance. 
 Hypothesis 3: In the financial sector the pooled OLS regression result and those for 
model 2 have positive coefficient with only the pooled OLS coefficient statistically 
significant. However Model 1 – the fixed effect estimators – indicates a negative 
coefficient figure which is statistically significant (only at 10%). All models for the 
oil and gas sector indicate negative but statistically insignificant relationship between 
board size on board and financial performance. 
 Hypothesis 4: In the financial scetor, the pooled OLS result show a positive but 
statistically insignificant relationship between between non-executive female 
directors and firm financial performance, model 1 (fixed effects) and model 2 
(random effects) however, show negative but statistically insignificant coefficients in 
our financial sector model. Similarly, the pooled OLS result, model 3 (fixed effects) 
and model 4 (random effects) all show negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficients in our oil and gas model.  
 Hypothesis 5: The pooled OLS result, model 1 (fixed effect) and model 2 (random 
effect) indicate no relationship between women on board committee and firm 
performance which is also statistically insignificant for both the financial and oil and 
gas sector.  
Performance measured by ROA 
 Hypothesis 1: Estimates for the pooled OLS  and model 2 (random effects) indicate 
insignificant coefficients which are close to zero, but there is a significant positive 
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relationship between Igbo Directors and ROA in the financial sector. Results in the 
oil and gas are all statistically insignificant.    
 Hypothesis 2 test that board gender diversity is positively related to firm 
performance. Coefficient for the pooled OLS is positive and statistically sigificant, 
model 1 (fixed effects) and model 2 (random effects) are statistically insignificant in 
the financial sector. Results in the oil and gas are all statistically insignificant also.    
  Hypothesis 3: The pooled OLS regression result model 1 (fixed effects) and models 
2 (random effects) all have negative and statistically significant coefficients. All 
models for the oil and gas sector indicate statistically insignificant relationship 
between board size and financial performance. 
 Hypothesis 4: Results for the coefficient of the pooled OLS indicates a positive but 
insignificant relationship. Results for the coefficients of model 1 (fixed effect) and 
model 2 (random effect) for the relationship between non-executive female directors 
and firm financial performance indicator – ROA - are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant. All models for the oil and gas sector indicate statistically insignificant 
relationship between non-executive female directors on board and financial 
performance.     
 Hypothesis 5: Coefficients for the pooled OLS, model 1 (fixed effects) and model 2 
(random effects) indicate coefficient close to zero in the financial sector. Results in 
the oil and gas are all statiscally insignificant indicating no relationship between 
women on board committee and firm performance 
Testing for time-fixed effects and the Hausman test 
We carried out the Hausman test of endogeneity to test between fixed and random effects 
models. Results (detail in appendix) of the test shows significant support for the fixed effects 
regression than the random effects. The p-value was highly significant. The null hypothesis of 
an equality of fixed and random effects regression estimations was rejected.  
Furthermore, we carried out a test for time-fixed effects. We reject the null that the 
coefficients for all years are jointly equal to zero, therefore time fixed effects are needed in 
this case.
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Table 6.7: Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Firm Performance and Board Diversity in the Oil & Gas and Financial Sectors (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Variable Names 
OLS 
Financial Sector 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 
Fixed  Effects 
Financial Sector 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 2 
Random Effects 
Financial Sector 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
Variable 
OLS 
Oil & Gas Sector 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 3 
Fixed Effects 
Oil & Gas 
Sector 
Tobin’s Q 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 4 
Random Effects 
Oil & Gas 
Tobin’s Q 
Sector 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value 
No of Directors .11  (.00) -.02  (.07) .04  (.29) -.04  (.90) -2.10  (.49) -.04  (.89) 
% Women on BD .03  (.06) -.01  (.75) -.02  (.34) .09  (.59) .09  (.73) .09  (.59) 
Non-Exe Women .00  (.87) -.03  (.13) -.02  (.29) -.13  (.57) -.02  (.95) -.13  (.57) 
Igbo Directors .00  (.31) .01  (.21) .00  (.45) .03  (.66) .09  (.55) .03  (.66) 
Hausa Directors .02  (.01) .01  (.47) -.00  (.73) .05  (.11) -.07  (.86) .05  (.10) 
Int. Directors -.02  (.00) -.00  (.68) -.01  (.16) -.01  (.67) -.73  (.31) -.01  (.67) 
Audit Women .00  (.92) .01  (.29) .00  (.48) -.08  (.28) .03  (.91) -.08  (.28) 
Log of Firm Asset -.09  (.00) -.30  (.00) -.09  (.01) -.00 (.99) .19  (.86) -.00  (.99) 
Intercept 1.26  (.00) 3.88  (.00) 1.46  (.00) .77  (.91) 31.66  (.51) .77  (.91) 
No of Observation 355 355 355 53 53 53 
Firms in Sample 48 43 43 8 7 7 
Adj. R-square .07 .03 .06 -.02 .07 .14 
F-Statistics       
 Prob>chi2 =  0.0001 
 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.0077 
 
  
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Table 6.8: Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Firm Performance and Board Diversity in the Oil & Gas and Financial Sectors (ROA) 
 
Variable Names 
OLS 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 
Fixed Effect 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 2 
Random Effect 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
OLS 
OIL & Gas Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 3 
Fixed Effect 
Oil & Gas 
Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 4 
Random Effect 
Oil & Gas 
ROA 
Sector 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef.  P value Coef. P value Coef. P value 
No of Directors -.13  (.00) -.19  (.00) -.15  (.00) -.13  (.53) .22  (.91) -.13  (.53) 
% Women on BD .01  (.61) .03  (.21) .01  (.52) .02  (.89) -.01  (.93) .02  (.89) 
Non-Exe Women .02  (.28) -.05  (.03) -.03  (.16) -.02  (.86) -.00  (.99) -.02  (.86) 
Igbo Directors .00  (.48) .03  (.00) .01  (.16) .05  (.31) .08  (.41) .05  (.31) 
Hausa Directors .00  (.77) .00  (.89) .00  (.82) -.03  (.13) .04  (.87) -.03  (.13) 
Int. Directors -.00  (.61) .01  (.57) -.00  (.88) -.02  (.03) .10  (.82) -.02  (.29) 
Audit Women -.00  (.94) .01  (.32) .00  (.76) -.01  (.79) -.01  (.97) -.01  (.79) 
Log of Firm Asset -.02  (.19) .12  (.25) .03  (.18) -.28  (.60) -.42  (.57) -.28  (.60) 
Intercept 1.3  (.00) .18  (.89) 1.38  (.00) 3.97  (.36) -2.30  (.94) 3.97  (.35) 
No of Observation 356 356 356 53 53 53 
Firms in Sample 48 43 43 8 7 7 
Adj. R-square .02 .01 .04 .03 .00 .18 
 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.0077 
 
  
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Fixed effects regression result discussed (Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
In testing hypothesis 1, the coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo and 
Hausa) are close to zero, for Tobin’s Q in both the financial and oil and gas sectors. However, there is 
a positive relationship found between the proportion of Igbo Directors and ROA in the financial 
sector.  Therefore, we have mixed evidence for hypothesis 1 that ethnic diversity is negatively 
associated with firm performance. The Igbo variable in the ROA analysis supports the business case 
for diversity. It is well documented in literature (Griffiths, 2018, Lord Davies of Abersoch, 2014) the 
benefits of a diverse board. Our research shows the contribution of the Igbo board members are 
positively related to financial performance of the financial firms they represent. This might be because 
of a sector specific condition that is not captured in this research.   
For hypothesis 2 the fixed effect regression result reveals no relationship between the percentage of 
women on board for the both financial performance indicators - Tobin’s Q and ROA – and for both 
sectors.  Hence, we reject hypothesis 2 that board gender is positively related to firm performance. 
This could be due to ratio of men to women undertaken in this research.  
The preferred regression result for hypothesis 3 indicated a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between of board size and firm financial performance for both financial indicator Tobin’s 
Q and ROA in the financial sector. Results for Tobin’s Q analysis indicate coefficient close to zero 
and insignificant. Therefore, we have mixed evidence for hypothesis 3 that board size is positive 
related to firm performance. As with Hypothesis 1, there could be a sector specific reason that causes 
a difference in the result between the O&G and financial sectors that is not captured in this research.   
None of the coefficient for the number of non-executive female director on board is statistically 
related to both financial indicators – Tobin's Q and the ROA – in both sectors examined. Similarly, no 
coefficient for the number of female directors on board committee is statistically related to both 
financial indicators – Tobin's Q and the ROA – in both sectors examined. Therefore, we do not have 
evidence to accept or reject the hypotheses 4 and 5. This we suspect is due to the overwhelming 
shortage of a critical mass of women in board major committees and executive chair confirming 
(Kanter, 1977b). 
6.3.3 Before and After banking sector reform 2004-2008 
As alluded to in Chapter 4 the Nigerian economy faltered and was hit by the second round effect of 
the crisis as the stock market collapsed by 70 percent in 2008-2009 and many Nigerian banks 
sustained massive losses, as a result of their exposure to the capital market and downstream oil and 
gas sector. Therefore, the CBN had to rescue 8 of the banks through capital and liquidity injections, as 
well as remove some of their top managers and which resulted in prosecution of those who committed 
some infractions (Sanusi, 2012). The then Obasanjo regime also enforced the recapitalisation of the 
 121 
financial sector. This section of the research aims to understand whether the response to the crisis and 
reforms had any impact on the role of board diversity on the banking industry. The timeline is pre-
2009 and post 2009. 
Results: performance measured by Tobin's Q before 2009 
Table 6.9 presents regression result for the financial sector using the 10% level of significance.  
 Hypothesis 1: Coefficients for the pooled OLS, model 1 (fixed effects) and model 2 (random 
effects) are either zero or specify a statistically insignificant relationship between our ethnic 
variables (Igbo and Hausa) and our financial performance indicator – Tobin’s Q.  
 Hypothesis 2 tests that board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. The 
pooled OLS result, model 1 (fixed effect) and model 2 (random effect) all report negative 
coefficients that are statistically insignificant. This indicates that gender diversity has no 
impact on the financial performance in the pre-2009 era. 
 Hypothesis 3: The pooled OLS regression result and models 2 have positive coefficient with 
only the pooled OLS coefficient being statistically significant. This support the null 
hypothesis that the board size is positively related to the firm financial performance indicator 
– Tobin's Q – in the pre-2009 era. However Model 1 – the fixed effect estimators – indicates a 
negative but statistically insignificant relationship between Tobin's Q – our financial 
performance indicator – and board size. 
 Hypothesis 4: Results for coefficients of the pooled OLS, model 1 (fixed effect) and model 2 
(random effect) for the relationship between non-executive female directors and firm financial 
performance indicator – Tobin’s Q - are negative and statistically insignificant. Again this 
indicates that non-executive female members on board make no impact on firm financial 
performance indicator – Tobin's Q. 
 Hypothesis 5: The pooled OLS result, model 1 (fixed effect) and model 2 (random effect) 
indicate no relationship between women on board committee and firm performance which is 
also statistically insignificant.   
Result: performance measured by Tobin’s Q (2009-2013) 
Tables 6.9 present regression result for the financial sector using the 10% level of significance.  
 Hypothesis 1: Coefficients for the pooled OLS, model 1 and model 2 are either zero or 
statistical insignificant relationship between our ethnic variables (Igbo and Hausa) and our 
financial performance indicator – Tobin’s Q - except for Hausa directors in the pooled OLS 
result where the coefficient is negative and statistically significant.  
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 Hypothesis 2 test that board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. The 
pooled OLS result and model 1 (fixed effects) and model 2 (random effects) report 
statistically insignificant coefficients. This indicates that gender diversity has no impact on 
the financial performance of corporate boards of Nigerian firms in the post-2009 era as it is in 
the pre-2009 era. This result shows no difference with the before 2009 analysis. This suggests 
that there hasn’t been a huge jump in the number of women on board since 2009.  
 Hypothesis 3: The random effects model 2 shows a negative and significant relationship 
between the number of board members and firm performance indicator –Tobin's Q. Pooled 
OLS regression model and model 1 are statistically insignificant.  
 Hypothesis 4: Results for coefficients of the pooled OLS, model 1 (fixed effects) and model 2 
(random effects) for the relationship between non-executive female directors and firm 
financial performance indicator – Tobin's Q - were all statistically insignificant. Again this 
indicates that non-executive female members on board make no impact on firm financial 
performance indicator – Tobin's Q in both the before and after analysis. 
 Hypothesis 5: The pooled OLS result, model 1 (fixed effect) and model 2 (random effect) 
indicate no relationship between women on board committee and firm performance. Again, 
this indicates that non-executive female members on board make no impact on firm financial 
performance indicator – Tobin's Q. 
Fixed effects regression result discussed (Tobin’s Q). 
In testing hypothesis 1, the coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo and 
Hausa) are close to zero, for Tobin’s Q in the financial sector before 2009 but we find a negative 
relationship between the proportion of Hausa directors and Tobin’s Q after 2009.  Therefore, we 
cannot accept nor reject hypothesis 1 that ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm 
performance before 2009 but there is evidence to accept Hypothesis 1 after 2009. 
For hypothesis 2 the fixed effect regression result reveals no relationship between the percentage of 
women on board for the Tobin’s Q in both the pre and post 2009 analysis.  Hence, we cannot accept 
nor reject hypothesis 2 that board gender is positively related to firm performance in either time 
period.  
Our preferred regression result for hypothesis 3 indicated a negative but statistically insignificant 
relationship between of board size and firm financial performance for the financial indicator Tobin’s 
Q. Therefore, we cannot accept nor reject hypothesis 3 that board size is positive related to firm 
performance in either time period.    
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None of coefficient for the number of non-executive female director on board is statistically 
significant for both financial indicators – Tobin's Q – in both time periods examined. Similarly, no 
coefficient for the number of female directors on board committee is statically significant for both 
financial indicators – Tobin's Q. Therefore, we do not have evidence to accept or reject the hypotheses 
4 and 5 in either time period.  
 
Results: performance measured by ROA before 2009  
Tables 5.10 present regression result for the financial sector using the 10% significance level.  
 Hypothesis 1: Coefficients for the pooled OLS  and model 4 are either zero or indicate a 
statistically insignificant relationship between our ethnic variables (Igbo and Hausa) and our 
financial performance indicator – ROA. We do find a positive coefficient for the proportion 
of Igbo Directors in our fixed effect model before 2009. 
 Hypothesis 2 test that board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. The 
pooled OLS result and model 4 (random effect) report coefficients that are statistically 
insignificant.  
 Hypothesis 3: The evidence before 2009 indicates a negative and statistically insignificant 
relationship between the ROA – our financial performance indicator – and board size. 
 Hypothesis 4: Results for coefficients of the pooled OLS, model 3 (fixed effect) and model 4 
(random effect) for the relationship between non-executive female directors and firm financial 
performance indicator – ROA - are negative and statistically insignificant before 2009.  
 Hypothesis 5: The pooled OLS result, model 3 (fixed effect) and model 4 (random effect) 
indicate no relationship between women on board committee and firm performance which is 
also statistically insignificant.  
Result: performance measured by ROA (2009-2013) 
Tables 17 present regression result for the financial sector using the .10 statistical probability level.  
 Hypothesis 1: Coefficients for the pooled OLS, model 3 and model 4 are either zero or 
statistical insignificant relationship between our ethnic variables (Igbo and Hausa).  This is a 
change from the period before 2009 
 Hypothesis 2 test that board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. The 
pooled OLS result and model 2 (random effect) both report an insignificant relationship 
 124 
between gender and our firm performance indicator - ROA while model 1 (fixed effect) 
reports a positive and significant relationship. This is a change from the period before 2009. 
 Hypothesis 3: The pooled OLS regression result shows a negative and significant relationship 
between the number of board members and firm performance indicator –ROA. Model 1 
(fixed effects) and models 2 (random effects) are statistically insignificant. 
 Hypothesis 4: Results for the coefficients of the pooled OLS, and model 2 (random effect) for 
the relationship between non-executive female directors and firm financial performance 
indicator – ROA - were statistically insignificant. While model 1 (fixed effect) reports a 
negative but significant relationship between non-executive female directors and firm 
financial performance indicator – ROA.  This is a change from the period before 2009 
 Hypothesis 5: The pooled OLS result; model 1 (fixed effect) and model 2 (random effect) 
indicate no relationship between women on board committee and our firm performance 
indicator -ROA. 
Fixed effects regression result discussed (ROA). 
 In testing hypothesis 1 the coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo 
and Hausa) are close to zero, for ROA in the financial sector post 2009 but the coefficient on 
the proportion of Igbo Directors was positive before 2009. Therefore, we cannot accept nor 
reject hypothesis 1 that ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm performance post 
2009 but we also not that there has been a change over the two time periods. 
 For hypothesis 2 the fixed effect regression result reveals no relationship between the 
percentage of women on board for the ROA in both the pre 2009 analysis.  However, the 
coefficient is positive post 2009, so we do observe a change over time.  
 Our preferred regression result for hypothesis 3 indicated a negative but statistically 
insignificant relationship between of board size and firm financial performance for the 
financial indicator ROA. Therefore, we cannot accept nor reject hypothesis 3 that board size 
is positive related to firm performance.    
The coefficient for the number of non-executive female director on board is statistically related to the 
ROA post 2009 but negative. Similarly, no coefficient for the number of female directors on board 
committee was statically related to both financial indicators –ROA – in both sectors examined. 
Therefore, we do not have evidence to accept or reject hypothesis 5.  
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Table 6.9: Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Firm Performance and Board Diversity in the Financial Sectors (Tobin’s Q): Before and After 2009 
 
Variable Names 
OLS 
Financial Sector 
Before 2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 
Fixed Effect 
Financial Sector 
Before 2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 2 
Random Effect 
Financial Sector 
Before 2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
OLS 
Financial Sector 
After 2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 1 
Fixed Effect 
Financial Sector 
After 2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 2 
Random Effect 
Financial Sector 
After 2009 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value 
No of Directors .23  (.00) -.05  (.68) .10  (.21) -.00 (.93) -.02  (.81) -.25  (.00) 
% Women on BD -.03 (.50) -.00  (.93) -.02  (.65) -.02 (.21) .01  (.71) .01  (.87) 
Non-Exe Women .00  (.97) .00  (.99) .00  (.91) -.01 (.67) .02  (.92) -.04  (.33) 
Igbo Directors -.00  (.94) .02  (.38) .01  (.61) -.01  (.17) .00  (.97) .01  (.17) 
Hausa Directors -.01  (.51) .01  (.67) -.00  (.94) -.02  (.00) .02  (.28) .00  (.81) 
Int. Directors -.02  (.02) .01  (.68) -.01  (.42) -.01 (.02) .01  (.37) -.00  (.76) 
Audit Women -.01  (.67) -.01  (.72) -.00  (.82) .00 (.92) .00  (.70) .00  (.90) 
Log of Firm Asset -.14  (.00) -.14  (.47) -.09  (.08) -.02  (.29) -.21  (.04) .03  (.48) 
Intercept .55  (.44) 2.10 (.43) .91  (.31) 1.59 (.00) 2.52 (.03) 2.38  (.00) 
No of Observation 164 164 164 191 191 164 
Firms in Sample 48 48 43 43 43 43 
Adj. R-square .07 .02 .08 .10 .02 .07 
 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000   Prob>chi2 =  0.0077 
 
  
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Table 6.10: Regression Estimates of the Relationship between Firm Performance and Board Diversity in the Financial Sectors (ROA): Before and After 2009 
 
Variable Names 
OLS 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 3 
Fixed Effect 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 4 
Random Effect 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
OLS 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 3 
Fixed Effect 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model 4 
Random Effect 
Financial Sector 
ROA 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value Coef. P value 
No of Directors -.24 (.00) -.23  (.07) -.25  (.00) -.24 (.00) .00  (.93) -.00 (.97) 
% Women on BD .02 (.69) -.03  (.58) .01  (.87) .02 (.69) .02  (.02) -.01  (.64) 
Non-Exe Women -.04 (.35) -.05  (.39) -.04  (.33) -.04 (.35) -.03  (.04) -.01  (.71) 
Igbo Directors .01  (.34) .07  (.00) .01  (.17) .01  (.34) .00  (.77) -.01  (.63) 
Hausa Directors .00  (.79) -.02  (.49) .00  (.81) .00  (.79) -.00  (.84) -.01  (.22) 
Int. Directors -.00  (.77) -.01  (.49) -.00  (.76) -.00  (.77) .00  (.82) -.01  (.36) 
Audit Women .00  (.94) -.01  (.67) .00  (.90) .00  (.94) -.00  (.73) .00  (.91) 
Log of Firm Asset .04  (.39) .07  (.77) .03  (.48) .04  (.39) .06  (.31) -.04  (.19) 
Intercept 2.33 (.00) 1.14 (.71) 2.38  (.00) 2.33 (.00) -.56 (.42) 1.32  (.00) 
No of Observation 165 165 164 165 191 191 
Firms in Sample 48 48 43 48 43 43 
Adj. R-square .03 .00 .07 .03 .01 .07 
 Prob>chi2 =  0.2612   Prob>chi2 =  0.0002   
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Testing for time-fixed effects and the Hausman test 
We carried out the Hausman test of endogeneity to test between fixed and random effects 
models. Results (detail in appendix) of the test shows significant support for the fixed effects 
regression than the random effects. The p-value was highly significant. The null hypothesis of 
an equality of fixed and random effects regression estimations was rejected.  
We also carried out a test for time-fixed effects. We reject the null that the coefficients for all 
years are jointly equal to zero, therefore time fixed effects are needed in this case. 
6.4 Summary of Hypotheses Testing on Regression Results 
6.4.1 Review of the hypothesis 
This research theoretical framework led to the formulation of hypotheses that have been 
tested in this research to establish a link to our financial performance indicators –Tobin's Q 
and ROA – and at different times –pre-2009 and post 2009 – due to policy implementation in 
the banking industry. 
This section is a recap of results from all hypothesis tested.  
Hypothesis 1 expects that ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm performance. 
The result of the overall sector on the NSE suggest that the interaction of ethnic minority 
diversity coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo or Hausa) are 
positive, and significantly related with our financial performance indicator Tobin’s Q for 
Nigeria firms. This result is consistent with the literature that implies that having an ethnically 
diverse board is a knowledge-based asset that creates value for shareholders by linking an 
organisation to its external environment, thereby promoting firm performance. This result 
supports resource dependence theory which views ethnic diversity in a corporate board as an 
economic resource to the organisation that help firms comprehend the dynamic industry 
context of a country (Hitt et al., 2016, Hillman et al., 2009). We concluded from our 
comparative study for oil and gas and the financial sector that the coefficients for the 
indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo and Hausa) are close to zero, for Tobin’s Q in 
both the financial and oil and gas sectors. However, there is a positive relationship found 
between the proportion of Igbo Directors and ROA in the financial sector.  Therefore, we 
have mixed evidence for hypothesis 1 that ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm 
performance. The Igbo variable in the ROA analysis supports the business case for diversity 
It is well documented in literature (Griffiths, 2018, Lord Davies of Abersoch, 2014) the 
benefits of a diverse board. Our research shows a positive relationship between Igbo board 
members and financial performance of the financial firms. This might be because of a sector 
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specific condition that is not captured in this research. This should be investigated in future 
research in this area. In addition, the pre and post-2009 analysis for the financial sector also 
indicated no relationship between firm performance and ethnic diversity on corporate boards.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. 
Going by our preferred model – fixed effects model – result of the firm performance 
indicators –Tobin’s Q and ROA – no significant relationship for our all sector model. All 
other models for the financial and oil and gas sector overall and the pre-2009 and post 2009 
all report zero coefficient or no statistical significance between the relationship of our 
financial performance indicators and gender diversity. Therefore we cannot accept hypothesis 
2 that there is a positive relationship between gender and firm performance. This could be due 
to ratio of men to women on boards of firms undertaken in this research. Research shows that 
the effecacy of women and minorities on board is unlikely until a critical mass is met. 
According to Torchia et al. (2011b), a test was conducted to confirm if at least three women 
could constitute the desired critical mass by identifying different minorities of women 
directors (one woman, two women and at least three women). Tests are conducted on a 
sample of 317 Norwegian firms. The results suggest that attaining critical mass – going from 
one or two women (a few tokens) to at least three women (consistent minority) – makes it 
possible to enhance the level of firm innovation. (Isidro and Sobral, 2015) also found Women 
on the board are positively related with financial performance (measured in terms of return on 
assets and return on sales) and with ethical and social compliance, which in turn are positively 
related with firm value. The findings in this study suggest that greater female representation 
on corporate boards of large European firms can increase firm value indirectly which might 
not be captured by accounting-based financial performance. In chapter 7 the researcher 
explores why it is hard to get a critical mass on the Nigeria corporate board. Some factors 
discussed are issues with work-life balance, double shifting, social networking and how they 
can affect women progress on corporate boards in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted board size is positively associated with firm performance. However, 
our preferred model – the fixed effects model – reports no relationship between board size 
and our firm financial performance indicators – Tobin's Q and ROA in our all sector models. 
In our comparison of the financial and oil and gas sectors, there was still no relationship. 
Finally, in the pre-2009 analysis of both the financial and oil and gas sector comparison the 
firm financial performance indicator  ROA reports a negative relationship between firm 
performance and board size while in the post-2009 era both performance indicators also 
report negative relationships between firm performance and board size. This implies that as 
the size of a ﬁrm’s board increases, the less the degree of its impact on the ﬁnancial 
performance on the ﬁrm. This result is consistent with theory which states that as board 
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increases in size, free riding increases and reduces the efﬁciency of the board in monitoring 
management and providing strategic human resource for the organization (Ujunwa et al., 
2012). Paul (2009) examined the impact of board size on firm performance for a large sample 
of 2746 UK listed firms over 1981–2002. He found that the negative relation is strongest for 
large firms, which tend to have larger boards therefore supporting the argument that problems 
of poor communication and decision-making undermine the effectiveness of large boards. 
Hypothesis 4 suggests a negative relationship between non-executive female directors and 
performance. In the analysis for all firm on the NSE, this research found a negative 
relationship between Tobin's Q and ROA – our firm financial performance indicators – and 
non-executive female directors with significance. The pre and post-2009 analysis indicate 
either zero coefficient or statistically insignificant relationship between non-executive female 
directors and performance. This result cannot support the findings of Carter et al. (2003) and 
Smith et al. (2006) who report a positive relationship in the U.S. This result also refutes the 
resource dependency theory. Our results may make more sense in the Nigerian context.  
According to Ujunwa (2012) most female corporate board members in Nigeria have strong 
ties with the owners of the firms, and do not have any corporate background, they are likely 
to increase agency cost and delay decision-making process which will negatively affect 
performance (Terjesen et al., 2009). However, the issue might not be because of incapability 
of the female board member but the potency of their voice on the board. According to our 
qualitative analysis, the voice of a critical mass on board is important for the effectiveness of 
women and minority groups on board. According to Kanter (1977a) skewed groups on 
corporate board would be especially problematic because the tokens are either in focus or 
they are overlooked, and they may be subject to stereotyping (Kanter, 1977a). 
Finally, Hypothesis 5  proposes that the number of women directors on a major board 
committee is positively related to the financial performance of the firm. Our empirical 
research found out either weak or no link between the number of women directors on a major 
board committee and financial performance of the firm on the NSE. The argument discussed 
in hypothesis 2 is applicable here. Without the critical mass the positives of the business case 
for gender and ethic minorities diversity on board cannot be attained.  
We conclude from our quantitative analysis, particularly regarding our diversity variable, that 
we found an overall effect of ethnicity (Igbo) on firms on the NSE in the financial sector, 
however other sectors do not show enough evidence to accept or denies the effect of ethnicity 
on board.  
We can also conclude that there is no evidence for a relationship between gender on board 
and firm performance. Further more, the relationship between board size and firm 
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performance has consistently through the different models explored remained negative. This 
confirms the argument in the literature that a large board would increase agency cost, reduce 
the effective of the board by slow decision making etc. We can also conclude from our study 
that there is no evidence that non-executive female board member, or women on board 
committee make any impact on firm performance in Nigeria firms. 
6.5  Further investigation for qualitative analysis 
The qualitative section investigates the result of the relationship between boardroom 
characteristic and financial performance on the NSE by getting a sense of boardroom culture. 
This section would, therefore, be asking what influences board composition on a typical 
Nigerian corporate board. The quantitative analysis result shows a mixed evidence for 
ethnicity on board with Igbo positively related to performance in the financial sector but no 
significant relations recorded with all ethnic groups in other sectors. This section would be 
investigating these findings by asking question about regionality/ethnicity on board, the effect 
of local/catchment recruitment to board position. 
Female directors according to the quantitative analysis do not have any significant effect on 
the financial performance of firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. This research would 
further question the chances of women making meaningful contributions on board given the 
social, economic context of Nigeria. This research further investigates social networking and 
its effect on the chances of women and minorities becoming a director and the dynamics on 
the corporate board. It will also investigate the social acceptability of the Nigerian woman 
shattering the glass ceilings and its effect on board composition, Double Shift for women and 
minorities and how leadership structure could influence the direction of a firm.  
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7 Diversity and firm performance: 
qualitative analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
This Chapter employs content analysis and thematic analysis to examine the importance of 
boardroom characteristics and how they affect financial performance on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange while getting a sense of boardroom culture and how diversity influences boardroom 
culture. A content analytic approach could start with existing theory or prior research about a 
subject matter that is incomplete or would benefit from further description. Hence, the 
qualitative researcher might choose to use a directed approach to content analysis or the 
researchers could avoid using preconceived categories (Kondracki et al., 2002) instead 
allowing the categories and names for categories to flow from the data. To do that the 
researchers immerse themselves in the data to allow new insights to emerge. This analysis 
employed the use of content analysis to analyse the form and substance of communication. 
Underlying meanings and ideas are revealed through analysing patterns in elements of the 
text, such as words or phrases (Yang, 2008, p689). We have coded based on reoccurring 
themes from the interview discourse to make observations about the messages conveyed 
(Babbie, 2013).  
Thematic analysis is a widely used qualitative analytic method (Babbie, 2013, Vaismoradi et 
al., 2013). Qualitative approaches are incredibly diverse, complex and nuanced (Holloway 
and Todres, 2003, Vaismoradi et al., 2013), and thematic analysis should be seen as a 
foundational method for qualitative analysis. Thematic analysis is a qualitative analytic 
method for ‘identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally 
organises and describes data sets in detail. However, frequently it goes further than this and 
interprets various aspects of the research topic’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this case, the 
research is looking to identify through the interviews, themes that explain how diversity and 
other board characteristics on the Nigerian corporate boards affect performance. 
Interviews were conducted with 32 board members across four major sectors in the Nigerian 
economy and are on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The sector selections were informed by 
their importance to the Nigerian economy and the availability of respondents. According to 
the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, the oil and gas industry accounts for 70% of the Nigerian 
budget and the finance, service and conglomerate sectors are the employers of highly skilled 
workers in Nigeria, and they are the drivers of the Nigerian economy, hence, their importance 
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in this research. The interviewees consist of 25 men and 7 women. We were only able to 
reach 7 women first because we are constrained by the few number of women on corporate 
boards in Nigeria and secondly the unavailability of these women on board owing to a packed 
schedule of activities. This is no surprise as the literature suggests that heavy workload, 
assuming long and flexible working hours are key ways to suggest commitment to job and 
organisation (Hansford et al., 2002) and more so for Nigerian women it is important that they 
not only show commitment at work but also at home (Adesina, 1992). Of the 25 men, 14 are 
executives, 11 are non-executives, out of the 7 women interviewed, three are executives, and 
four are non-executives. All participants are married with children except for one female 
board member. This shows the importance of managing family and career especially for 
women in Nigeria (Momoh et al., 2013, Sen and Grown, 2013). 
Table 7.1: Research interviewee profile 
Gender                                                                                                                                           Male Female 
                                                                                                                                                        25           7 
Age                                                                               > 55                                                           6            2 
                                                                                      45-54                                                        19          5 
                                                                                      <45 
                                                                                    
Ethnicity                                                                    Yoruba                                                      15          4 
                                                                                      Igbo                                                           8            3 
                                                                                      Hausa                                                        2            0 
Region                                                                        West                                                        19          5 
                                                                                       South                                                       6           2 
                                                                                       North                                                       0           0 
Family Formation                                                    Married                                                   25         7 
                                                                                       Married with Kids                               25         6 
                                                                                       Single                                                       0           0 
Sector Representation                                            Oil & Gas                                                 14          4 
                                                                                       Finance                                                   6            3 
                                                                                       Conglomerate                                        3           0 
                                                                                       Service                                                    2            0 
Executive and Non-executive board member Executive Board members                  14         3 
                                                                                       Non-executive Board members         11         4  
Years in current organisation                               > 15                                                          20        4 
                                                                                       < 5                                                             6          2 
Educational Degree                                                Bachelor’s Degree or equivalent         25        7 
                                                                                      Master’s Degree                                     22        7 
                                                                                      PhD                                                            8          4 
                                                                                      Overseas degree (any)                           10        5 
                                                                                      Domestic degree (only)                          14       2 
 
24 participants have been with their current employer for more than 16 years while eight have 
been with current employers for less than five years. It was important to have regional and 
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ethic representation in our sample to understand if regionality or ethnicity play any part in 
board recruitment in Nigeria. 
From Table 7.1 we see that most of our research respondents are employed in the Oil and Gas 
sector (18) and finance sector (9) second mainly due to access reasons. In the Oil and Gas 
sector, ethnicity is about the same for Igbo (7) and Yoruba (11) with only one Hausa. A good 
number (5, 5) have a PhD in the Finance and Oil and Gas sector in Nigeria with at least a 
degree (6, 8) obtained from universities abroad. These figures, however, does not necessarily 
describe the leadership of the companies on the NSE more generally. 
A code was assigned to each participant such as OGMY1. The first two letters denote the 
sector (OG= Oil and Gas). Only in this case do we have two letters denoting the sector. Other 
sectors have one letter representation i.e. F (Financial), C (Conglomerate), S (Service). The 
next letter represents Gender: M for male and F for female. The next letter Y denotes the 
ethnicity of the interviewee. There are over 500 ethnicities in Nigeria, but the three major 
tribes are Yoruba (as in the case of the example), Igbo and Hausa. Finally, the number 1 
signifies the chronology of the interviews and for referral back to the transcripts. 
There are six main themes, which are deduced from the interview to achieve research 
objectives. They include the following; 
 Social Networking reducing chances of women and minorities from reaching 
boardroom appointment 
 Regionality/local content and a biased board composition 
 Social acceptability: its effect on board composition 
 Quality versus Diversity  
 Double Shift for women and minorities 
 Leadership Structure 
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Table 7.2: Research Interviewee profile by sector 
                                                                                                                                                        Financial               Conglomerate                   Service                       Oil and Gas 
Gender                                                                                                                                           Male Female         Male  Female           Male    Female             Male    Female 
                                                                                                                                                        6            3                  3          0                      2          0                        14           4 
Age                                                                               > 55                                                           6            1                  0          0                     2          0                         15          3 
                                                                                      45-54                                                        0             2                 0          0            
                                                                                     < 45 
Ethnicity                                                                      Yoruba                                                      5            2                  3          0                     0           0                         8           2 
                                                                                      Igbo                                                           1            1                  0          0                     2           0                         5           2 
                                                                                      Hausa                                                        0            0                  0          0                                                             1           0 
Region                                                                          West                                                        5           2                    3           0                                                            8            2 
                                                                                       South                                                       1           1                   0           0                    2           0                         5            2 
                                                                                       North                                                       0           0                   0           0                                                            1            0 
Family Formation                                                       Married                                                   6          3                     3           0                   2           0                         8            1 
                                                                                       Married with Kids                                 6          3                     3           0                   2           0                         5            2 
                                                                                       Single                                                       0           0                   0           0                   0           0                         1            0 
Executive and Non-executive board member       Executive board members                  3            2                   3           0                                                           8            1 
                                                                                       Non-executive board members         3           1                    0           0                   2           0                        6             3 
Years in current organisation                                   > 15                                                          5          2                    3           0                   2           0                        10           3 
                                                                                       < 5                                                            1          1                    0           0                   0           0                         5            1 
Educational Degree                                                   Bachelor’s Degree or equivalent         6          3                    3           0                   2           0                        14          4 
                                                                                      Master’s Degree                                     5          3                    2           0                   1           0                        14           4 
                                                                                      PhD                                                           3          2                    1           0                    0           0                        4            1 
                                                                                      Overseas degree (any)                          3           3                   1           0                    0           0                        6            2 
                                                                                      Domestic degree (only)                         3          0                   2            0                   3           0                        6            2 
Source: compiled from interviews.  
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Table 7.3: Participants/themes 
THEMES RESEARCH OBJECTIVE INTERVIEW LITERATURE 
Social Networking  To understand how social 
networking affect the 
chances of women and 
minorities from reaching 
boardroom appointment 
 
OGMY2 
OGFY12 
FFY3 
OGMI17 
(Grant and Taylor, 2014, Ujunwa, 
2012, Oakley, 2000, Chovwen, 
2007) 
Regionality/local content and 
board composition 
To find out the importance 
regionality/local content 
on board composition of 
Nigerian firms and if causes 
bias 
OGM18 
OGFY4 
BMI10 
CM122 
SMY16 
(Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-
Kwaako, 2007) (Ibrahim, 2016a) 
Social acceptability To understand the context 
that women and minorities 
operate in the Nigerian 
society and how/if this 
effect is carried over to the 
Nigerian corporate world 
 
BFY11 
BFY12 
OGY6 
OGMY2 
OGMI117 
CMI22 
FFY3 
OGFI14 
OGFY13 
(Chovwen, 2007, Mordi et al., 
2010, Terjesen and Singh, 2008, 
Yap and Konrad, 2009, Terjesen 
et al., 2013) 
Quality versus Diversity  
 
To understand top 
managerial position 
requirements and how firm 
decide the best candidate 
on quality and diversity of 
the candidates 
OGMY2 
BFY12 
BFY11 
CMY22 
ITMY19 
BFI13 
OGY3 
OGFI13 
(Adesua Lincoln and Adedoyin, 
2012, Carter et al., 2010, Carter 
et al., 2003, Powell et al., 2002, 
Powell and Graves, 2003) 
Double Shift for women and 
minorities 
 
How does double shifting 
for women and minorities 
on the Nigerian corporate 
firms affect their career 
path 
BFY11 
BFI13 
OGMY3 
CMY22 
BFY11 
BFI13 
FFY1 
(Blair-Loy, 2009, Chovwen, 2007, 
Oakley, 2000, Syed and Van 
Buren, 2014) 
Leadership Structure  
 
 
 
The effect of leadership 
structure on the decision-
making process of the firm 
and how it affect firm 
performance 
OGMI7 
OGFY12 
OGMY3 
OGMY2 
OGMY1 
 
(Carter et al., 2010, Dalton et al., 
1998, Dalton and Kesner, 1983, 
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7.2 Characteristics of board members and its effects on organisation 
performance 
According to Fondas and Sassalos (2000), better corporate governance should be attained when there 
is a varied exchange of experiences and voices on corporate boards. Examining the characteristics of 
the corporate boardroom is important to understanding organisational culture, corporate governance 
best practices and how they influence organisational performance. Our quantitative research suggests 
a negative result and we want to establish whether this is because the women on boards are too 
closely linked to the owners or if they do not have an effective voice, we therefore will use qualitative 
methods to check our result. By doing this we get a sense of how gender and minorities on corporate 
board are appointed and how they affect decision-making processes. These issues have been 
extensively explored in the literature review, researchers agree that key variables like social 
networking, skills, experience and social acceptability play a major role in boardroom appointment 
(Carter et al., 2007, Ujunwa, 2012). Under-representation of women and minorities on corporate 
boards can be the result of discrimination as a consequence of the social networks they belong to, and 
the social acceptability of women by the society to which they belong (Mordi et al., 2010).  
Specified in the literature particularly in Lord Davies of Abersoch (2014) is the fact that some of the 
benefits of diversified corporate boards are that they improve performance and generate higher 
creativity. They also give access to the widest talent pool, bring innovation and quality decision-
making at individual and group levels and mean that firms are being more responsive to the market 
and achieve better corporate governance. This study hopes to explore these points in an emerging 
country context such as Nigeria where good governance is critical but is also developing. Therefore, 
we will critically analyse the interviews of respondents at the executive board of director level, to 
examine where these characteristics are most critical and to analyse quantitative data to see if any of 
these characteristics affect the financial standing of Nigerian corporation on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange.  
According to (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) board functioning is highly related to organisational 
performance, the question this study hopes to answer is whether increased diversity of the boardroom 
affects overall company performance in an emerging country context such as Nigeria which has a 
complex history in diversity in both attitudes to women but also to people of different ethnicity. 
According to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), there are two key functions for boards that are highly 
related to the performance of the organisation. First, boards are commonly the most influential players 
defining strategy/direction and decision-making inherent in their structural position. Second, boards 
fulfil a monitoring role that may include representing shareholders, monitoring proper use of 
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organisations’ wealth, response to takeover threats and hiring, compensating and monitoring the 
performances of top management.  
Taking into consideration Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)’s research, Fondas and Sassalos (2000) 
argue that the presence of women directors help a board execute its strategic function because their 
experience is often closely aligned with company needs. For example, Fondas and Sassalos (2000) 
note that women may have a slight edge over men regarding impacting strategic planning. 
Consequently, women can potentially help the board fulfil its strategic role. Women tend to take the 
director’s role very seriously, which can lead to improved corporate governance through more 
questioning and open discussion (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). The presence of women on boards, 
according to the literature, leads to more civilised behaviour and sensitivity to other perspectives, as 
well as a more interactive and transformational board management style (Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
Companies without women directors may find that large investors such as pension funds start to 
question whether to put their funds in companies not demonstrating equal opportunities at the top. 
Also, women directors play an important part as role models for younger women and symbolise 
career possibilities to prospective recruits (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004).  
Burke (2000) offers some additional practical reasons why firms should consider adding qualified 
women to the board. He notes that in general there are not currently enough talented directors to go 
around, a point that is also relevant to an emerging country context.  Men currently serving on boards 
do not have the time to take on additional responsibilities. This makes the continuing reliance on male 
CEOs for board members less practical and potentially dilutes quality. Therefore, firms should expand 
their searches beyond the traditional talent pools. He also notes that women can add important 
symbolic value both inside and outside the organisation, thereby linking the firm with other 
constituencies. However according to Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) the philosophy that there are not 
enough talented CEOs is a way to exclude outsiders and to socially exclude women and minorities 
from reaching to managerial positions. In Nigeria, the latter is potentially the case as women occupy 
many subcommittee seats e.g. remuneration, audit, compensation and management resources, etc. but 
do not get to board membership. Furthermore, according to Ujunwa et al. (2012) research in Nigeria, 
concluded that when there is an influx of women in management, it signals to shareholders that 
change is about to take place, and the ripple effect causes encouragement amongst shareholders which 
might then result in an increase in share price. Also in Lückerath-Rovers (2013) study, through 
examining 99 listed companies in the Dutch Female Board Index, they concluded that firms with 
women directors perform better than those without women on their boards. 
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According to Ogbechie (2012), the Nigerian corporate world is a managerial hegemony which makes 
the board an old-boys ran club making the board set up a legal fiction. Hence, it is imperative to allow 
an environment for women and ethnic and regional minorities to have a voice on corporate boards. 
Selby (2000) interviewed women board members from top US firms and observed that by including 
gender diversity on their boards, firms concomitantly included diversity in other experiences and 
values. She notes that the “questioning culture” of a board can be influenced, in a positive respect, by 
having women board members. This assumption is made with the premise that women and minorities 
are entering an exclusively male dominated circle. Otusanya et al. (2013) and Ujunwa (2012) are 
supportive of the above, stating that women directors help foster competitive advantage by dealing 
effectively with diversity in labour and product markets. It is important however, that women and 
ethnic minorities should be given an opportunity to prove their value on corporate boards not just for 
the access they provide but also for their competence and managerial abilities. Otusanya et al. (2013) 
see women directors as champions for change because in most cases they are relatively younger than 
their male colleagues are and are open to relatively newer ideas and approaches to doing business. 
Ujunwa (2012) argues that the board should reflect the diversity of the firm’s customer base and 
labour pool.  
These arguments may well apply to regional diversity as well as gender diversity. According to 
Maume (1999), there is a positive correlation between race on corporate boards and financial 
performance in some US top organisations. Despite an extensive body of literature examining the 
relationship between women on boards and firm financial performance, the evidence is mixed. 
According to Post and Byron (2015) who compared studies by statistically combining the results from 
140 studies and examine whether these results vary by firms' regulatory and socio-cultural contexts. 
They found that female board representation is positively related to Tobin's Q and that this 
relationship is more positive in countries with stronger shareholder protection. They explained that 
this result might be so because shareholder protection motivates boards to use the various boardroom 
characteristics to good effect. They further claimed that even though the relationship between female 
board representation and market performance is near zero, the relationship is positive in countries 
with greater gender parity and negative in countries with little gender parity like in the case of Nigeria 
in our research. (Post & Bryan 2015). They believed this because of societal gender differences in 
human capital, which may affect shareholder's assessment of the future earning prospect of companies 
that have greater female directors. 
Hence, this chapter explores, using interviews from key sectors of the Nigerian economy, the effect of 
diversity on boardroom characteristics in the Nigerian corporate organisation. 
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7.3 Social Networking amongst appointed board members  
Several related theories of social groups (e.g., attraction-selection-attrition, homo-social reproduction) 
examines how people seek to have interaction with people with the same demographic profiles, 
perspectives, and values, which are then reinforced in intragroup communication (Terjesen et al., 
2015b). Tajfel (1986)'s social identity theory explains that individuals describe themselves according 
to the groups they represent such as gender, race, class, and occupation. In most cases, there is 
segregation into insiders and outsiders, and people are more likely to give or proffer allegiance to 
people they regard as insiders, making it harder for outsiders to infiltrate the team. 
Even with an increase of women on FTSE 100 boards in March 2018 to almost 27.7%, up from 20.7% 
in 2014 the UK as still not reached the 25% target (Griffiths, 2018). Oakley (2000) commented on 
career barriers hindering women from achieving CEO positions in the USA, which are also very 
relevant for the West African context and for women trying to achieve elite positions on corporate 
boards. This is especially relevant to Nigeria as indicated by the result of this research quantitative 
analysis, which going by our preferred model – fixed effects model, we found no significant 
relationship between gender and our performance indicators. Organisational barriers include informal 
and hidden senior promotion processes (Alimo-Metcalfe, 1995) (Patton and McMahon, 2014) and 
lower pay for women (Ruggie, 2014, Oakley, 2000). Behavioural and cultural explanations include 
gender stereotyping of leadership (Cuadrado et al., 2015); gendered communication styles (Grant and 
Taylor, 2014); management and “fit”, corporate culture, power dynamics, old boys’ networks and 
social exclusion (Dougherty et al., 2013), as well as elements of tokenism (Kanter, 1977a).  
Research reports these barriers are not peculiar to western corporate boards but also apply across 
Western and African countries, particularly in male-dominated organisations e.g. Fakeye et al. (2012), 
Ujunwa (2012) in Nigeria, Nkomo and Ngambi (2009) in Ghana, (Wachudi and Mboya, 2012) in 
Kenya. Many of these barriers may be unintentional, subtle forms of discrimination. As their gender is 
the norm in the business world, most males would experience organisations differently to females, 
and hence be unaware of what it means to be different. Appointment to the board and senior 
management positions is often based on political connections, ethnic loyalty and religious faith as 
opposed to considerations of efficiency and professional qualifications, cabal mostly dominated by 
men (Yerokun, 1992). Omotola (2007b) and Obi (2001) outlined some of the hurdles women face in 
getting to top positions in an organisation in Nigeria. The reasons are not farfetched, it is the way 
women are viewed by the institutions which are a reflection of the public (Meyerson and Tompkins, 
2007, Wood, 2006), "unsupportive working environment, organisational culture, national cultural 
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barrier, poor career planning and difficulty in balancing career and family" (Richard Iyiola, 2011, 
Friedman and Greenhaus, 2000).  
In Nigeria it is adjudged as an abnormality for women to take part in public affairs; women who 
undertake careers that are reserved for men are titled ‘wayward women’ (Okeke, 2017).  Thus, 
women’s behaviour may be different in organisational life compared to men. Women often shun the 
use of impression management, the strategies and tactics which people use to manage their reputation 
and the perception of their image held by others, especially at work (Vinnicombe and Singh, 2002). 
Such strategies include self-promotion of ambition and achievements; upwards influencing 
behaviours such as relationship building with managers and other key people; and ensuring other 
high-performance behaviours may directly affect material outcomes. For example, ensuring that one's 
competence, commitment and ambition are visible to senior managers may result in improved 
performance ratings as well as attracting more resources for their team. However, women tend to be 
more modest than men, and they often prefer to share praise rather than take credit due to their 
personal efforts, and they believe in the fairness of the formal structures (e.g. promotion systems) of 
the organisation (Rudman and Glick, 2001). Hence women do not easily gain upwards visibility, and 
they tend to dislike and avoid organisational politics (Frank, 2014), which may not be designed to suit 
their learning or working styles. Women often have different values, choose different paths and don’t 
plan their career portfolios (Vinnicombe and Singh, 2002). However questioning the ambition of 
women based on managerial style differences or visibility issues making then supposedly less 
qualified CEOs is not plausible (Iannotta et al., 2015, Lückerath-Rovers, 2013).  
In a survey sponsored by the International Women's Forum, (Geoffrey and Liu, 2015) found some 
surprising similarities and some significant difference between men and women leaders. Among these 
similarities are characteristics related to money and children. They found that the men and women 
participants earned the same amount of money (and the household income of the women is double 
that of the men). This finding is contrary to most studies, which find a considerable wage gap between 
men and women, even at the executive level (Lips, 2013, Gregory‐Smith et al., 2014). Geoffrey and 
Liu (2015) further concluded that just as many men, as women, experience work and family conflict, 
but the similarities end when men and women describe their leadership styles and how they interact 
with colleagues in the workplace. In an additional report by Desvaux and Devillard (2008) for 
McKinsey & Company, further research was conducted which confirms a correlation between how 
well a company performs and the proportion of women it has to its management team. They found 
that one element of the answer lies in the way they exercise leadership. Indeed, some leadership 
behaviours, observed more frequently among women than among men, have a positive impact on a 
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company's organisational output. In this way, women complement and enhance the range of 
leadership behaviours that are critical to corporate performance (Desvaux et al., 2007). They chose 
nine key criteria: leadership team, direction, work environment and values, accountability, 
coordination and control, capabilities, motivation, innovation and external orientation. Using this tool, 
they established a correlation between a company's level of excellence in these nine areas and its 
financial performance. On average, the companies ranked most highly according to these 
organisational criteria tend to have operating margins twice as high as those of the lowest ranked 
(Desvaux et al., 2007). 
Eagly et al. (2003) established a correlation with financial performance with the existence of a 
"critical mass" of at least three women in a corporation's management team showing whether the 
presence of women in itself or only in sufficient numbers contribute to organisational performance 
that could explain the positive correlation. They also found nine leadership behaviours that improve 
organisational performance: participative decision making, role model, inspiration, expectations and 
rewards, people development, intellectual stimulation (Eagly, 2007, Eagly et al., 2003). They found 
out that women use the following five leadership style - people development, expectation and 
rewards, role model, inspiration and participative decision making - more frequently than men. Men, 
however, adopt two behaviours (Control and corrective action and Individualistic decision making) 
more often than women with no significant difference in the frequency of use between women and 
men for the two remaining behaviours (intellectual stimulation and efficient communication). Men 
were more likely than the women to describe themselves in ways that characterise what some 
management experts call "transactional" leadership.' That is, they view job performance as a series of 
transactions with subordinates-exchanging rewards for services rendered or punishment for 
inadequate performance. Men were also more likely to use the power that comes from their 
organisational position and formal authority. The women respondents, on the other hand, described 
themselves in ways that characterise "transformational" leadership-getting subordinates to transform 
their self-interest into the interest of the group through concern for a broader goal. Moreover, they 
ascribe their power to personal characteristics like charisma, interpersonal skills, hard work, or 
personal contacts rather than to organisational stature. 
Chovwen (2007) conducted research on "barriers to acceptance, satisfaction and career growth of 
women in Nigeria. He used in-depth interviews with 32 female executives between the ages of 40 to 
58 years who have a minimum qualification of a first-class degree and have spent not less than one 
year in their present positions as executives in the health, judicial, finance and education sectors. He 
concluded that women are considered alien within the culture of traditional male occupations, a 
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culture that promotes camaraderie among the male folk and women are not admitted. To the 
respondents, acceptance connotes a positive attitude, a warm atmosphere. A person feels welcomed 
when he or she is part of decisions made in that environment. Factors that indicate perceived lack of 
acceptance include subtle and blatant discriminatory practices, exclusion from networks. Interviews 
by Chovwen (2007) were conducted in two focused groups, and one of the quote says:  
Sometimes when there is going to be a meeting, the head of the department will 
say, do not call her, she is a radical. This is because, I speak out, and I tell them 
the things they do that are not right. ... There is an underlying current of 
resistance, very subtle. One is sometimes shut out. It is a very complex situation, 
but women who want to remain in such situations have to persevere 
(Chovwen, 2007) 
Women experience a lack of acceptance if they are perceived as being strict, uncompromising and as 
a source of challenge and opposition. According to Agbalajobi (2010), some women executives adopt 
this "deviant attitude" to dispel the notion that they are weak. Unfortunately, this supposed "deviant 
attitude" is born from the stereotypical expectation of women in the Nigerian society, which is 
informed, by cultural norms and religion. Hence, these behaviours are seen to be contrary to 
expectation, and such individuals are tagged or given names such as “Iron lady” or Margaret 
Thatcher.  
There are differing views between senior women and CEOs regarding the barriers to progress to board 
positions. In a US survey in 2016, Patricia & Linda (2016) reported that most CEOs (82 percent) 
thought that women were held back by a lack of significant general management or line experience, 
compared to only 47 percent of the senior women. A notably 64 percent of CEOs thought that women 
had not been in the pipeline long enough, compared to only 29 percent of women. While 52 percent of 
the senior women thought male stereotyping held them back, only 25 per cent of the CEOs agreed. 
Similarly, almost half (49 percent) of the women said that exclusion from informal networks was a 
barrier, compared to only 15 percent of the CEOs. Other factors include caregiving and women’s 
choice, sex discrimination.  
As earlier pointed out social identity theory (Tajfel (1986) explains that individuals define themselves 
according to their affiliations to certain groups such as gender, race, class, and occupation. Hence, the 
insiders are protective of the caucus seeing anyone else as outsiders and are more likely to provide 
better assessments or appraisal of the insiders, making it more difficult for outsiders to join these 
groups. These theoretical frameworks have been used, independently or in parallel, to describe the 
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exclusion of women and ethnic minorities’ from social networks. For example, Daily and Dalton 
(1995) describe how CEOs, who are mostly men, are more likely to lead boards composed of 
individuals, of similar gender, as well as age, background, and experience. Social identity, social 
network and cohesion theories have also been put forward as possible explanations for the paucity of 
women on boards (Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
The effect of social networking on a board cannot be over-emphasised. According to the result of the 
interview, social networking is crucial to getting boardroom level appointment. 
"Birds of the same feather flock together. The only thing I can think of really is a 
recommendation by referral. We advertise positions but if for instance I knew 
someone capable and experienced for the job I can recommend. Which is also 
very important because we have a prior relationship". 
OGMY2 
Social network theory predicts that individuals with access to resources valuable to the company are 
likely to have the best chance of entering the exclusive network. Ackah and Heaton (2003) affirm that 
women were excluded from the networks through which they could make themselves known and 
learn about promotion processes. This is not peculiar to developed economies. According to Ujunwa 
(2012) When the board size is increased by increasing representation to outsiders, it is likely that there 
will be an ethnic diversity of board members in general. Such diversity is considered a strategic 
resource and provides a link to different external resources, therefore when the resource they provide 
could be the gateway to boardroom appointment. A study conducted in Tanzania showed that women 
who do not network remain vulnerable and liable to being rendered invisible and never remembered 
when promotions were being discussed (Izraeli and Adler, 1994). The ability to network was 
perceived as a business skill that is essential for building relations with clients, and as a method by 
which one‘s visibility to senior management is demonstrated, and this way enhances career 
progression (Groysberg and Bell, 2013). According to Ackah and Heaton (2003), a network of 
friends, colleagues, and clients can be valuable means to career advancement because it can prove 
beneficial in getting things done. Employees who network with its customers look good to 
management because they help to strengthen the employer‘s stability (Groysberg and Bell, 2013).  
There is an inherent culture on board that causes hindrances to women been 
heard in the boardroom or for new female directors to get an entry. This is the 
issue for many years now.  
FFY2 
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Directors are nodes in a network of organizational linkages, and contribute resources such as 
information and knowledge to their board, their organization, and to other members of the network, 
sharing power and acting as a socially cohesive group (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). A board is a 
privileged closed group with its rules and ways of thinking. Directors facilitate invitations to join 
other boards, by recommending and sponsoring colleagues like themselves, whom they know are 
likely to fit the existing mold. 
 
7.3.1 Participation in Social and Professional events  
DeCenzo and Robbins (2007) say that to increase visibility, women need to participate in social 
activities. This includes being seen at social functions, being effective in professional associations and 
developing powerful allies who speak well of you. Attending social gatherings increases one's 
visibility. According to Aswathappa (2005), one‘s presence at social functions and events provide 
social interaction and a source of information about career opportunities. To enhance career 
advancement opportunities, one needs to join a support group to be able to listen to others and 
develop empathy and other key interpersonal relationships. This can be a challenge to women 
especially when the institution requires their presence at formal gatherings e.g. dinners or cocktails 
that end quite late since they must balance work and family needs. According to Walsh and 
Borkowski (2006) professional networks provide instrumental benefits to their members such as 
information exchange, access to resources and promotional opportunities. Hansen (2008) asserts that 
it is important for one to focus on people with power and influence in the organisation to benefit from 
their clout. More often than not focusing on people at higher levels requires time, significant 
commitment, drive and passion that eventually drives results. She observes that women tended to 
focus on people at lower levels than themselves.   
Board relationships can also be explained using gendered theories of trust (Buchan et al., 2008, Walsh 
and Borkowski, 2006). While trust is variously defined in the literature, scholars in many fields 
identify gender differences, for example in trusting behavior, with men more likely to have the basis 
of their confidence in others, particularly shared group status (collective trust), and women more 
likely to trust both on this mutual trust as well as on the basis of a personal relationship (relationship 
trust) (Molloy et al., 2010). To this end, Walsh and Borkowski (2006) researched that women found a 
way to appear as good prospects to elite groups on corporate boards by proving to be invaluable. 
Hence, women may find it hard to break into the elite circle; 
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"…yes. It is cliché, but it is true especially in Nigeria. The top guys are only a 
group of few, and it is hard to get in unless you prove yourself invaluable to 
them…" 
OGFY12 
This indicates that for women and ethnic minorities on boards they have to very relevant to the 
organisation and other board members (be an ally) to have a voice at the board level. This could be an 
explanation for our quantitative analysis result, which shows no relationship between gender and 
firm’s performance. Traditionally, board members have been chosen from the ranks of existing CEOs 
(Gutner, 2001); and, because CEOs are mostly men, they engage in homo-social reproduction, or 
placing others on the board who have the same general characteristics-including age, gender, 
background, and experience (Daily and Dalton, 1995). We conclude that this is not only affects 
women but also ethnic minorities on boards as most Nigerian corporate boards are ethnically mixed. 
According to Okike (2007), it is called “The Nigerian Factor”. It has political, ethnic, religious, socio-
economic connotations. 
"...this company is owned and situated in Lagos. I know it is a cosmopolitan city, 
and you find more westerners on board here or those who have lived here for a 
while. It is not strange to find that link in most companies". 
BMI10 
 
As a result, in the Nigerian corporate world, men are more likely to get an advantage as a result of 
their social networks. As a participant inadvertently acclaimed that, the disparity in the ratio of men 
and women on board might work to the disadvantage of women; 
"…Like in the board of xxx, it is almost 50/50 gender diversity. In my previous 
employment xxx it was more 80/20 in favour of men and can sometimes make 
decision skewed towards the clique on the board."  
OGMY2 
Some more forward thinking sectors in Nigeria like the banking sector is enforcing quota system on 
corporate boards to improve gender diversity. The effectiveness of the quota system is well debated in 
the literature. According to Wang and Kelan (2013) using a sample of Norwegian quoted companies 
in the period of 2001–2010 to explore whether the gender quota requiring 40 % female directors on 
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corporate boards changes the likelihood of women being appointed to top leadership roles as board 
chairs or corporate CEOs. Their empirical results indicate that the gender quota and the resulting 
increased representation of female directors provide a fertile ground for women to take top leadership 
positions. The presence of female board chairs is positively associated with female directors' 
independence status, age and qualification, while the presence of female CEOs is positively related to 
the average qualification of female directors. Firms with older and better educated female directors 
are more likely to appoint female board chairs. It is also important to note that most corporate boards 
have only one woman director or a small minority of women directors. Therefore, they can still be 
considered as tokens. Torchia et al. (2011a) therefore tested a sample of 317 Norwegian firms to 
check if at least three women could constitute the desired critical mass. The results suggest that 
attaining critical mass – going from one or two women (a few tokens) to at least three women 
(consistent minority) – makes it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation. Moreover, the 
results show that the relationship between the critical mass of women directors and the level of firm 
innovation is mediated by board strategic tasks. 
This is emulated by the Nigerian Central Bank, the primary regulator for Nigerian financial 
institutions, who announced a regulatory directive requiring all banks operating in Nigeria to meet a 
quota of 30% participation by women on boards. The directive also requires banks to ensure that at 
least 40% of management is composed of women, as well as include reports on representation of 
women within their institutions in their annual reports statistics. The Governor of the Nigerian Central 
Bank outlined how this was intended to stimulate women's participation in development and nation 
building, furthermore explaining that the regulatory action was taken based on recognition of the 
underrepresentation of women among the leadership of financial institutions (Adebowale, 2012). The 
hope is that by changing the landscape of the financial sector, the regulatory directive would spur 
change in other market sectors as well. 
Though the regulatory directive represented a definite step toward parity, subsequent studies have 
revealed that many financial institutions continue to fall short of the 30% target. For example, Women 
in Management, Business and Public Service—a Nigerian non-profit organization that advocates for 
the success of women in the workplace—found that 19% of board members for Nigerian banks were 
women as of 2014 (Adebowale, 2012, Ogbechie, 2016). While this percentage falls significantly short 
of the 30% target identified in the regulatory directive, 19% is considerably higher than the 
countrywide average of 11.5% and the continental average of 12.7%. Moreover, this percentage has 
increased from 15% to 19% since the announcement of the regulatory directive in 2012, suggesting 
that some progress toward gender equality in Nigeria is being made (Ogbechie, 2016).  
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Furthermore, women in the Nigerian corporate world consider themselves well placed to get to the top 
position in their respective firms with increasing number of women on subcommittees e.g. audit, 
remuneration, etc. However, some of their male colleagues believe that this increase of women 
representation on subcommittee is an adequate accomplishment for their firm. 
"Absolutely. I do know many instances, at least here, where the number of women 
has outstripped the target this has not stopped them from recognition". 
OGMI17 
To improve boardroom membership women are using forums provided like Women in Management, 
Business and Public Service to clamour for support of each other. This is not a new concept. 
According to a report by Vinnicombe et al. (2015) Women are taking the initiative to increase female 
representation by building around the perspectives and insight of women themselves. The inaugural 
Global Women's Leadership Forum brought together 400 women across four regions simultaneously, 
inspiring them as mentors and role models too, in turn, encouraging the pipeline of talented women 
coming behind them. 
"…That is why we, the few women God has given the opportunity to be here, have 
to stick together. There are men's circles whether we like it or not". 
FFY3 
 
In summary, social networks on boards play a crucial role in interactions and dynamics on Nigeria's 
corporate boards most of which is dominated by men and ethnicity. Women and ethnic minorities are 
contending with homo-social reproduction of established board members, which makes women and 
ethnic minorities outsiders. However, with policy initiative like that in the finance sector, if replicated 
in another sector, could see a 30% representation of women and ethnic representation on corporate 
boards and as literature suggest is likely to improve monitoring, accountability and financial 
performance of organisations on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
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7.4 Regionality/local content and board composition?  
7.4.1 Regionality and Catchment area in Nigeria 
Some studies employ a resource dependency lens that views firms as operating in an open system and 
needing to exchange and acquire certain resources to survive, creating a dependency between the firm 
and external units. Within the corporate governance literature, firms seek linkages with the most 
beneficial resources and structure membership on the corporate board on this basis. Building on 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1978) arguments that board ties provide advice/counsel, legitimacy, and 
communication channels, scholars highlight the significant resources from directors' human capital 
and social capital.   
This sits in contrast to the focus on monitoring and control role that emerges from the separation of 
ownership and control and the resulting principal-agent problem in modern corporations (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). The board of directors is seen as an internal governance mechanism aiming at 
monitoring managerial behaviour and the quality of managerial decisions. Resource dependence 
theory (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) suggests that boards have an additional role in linking the firm to 
its external environment to secure critical resources. Board member networks and contacts are crucial 
for their ability to perform the role of boundary spanners securing contacts for their companies. 
Furthermore, the knowledge and expertise of board members are vital for their ability to provide 
necessary advice and insights into the organisational phenomenon and therefore to support 
management in making sound decisions.  
According to Hilson (2012), Corporate Social Responsibility was advocated against by some 
multinational corporations and by the 1980s, the rhetoric had changed dramatically. The very 
managers of the profit-making enterprises who, only a decade earlier, had questioned the role of CSR 
in business and seemed willing to violate regulations to maximise profits, were now openly embracing 
it. However, how it is executed/implemented in developing country may be different. One of the 
benefits of CSR according to the law of the Federal Government of Nigeria for catchment areas, 
especially in the extractive industry (Oil and Gas), is that a quota of its junior level staff in technical 
roles must be from the catchment area. Companies, therefore, use this to pay back and form real 
alliances with the community they work at:  
 “I cannot speak for the company on this matter but what I do know for a fact is 
that there is a Federal government policy around what is called catchment area 
and that applies only to junior staffs. Moreover, what the catchment policy says is 
70% of your workforce, junior staff, must come from your catchment area, so, and 
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we have operations in the Delta of course. So, what that means is that 70% of the 
workforce, junior staff that is the target should be from that area. That is what I 
can say". 
OGMI8 
Many of our interviewees believe it the right thing to do, and it is progressive since multinational 
companies in the explorative environment have affected the oil-blessed regions in Nigeria adversely. 
Their actions have affected the livelihood of the inhabitants of the region through oil spillage, gas 
flaring, etc. 
Consequently, the Niger Delta region has been engrossed in conflicts and violence that has hampered 
development, created insecurity, and has caused Nigeria’s daily oil production output to drop. 
Consequently, Nigeria loses revenue. Youth restiveness which has metamorphosed into the 
proliferation of arms, the emergence of militias, kidnapping, armed robbery, inter-community clashes, 
etc. has become an obstacle to economic growth and developmental drive pursued by the relevant 
authorities tasked with providing and ensuring a good life for the citizenry. Protests, (which are 
sometimes violent) have been seen by communities as a major way of attracting the attention of the 
oil companies, government and the general public to their plight (LaMonica and Omotola, 2014, Bello 
and Olukolajo, 2016). 
According to Hilson (2012), taking the case of Nigeria where Royal Dutch Shell has been extracting 
oil in the Niger Delta since the late 1950s. In 2010, the company ranked 27th on the list of the World's 
Top175 Economic Entities, generating US$378.152billion in revenues, while its host ranked 56th on 
this list, with a GDP of US$193.669billion. Although Nigeria ranks 148 out of 180 countries in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (International, 2015), this has not discouraged investment from 
European and US-based oil companies. Previously, especially during the military era, multinational 
oil companies responded to these protests by securing the assistance of the Nigerian police or military 
to terrorise and brutalise the people (Anthony and Pratt, 2015). However, instead of a decrease in such 
protests, most of which relate to unemployment, environmental degradation, destruction of the means 
of livelihood and lack of access to healthcare delivery, the region has become extremely volatile and 
portend danger to potential investors. It has also destabilised oil companies’ operations as most of 
their workers, and oil installations have fallen victim to the extra-judicial approach of host 
communities. Consequently, oil companies have decided to increase their corporate social 
responsibility towards host communities. It is believed that these will be the antidote or panacea to 
youth restiveness in the region.  
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"…plays a role at the technical level not in leadership level. Junior level of 
employment. There are some jobs allotted to the Delta where the company is 
located. They must qualify technically but the geographical location matters in 
their case… I think we have got it right there". 
OGFY4 
However, some participants believe that the idea of the catchment of local content is not only 
practised at junior level but also even at board level. It is felt that they stand as representatives of the 
community on board. However, the dominance of the number of the locals on boards is called into 
question. It is commonplace that the composition of the board is dominated by the region/ethnicity 
where the owner of the firm comes from. However, some directors believe that directorial recruitment 
and appointment using the catchment system is a process that results in mediocrity, nepotism and 
racial prejudice.  
"Ethnic diversity is usually a panacea for perpetuating mediocrity, nepotism and 
as such should not be encouraged." CMI22 
Other academic research in Nigeria also suggests that appointment to the board, senior management 
positions and even lower cadres are often based on political connections, ethnic loyalty and religious 
faith as opposed to considerations of efficiency and professional qualifications (Akanki, 1994a, 
Yerokun, 1992).  
 “We are a privately-owned establishment, we encourage diversity regionally but 
not at the expense of professionalism”. 
CMI22 
Most Nigerian firms believe ethnic and gender equality is a corporate practice that should be adopted, 
however they do not think it improves the financial performance of the firm. They believe the quality 
of decision making on board makes the difference and since most female or ethnic minority voices are 
ignored on boards, they do not recognise their contribution. However, their contribution is mostly not 
acknowledged because they are seen as token on firm boards because of an imposed quota on board or 
because they are the only woman on a board.  In Terjesen et al. (2009) analysis of interviews with 37 
women directors, 12 CEOs and 7 corporate secretaries from Fortune 1000 United States companies 
they found out that women who have served alone (and those who have observed the situation of one 
woman on a board) report that lone women are often not listened to. Respondents described a lone 
woman making a valid point, being ignored, and then hearing a male director be congratulated for 
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saying the same thing shortly after that. Lone women are often excluded from socialising with other 
board members and even from some decision-making discussions. 
7.4.2 Political Influence on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
Why do firms prefer to be politically connected? Is political connectedness always linked to political 
corruption? Researchers have noted that firms try to achieve economic advantages over their 
competitors in a variety of ways, including preferential treatment by state-owned banks in obtaining 
credit, easier access to government contracts, lighter taxation, and a more relaxed regulatory 
environment.  
The relationship between political corruption and economic performance has been a focus of attention 
ever since Olsen and Eadie (1982) argued that special interest groups could cause the stagnation and 
decline of nations. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) developed the argument that corruption is a destructive 
force in developing countries such as Nigeria. They believe that weak institutions, and the political 
connectedness of firms, provides a fertile ground for political corruption, especially when there is 
evidence of ‘‘abuse of public office for private profits'' (e.g., (Kaufmann and Vicente, 2011, Ujunwa, 
2011)). As a result, anti-corruption policies have become a central component of development 
strategies in many countries and the World Bank alone has supported more than 600 anti-corruption 
programs since 1996 (Banerjee et al. 2012). 
Based on the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys of approximately 8000 firms in 40 countries, they can 
show that ‘‘privileged'' firms are rewarded with an improved business environment (lower 
administrative and regulatory barriers, greater pricing power, and easier access to credit). However, 
these firms also provide politically valuable benefits to politicians through higher employment, 
bloated payrolls and greater tax payments. These “privileged'” firms are found to be worse performers 
than their non-influential counterparts. 
According to (Adekoya, 2011), it is easier for a politician to enter the board of a firm if the company 
is state owned. However, not all politically appointed managers or members of boards of state-owned 
companies are corrupt. Still, it is reasonable to hypothesise that if the state is a significant shareholder 
and politicians can appoint less capable but politically loyal managers and board members, an abuse 
of corporate governance mechanisms and political corruption might exist. Consequently, if politically 
appointed managers and board members serve the interest of political parties (e.g. by providing 
money for their activities) and also serve their individual interests (e.g., achieving promotion and 
higher pay), the principal-agent framework suggests that the quality of their decisions will be 
suboptimal, and the firms are likely to be less productive. If this political interference in management 
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decisions occurs in a significant number of firms, the negative effects will also appear at the 
macroeconomic level (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). 
Nigeria provides an interesting context in which to study the effects of external factors, due to the 
distinctiveness of its corporate governance system from the Anglo-American systems, such as the 
founding families who frequently retain control, play dominant roles in the management, and are 
responsible for corporate strategic direction and performance outcomes of public listed companies. 
Nigeria presents an evolving corporate governance system, significantly influenced by notable agents 
of convergence (e.g. politicians, former ministers, etc.), and provides a useful platform from which to 
examine the influences shaping the evolution, construction, expectations and expressions of corporate 
governance, in developing countries. 
In the post-colonial period Nigeria, like many developing countries adopted an interventionist 
development strategy that involved restrictions on foreign ownership and an active role for 
government in key economic sectors, especially infrastructure and oil and gas. This development 
strategy, operating in a context of weak market institutions and a lack of robust political democracy, 
did not result in responsible corporate governance. In recent years, international economic pressures 
have induced the country to adopt a program of economic liberalisation and deregulation. Advocates 
of the reforms tout their potential not only for generating greater economic growth but also for 
contributing to more responsible corporate governance (Ahunwan, 2002). However, there are sceptics 
of the new direction. 
A huge problem associated with majority ownership in Nigeria is government ownership (and 
influence). In corporations, wholly owned by the government, corporate governance and partisan 
political considerations merge. Several years of military rule and high levels of corruption have 
adversely affected the management of public sector corporations. Appointment to the board, senior 
management positions and even lower cadres is often based on political connections, ethnic loyalty 
and religious faith as opposed to considerations of efficiency and professional qualifications (Akanki, 
1994a, Yerokun, 1992). With every change in government and the leading party, alliances have to be 
made/changed to lobby for contract and get political favours hence the appointment of a key political 
figure on the corporate boards. Furthermore, according to Bhagwati, 1982 as cited in Ahunwan (2002) 
coming under the authority of government ministries, these corporations are also subject to the rent-
seeking behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats, which further reduces the level of professionalism 
and productivity in these enterprises.  
According to Ujunwa (2012), most board chairpersons in Nigeria are retired military generals, ex-
ministers and relations of ex-Nigerian leaders having close links with the firm owners as a result of 
 
 
 
 
153 
ethnic affiliation. This arrangement allows well-connected economic agents to earn returns above 
those that would prevail in an economy where the factors of production were priced by the market. 
Firms use these cronies to attract government patronage and shield from the axe of the law. Crony 
capitalism gives rise to agency problem between tax-paying citizens and policy makers and between 
corporate managers and stakeholders (Vaugirard, 2005). 
Hence for a firm without such political alliance or affiliation; 
"….there is no advantage, as the Government does not own my company." 
SMY16 
7.5 Social acceptability: its effect on board composition 
7.5.1 Self-Schema 
Self-schema according to Terjesen et al. (2013), (Terjesen and Singh, 2008)is an individual's 
psychological construction of self, based on some aspects, most commonly gender. Gender self-
schemas are developed from childhood and serve as mental models through which information is 
processed. Male gender self-schemas are based on roles, norms, values, and beliefs that are 
considered appropriate for men, such as income provider, dominance, aggression, achievement, 
autonomy, exhibition, and endurance (Yap and Konrad, 2009). In contrast, female gender self-
schemas are largely based on roles, norms, values, and beliefs held about women such as homemaker, 
affiliation to others, nurturance, deference, and abasement (Yap and Konrad, 2009). These self-
schemas are present from childhood up to the point at which male and female graduates evaluate and 
enter the workplace (Terjesen et al., 2007). Gatekeepers have views on gender-appropriate 
behaviours, roles, and expectations that may bias executive selection (Oakley, 2000). Gender self-
schemas are a feature of the Nigerian lifestyle from infancy to adulthood. Gender roles are also well 
supported by culture and religion. Hence, for women and minorities to take up positions on the board, 
they need a salient approval from family and society. 
"…yeah. For me, I am lucky I have a very understanding husband and family. 
When I was very young in 1989, my Dad told me to do a master's degree because 
in a few years’ time my first degree will not mean anything. When I started my 
PhD, my husband was very supportive, and the kids were all in boarding school. 
So it was easy. I was to be appointed to board my husband, by that time my kids 
were all in University.... he encouraged me and understood what the demands 
would mean for the family...." 
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BFY11 
"It helps that all the kids are grown up now. I will not have taken the job 
otherwise. I am not sure my husband would have agreed otherwise". 
BFY12 
"It is not much of an issue with my immediate family. They have been fantastic, but 
it is hard work. It is mostly the bickering outside the family. That is our society for 
you…" 
OGY6 
Research has established that national culture is a major factor defining women’s role in society more 
broadly, but also that country cultures help shape corporate board demography (Grosvold and 
Brammer, 2011). They concluded using Parboteeah et al. (2008) that these four aspects of national 
culture identified in their research (gender differentiation, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, and 
power distance) are present in particular groups and they play a role in shaping corporate board 
demography. Gender differentiation is the degree to which men and women are viewed differently in 
a given society. Where gender differentiation is lower, women are more likely to assume senior 
positions of authority (Broadbridge et al., 2006).   
Assertive societies are deemed to be characterised by more masculine values and norms with an 
emphasis on toughness and material possessions (Parboteeah et al., 2008), suggesting societal 
attitudes linked to more traditional gender stereotype roles. The Nigerian society is an example of an 
assertive society. Uncertainty avoidance refers to a nation’s reliance on well-established social norms 
to cope with unpredictability. Burgess and Tharenou (2002) stated that companies were occasionally 
reluctant to take on women directors as there was perceived risk and uncertainty in appointing them, 
hence in Parboteeah et al. (2008) work countries that score high on uncertainty avoidance are 
expected to have fewer female board directors (Bruckmüller and Branscombe, 2010). The concept of 
power distance captures the degree to which a country accepts and recognises that power is unequally 
distributed in society. Pyramidal, patriarchal control and gender inequalities are often associated with 
countries that are considered to have high power distance. Women are often accorded positions at the 
bottom of the career ladder and are expected to adhere to more traditional female gender roles in 
Nigeria (Chovwen, 2007, Parboteeah et al., 2008), suggesting women are less likely to hold positions 
of power in such societies 
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Even men on board understand the schema thereby making sure they have stay-at-home wives or at 
the very least a partner who does not have an equally demanding career. 
 “The nature of job could be demanding at times and my wife understands? She 
may not get time as she wants but you observe your holiday. You are entitled to 25 
working days, which you use efficiently towards occasion, or festival you would 
like to attend… (OO- so what does your wife do?) Personal business so she can 
have time for the kids”. 
OGMY2 
"I am mostly away from the family, but I am sure they understand. I have to take 
care of my family. My wife's job is not as demanding so she is at home more than I 
can be". 
OGMI17 
However, some do believe their organisation is doing well to combat this schism. 
"Everyone in this company has an equal opportunity to succeed no matter our 
difference. We have the right framework in place for women, for instance, 
considering childbearing, etc." 
CMI22 
For example, there are laws pertaining to maternity leave for six weeks before and after. 
However, compliance with the law may mean little when society’s attitudes are not 
supportive. According to Labour Act Chapter 198 (Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990) 
“In any public or private industrial or commercial undertaking or any branch thereof, or in 
any agricultural undertaking or any branch thereof, a woman- (a) shall have the right to 
leave her work if she produces a medical certificate given by a registered medical 
practitioner stating that her confinement will probably take place within six weeks; (b) shall 
not be permitted to work during the six weeks following her confinement; (c) if she is 
absent from her work in pursuance of paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection and had been 
continuously employed by her then employer for a period of six months or more 
immediately prior to her absence, shall be paid not less than fifty per cent of the wages she 
would have earned if she had not been absent; and (d) shall in any case, if she is nursing her 
child, be allowed half an hour twice a day during her working hours for that purpose” 
(Uvieghara, 2001). However, Udegbe and Udegbe (2003) reported that some employment 
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and placement practices in the workplace in Nigeria are such that women are not allowed to 
take jobs that may be hampered by their “reproductive health concerns”. All these have 
implications for the career development and retention of women in the workplace and 
particularly in male-dominated occupations (Udegbe and Udegbe, 2003). 
7.5.2 Work-life balance 
In a society filled with conflicting responsibilities and commitments, work/life balance has become a 
predominant issue in the workplace. The work/life balance of female employees has become an 
important subject since the time has changed from men earning the family living in today‘s world 
where both men and women equally share the responsibility of financing for the betterment of their 
family life. Work-life balance does not mean an equal balance. It means the capacity to schedule the 
hours of professional and personal life so as to lead a healthy and peaceful life (Sharma et al., 2012). 
Mooney and Ryan (2009) state that the main concerns from women‘s perspectives were the constraint 
to work longer hours that the minimum requirement in addition to the organisation anticipating its 
managers to be flexible to the needs of the business. When the demands of the job increasingly 
encroach into family life, women experience conflict which affects their career outcomes (Mordi et 
al., 2010, Terjesen and Singh, 2008). Mordi et al. (2010) stated that work-life balance is tough for 
women with young children especially when they try to balance their role as the primary caregiver 
with additional responsibility in the organisation. Research has illustrated that working women with 
rigid schedules report more family difficulties than working women with flexible schedules (Kauffeld 
et al., 2004). Where family demands are concerned, ambitious women seldom rely on organisational 
support for fear of reinforcing the common stereotype (Broadbridge and Hearn, 2008). Therefore, 
many women who are executives and those in elite occupations handle the conflict by making 
strategic choices between their career advancement and family such as ―opting out or postponing 
their marriage and parenting (Blair-Loy, 2009). In other circumstances, women also enhance their 
personal domain resources by relying on spousal support, for example dividing house responsibilities 
and taking care of their children (Brett and Stroh, 2003). Some of our interviewees confirm this: 
 “It helps that all the kids are grown up now. I would not have taken the job 
otherwise. I am not sure my husband would have agreed otherwise." 
OGFI14 
“I do not have kids, and in this society, you can imagine what that means. I love 
my job, and my husband has been great support... “ 
OGFY13 
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However, in certain cases such couple-level adaptive strategies, even though packaged as a couple's 
collective decision, do not necessarily promote women's work-life balance (Wierda‐Boer et al., 2008). 
It is important to note that both men and women given the Nigerian context, which is influenced by 
cultural and religious beliefs, have to deal with work-life balance but according to Keene and 
Reynolds (2005), women managers are at a disadvantage because of family and job responsibilities, 
and since family needs more attention, women managers are forced to avoid overtime. To handle 
work/life balance, Friedman and Greenhaus (2000) emphasise that working adults learn to build 
networks of support at home, at work and in the community. Juggling competing demands are tiring if 
not stressful and bring lower productivity, sickness, and absenteeism, so work/life balance is an issue 
for all employees and all organisations. The conflict between work and family has real consequences 
and significantly affects the quality of family life and career attainment of both men and women as 
emphasised by Friedman and Greenhaus (2000). In Nigeria, for instance, it is seen as the primary duty 
of the woman to take care of her home. This is her priority, while her career is secondary. In fact, men 
choose to marry stay-at-home wives or women who would want a job that gives them ample time to 
cater for the kids, which may help to continue the perpetuation of family norms.  
7.6 Quality versus Diversity and Double shift for women and 
minorities 
7.6.1 Quality versus Diversity 
Better corporate governance is achievable through sharing a broader and different range of 
experiences and opinions (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). Homogenous boards tend not to recognize 
how similarly members think because these values are the norm for them (Stahl et al., 2010). Women 
have different experiences of the workplace, marketplace, public services and community, and 
therefore women directors bring a different voice to debates and decision making (Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria, 2004). 
Many researchers explore the impact of women directors on firm level financial performance, 
reporting mixed results, although positive relationships are found in recent studies. Using data from 
3,876 public firms in 47 countries and controlling for a wide set of corporate governance mechanisms, 
Terjesen et al. (2015b) find that firms with more female directors have higher firm performance by 
market (Tobin’s Q) and accounting (return on assets) measures. Their study examines the role of 
female directors in enhancing the independence and effectiveness of boards and their results suggest 
that female directors send a positive signal to the public regarding a firm’s ethical behaviour, firms 
with female directors have better financial performance and finally the positive firm performance 
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effect of many independent directors is only positive if that board is also gender diversified. Other 
research show there is certainly a relationship between the presence of women directors and higher 
market capitalization in Fortune 500 (Catalyst, 2008) and FTSE 100 firms (Terjesen et al., 2007, 
Vinnicombe and Singh, 2002). 
MSCI ESG research of female leadership in U.S. companies they found out that companies in the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index with strong female leadership generated a Return 
on Equity of 10.1% per year versus 7.4% for those without (as of September 9, 2015, measured on an 
equal-weighted basis) (Lee et al., 2015). In the FTSE 100 study, the larger the firm’s market 
capitalization, the greater the likelihood is for multiple women directors, however market 
capitalization can be seen as a proxy for size. Firms with women directors are more likely to have 
larger workforces, as well as larger boards (Burke, 2000). The internal talent pool is larger, arguably 
providing more opportunities for challenge and growth, and more routes to the top for women than in 
smaller firms.  
Catalyst’s (2011) study found that companies with the most women board directors outperformed 
those with the least on return on sales (ROS) by 16 percent and return on invested capital (ROIC) by 
26 percent. Companies with sustained high representation of women—three or more women board 
directors in at least four of five years—significantly outperformed those with no female board 
directors. They also found a clear and positive correlation between the percentage of women board 
directors in the past and the percentage of women corporate officers in the future.  
Line experience is necessary for advancement into CEO and top leadership positions, and Catalyst’s 
annual Censuses show that historically women are underrepresented in these roles. This is also the 
trend in the Nigerian corporate world. According to Ujunwa (2012), only 11.7 percent of Board 
Directors in the country are women. This result is disturbing considering the growing number of 
women participation on corporate board of other developing and developed economies.  In the 
Cranfield (2017) report, the percentage of women on FTSE 100 boards has increased to 27.7%, up 
from 26% in June 2016. Women directors contribute unique skills, knowledge, and experience to their 
boards, but their feminine attributes may be masked in boardroom cultures that do not allow 
expressive behaviours. This can lead to the board having female representation, but only masculine 
behaviours, losing the benefits of diversity (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005). Some CEOs have to 
persuade female and male directors that it is okay to express intuition and emotion, and that “feminine 
intuition” about some proposed strategy might well be just what the board needed to hear (Terjesen 
and Singh, 2008). While this is an essentialist view of female talents, emotional intelligence of both 
women and men is increasingly valued at the very top. 
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According to OGMY2: 
“What are the types of talent required? Some skills are dominant in men or 
women. For instance if you are looking for analytical thinking that is taking 
volumes of decisions as people talk is found in women, they talk round in circle 
and think as they talk while the men talk straight. In talking straight at time, you 
miss out valuable ideas. It’s important to have equal opportunities”.  
OGMY2 
And to this end, there are policy implementations in the Nigerian banking sector; 
“I know the CBN is trying to increase women and minorities chances of top jobs 
in the banks. I think it is a great idea and would create a platform for women to 
show what they are capable of. We already have good examples of women doing 
great job in the Banking sector...” 
BFY12 
Some of the successful stories of the financial sector include: Sola David-Borha, CEO 
Stanbic IBTC Holdings PLC who is described as a woman with a strong personality and a 
high IQ is one of the highest paid CEOs in Nigeria.  Osaretin Afusat Demuren, Chairperson 
Guaranty Trust Bank who was confirmed sixth Chairperson of the Board of Guaranty Trust 
Bank Directors in April this 2015.  Ibukun Awosika, Chairperson, First Bank of Nigeria 
who was announced on 8th September 2015 as the new chairperson of the Board, making 
her the first woman to take up this position since the establishment of the bank. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) advocates for inclusion of more women in top executive positions 
and the importance of gender diversity in board positions. Statistics from the CBN shows that women 
occupy 27 percent of senior management positions and 15 percent of board seats (Adesua Lincoln and 
Adedoyin, 2012). In a bid to address the gender imbalance, the CBN has set a mandatory target 
requirement through the Banker’s Committee, the target is said to increase the number of women on 
the boards and ensure that women hold 40 percent of top management positions and 30 percent of 
board seats by 20146. Many corporations in Nigeria have set up committees tasked with oversight of 
the CBN Directive in a bid to ensure that they are able to meet the target and address gender 
                                                          
6 According to the then CBN governor, Sanusi this quota could not be met because the banking sector did not have enough qualified 
women to fill the position. 
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imbalance in their organisations. The CBN is also encouraging corporations to ensure that they 
monitor and report on the number of women and include a summary of how they have complied with 
the policy initiative in their annual report. This policy is important because fewer women than men in 
Nigeria are feeding through the corporate pipeline to the top executive levels and Nigerian women are 
poorly represented in corporate boardrooms.  
“I think more women should occupy top managerial positions and I know that 
there are women with the right qualifications even in this company who could 
occupy these positions. A lot of things can increase or diminish your chances 
getting to the top…. sometimes you need a bit of luck” 
BFY11 
The percentage of women on boards of Nigerian companies—11.7% as of 2016—falls slightly below 
the continental average of 12.7% (Outlook, 2016). Historically, many sociocultural factors have made 
progress toward gender equality in the corporate sphere difficult, including limited access to 
education for women which, in the past, resulted in a limited number of women presumed to be 
qualified for corporate positions (Fakeye et al., 2012). It is however interesting to note that the women 
interviewed were more educated than the men. Hence, it could be more of a social barrier to block 
women. While many companies in Nigeria still struggle to attain adequate representation of women 
on their boards, major oil and gas company Oanda plc has been recognized as having one of the 
highest percentages of women directors in Africa, with women comprising over 30% of its board 
(ADB, 2014). Though the regulatory directive so far lacks a strong enforcement mechanism, the shift 
toward parity within financial firms could play a significant role in shifting norms throughout other 
sectors as well. 
Some of the reasons for the disproportionate number of men on corporate boards stem from the fact 
that men in Nigeria often tend to occupy the senior managerial positions deemed a prerequisite of 
board membership. Traditional views and values as to women’s participation in economic activities 
are contributory factors which account for the lower numbers of women in employment or executive 
positions (Syed and Van Buren, 2014). For instance, women’s participation in the industrial sector is 
11% as compared with 30% for men. Women represent 87% of those employed in the service sector, 
which involves predominantly informal and unregulated forms of employment. In the Federal Civil 
Service, which is the largest single-entity employer in Nigeria, 76% of civil servants are men whereas 
24% are women and women hold less than 14% of total management level positions. Women 
represent 17.5% and men 82.5% of those employed within the medical field, which generally involves 
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highly skilled and relatively well-remunerated work. (CIDA Nig. GSAA 2014). However, given these 
figures one might expect a critical mass of women on most corporate boards on Nigerian firms. 
Furthermore, according to Uvieghara (2001) the  Nigerian labour law has no regulation that mandates 
nondiscrimination based on gender in hiring or promotion. This is whether the law specifically 
prevents or penalizes gender-based discrimination in the hiring or promotion process; the law may 
prohibit discrimination in employment based on gender but be silent about whether job applicants are 
protected from discrimination. This therefore means qualified women and minorities could be easily 
and without repercussion be discriminated against by organizations. 
However important the issue of increasing the representation of women and regional minorities on 
corporate board is, there are sceptics who believe that the advocacy for quota on board undermines 
quality on boards.  
“Merit and a broad experience base should be the most important factors in 
making Board appointments as it is the Board that sets the business direction of 
the company. Board appointments should not be seen as a popularity contest” 
CMY22 
“My own thinking about this is that in theory it’s a brilliant idea but we have to be 
careful not to create mediocrity because if people are well qualified that’s ok but 
if it’s not well balanced mediocrity sets in and performance dwindles. We do not 
operate quota system here. This is an equal opportunity company”. 
ITMY19 
According to research, mediocracy could be biased towards men and unfavourable to women and 
ethnic minorities on board. Early work by Petersen et al. (2000) on meritocracy focuses on the impact 
of sex, race, and social networks, to analyse the hiring process in a midsized high-technology 
organization, using information on all 35,229 applicants in a 10-year period (1985–94). For gender, 
the process is entirely meritocratic: age and education account for all sex differences. However, even 
without considering the two meritocratic variables, there are small or no differences between men and 
women at all stages in the hiring process. For ethnic minorities, the process is partly meritocratic but 
partly reliant upon social networks. Once the referral method is considered, all race effects disappear. 
In hiring, ethnic minorities are thus disadvantaged in the processes that take place before the 
organization is contacted. They lack access to or utilize less well the social networks that lead to high 
success in being hired.  
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In the “paradox of meritocracy” by Castilla and Benard (2010) they develop and empirically test the 
theoretical argument that when an organizational culture promotes meritocracy (compared with when 
it does not), managers in that organization may ironically show greater bias in favour of men over 
equally performing women in translating employee performance evaluations into rewards and other 
key career outcomes. To assess this effect, they conducted three experiments with a total of 445 
participants with managerial experience who were asked to make bonus, promotion, and termination 
recommendations for several employee profiles. The main finding is consistent across the three 
studies: when an organization is explicitly presented as meritocratic, individuals in managerial 
positions favour a male employee over an equally qualified female employee by awarding him a 
larger monetary reward. They concluded that the pursuit of meritocracy at the workplace might be 
more difficult than it first appears and that there may be unrecognized risks behind certain 
organizational efforts used to reward merit. 
According to Adesua Lincoln and Adedoyin (2012) the Nigerian labour market is gendered, with 
women reported to earn consistently less than their male counterparts, in some cases well educated 
women are reported to earn less than men who have lower qualifications. This state of affairs is 
supported by Okpara (2006) who identifies significant pay gaps between male and female managers 
within the banking sector. This problem is not peculiar to Nigeria. According to the Office for 
National Statistics UK 2018, the gender pay gap for full-time employees is close to zero between the 
ages of 18 and 39 years. From the age of 40 years, it widens. For all employees, the gender pay gap 
widens after the age of 30 years and this coincides with an increase in working part-time from this 
age. A negative gender pay gap among part-time employees (category that includes more women) 
emerges in the age group 30 to 39 years before reversing by the age of 50 years. However, after 
women return to work following the birth of a first child, that wage difference per hour widens 
steadily.  
Among this research’s respondents, there is a popular unanimity that a quota system for gender and 
minority on board is a good idea in itself but could easily be a catalyst for mediocrity, nepotism and 
gold skirting.  
“You can't over emphasise the importance of diversity on board. It does not mean 
mediocrity. There should be checks and balances in every board to make sure self-
interest are not more important that the corporate goal”. 
BFI13 
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This indicates an Agency problem which predicts the misalignment of interests between shareholders 
and managers, that is, managers engage in activities for their own benefits rather than the benefits of 
the firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A well-documented agency problem is 
managerial “empire building”, which refers to managers’ tendencies to grow the firm beyond its 
optimal size or to maintain unutilized resources with the purpose of increasing personal utility from 
status, power, compensation, and prestige (Chen et al., 2012, Daily et al., 2003). Hence, this can 
influence appointment into board membership with a CEO/ owner employing people with similar 
interest on the board forming a caucus in which most women or ethnic minorities would be outsiders. 
In Nigeria this is a popular situation (Ujunwa et al., 2012). Therefore for women and ethnic minorities 
to get board level appointment they must prove themselves an invaluable asset to the firm by 
academic accomplishments, lots of experience, alliance with firm external influences etc. 
A few board members actually think their organisation is doing enough regarding gender and regional 
diversity even though it is not necessarily at board level. This is also supported by research. 
According to Peterson and Philpot (2013), women are less likely to serve on key committees. While 
women are less likely to be on executive committees and more likely to be on public affairs 
committees, gender is no longer a significant factor in the likelihood of being on the nomination, 
compensation, finance, or audit committees (Peterson and Philpot, 2013).  
Boards of top US and UK companies are remarkably homogenous in terms of gender and ethnic 
diversity. Whilst there are more companies with women directors in the Fortune 500 than the FTSE 
100, of those companies with women directors, most have only one woman in the boardroom. When 
women are in such a minority at the top of large companies, they are said to be “tokens” (Kanter, 
1977a). Token theory suggests that when percentages of representation in the community fall below 
15 per cent, those who are different are seen as representing their category rather than being seen as 
individual, because they are so unusual. This is identified in interviewees’ response; 
“…I know but when a woman is on a board it's because she has undeniable 
qualities and is believed to add value to the company. That why you see 
increasingly the same woman on more than one board” 
OGFI15 
It is important however for the Nigerian firms to find a good corporate governance strategy to 
improve the critical mass of women and ethnic minorities on board because the literature has stressed 
the importance of at least three women in order to improve firm performance (Joecks et al., 2013, 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). According to sigh Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) in a board with a minority 
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of between 15 per cent and 30 per cent, the population is seen as skewed and in a skewed population, 
the minority individuals are less isolated and often provide social support for others. A better balance 
would be a 60:40 split and a perfect balance would be a 50: 50 split. Token individuals in senior 
positions have to give attention and make decisions about how to behave in order to fit in the group, 
using energy that those in the dominant category (males) do not have to expend. Very often, the 
tokens will seek to be assimilated by having a public face at work, keeping a private face hidden. 
Kanter (1977a)’s view is that when there are two tokens, the isolation is much less. Tokenism and 
newly appointed women directors in the FTSE 100 companies were discussed by Bailey (1991) in 
Singh and Vinnicombe (2004), who wrote that “The boardroom is still a male bastion, peopled with 
what John Betjeman called ‘businessmen with awkward hips and dirty jokes upon their lips”. Bailey 
(1991) commented that the enormous press coverage over the appointment of one female executive 
director showed that this was extremely useful in putting the company in a good light. Another 
woman director said that she took ages before accepting an invitation to become the only female (non-
executive) director of a FTSE 100 board: “There is a danger of tokenism. It is a difficult area for 
women. There is a good side in that everything you say gets listened to. The bad side is that you are 
allowed a much lower error rate than men”. She also commented on the boardroom culture: “There is 
a lot of camaraderie, habit and custom when men are together. When you bring a woman in, you 
indefinably change all that. But after a year or so, it’s all forgotten”. One of respondent picks this up: 
“It’s hard alone at the top, after a while you get used to it. I got valuable advice 
from the only other executive female member on the board years ago….” 
OGFY13 
7.6.2 Double shifting for Women and Minorities on Corporate boards 
Some of the reasons for the disproportionate number of men on corporate boards stems from the fact 
that men in Nigeria often tend to occupy the senior managerial positions deemed a prerequisite of 
board membership. Traditional views and values as to women’s participation in economic activities 
are contributory factors which account for the lower numbers of women in employment or executive 
positions and these social norms about gender roles in the economic sphere also influence women’s 
employment outcomes and their progression (Syed and Van Buren, 2014).  
Women face accommodating the sometimes-conflicting demands of their roles as women and their 
roles as leaders. In general, people expect and prefer that women be communal, manifesting traits 
such as kindness, concern for others, warmth, and gentleness and that men are manifesting traits such 
as confidence, aggression, and self-direction (Malibari, 2013). Because leaders are thought to have 
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more than communal qualities (Powell et al., 2002), stereotypes about leaders generally resemble 
stereotypes of men more than stereotypes of women. As a result, men can seem usual or natural in 
most leadership roles, thereby placing women at a disadvantage (Eagly and Karau, 2002). Although 
this asymmetry between women and leaders appears to be decreasing over time, it has not disappeared 
(Duehr and Bono, 2006). As a result, people more easily credit men with leadership ability and more 
readily accept them as leaders. 
Despite a general commitment to the principle of non-discrimination as enshrined in Section 2 of the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Nigeria falls short of the desired result of giving 
males and females equal opportunities to advance socially, physically, educationally, politically and 
economically.  Evidences abound that several negative aspects of gender relations, such as gender-
based division of labour, disparities between males and females access to power and resources, and 
gender biases in rights and entitlements, remain pervasive in Nigeria (Oyefuga et al., 2013).  
In addition to the expectations of the woman as a manager is the challenge of women’s double shift as 
wives, mothers and career women, as well as the greater geographical mobility required at higher 
executive levels which is linked to the reduction in the supply chain for leadership candidates. 
Nigerian women are reported to avoid promotion to executive positions if these involve working anti-
social hours or frequent travel away from their families (Oyefuga et al., 2013). This is not surprising 
as Nigerian women endure the most of household chores and care responsibilities. 
“It’s a man’s world. There is nothing we can do about it. I think most women I 
know on board including myself have to work twice as hard, travel, work late etc. 
and the scrutiny is fierce… combined with responsibilities at home”.  
BFY11 
“I know we all have to work hard to make positive impact on the company's 
board. I know that as a woman you may have added responsibility with respect to 
family…” 
BFI13 
 
This is not just a problem for women, it also applies to ethnic minorities on boards: 
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“I'm not talking on behalf of the company here but I can understand that some 
minorities have to work a lot hardly especially when the composition of board 
members is skewed to tribe (I won't mention any tribe)”. 
OGMY3 
 
A few on Nigeria’s corporate board however do not think double shift is a problem affecting women 
fulfilling their managerial potential. They believe in initiative and pro-activeness of its board 
members, with the expectation that you can come up with a solution and if you cannot your 
contribution is dismissed.  
“I pledge the fifth. I can't comment on that…I understand your point but I think 
everyone on this board needs to work hard and be productive”. 
OGMY2 
“In my opinion everyone has to work hard. It does not matter the tribe, gender or 
region you come from. The relationship don't really matter on board if you don't 
have relevant ideas and solutions” 
CMY22 
Which undermines the value of relationships on board, which is the bedrock upon which most 
decision making and board activities are made. 
The recent fraudulent activities of women in managerial position in the banking and oil and gas sector 
is also seen as a setback for women thus getting doubly penalized not just for the fraudulent act but 
for being a woman who committed fraudulent act. According Otusanya et al. (2013), bank executives 
and directors have been involved in corrupt practices in Nigeria which have had negative outcomes. 
Evidence is provided to show that, in pursuit of their own personal desires to accumulate capital, 
corporate executives have designed novel schemes to circumvent laws and regulations. Most famous 
of them is the women involved in this fraud. This sentiment is reflected in the interviewee’s remark: 
“...recent failures of women in top management positions in the finance sector as 
set us back a decade now. It's unfortunate…” 
BFY11 
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“…well most people can get away with mistakes on board but as a woman you 
have to very sure and get it right the first time. You really have to work twice as 
hard”. 
BFI13 
7.6.3 Challenging assignments 
Challenging assignments involve adding to an employee‘s existing responsibilities and this gives the 
employee a sense of recognition as they stand out (Aswathappa, 2005). Armstrong et al. (2006) argues 
that recognition is necessary in career advancement. Recognition could be achieved by accepting 
challenging assignments which stretch and compliment one‘s knowledge and then learn as much as 
one could. Dessler (2009) notes that challenging assignments provide employees with opportunities 
for achievement and motivation. Hansford et al. (2002) found that an ability to take challenging 
assignments helped professionals to fulfil growth needs. Undertaking challenging assignments entails 
the ability and willingness to assume a heavy workload and putting in long face hours (Dessler, 2009), 
because this demonstrates commitment to the organization and due to the increased responsibilities. 
Research done by Vinnicombe and Singh (2002) indicated that successful women attributed their 
career success to hard work which led to good performance. In contribution to heavy work load, 
Hansford et al. (2002) suggests that apart from assuming long and flexible working hours by 
extending the work environment to working outside of normal hours; heavy work load also entails 
having a preoccupation with work related issues like undertaking geographical assignments. This 
could be an indication of commitment to the job and organization. Chew and Zhu (2002) indicate that 
in organizations, it is generally expected that international assignments lead to career advancement 
and employees aspiring to be managers ought to consider this issue. Powell and Graves (2003) say 
that service in different geographic locations presents employees with opportunities to polish their 
skills by working on high visibility projects but because of the limited access to geographical 
assignments, women‘s career progression is hindered.  
The work environment also becomes unfriendly when women are seen to be unfit or uncommitted to 
work. For instance, male colleagues may frown at taking time off work to attend to personal or family 
issues. This attitude reinforces men’s belief that women are not fit for male dominated occupations. 
According to a female interviewee, she concluded that: 
... I think most of my male colleagues think of the female counterpart from a 
domestic standpoint. Hence they ignore your comments sometimes especially 
when it is against their opinion… you really have to know your stuff at this level. 
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FFY1 
 The issues raised above underscores the predicament of women in non-traditional occupations. It 
highlights the challenges they face in daring to intrude into an exclusive male domain. In African 
culture, men and women are perceived differently, while young men are encouraged to do well, young 
women and their assumed needs are less likely to fit into the demands of the industry (Chovwen, 
2007). Osayawe Ehigie and Clement Akpan (2004) reported that a woman in a profession is seen as 
violating the values and norms revolving around the female role; her career is seen as ambiguous, 
contradictory and a source of strain. This attitude further supports the view by Adesina (1992) that the 
role of women is seen as complimentary to that of men and not competitive. 
7.7 Leadership structure 
There is a body of research dedicated to the leadership structure of corporate firms (Carter et al., 
2010, Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Carter et al. (2010) found that the leadership structure of the firm 
and power of the CEO would have an impact on financial performance. Rechner and Dalton (1991) 
however suggests that firms with lower proportions of outside directors outperform their counterparts 
with greater representation by outside directors. This is empirically confirmed for both the small 
corporations as well as the Inc. 100. There are further discussions in the literature on the effectiveness 
of a CEO duality on corporate board. The preference for the separate board leadership structure is 
largely grounded in agency theory concerns regarding the potential for management domination of the 
board. As noted by Finkelstein and D'aveni (1994) 'according to agency theory, duality promotes CEO 
entrenchment by reducing board monitoring effectiveness.' Consistent with agency theory predictions, 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms with a separate board leadership structure outperformed 
those firms with the joint structure when relying on return on equity, return on investment, and profit 
margin. Nevertheless, the impact of the joint structure on firm performance has not been 
unequivocally established. 
An obvious assumption implicit in leadership structure/performance relationships is that the choice of 
the various governance options could be associated with changes in organizational strategy and firm 
performance. It has been argued that firm size could be an important factor in such an assumption. 
While the following specifically focused on the choice of inside or outside CEO successors, the 
sentiment underscores the importance of firm size: 'This assumption may be questionable, particularly 
in large organizations. The sheer number of persons involved, the complexity of the organization, and 
the variety of vested interests both inside and outside the company represent potential constraints to 
successful change strategies' (Dalton and Kesner, 1983). It may be, then, that the scale and complexity 
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of the large firm would cloud any relationship between board composition and structure and 
performance. According to our discussant; 
“…so, different companies have different structures and unfortunately the 
structure can change rather quickly. So yeah, every company decide various level 
for different people for various reasons. You can change your business strategy 
and change your structure. There is no fixed structure that we have and I think 
this is mainly because of the size of the firm and the sector (oil & gas). For 
instance the pressure of the fall in price could have effect on top level 
management staff as well as the lower level staffs” 
OGMI7 
Another critical aspect of the board, which potentially links it with financial performance, is the 
control role. This role, most closely aligned with agency theory, requires the board to monitor and 
evaluate the CEO and his or her top management team and company performance in general, as well 
as protect shareholders' interests. Here again, the scale and complexity of the firm may compromise 
boards' abilities to reasonably dispatch this responsibility. We could imagine that the availability of 
high-quality information regarding the firms' and officers' performance is inversely related to the size 
and complexity of the firm. We would also suspect a similar tendency regarding the balance of 
information, which is provided to the board by the firms’ officers, and information, which is 
independently derived by the board from other sources. The information flow between management 
and directors is particularly at issue under the dual structure as CEOs may carefully control the quality 
and quantity of information that directors receive when also serving as board chairperson. Others, too, 
have noted additional, pragmatic influences of organizational size on governance 
structure/performance relationships. It has been observed, for example, that CEOs and directors are 
less constrained by organizational systems and structures in the smaller firm and may have far more 
discretion as compared to their large- firm counterparts (Daily and Dalton, 1995, Eisenhardt, 1989). If 
so, the smaller firm may facilitate greater board influence and may enhance board structure and firm 
performance linkages. 
…yeah you are right. I used to work with xxx and decision making took too long. 
Here at xxx because of the size of the firm, it is a lot quicker making decisions and 
we have full trust in our staffs… 
OGFY12  
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There are bodies of literature dedicated to family businesses. Boards in Belgian for small and 
medium-sized family businesses perform two aggregated board roles: control and service. The control 
role is mainly based on agency theory, whereas the service role embraces several theoretical 
perspectives. These findings seem to confirm earlier research executed for the population of SMEs 
and/or family businesses. Some studies (Deakins and Whittam, 2000, Johannisson and Huse, 2000) 
acknowledged the board’s control or monitoring role, others have indicated the board’s involvement 
in several service-related tasks (Johannisson and Huse, 2000, Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000, 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002).  
In the Nigerian corporate world, the popular leadership structure is the separation of the CEO and 
Chairperson’s role. Out of 177 listed, 116 firm have the separation of CEO and Chairperson’s role. 
This is confirmed by the interviews taken: 
“We have the CEO and Chairman as different person on the board of this firm” 
OGMY3 
According to literature some of the pros of duality are that duality creates a clear-cut leadership which 
permits a sharper focus on company objectives and promotes more rapid implementation of decisions 
(Boyd, 1995). Along these lines, the case for the dual CEO is based on the need for dynamic and 
purposeful leadership in situations that call for quick, sure-footed decisions in all areas of the firms 
operation. It also helps to reduce the cost associated with transferring of knowledge to a separate 
chairperson on the board. However, empirical work on this subject matter remains inconclusive. 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) found no differences in the leadership structure between failed and non-failed 
firms. Donaldson (1990) found superior long term ROE when there is duality. Dalton et al. (1998) 
failed to find any significant evidence of differences in governance structures between CEO duality 
and non-duality firms.  
When we asked the board members which they prefer they had this to say; 
“The Chairman, CEO and all board members here enjoy a great relationship”.  
OGMY3 
“It’s pyramidal. Having said that there is a lot more empowerment here at xxx. I 
guess it’s because of the size of the company”. 
OGMY2 
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“At xxx we think that every performance success at board room level is as a result 
of the effort of our employees. It means we have an employee driven performance 
and the employee understand the leaders walk the talk and not only want result 
but they reward result”. 
OGMY1 
It is also clear from these comments how much respect plays a part on the corporate board between 
the chairperson, CEO and the rest of the board. This is because of the cultural influence on the board. 
“It depends on who the leaders are. At my time because of the African setting, so 
hmm,… it might be difficult for you to appreciate but in my generation, you hold 
your elders in reverence you cannot call them by first names and you cannot be 
too free with them. These days’ young people can even slap the elders and talk 
anyhow but at that time, it is good to understand the African culture and the 
context of the time. It still happens today but not like my time”. 
OGMY3 
In addition, this dynamic may affect communication of idea on board. 
“We used to have meetings, and you are free to speak out at meetings. When I was 
much younger, when I started at this companies there were no computers so you 
couldn’t send emails, but now you can make pictures of your ideas, send emails to 
your supervisors…. mainly the same things except that most of you are colleagues 
and have known each other for a while. At meetings, you can tell your ideas, send 
memos. It’s discussed and strategies formulated with CEO’s blessings of course”. 
OGMY2 
7.8 Critical review of theories using the interview response 
7.8.1 Board diversity, board composition, and performance 
In the managerial and organisational literature two theories, resource dependence theory and agency 
theory, offer the broad theoretic foundations for how board diversity and composition influences firms 
performance, public perception of a firm and how, in turn, these factors affect corporate financial 
performance. These theories are prevalently utilized in literature because they represent two key 
functions of the board (Carter et al., 2003). According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003), resource 
dependence theory offers the rationale for the board’s function of providing critical resources to the 
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firm including legitimacy, advice, and counsel. These board resources offer the corporation support in 
understanding and responding to its environment (Boyd, 1995) they can help it better achieve 
improved performance and attractiveness from investors. Agency theory provides the rationale for the 
board’s critical function of monitoring management on behalf of the shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
Fama and French, 1993). It also predicts that the misalignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers could lead to agency problems, that is, managers engage in activities for their own benefits 
rather than the benefits of the firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In order to exercise 
its monitoring function the board needs the appropriate mix of experience and capabilities to evaluate 
management and assess business strategies and their impact on performance (Carter et al., 2003, 
Ujunwa, 2012). Finally, the pressure on firms to have gender parity in director or senior management 
positions comes from a broad set of people, which includes shareholder activists, large institutional 
investors, politicians, and consumer groups (Fields and Keys, 2003). Hence, firms assiduously doing 
stakeholder management – by giving more voice to women, for example – will, other things 
remaining the same, be relatively successful and improve relationship with stakeholders which in 
return improves public perception. 
7.8.2 Diversity of director resources  
An effective board provides resources to the corporation including advice and counsel and links to 
other organizations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). These linkages can provide channels for 
communication with, and access to support from external organizations (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). 
Hence, board resources can help the firm manage business challenges (Boyd, 1995) and enable it to 
deal more effectively with external organizations (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). The board’s human 
capital resources are based on the collective experience and expertise of board members. This 
expertise includes insiders with knowledge of company strategy and operations, business experts with 
knowledge of corporate strategy, support specialist with knowledge of legal and regulatory affairs, 
influential members of the community with knowledge and relationships with external stakeholders 
including the government and local communities (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  
Diversity of experience is an important asset as studies with management teams have shown that 
functional diversity can enhance team innovation through the generation of alternative solutions and 
innovation (Bantel, 1993). Accordingly, the greater the diversity of board resources, the greater the 
potential for understanding and problem solving that can enable the board to effectively address the 
business environment and foster improved performance. Board resource diversity may also enhance 
network ties (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002). Insiders offer strong internal network connections. 
Business experts may offer connections to their focal firms and to suppliers, customers, and other 
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boards. Support specialists have connections with their focal firms, customer networks, and with 
professional associations. Community influential members may have significantly different networks 
composed of academic experts, medical and scientific resources, legal networks, and investment and 
commercial banking networks. Community influential members may also have network ties to 
government agencies, community groups, and non-profit organizations (Hillman et al., 2002). The 
variety of these network connections will aid the corporation in understanding and responding to its 
environment. These networks may provide advice and expertise as well as connections that foster 
collaboration and co-operation with key stakeholders (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002). In summary, 
the impact of a rich, diverse set of network ties should enhance ratings of CSR, because these ties 
provide access to support, expertise, and counsel from external organizations.  
The diversity of board resources also affects the board’s critical function of monitoring management. 
The relationship between the shareholders and the management of a corporation is an agency 
relationship subject to principal and agent conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to different 
perceptions of risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to address these issues, shareholders appoint a board 
of directors to monitor management. The board’s role in monitoring includes functions ranging from 
strategy implementation to rewarding the CEO and top managers of the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). In order to effectively monitor management, the board needs the right ‘‘skills, experience, 
expertise and knowledge’’ (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), 389). Diversity of director resources can help 
provide these skills. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) studied the impact of board ties and found that 
the board’s ability to monitor and advise management is related to expertise demonstrating that the 
background and experience of board members were crucial for effective monitoring. Diverse director 
resources can provide insider knowledge, line management skills, support specialist skills (legal, 
banking, and insurance), and experience working with the community (Hillman et al., 2002).  
7.8.3 Board gender composition  
In addition to director resource diversity, gender composition (i.e., the number of women on the 
board) is expected to have a positive impact on social capital and CSR. On boards, women are more 
than twice as likely as men to hold a doctoral degree (Hillman et al., 2002). Compared to male 
directors, female directors gain board experience with smaller firms and are less likely to have prior 
CEO or COO experience (Terjesen and Singh, 2008). Given the limitation of our research panel, this 
research cannot generalise in this case but all women on the corporate boards have at least a Master’s 
degree with 5 having a PhD while men have at least a Bachelor’s degree with 6 PhDs. However, we 
can conclude from our sample that women are better educated than their male counterpart are.  
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In support of the resource dependency theory Daily et al. (2003) concludes from their research that 
increasing board gender diversity can enhance decision making, as a wider variety of perspectives and 
issues are considered and a broader range of outcomes is assessed. The presence of more female 
directors may stimulate more participative communication among board members, if one assumes that 
gender differences in leadership styles, as evidenced in some studies, also exist at board director 
levels. If female directors are more participative (Eagly et al., 2003), democratic (Eagly and Karau, 
2002), and communal than men (Rudman and Glick, 2001), then having more women on a board 
could encourage more open conversations among members of the board. A broader perspective may 
enable the board to better assess the needs of diverse stakeholders. The result may enhance the 
board’s ability to improve effectively performance.  
Another theoretical underpinning for the expected relationship between board diversity and corporate 
reputation is signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2011a). Signalling theory assumes asymmetric 
information, and proposes that parties may convey, intentionally or not, relevant, but not readily 
observable information, through observable signals that are meaningful to the other party. In this 
regard, the number of women on a firm’s board may act as a signal to observers indicating that the 
firm pays attention to women and minorities, and is, therefore, socially responsible. In support of the 
signalling argument, a recent analysis of the annual report of Fortune 500 companies revealed that 
companies with higher percentages of female directors are more likely to display pictures of them in 
their annual reports (Bernardi et al., 2002). If one expects this signal of having more women on the 
board to be effective, then one would expect firms with a strong signal to have more favourable CSR 
ratings, and in broader terms, a better reputation. Some evidence points that this is a plausible 
expectation. Fortune 500 companies with a higher percentage of female directors were more likely to 
appear on Ethisphere Magazine’s ‘‘World’s Most Ethical Company’’ list (Bernardi et al., 2002). In 
the Nigerian corporate world, this is the case too. On most annual report of firms on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange, there is a figure and graphic representation of gender on their boards. 
Women also increase the demographic diversity of the board, helping to ensure the board’s 
demographic difference from management. (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) found that CEOs attempt 
to select board members who are demographically similar to them to secure support, and that this 
support led to higher compensation. Consequently, gender diversity on the board can help ensure 
demographic differences from the CEO needed for effective monitoring. The effectiveness of women 
on boards may increase with the addition of female directors. While a single female director may have 
a positive impact on firm’s reputation, she may also face challenges. Groups with a single minority 
member (e.g., a female director) may consider that minority member to be a token; they may perceive 
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the minority individual as less competent and of lower status. Consequently, the group may fail to 
take the token’s opinions or contributions seriously (Brewer and Kramer, 1985, Kanter, 1977a). 
Furthermore, research suggests that minority voices are not easily expressed or heard in groups 
(Nemeth, 1986) because social pressures encourage conformity with the majority’s opinion. However, 
when a group is faced with consistent opinions from multiple minority members, it is more likely to 
consider and learn from the minority voice (Asch, 1955). Empirical evidence suggests that these 
processes may also be at play on boards. For example, when a critical mass of women (i.e., at least 
three) is represented on a board, female directors are able to ask challenging questions and work 
together to demonstrate collaboration in decision making (Yap and Konrad, 2009, Brewer and 
Kramer, 1985). In Fortune 500 companies today and firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, however, 
most boards have fewer than three women and representation of more than four is rare (Catalyst 
Census, 2009; (Ujunwa, 2011). 
In summary, because female directors tend to have different educational and professional 
backgrounds from those of male directors, and may be more participative and democratic in decision-
making processes, diversifying boards by increasing the number of female directors may help ensure 
that more perspectives and issues are considered in the decision-making process, leading the board to 
achieve better decisions. The qualities that women bring to boards may also provide better oversight 
of management activities, because of the increased heterogeneity among the board, with top 
management teams, and the CEO. Finally, the presence and the number of women on boards may 
signal to stakeholders that the firm pays attention to women and minorities, and is, therefore, socially 
responsible. 
7.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we used content analysis and thematic analysis to examine the importance of 
boardroom characteristics and how they affect financial performance on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
while understanding how diversity influences boardroom culture. 
Interviews were conducted with 32 board members across four major sectors in the Nigerian economy 
and are on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The sector selections were informed by their importance to 
the Nigerian economy and the availability of respondents. The interviewees consist of 25 men and 7 
women. We were only able to reach 7 women first because we are constrained by the few number of 
women on corporate boards in Nigeria and secondly the unavailability of these women on board 
owing to a packed schedule of activities. A quick glance at the data shows that women are on the 
average more educated than their male counterpart therefore have educational qualification to on 
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board. Key themes explored in this section included: social networking, regionality/local content and 
a biased board composition, Social acceptability: its effect on board composition, Quality versus 
Diversity, Double Shift for women and minorities, Leadership Structure. 
The social identity theory assumes that in most cases, there is segregation into insiders and outsiders, 
and people are more likely to give or proffer allegiance to people they regard as insiders, making it 
harder for outsiders to infiltrate the team. Our study confirms this in the case of Nigeria with women 
and minorities finding it hard to get to the top level on boards because they are not in the social class 
of men on board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). This is confirmed Ogbechie (2012) who believes the 
Nigerian corporate world is a managerial hegemony which makes the board an old-boys ran club.  
Another theme explored is regionality/local content. One of the benefits of CSR according to the law 
of the Federal Government of Nigeria for catchment areas, especially in the extractive industry (Oil 
and Gas) is that a quota of its junior level staff in technical roles must be from the catchment area. 
However, some participants believe that the idea of the catchment of local content is not only 
practised at junior level but also even at board level. The dominance of the number of the locals on 
boards is called into question. From our interviews, some directors believe that directorial recruitment 
and appointment using the catchment system is a process that results in mediocrity, nepotism and 
racial prejudice. This is confirmed by other academic research in Nigeria who believe that 
appointment to the board, senior management positions and even lower cadres are often based on 
political connections, ethnic loyalty and religious faith as opposed to considerations of efficiency and 
professional qualifications (Akanki, 1994a, Yerokun, 1992).  
In the study of social acceptability in our research, we showed that Gender self-schemas are a feature 
of the Nigerian lifestyle from infancy to adulthood. Gender roles are also well supported by culture 
and religion. Hence, for women and minorities to take up positions on the board, they need a salient 
approval from family and society, which is hard to come by because it is not socially or culturally 
fully acceptable that women take up leadership position. However, some of our discussants do believe 
their organisations are doing enough to combat this schism by enforcing equal opportunity and putting 
in place framework for women regarding maternity. We conclude that however that organisations 
need to help with social awareness about the impact of women on organisational growth and there is a 
need for public education on the stigma of child bearing, how men can be supportive of their spouses 
in improving work-life balance.  
The quality of women applicant for board position for instance, in Nigeria, has been used as an excuse 
for not meeting the CBN quota of 30% representation on board. However, data for diversity 
educational attainment, which is measured by the quantum of turnout from tertiary institutions and 
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number participating in the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) every year, shows that the 
percentage of female completion rate was 47.50% and 52.50% for men in 2016. There are many 
research which proves the business case for diversity due to positive influence of women on the 
financial growth of their organisation (Carter et al., 2003, Lord Davies of Abersoch (2014). We 
conclude that quota system in Nigeria needs to be enforced and there should be conducive 
environment for women to thrive in a male dominated industry.  
Women are faced with accommodating conflicting demands of their roles as women and their roles as 
leaders (Malibari, 2013) because leaders are thought to have more than communal qualities (Powell et 
al., 2002) and stereotypes about leaders generally resemble stereotypes of men more than stereotypes 
of women. As a result, men can seem usual or natural in most leadership roles, thereby placing 
women at a disadvantage (Eagly and Karau, 2002). This means that women and minorities on board 
must deal with double shift to impress other board members. In our study, we have discussant who 
think it is a man’s world and there is nothing they can do about it. Most women must work twice as 
hard, travel, work late to be accepted in the old’s boy club. 
We also looked at leadership structure and how it affects firm performance. In leadership 
structure/performance relationships, it is assumed that the choice of the various governance options 
could be associated with changes in organizational strategy and firm performance. In our study, this is 
confirmed by our discussants who believed that here is no fixed structure that they have and this 
primarily because of the size of the firm and the sector (oil & gas). We however can see the role of 
cultural reverence for owners and how much they influence board composition and board decisions 
even though it popular to have the CEO and owner separated.  
There are other themes that we think should be explored in specific setting like Nigeria. For instance, 
we think perhaps age and culture is a theme that could be explore in more depth in African cultures 
and how this affect boardroom dynamics.  
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8  Conclusion and recommendations  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to present the overall discussion of the results in the light of the research questions 
of the thesis. The strengths of this research are discussed. Some limitations of the study and some 
ideas for further research are identified. Finally, some recommendations are suggested, with the 
objective of providing the corporate firms best corporate practises to maximize firm financial 
performance potentials by inclusion of ethnic/regional and gender diversity in the board selection 
process.  
8.2 Discussion 
According to the literature, the concept of gender and other forms of diversity varies from one country 
to another, depending on cultures, traditions and values. Corporate governance theory proposes that 
board structure is a strong influence on the actions of the board and top management that ultimately 
affect firm performance (Kim et al., 2009). According to Carter et al. (2010) a secondary, but 
important, proposition of this larger construct is that the demographic diversity of the board is one 
dimension of board structure that matters. However, there are reasonable theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence that suggest either no effect of board diversity on firm performance or a 
detrimental effect. Understanding the influence of the gender and ethnic minority diversity of the 
board of directors on the financial performance of the firm has important implications for top 
managers, shareholders, corporate boards, and policy makers. 
This research was conducted in Nigeria to gather empirical evidence of diversity and how it affects 
performance in the Nigerian context. The study of diversity and firm performance of firms on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange adds to the growing literature of developing economies like Nigeria because 
most corporate board literature tends to focus on developed economies (Ceci and Williams, 2011, 
Connelly et al., 2011b, Richard, 2000).  
Since the aim of the research is to investigate diversity and performance in terms of numeric 
indicators and also to revealing reasons of few women and minorities on board and to understand their 
experience, a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is used to assist the researcher in 
understanding different diversity dimensions of firms on the NSE. The findings are analyzed from 
various sources including documentation (annual reports, NSE fact books, Bloomberg, etc.) as well as 
interviews conducted with board members of reputable Nigerian corporation in the financial and oil 
and gas sectors in cosmopolitan regions in the country (Lagos, Abuja, Port-Harcourt, Ibadan, Benin 
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city). With this various sources of data, the researcher is able to gain critical insight into the corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria. 
To understand the impact of each of the board characteristic variables, the researcher used some board 
related theories such as agency theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory. Each of 
these theories is discussed in chapters 3 and a model (figure 2 page 42) was formulated to provide the 
conceptual framework for the hypothesis of a link between the gender and ethnic diversity of the 
board and the financial performance of the firm. The research argued that some board characteristics 
such as board size, number of female directors, non-executive female directors, firm size, quota, 
might exist either positive or negative impact on board processes, which in turn have an impact on 
board performance. Board performance in this case means financial performance, which is indicated 
by the Tobin’s Q and the ROA. Zahra and Pearce (1989) opined that the effectiveness of the board 
would result in better subsequent firm performance.  
 
The key discussions of the research are split into five arguments associated with diversity and firm 
performance. First, this research looked at the ethnic diversity on corporate firms on the NSE. The 
research hypothesis expects a positive relationship between ethnicity on board and firm performance 
which is in contrast to Kanter (1977a)’s theory that a skewed board to a certain member category 
would reduce the influence of the other categories as monitoring agencies on board, which will 
invariable reduce performance. In our research there are mixed result for hypothesis 1. The result of 
the overall sector on the NSE suggest that the interaction of ethnic minority diversity coefficients for 
the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo or Hausa) are positive, and significantly related 
with our financial performance indicator Tobin’s Q for Nigeria firms. This is consistent with the 
literature that implies that having an ethnically diverse board is a knowledge-based asset that creates 
value for shareholders by linking an organisation to its external environment, thereby promoting firm 
performance (Carter and Wagner, 2011). This result supports resource dependence theory which 
views ethnic diversity in a corporate board as an economic resource to the organisation that help firms 
comprehend the dynamic industry context of a country (Hitt et al., 2016, Hillman et al., 2009). In the 
comparative study of the oil & gas and the financial sector, this research concluded that the 
coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo and Hausa) are close to zero, for 
Tobin’s Q in both the financial and oil and gas sectors. However, there is a positive relationship found 
between the proportion of Igbo Directors and ROA in the financial sector.  Therefore, we have mixed 
evidence for hypothesis 1 that ethnic diversity is negatively associated with firm performance. The 
Igbo variable in the ROA analysis supports the business case for diversity. It is well documented in 
literature (Griffiths, 2018, Lord Davies of Abersoch, 2014) the benefits of a diverse board. Proponents 
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of the value-in-diversity perspective like Herring (2009) argues that a diverse workforce, relative to a 
homogeneous one, is generally beneficial for business, including but not limited to corporate profits 
and earnings. This supports our research, which shows a positive relationship between Igbo board 
members and financial performance of the financial firms. This research might be because of a sector 
specific condition that is not captured in our analysis. This should be investigated in future research in 
this area. In addition, the pre and post-2009 analysis for the financial sector also indicated no 
relationship between firm performance and ethnic diversity on corporate boards.  
In addition to our quantitative findings, which found no evidence of a relationship between ethnicity 
and performance on board except the Igbo board members, the qualitative research concludes that 
ethnicity on board does have an effect on board composition and the firm performance. One of the 
benefits of CSR according to the law of the Federal Government of Nigeria for catchment areas, 
especially in the extractive industry (Oil and Gas), is that a quota of its junior level staff must be from 
the catchment area in technical roles. According to our research, not only is there a quota of junior 
employee in these organisation there is a monopoly of ethnicity on most boards with a token position 
reserved for people of different ethnicity. According to various correspondence they believe, or agree 
with the importance of ethnic diversity on board but they conclude due to various experiences that in 
principle it is a façade for nepotism, a panacea for perpetuating mediocrity which is in contrast to the 
resource dependence literature (CMI22 see page 152) . They also believe that because in some cases 
decisions are made on the bases of consensus, which may not be the best approach, as is most cases, 
results may be skewed in favour of the ethnic minority on board. 
Our finding further show that although quota system – a newly introduced initiative in the banking 
sector – is becoming a template on most corporate boards,  there is a good number of opposition to it. 
Some of our correspondence think the quota system is a popularity contest and that merit and a board 
experience base should be the most important factors in board appointments. One of the argument 
with some of our correspondence is the quality of the token on board. They conclude that excessive 
reliance on experts who may not be well informed about the decision about to be taken can lead to 
wrong decision because on most top firms in Nigeria due to the quota system firms pick the same 
woman on different company boards which is literature is called gold skirt. 
Second, we explore gender diversity on corporate boards in Nigeria and we investigate quantitatively 
and qualitatively the effect of gender on firm performance. We employed variables like number of 
board members, number of female board members, and the existence of quota to investigate our 
claims. Hypothesis 2 predicts that board gender diversity is positively related to firm performance. 
Going by our preferred model – fixed effects model – result of the firm performance indicators –
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Tobin’s Q and ROA – no significant relationship for our all sector model. All other models for the 
financial and oil and gas sector overall and the pre-2009 and post 2009 all report zero coefficient or 
no statistical significance between the relationship of our financial performance indicators and gender 
diversity. Therefore, we cannot accept hypothesis 2 that there is a positive relationship between 
gender and firm performance. This could be due to ratio of men to women on boards of firms 
undertaken in this research (25 men and 7 women). Research shows that the efficacy of women and 
minorities on board is unlikely until a critical mass is met. According to Torchia et al. (2011b), 
suggest that attaining critical mass – going from one or two women (a few tokens) to at least three 
women (consistent minority) – makes it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation. (Isidro and 
Sobral, 2015) also found Women on the board are positively related with financial performance 
(measured in terms of return on assets and return on sales) and with ethical and social compliance, 
which in turn are positively related with firm value. An explanation for our result could be according 
to Carter et al. (2010) the level of integration of any group into the mainstream society appears to be a 
relevant factor in the definition of diversity. If a diverse group, whether defined by gender, ethnicity, 
language, religion, education, or some other dimension, is highly integrated, then any noticeable 
difference in the behavior of corporate directors from that diverse group might be minimal, even more 
so if the gender and ethnic diversity is well skewed towards a category on board.  
 
In chapter 7 (qualitative analysis), the researcher explores why it is hard to get a critical mass on the 
Nigeria corporate board. Some factors discussed are issues with work-life balance, double shifting, 
and social networking. Research has established that national culture is a major factor defining 
women’s role in society more broadly, but also that country cultures help shape corporate board 
demography (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). Hence, if the society, like in the case of Nigeria, see 
women characteristics as non-leadership features then it is hard for them to reach such position. Our 
respondents confirmed the literature which suggests that when the demands of the job increasingly 
encroach into family life, women experience conflict which affects their career outcomes (Mordi et 
al., 2010, Terjesen and Singh, 2008). Mordi et al. (2010) stated that work-life balance is tough for 
women with young children especially when they try to balance their role as the primary caregiver 
with additional responsibility in the organisation. For most women in this situation in Nigeria, it is 
mostly vetoed by the man to choose the kids over career advancement. In fact, according to our 
interview, it is a criterial for some men to have a stay home wife or business owner, so they can leave 
to take care of the kids anytime (OGFI14 see page 158). If the woman would continue work 
regardless of the aforementioned issues, she faces double shifting and challenging assignment 
(BFI11). She also has also zero chance of redemption from a mistake as she is scapegoated (CMY22). 
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Thirdly, Hypothesis 3 predicted board size is positively associated with firm performance. However, 
our preferred model – the fixed effects model – reports no relationship between board size and our 
firm financial performance indicators – Tobin's Q and ROA in our all sector models. In our 
comparison of the financial and oil and gas sectors, there was still no relationship. Finally, in the pre-
2009 analysis of both the financial and oil & gas sector comparison the firm financial performance 
indicator ROA reports a negative relationship between firm performance and board size while in the 
post-2009 era both performance indicators also report negative relationships between firm 
performance and board size. This implies that as the size of a ﬁrm’s board increases, the less the 
degree of its impact on the ﬁnancial performance on the ﬁrm. This result is consistent with theory 
which states that as board increases in size, free riding increases and reduces the efﬁciency of the 
board in monitoring management and providing strategic human resource for the organization 
(Ujunwa et al., 2012). Paul (2009) examined the impact of board size on firm performance for a large 
sample of 2746 UK listed firms over 1981–2002. He found that the negative relation is strongest for 
large firms, which tend to have larger boards therefore supporting the argument that problems of poor 
communication and decision-making undermine the effectiveness of large boards. It is interesting to 
note that separate regression model showed a negative relationship between our financial indicators 
and performance. Following the global financial crisis of 2008 the CBN increase monitoring of all 
financial institutions. However according to Ujunwa (2012) policy implementation  and appropriate  
punishment for non-compliance has hampered improved and better corporate governance in Nigeria. 
This could be a reason for no difference in the effect of pre and post 2009 analysis.  
This research investigates the resource dependency theory in the Nigerian context by empirically 
study of the effect of board size on firms’ financial standing on the NSE.  Our hypothesis 4 is in 
accordance with resource dependency theory that diverse and increased number of directors on any 
corporate board improves knowledge and information. The economic case does not argue that ethnic 
diverse directors are perfect substitutes for other board members; rather, ethnic diverse directors are 
individuals with unique characteristics that create additional value for shareholders. To this end, we 
investigate the effect of non-executive female directors on corporate board. With the increase in 
popularity of non- executive female member on the Nigerian board, it is important to know how they 
affect firm performance. 
While independence of the board is considered a key criterion in the governance of firms, there is no 
robust evidence that board independence improves firm performance Adams and Mehran (2012). An 
important issue that is highlighted in recent research on this latter topic is that increased independence 
also comes at a cost – the possibility of breakdowns in communication between the CEOs and 
directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Some researchers have also argued that a board‘s monitoring 
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role is more efficiently performed by more independent boards (Guest, 2009, Lehn et al., 2009). 
However, a few recent papers also challenge the notion of independence, and document that boards 
that are independent on paper can be ineffective monitors when the directors are socially or 
professionally connected to the CEO (Hwang and Kim, 2009, Dey et al., 2011). According to Ujunwa 
(2012) most female corporate board members in Nigeria have strong ties with the owners of the firms, 
and do not have any corporate background, they are likely to increase agency cost and delay decision-
making process which will negatively affect performance (Terjesen et al., 2009). However, the issue 
might not be because of incapability of the female board member but the potency of their voice on the 
board. According to our qualitative analysis, the voice of a critical mass on board is important for the 
effectiveness of women and minority groups on board. According to Kanter (1977a) skewed groups 
on corporate board would be especially problematic because the tokens are either in focus or they are 
overlooked, and they may be subject to stereotyping. 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 proposes that the number of women directors on a major board committee is 
positively related to the financial performance of the firm. Our empirical research found out either 
weak or no link between the number of women directors on a major board committee and financial 
performance of the firm on the NSE. The argument discussed in hypothesis 2 is applicable here. 
Without the critical mass the positives of the business case for gender and ethnic minorities diversity 
on board cannot be attained (Kanter, 1977b). The research result also confirms the expectation the 
struggle of female directors to double shift as the manager and as wives, mothers and career women, 
as well as the greater geographical mobility required at higher executive levels which is linked to the 
reduction in the supply chain for leadership candidates. Some of our respondents confirmed that they 
have avoid or push back promotion to executive positions early in their career because they have 
young kids and “if these involve working anti-social hours or frequent travel away from their 
families” (Oyefuga et al., 2013). 
8.3 Strength of the research 
This thesis presents the benefits of conducting a mixed-method study, which facilitated the researcher 
in examining how board characteristics – particularly diversity - interact with firm financial 
performance indicators. The quantitative findings capture a broad picture of the diversity and how 
women and minorities make an impact on – through our financial indicators Tobin’s Q and ROA. We 
explore corporate diversity theories and how it affects board composition. While the qualitative 
analysis permits the researcher to explore in more depth women and minorities directors’ experience 
on Nigerian boards.  
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The combined quantitative and qualitative approach has provided an overview of corporate 
governance research as it can facilitate a broader and deeper understanding of governance practices 
that would improve firm productivity. The study contributes to understanding of board effectiveness 
in an emerging market where board roles and processes are still developing by examining both the 
traditional variables such as board size, firm size, board independence (non-executive directors) and 
other organizational attributes such as board diversity (gender and ethic).   
 
Secondly, the study will add to some insight into better governance practices in Nigeria that explain 
the barriers facing board members in relation to diversity and getting one’s voice heard as well as 
dealing with other barriers. This is important because The lack of good governance amongst Nigerian 
companies has been blamed for the economic backwardness of the country (Adekoya, 2011). 
 
Finally, we reckon that the empirical study of ethnicity in this research helps address the scarcity of 
this research d in Nigeria. Most literature about the subject matter are about global developed 
economies (US (Maume, 1999, Maume, 2004), UK, ) and a few other developing economies,  thus 
has linking ethnicity to financial performance in the Nigerian context gives us greater insight into 
what can happen in developing economies relative to their differing contexts. Given the importance of 
ethnicity in Nigeria (a country with over 250 language and ethnicity), it is important to understand the 
interaction of ethnicity on corporate boards, how companies recruit, process and consider gender and 
ethnic dimensions and how this is linked to the national context and culture.    
8.4 Limitation of the research  
Some limitations of this study include the issues relating to the representativeness of participants and 
the fact some variables in the quantitative models are missing reducing the number of variable we 
could have used in this research.  
This analysis has been conducted through fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja primarily the commercial 
capital and the federal capital territory of Nigeria respectively. Most firms have their headquarters 
there. However, there could be data bias as this region are the most developed in the country and other 
effects of the less developed regions may not have been captured by the research. According to Stake 
(1978), while a case study may constitute a weak basis for generalisations, it can represent a particular 
community (for example, ethnic group on board), thereby allowing some generalisations. However, 
although this present study has been conducted primarily in Lagos and Abuja, this sample is adequate 
for providing a good representation of firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange because most of these 
companies are based there. The data presents a detailed view of the issues relevant to diversity, board 
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composition and firm performance on the NSE. Many of the issues resonate with the existing 
literature; thus, it is possible that the findings of this study is applicable to other developing 
economies who have similarly geo-political setup. However, according to Adesua Lincoln and 
Adedoyin (2012) we must be careful making generalisation in Nigeria given it cultural diversity. 
 
We also had time constraint in going to Nigeria for the fieldwork that was linked to visa issues, which 
limited time spent in the country interviewing. At the beginning, we had primarily a qualitative 
research design for this topic but upon revision by the transfer panel, we decided to use a mix method 
because it stresses the use of component designs in which different elements are kept separate. In this 
study, the quantitative approach is suitable to answer the research question asking whether ethnic 
plays a prominent role in firm financial performance, while the qualitative approach is appropriate to 
investigate of individual experience related ethnicity, double shifting, culture, regionality on corporate 
board (see page 88). However, because of the delay in the new analytical construct combined with 
delay on permit procurement, more interview participant was not reached, which would have given 
the research more robust finding. However, recognising, identifying and contacting the small numbers 
of female and ethnic directors, who themselves have very pressurised jobs is always challenging for 
researchers, which helps to support the adoption of a pragmatic approach to methodology. This is 
because in developing countries such as Nigeria the quality of data to do quantitative studies is more 
limited. The size of the country and the volatility in certain regions like the Niger Delta makes the 
possibility of extending qualitative research outside of the safer major cities also problematic. In 
addition, directors too being a small but very powerful cohort makes access more challenging as there 
are many demands on their limited time and for women with double roles, even more so.  
The model for this research has used a limited number of control variables in studying firm 
performance. There are several other control variables identified in literature but are not included in 
this model. Examples are average additional directorships, percentage ownership of the board (Carter 
et al., 2010), decision comprehensiveness (Simons et al., 1999). Future research should address the 
limitations of this study. Several extensions to this study can be undertaken. The researcher focused 
only on certain set of board characteristics for their impact on firm performance in the quantitative 
analysis. There are other board characteristics such as age, educational qualifications (Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2011) that could have been considered. 
In the qualitative analysis, we explored ethnicity and regionality but cultural was not fully explored. It 
would be helpful to know in more depth how culture and religion specifically affects women and 
minorities.   
In addition, this research used the fixed effect analysis. We recommend for further researcher to 
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explore other quantitative methods like generalised method of moments, which is also used in the 
corporate governance literature. 
8.5 Contributions  
Some important contributions emerge from this research. Firstly, we have expanded research into 
corporate governance and diversity by developing an expanded theoretical framework to help explain 
governance in the Nigerian context. The framework of Carter et al. (2010) was the template for our 
empirical research, however we furthered the research by paying close attention to the ethnic variables 
and adopting a mixed method approach  to understand the experiences of board members on a typical 
Nigerian firm’s board. This study is therefore a contribution to empirical study of corporate 
governance. The theoretical contribution (as seen in chapter 3) is epitomised by the model explained 
by figure 2 (page 42). The research combines the three main theories agency, resource dependence 
and shareholder theories to explain how board composition affects financial performance in Nigeria. 
Using this approach rather than a single perspective to is a better way to understand the impact of 
corporate governance on board performance in developing countries like Nigeria where the impact of 
rules and regulation are more limited and other cultural factors such as cronyism, women’s double 
roles are more prevalent. As the literature suggests, agency theory primarily emphasises shareholders’ 
interests, while the stakeholder theory takes cognisance of the benefit of all interested parties and not 
just the shareholders while resource dependence explains how firm interacts with external influences 
on its decision making process all of which are captured in this study. To have a better understanding 
of board process and dynamics, as discussed in this section, there is a need to integrate different 
theories rather than consider any single theory. Such an approach was supported by Stiles (2001) who 
calls for multiple theoretical perspectives and Roberts (2005) who suggests theoretical pluralism. 
This research contributes to the literature with the use of a mixed method in this study. Study of 
different theoretical standpoints clarifies the need to take a cohesive approach rather than a single 
perspective to understand the impact of corporate governance on board performance. The quantitative 
section in this research employed the framework as seen in figure 2 (page 42) to answer questions 
about the board composition and how its characteristics affects performance. The qualitative 
approach, on the other hand, is appropriate to investigate of individual experiences of men and women 
on the influences of culture, leadership structure, etc. on their impact on the decision-making process 
on board. In essence, this research design abundant evidence which may deepen some fundamental 
understanding of the study (Wilson, 2014). 
Another contribution of this study is the understanding of board composition and firm performance in 
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an emerging market where board roles and processes are still developing by examining both the 
traditional variables such as board size, board independence and other organizational attributes such 
as board diversity (gender and ethic) and board professional human capital variables such as board 
committee composition. The Nigerian context is unique because of its cultural and ethnic divide, its 
political instability, it is an emerging economy, a corrupt state, a developing democracy, all the 
turbulence that emerges from the oil region of the country and the development of its corporate 
governance policies. We found no evidence both quantitatively of a relationship between ethnicity 
and performance on board, except the Igbo board members on firm performance because, the 
qualitative research shows that the law of the Federal Government of Nigeria for catchment areas is 
manipulated. Not only is there a quota of junior employee in these organisation there is a monopoly of 
ethnicity on most boards with a token position reserved for people of different ethnicity which is a 
façade for nepotism, a panacea for perpetuating mediocrity which is in contrast to the resource 
dependence literature (CMI22 see page 152). It is therefore important that the government enforce the 
catchment rule, put tougher penalty for rule-breakers, and make sure the rules are enforced if they 
want to see improvements in diversity and governance.  
Thirdly, the study will add to better corporate governance practices in Nigeria. The lack of good 
governance amongst Nigerian companies has been blamed for the economic backwardness of the 
country (Dike, 2006); hence, the research would help know those corporate governance practises that 
would improve firm performance such as board heterogeneity in terms of human capital, gender, 
ethnicity and regionality.  
Finally, this research also contributes to the African topical policy debate regarding the effectiveness 
of corporate governance mechanisms. Nigeria is a regional power. The Nigerian government has 
tasked itself to make the country to be one of the 20 largest economies in the world by year 2020, by 
being able to maintain its economic leadership role in Africa. However, Nigeria must put in place an 
effective corporate governance framework in order to become a respected and significant player in the 
global political economy. The discussions in this research are only useful to the sub-Saharan African 
business scholars but offer suggestions on how African nations can structure their business 
corporations to address corporate corruption through good corporate governance (Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2011). 
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8.6 Recomendation  
Evidence from our research suggest a mixed result for the realtionship between ethnity and firm 
performance. Result of the overall sector on the NSE suggest that the interaction of ethnic minority 
diversity coefficients for the indicators of an ethnically diverse board (Igbo or Hausa) are positive, 
and significantly related with our financial performance indicator Tobin’s Q for Nigeria firms. This 
result supports resource dependence theory which views ethnic diversity in a corporate board as an 
economic resource to the organisation that help firms comprehend the dynamic industry context of a 
country (Hitt et al., 2016, Hillman et al., 2009). Where as in the comparative study and sepearte years 
study ethnicity has had no influence on board. Evidence from our research therefore, is not enough to 
support gender diversity on corporate boards based on the premise that gender will improve the 
financial performance of the firm. However, gender and ethnic minority directors do not appear to 
have a negative effect on firm financial performance, which means that focusing on diversity should 
not threaten companies’s performance, which some board members alluded to on the importance of 
appointing people on merit, the right people. 
 From our analysis we can conclude that women on board have not had the number or executive 
position on board to make the desired impact on firm performace. Our interview analysis also show 
that various barriers including double shifting for women and minorities, social networking, 
mentoring, effects of tokens on board has prevented full utilisation of firm human capital resources on 
boards. Drawing from (Kanter, 1977b) agrument that until a critical mass or a balance board is met 
the influence of women and minority on board would not be felt, we therefore recommended that the 
impending bill of gender equality put to the senate be passed into legislation to create a platform to 
increase women on board. This bill has been in the Nigerian senate for eight years. This bill was 
designed to eradicate gender inequality in politics, education and employment. With the election 
coming in Feburary this year and the political class predominantly male, it is uncertain anything 
would be done about it until the new regime starts. Until this bill become law, unfortunately there 
would be no grounds for the procecution of gender discrimination. Until this bill is passed it will be 
difficult to challenge the existing situation in relation to diversity, governance and corproate 
performance.. 
In an age of globalization, governance reforms are critical. Nigeria has been undertaking a program of 
reforms for more than a decade now. The nature of the reforms has been largely determined by 
developments in the global economy. We have shown in this paper that Nigeria has introduced 
reforms in some of these areas. The financial sector for instance under the leader of the then CBN 
governor Mallam Lamido Sanusi, agreed that by 2014 at least 30 percent of the board seats in 
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Nigerian banks would be occupied by women and at least 40 percent of senior management positions 
will be held by women in 2015 (Sanusi, 2012). The then Governor of the CBN, Governor Sanusi, 
revealed that since the establishment of the CBN's only four women have held the position of the 
director even though there were women capable and qualified to fill directorial roles. However, since 
2017, there are about seven female directors; this comes from a conscious policy of looking for 
qualified women to take these positions. Though the regulatory directive represented a definite step 
toward parity, subsequent studies have revealed that many financial institutions continue to fall short 
of the 30% target. Women in Management, Business and Public Service found that 19% of board 
members for Nigerian banks were women as of 2014 (Adebowale, 2012, Ogbechie, 2016). Which 
falls significantly short of the 30% target identified in the regulatory directive. The then CBN 
governor said the target could not be met because there was not enough women to take the position on 
board. This research advocates for more mentoring for women to help improve their chances of 
breaking the glass ceiling. However, other strategies would need to be implemented to improve the 
pipeline to director level particularly as the educational level of women in Nigeria is improving which 
suggests that there should be more candidates in the future looking for opportunities to come through.  
However, our interview analysis shows there is a huge gap in this area as women and minorities on 
board find it hard to penetrate the old boys club on board and while we cannot generalize about 
Nigerian education, it was interesting that in our qualitative research all female directors were more 
highly educated than the men were. This could be explored further in future studies. This research 
suggests that it is part of the company policy to mentor prospective leaders, who have interest and 
qualifications for the board position. As recommended by Shantz et al. (2011), in the male dominated 
organisation, women have difficulties making a connection and thus are likely to lose in their careers 
particularly as they are subject to wider social pressures about familial responsibilities unlike the men 
in our research who considered that they benefited from having wives to support their careers.. 
8.7 Conclusion 
This study aims at understanding the board characteristics of Nigerian firms, how these characteristics 
interrelate, and the extent to which these known characteristics impact on firm performance. Our 
studies focus on two forms of diversity - ethnicity and gender – of  directors of quoted companies in 
Nigeria using a carefully chosen pragmatic, and mixed research methodology. Empirical data was 
gathered through the annual reports of 190 companies and the Nigerian Stock Exchange Factbook. 
Other infomations where garthered theough Google. Linkedin and other internt platforms. We also 
undertook interview with 32 board members and discussed various key board characteristics, which 
may affect performance. 
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We conclude from our quantitative analysis particularly regarding our diversity variable that we found 
an overall effect of ethnicity on all the boards on the NSE, however each sector doesn’t show enough 
evidence to accept or denies the effect of ethnicity on board.  
We can also conclude that there is no evidence for a relationship between gender on board and firm 
performance. Further more, the relationship between board size and firm performance has consistently 
through the different models explored remained negative. This confirms the argument in the literature 
that a large board would increase agency cost, reduce the effective of the board by slow decision 
making process. We can also conclude from our study that there is no evidence that non-executive 
female board member, or women on board committee make any impact either negative or positive on 
firm performance in Nigeria firms. We can also conclude from our qualitaitve research that  social 
networking, regionality, social acceptability, double shifting for women and minorities play important 
roles in determining the effectiveness of this human resources on the Nigerian corporate board, which 
may help to explain the above finding. 
Therefore this study adds to the existing literature on corproate governance by looking at the effect of 
ethnicity on board and how recent reforms particularly in the banking sector as influenced diversity on 
corporate board. This research is of particular interest to policy makers, concerned or interesting in 
developing an appropriate corporate governance environment. The research is a modest attempt to 
provide some academic evidence to help provide some insight for current and future governance 
reforms in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ABERNETHY, M. A., KUANG, Y. F. & QIN, B. 2014. The influence of CEO power on compensation 
contract design. The Accounting Review, 90, 1265-1306. 
ABUBAKAR, B. A., GARBA, T., SOKOTO, A. A. & MAISHANU, M. M. 2014. Corporate Board Gender 
Diversity and Performance: Evidence from Nigerian Stock Exchange. Economic Journal of 
Nepal, 34. 
ACKAH, C. & HEATON, N. 2003. Human resource management careers: different paths for men and 
women? Career Development International, 8, 134-142. 
ADAMOLEKUN, L. & KINCAID, J. 1991. The federal solution: assessment and prognosis for Nigeria and 
Africa. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21, 173-188. 
ADAMS, R. B. 2012. Governance and the financial crisis. International Review of Finance, 12, 7-38. 
ADAMS, R. B. 2016. Women on boards: The superheroes of tomorrow? The Leadership Quarterly, 27, 
371-386. 
ADAMS, R. B., ALMEIDA, H. & FERREIRA, D. 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate 
performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18, 1403-1432. 
ADAMS, R. B. & FERREIRA, D. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance. Journal of financial economics, 94, 291-309. 
ADAMS, R. B. & KIRCHMAIER, T. 2013. Making it to the top: From female labor force participation to 
boardroom gender diversity. ECGI-Finance Working Paper. 
ADAMS, R. B. & MEHRAN, H. 2012. Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank 
holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21, 243-267. 
ADB 2014. African Development Report 2014 
Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth. 
ADEBOWALE, A. 2012. A Study of Women Attitudes toward their Socioeconomic and Political 
Empowerment: Nigeria Women and National Development. Global Advanced Research 
Journal of Management and Business Studies, 1, 228-239. 
ADEGBAJU, A. & OLOKOYO, F. 2008. Recapitalization and banks’ performance: a case study of 
Nigerian banks. African Economic and Business Review, 6. 
ADEGBITE, E. & NAKAJIMA, C. 2011. Corporate governance and responsibility in Nigeria. 
International journal of Disclosure and Governance, 8, 252-271. 
ADEKOYA, A. A. 2011. Corporate governance reforms in Nigeria: Challenges and suggested solutions. 
Journal of Business systems, governance and ethics, 6, 38-50. 
ADESINA, A. 1992. “Rural women and their working conditions: implications for poverty alleviation in 
Nigeria”, paper presented at the 7th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Rural Sociological 
Association, Ado Ekiti, 17‐20 May. 
ADESUA LINCOLN, A. & ADEDOYIN, O. 2012. Corporate governance and gender diversity in Nigerian 
boardrooms. Corporate Governance and Gender Diversity in Nigerian Boardrooms 
(September 30, 2012). World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 71, 1853. 
ADEYEMO, D. & SALAMI, A. O. 2008. A review of privatization and public enterprises reform in 
Nigeria. Contemporary Management Research, 4. 
AFRICA, A. 2012. Nigeria: Women's Representation on Banks' Board Still Dismal. 
AFRICAN'XCHANGES. 2018. African Stock (Securities) Exchanges Live [Online]. Available: 
https://afx.kwayisi.org/bsebw/ [Accessed 01/04/2018 2018]. 
AGBALAJOBI, D. T. 2010. Womens participation and the political process in Nigeria: Problems and 
prospects. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4, 075-082. 
 
 
 
 
192 
AGUILERA, R. V., FILATOTCHEV, I., GOSPEL, H. & JACKSON, G. 2008. An organizational approach to 
comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities. 
Organization science, 19, 475-492. 
AGUILERA, R. V. & JACKSON, G. 2003. The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants. Academy of management Review, 28, 447-465. 
AHUNWAN, B. 2002. Corporate governance in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 37, 269-287. 
AKANBI, P. A. 2012. An examination of the link between corporate governance and organizational 
performance in the Nigerian banking sector. Management Arts, 43, 6564-6573. 
AKANKI, E. 1994a. Company Directors' Responsibility', a paper delivered at a seminar on The Role of 
The Company Secretary in Corporate Management, at the Federal Palace Hotel. Lagos, 
Nigeria on, 24. 
AKANKI, E. O. 1994b. ‘Company Directors’ Responsibility’, a paper delivered at a seminar on The Role 
of The Company Secretary in Corporate Management, at the Federal Palace Hotel, Lagos, 
Nigeria on 24 October, 1994. 
AKINSANYA, A. A. 1983. State strategies toward Nigerian and foreign business. The Political Economy 
Of Nigeria, New York: Praeger Publishers. 
ALBUQUERQUE, A. M., BENNETT, B., CUSTODIO, C. & CVIJANOVIC, D. 2018. CEO Compensation and 
Real Estate Prices: Pay for Luck or Pay for Action? 
ALIMO-METCALFE, B. 1995. An investigation of female and male constructs of leadership and 
empowerment. Women in Management Review, 10, 3-8. 
ALL AFRICA 2012. “Nigeria: Women’s Representation on Bank’s Board Still Dismal. 
ALLEN, F., OTCHERE, I. & SENBET, L. W. 2011. African financial systems: A review. Review of 
Development Finance, 1, 79-113. 
ALLISON, P. D. 2009. Fixed effects regression models, SAGE publications. 
ALUKO, B. T. & AMIDU, A. Women and land rights reforms in Nigeria.  5th FIG regional conference, 
on Promoting Land Administration and Good Governance. Accra, Ghana, 2006. 
AMAO, O. & AMAESHI, K. 2008. Galvanising shareholder activism: A prerequisite for effective 
corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 82, 119-130. 
ANAETO, E. 2015. Banking industry environment: 2014 -2016 challenges. Vanguard. 
ANIKWE, A. 2014. Nigerian Stock Exchange / Securities And Exchange Commission – Compliance 
Requirements For Listed Companies [Online]. Available: http://www.lpc-ng.com/nigerian-
stock-exchange-securities-and-exchange-commission-compliance-requirements-for-listed-
companies/ [Accessed 20 December 2016 2016]. 
ANTHONY, A. & PRATT, O. 2015. Oil, Children and Adolescents in the Contemporary Niger Delta, 
Nigeria. J Child Adolesc Behav, 3, 2. 
APESTEGUIA, J., AZMAT, G. & IRIBERRI, N. 2012. The impact of gender composition on team 
performance and decision making: Evidence from the field. Management Science, 58, 78-93. 
ARMSTRONG, P., SEGAL, N. & DAVIS, B. 2006. Corporate governance in South Africa. Handbook on 
international corporate governance, 210-31. 
AROWOLO, D. E. & OLOGUNOWA, C. S. 2012. Privatisation in Nigeria: A critical analysis of the virtues 
and vices. International Journal of Development and Substantiality, 1, 1-12. 
ARROW, K. J. 1971. The theory of risk aversion. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing, 90-120. 
ARTHURS, J. D. & BUSENITZ, L. W. 2003. The boundaries and limitations of agency theory and 
stewardship theory in the venture capitalist/entrepreneur relationship. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 28, 145-162. 
ASCH, S. E. 1955. Opinions and social pressure. Readings about the social animal, 193, 17-26. 
ASWATHAPPA, K. 2005. Human resource and personnel management, Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
AYANWALE, A. B. 2007. FDI and economic Growth: Evidence from Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
193 
AYEOMONI, M. O. 2012. The Languages in Nigerian Socio-political Domains: Features and Functions. 
English Language Teaching, 5, p12. 
AZUBUIKE, L. O. 2009. Privatization and Foreign Investments in nigeria, Universal-Publishers. 
BABBIE, E. R. 2013. The basics of social research, Cengage Learning. 
BANK, W. 2014. Nigeria - Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) : accounting and 
auditing [Online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/109681468288617735/Nigeria-Report-on-the-
Observance-of-Standards-and-Codes-ROSC-accounting-and-auditing [Accessed 2017]. 
BANTEL, K. A. 1993. Strategic clarity in banking: Role of top management-team demography. 
Psychological Reports, 73, 1187-1201. 
BARR, G., GERSON, J. & KANTOR, B. 1995. Shareholders as agents and principals: The case for South 
Africa's corporate governance system. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8, 1-32. 
BATRA, G., KAUFMANN, D. & STONE, A. H. 2003. The firms speak: What the world business 
environment survey tells us about constraints on private sector development. Pathways Out 
of Poverty. Springer. 
BEAR, S., RAHMAN, N. & POST, C. 2010. The impact of board diversity and gender composition on 
corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. Journal of Business Ethics, 97, 207-221. 
BECHT, M., BOLTON, P. & RÖELL, A. 2003. Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, 1, 1-109. 
BECKMAN, C. M. & HAUNSCHILD, P. R. 2002. Network learning: The effects of partners' 
heterogeneity of experience on corporate acquisitions. Administrative science quarterly, 47, 
92-124. 
BELL, B. & VAN REENEN, J. 2016. CEO Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A 
Question of Governance? : National Bureau of Economic Research. 
BELLO, L. & BELLO, L. 2016. Re: duplication of corporate governance codes and the dilemma of firms 
with dual regulatory jurisdictions. Corporate Governance, 16, 476-489. 
BELLO, O. M. & OLUKOLAJO, M. A. 2016. Adequate Compensation as a Tool for Conflict Resolution in 
Oil Polluted Wetlands of Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. 
BERGH, D. D., AGUINIS, H., HEAVEY, C., KETCHEN, D. J., BOYD, B. K., SU, P., LAU, C. L. & JOO, H. J. S. 
M. J. 2016. Using meta‐analytic structural equation modeling to advance strategic 
management research: Guidelines and an empirical illustration via the strategic leadership‐
performance relationship. 37, 477-497. 
BERLE, A. A. & GARDINER, C. 1968. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property, 204-
5. 
BERNARD, H. R. & BERNARD, H. R. 2012. Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, Sage. 
BERNARDI, R. A., BEAN, D. F. & WEIPPERT, K. M. 2002. Signaling gender diversity through annual 
report pictures: a research note on image management. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 15, 609-616. 
BHAGAT, S. & BOLTON, B. 2008. Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of corporate 
finance, 14, 257-273. 
BHAGWATI, J. N. & SRINIVASAN, T. 1982. The welfare consequences of directly-unproductive profit-
seeking (DUP) lobbying activities: Price versus quantity distortions. Journal of International 
Economics, 13, 33-44. 
BLAIR-LOY, M. 2009. Competing devotions: Career and family among women executives, Harvard 
University Press. 
BLAIR, M. M. & STOUT, L. A. 1999. A team production theory of corporate law. Virginia Law Review, 
247-328. 
 
 
 
 
194 
BOBONIS, G. J. 2009. Is the allocation of resources within the household efficient? New evidence 
from a randomized experiment. Journal of political Economy, 117, 453-503. 
BØHREN, Ø. 1998. The Agent'ss Ethics in the Principal-Agent Model. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 
745-755. 
BOONE, A. L., FIELD, L. C., KARPOFF, J. M. & RAHEJA, C. G. 2007. The determinants of corporate 
board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 66-
101. 
BOULOUTA, I. 2013. Hidden connections: The link between board gender diversity and corporate 
social performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 113, 185-197. 
BOURNE, D., INAL, G. & KARATAŞ-OZKAN, M. 2011. Understanding the dynamics of careers and 
identities through multiple strands of equality and diversity. Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: 
An International Journal, 30. 
BOYD, B. K. 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management 
Journal, 16, 301-312. 
BRAMMER, S., MILLINGTON, A. & PAVELIN, S. 2007. Gender and ethnic diversity among UK 
corporate boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 393-403. 
BRANISA, B., KLASEN, S., ZIEGLER, M., DRECHSLER, D. & JÜTTING, J. 2014. The institutional basis of 
gender inequality: The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI). Feminist economics, 20, 
29-64. 
BRAUN, V. & CLARKE, V. 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in 
psychology, 3, 77-101. 
BRENNAN, N. M., SOLOMON, J., BRENNAN, N. M. & SOLOMON, J. 2008. Corporate governance, 
accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 21, 885-906. 
BRETT, J. M. & STROH, L. K. 2003. Working 61 plus hours a week: why do managers do it? Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 88, 67. 
BREWER, M. B. & KRAMER, R. M. 1985. The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. Annual 
review of psychology, 36, 219-243. 
BRICKLEY, J. A., COLES, J. L. & JARRELL, G. 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and 
chairman of the board. Journal of corporate Finance, 3, 189-220. 
BROADBRIDGE, A. & HEARN, J. 2008. Gender and management: new directions in research and 
continuing patterns in practice. British Journal of Management, 19, S38-S49. 
BROADBRIDGE, A., HEARN, J., HUSE, M. & GRETHE SOLBERG, A. 2006. Gender-related boardroom 
dynamics: How Scandinavian women make and can make contributions on corporate 
boards. Women in Management Review, 21, 113-130. 
BROWNBRIDGE, M. 1996. The impact of public policy on the banking system in Nigeria, Institute of 
Development Studies Zaria, Nigeria. 
BRUCKMÜLLER, S. & BRANSCOMBE, N. R. 2010. The glass cliff: When and why women are selected 
as leaders in crisis contexts. British Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 433-451. 
BUCHAN, N. R., CROSON, R. T. & SOLNICK, S. 2008. Trust and gender: An examination of behavior 
and beliefs in the Investment Game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68, 466-
476. 
BUCK, T. & SHAHRIM, A. 2005. The translation of corporate governance changes across national 
cultures: The case of Germany. Journal of International Business Studies, 36, 42-61. 
BURGESS, Z. & THARENOU, P. 2002. Women board directors: Characteristics of the few. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 37, 39-49. 
BURGESS, Z. M. & THARENOU, P. 2000. What distinguishes women nonexecutive directors from 
executive directors? Women on corporate boards of directors. Springer. 
 
 
 
 
195 
BURKE, R. J. 1997. Women on corporate boards of directors: A needed resource. Women in 
Corporate Management. Springer. 
BURKE, R. J. 2000. Company size, board size and numbers of women corporate directors. Women on 
corporate boards of directors. Springer. 
BURNEY, A. 2008. Inductive and deductive research approach. Retrieved, 9, 2010. 
CADBURY, A. 1999. What are the trends in corporate governance? How will they impact your 
company? Long Range Planning, 32, 12-19. 
CAMA 1990. Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990. 
CAMPBELL, K. & MINGUEZ-VERA, A. 2008. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial 
performance. Journal of business ethics, 83, 435-451. 
CAMPBELL, K. & MÍNGUEZ-VERA, A. 2008. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial 
performance. Journal of business ethics, 83, 435-451. 
CAMPBELL, K. & VERA, A. M. 2010. Female board appointments and firm valuation: Short and long-
term effects. Journal of Management & Governance, 14, 37-59. 
CARPENTER, M. A. & WESTPHAL, J. D. 2001. The strategic context of external network ties: 
Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision 
making. Academy of Management Journal, 44, 639-660. 
CARTER, D., D'SOUZA, F. P., SIMKINS, B. J. & SIMPSON, W. G. 2007. The diversity of corporate board 
committees and firm financial performance. Available at SSRN 972763. 
CARTER, D. A., D'SOUZA, F., SIMKINS, B. J. & SIMPSON, W. G. 2010. The gender and ethnic diversity 
of US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 18, 396-414. 
CARTER, D. A., SIMKINS, B. J. & SIMPSON, W. G. 2003. Corporate governance, board diversity, and 
firm value. Financial Review, 38, 33-53. 
CARTER, N. M. & WAGNER, H. M. 2011. The bottom line: Corporate performance and women’s 
representation on boards (2004–2008). Catalyst, 1. 
CASCIARO, T. & PISKORSKI, M. J. 2005. Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint 
absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. Administrative science quarterly, 
50, 167-199. 
CASTILLA, E. J. & BENARD, S. 2010. The paradox of meritocracy in organizations. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 55, 543-676. 
CECI, S. J. & WILLIAMS, W. M. 2011. Understanding current causes of women's underrepresentation 
in science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 3157-3162. 
CERTO, S. T. 2003. Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: Signaling with board 
structures. Academy of management review, 28, 432-446. 
CHARRON, D. C. 2007. Stockholders and stakeholders: the battle for control of the corporation. Cato 
J., 27, 1. 
CHEN, C. X., LU, H. & SOUGIANNIS, T. 2012. The agency problem, corporate governance, and the 
asymmetrical behavior of selling, general, and administrative costs. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 29, 252-282. 
CHEN, H. 2014. CEO duality and firm performance: an empirical study of EU listed firms. 
CHEW, I. K. & ZHU, W. 2002. Factors influencing Singapore managers' career aspiration in 
international assignments. Career Development International, 7, 96-108. 
CHIZEMA, A. & KIM, J. 2010. Outside directors on Korean boards: Governance and institutions. 
Journal of Management Studies, 47, 109-129. 
CHOVWEN, C. 2007. Barriers to acceptance, satisfaction and career growth: Implications for career 
development and retention of women in selected male occupations in Nigeria. Women in 
Management Review, 22, 68-78. 
 
 
 
 
196 
CHRISTOPHER, J. 2010. Corporate governance—A multi-theoretical approach to recognizing the 
wider influencing forces impacting on organizations. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 21, 
683-695. 
CHUKWUNEDU, O. S. & OKAFOR, G. O. 2011. Creative Accounting, Corporate Governance Watch 
Dogs Institutions and Systems-the Case of Cadbury (Nig) Plc. Corporate Governance Watch 
Dogs Institutions and Systems-the Case of Cadbury (Nig) Plc (October 19, 2011). 
CHUNG, K. H. & PRUITT, S. W. 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin's q. Financial management, 70-
74. 
CLAESSENS, S., DELL’ARICCIA, G., IGAN, D. & LAEVEN, L. 2010. Cross-country experiences and policy 
implications from the global financial crisis. Economic Policy, 25, 267-293. 
CLAESSENS, S., DJANKOV, S. & LANG, L. H. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East 
Asian corporations. Journal of financial Economics, 58, 81-112. 
CLARKE, T. 2004. Theories of corporate governance: The philosophical foundations of corporate 
governance, Routledge. 
COHEN, J., KRISHNAMOORTHY, G. & WRIGHT, A. M. 2002. Corporate governance and the audit 
process. Contemporary accounting research, 19, 573-594. 
COLES, J. L., DANIEL, N. D. & NAVEEN, L. 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of financial 
economics, 87, 329-356. 
CONNELLY, B. L., CERTO, S. T., IRELAND, R. D. & REUTZEL, C. R. 2011a. Signaling theory: A review and 
assessment. Journal of Management, 37, 39-67. 
CONNELLY, B. L., JOHNSON, J. L., TIHANYI, L. & ELLSTRAND, A. E. 2011b. More than adopters: 
Competing influences in the interlocking directorate. Organization Science, 22, 688-703. 
CONYON, M. J. & PECK, S. I. 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management 
compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 146-157. 
CORBETT, K. P. 2016. Performance Management in Irish Public and Private Sector Organisations: 
Moving Towards Multicultural Performance Management Practice. 
CORNWALL, A. & RIVAS, A.-M. 2015. From ‘gender equality and ‘women’s empowerment’to global 
justice: reclaiming a transformative agenda for gender and development. Third World 
Quarterly, 36, 396-415. 
COTTER, D. A., HERMSEN, J. M., OVADIA, S. & VANNEMAN, R. 2001. The glass ceiling effect. Social 
Forces, 80, 655-681. 
COUNCIL, N. L. 2013. CEO Recruitment, performance review & remuneration committee. 
CRESWELL, J. W. 2012. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches, 
Sage publications. 
CRESWELL, J. W. 2013. Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches, 
Sage Publications, Incorporated. 
CUADRADO, I., GARCÍA‐AEL, C. & MOLERO, F. 2015. Gender‐typing of leadership: Evaluations of real 
and ideal managers. Scandinavian journal of psychology, 56, 236-244. 
DAILY, C. M. & DALTON, D. R. 1995. CEO and director turnover in failing firms: an illusion of change? 
Strategic Management Journal, 16, 393-400. 
DAILY, C. M., DALTON, D. R. & CANNELLA, A. A. 2003. Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue 
and data. Academy of Management Review, 28, 371-382. 
DALLAS, L. L. 2001. New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, The. Tul. L. 
Rev., 76, 1363. 
DALTON, D. R., DAILY, C. M., ELLSTRAND, A. E. & JOHNSON, J. L. 1998. Meta-analytic reviews of 
board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic management 
journal, 19, 269-290. 
 
 
 
 
197 
DALTON, D. R. & KESNER, I. F. 1983. Inside/outside succession and organizational size: The 
pragmatics of executive replacement. Academy of Management journal, 26, 736-742. 
DAMODARAN, A. 2003. Country risk and company exposure: theory and practice. 
DAVID, M. & SUTTON, C. D. 2011. Social research: An introduction, Sage. 
DE ANDRES, P., AZOFRA, V. & LOPEZ, F. 2005. Corporate boards in OECD countries: Size, 
composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
13, 197-210. 
DE HAAN, J. & VLAHU, R. 2016. Corporate governance of banks: A survey. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 30, 228-277. 
DEAKINS, D. & WHITTAM, G. 2000. Business start-up: theory, practice and policy. Enterprise and 
Small Business: Principles, Practice and Policy, Financial Times Prentice-Hall, London. 
DECENZO, D. & ROBBINS, S. 2007. Fundamentals of Human Resource Management, Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiles & Sons. Inc. 
DENIS, D. J., DENIS, D. K. & WALKER, M. D. 2012. Matching directors with firms: Evidence from board 
structure following corporate spinoffs. Working Paper, University of Pittsburgh and North 
Carolina State University. 
DESSLER, G. 2009. A framework for human resource management, Pearson Education India. 
DESVAUX, G., DEVILLARD-HOELLINGER, S. & BAUMGARTEN, P. 2007. Women matter: Gender 
diversity, a corporate performance driver, McKinsey. 
DESVAUX, G. & DEVILLARD, S. 2008. Women Matter 2: Female leadership, a competitive edge for the 
future. Study, McKinsey & Company, Paris. 
DEUTSCH, Y. 2005. The impact of board composition on firms’ critical decisions: A meta-analytic 
review. Journal of Management, 31, 424-444. 
DEY, A., ENGEL, E. & LIU, X. 2011. CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split? Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 17, 1595-1618. 
DONALDSON, L. 1990. The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and management theory. 
Academy of management Review, 15, 369-381. 
DONALDSON, T. & PRESTON, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, 
evidence, and implications. Academy of management Review, 20, 65-91. 
DOUGHERTY, T. W., DREHER, G. F., ARUNACHALAM, V. & WILBANKS, J. E. 2013. Mentor status, 
occupational context, and protégé career outcomes: Differential returns for males and 
females. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 83, 514-527. 
DREES, J. M. & HEUGENS, P. P. 2013. Synthesizing and extending resource dependence theory: A 
meta-analysis. Journal of Management, 39, 1666-1698. 
DUCHIN, R., MATSUSAKA, J. G. & OZBAS, O. 2010. When are outside directors effective? Journal of 
financial economics, 96, 195-214. 
DUEHR, E. E. & BONO, J. E. 2006. Men, women, and managers: are stereotypes finally changing? 
Personnel Psychology, 59, 815-846. 
EAGLY, A. H. 2007. Female leadership advantage and disadvantage: Resolving the contradictions. 
Psychology of women quarterly, 31, 1-12. 
EAGLY, A. H., JOHANNESEN-SCHMIDT, M. C. & VAN ENGEN, M. L. 2003. Transformational, 
transactional, and laissez-faire leadership styles: a meta-analysis comparing women and 
men. Psychological bulletin, 129, 569. 
EAGLY, A. H. & KARAU, S. J. 2002. Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. 
Psychological review, 109, 573. 
EHIKIOYA, B. I. 2009. Corporate governance structure and firm performance in developing 
economies: evidence from Nigeria. Corporate Governance: The international journal of 
business in society, 9, 231-243. 
 
 
 
 
198 
EISENBERG, T., SUNDGREN, S. & WELLS, M. T. 1998. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in 
small firms. Journal of financial economics, 48, 35-54. 
EISENHARDT, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of management 
review, 14, 57-74. 
EKEH, P. P. & OSAGHAE, E. E. 1989. Federal character and federalism in Nigeria, Heinemann 
Educational Books (Nigeria). 
ELSAYED, K. 2007. Does CEO duality really affect corporate performance? Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15, 1203-1214. 
ELSON, C. M. J. B. R. 1992. Executive Overcompensation--A Board-Based Solution. 34, 937. 
ELY, R. J. & THOMAS, D. A. 2001. Cultural diversity at work: The effects of diversity perspectives on 
work group processes and outcomes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, 229-273. 
ENTERPRISES, B. O. P. 1999. Publis Enterprises (Privitazation and Commercialsation) Act 1999 
[Online]. Available: http://www.bpeng.org/sites/bpe/Pages/home.aspx [Accessed 20 Oct. 
2016 2016]. 
ERHARDT, N. L., WERBEL, J. D. & SHRADER, C. B. 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial 
performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11, 102-111. 
ESTRIN, S. 2002. Corporate governance and privatisation: Lessons from transition economies. Journal 
of African Economies, 11, 68-104. 
EXCHANGE, N. S. 2002. Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact books, various issues. Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
FAKEYE, Y., GEORGE, O. J. & OWOYEMI, O. 2012. Women in purgatory: the case of Nigerian women 
in the boardrooms. Asian Journal of Business and Management Sciences, 1, 134-150. 
FALEYE, O. 2007. Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 83, 501-529. 
FAMA, E. F. & FRENCH, K. R. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal 
of financial economics, 33, 3-56. 
FAMA, E. F. & JENSEN, M. C. 1983a. Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law & 
Economics, 26, 301-325. 
FAMA, E. F. & JENSEN, M. C. 1983b. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of law and 
economics, 301-325. 
FAPOHUNDA, T. M. 2012. Towards Improved Access to Full Employment and Decent Work For 
Women in Nigeria. Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 2. 
FARRELL, K. A. & HERSCH, P. L. 2005. Additions to corporate boards: the effect of gender. Journal of 
Corporate finance, 11, 85-106. 
FIELD, A. 2009. Discovering statistics using SPSS, Sage publications. 
FIELDS, M. A. & KEYS, P. Y. 2003. The emergence of corporate governance from Wall St. to Main St.: 
Outside directors, board diversity, earnings management, and managerial incentives to bear 
risk. Financial Review, 38, 1-24. 
FILATOTCHEV, I. & WRIGHT, M. 2011. Agency perspectives on corporate governance of multinational 
enterprises. Journal of Management Studies, 48, 471-486. 
FINKELSTEIN, S. & D'AVENI, R. A. 1994. CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of 
directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of 
Management Journal, 37, 1079-1108. 
FINKELSTEIN, S. & HAMBRICK, D. C. 1996. Strategic leadership, West St. Paul, Minn. 
FONDAS, N. & SASSALOS, S. 2000. A different voice in the boardroom: How the presence of women 
directors affects board influence over management. Global focus, 12, 13-22. 
FORTIN, N. M., BELL, B. & BÖHM, M. J. L. E. 2017. Top earnings inequality and the gender pay gap: 
Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 47, 107-123. 
 
 
 
 
199 
FRANK, M. H. 2014. Women's experiences as learners in an adult basic education and training 
programme. 
FREEMAN, R. E. 1983. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Advances in strategic 
management, 1, 31-60. 
FREEMAN, R. E. 2001. A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation. Perspectives in Business 
Ethics Sie, 3, 144. 
FREEMAN, R. E., WICKS, A. C. & PARMAR, B. 2004. Stakeholder theory and “the corporate objective 
revisited”. Organization science, 15, 364-369. 
FRIEDMAN, S. D. & GREENHAUS, J. H. 2000. Work and family--allies or enemies?: what happens 
when business professionals confront life choices, Oxford University Press, USA. 
GABRIELSSON, J. & HUSE, M. 2002. The venture capitalist and the board of directors in SMEs: roles 
and processes. Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 4, 125-
146. 
GABRIELSSON, J. & WINLUND, H. 2000. Boards of directors in small and medium-sized industrial 
firms: examining the effects of the board's working style on board task performance. 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12, 311-330. 
GBEREVBIE, D. E. & IBIETAN, J. 2013. Federal Character Principle and Administrative Effectiveness in 
the Nigerian Public Service: Challenges and Prospects for Sustainable Development 1999-
2012. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 15, 46-61. 
GEOFFREY, T. & LIU, Y. 2015. Female leadership and gender equity: Evidence from plant closure. 117, 
77-97. 
GEORGE, D. A. & OGUNNIYI, O. J. 2014. The Historical Development of Women Career in Corporate 
Sector in Nigeria. Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities Vol, 3, 1. 
GERSON, J. & BARR, G. 1996. The Structure of Corporate Control and Ownership in a Regulatory 
Environment Unbiased toward One‐Share‐One‐Vote. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 4, 78-97. 
GIBBS, G. R. 2002. Qualitative data analysis: Explorations with NVivo, Open University. 
GIBSON, K. 2012. We Visit Nigeria, Mitchell Lane Publishers, Inc. 
GOERGEN, M., MARTYNOVA, M. & RENNEBOOG, L. 2005. Corporate governance convergence: 
evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21, 
243-268. 
GOMEZ‐MEJIA, L., WISEMAN, R. M. & DYKES, B. J. 2005. Agency problems in diverse contexts: A 
global perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1507-1517. 
GOMPERS, P. A., ISHII, J. L. & METRICK, A. 2001. Corporate governance and equity prices. National 
bureau of economic research. 
GRANT, A. D. & TAYLOR, A. 2014. Communication essentials for female executives to develop 
leadership presence: Getting beyond the barriers of understating accomplishment. Business 
Horizons, 57, 73-83. 
GRAY, D. F., MERTON, R. C. & BODIE, Z. 2007. Contingent claims approach to measuring and 
managing sovereign credit risk. Journal of Investment Management, 5, 5. 
GRAY, R., DEY, C., OWEN, D., EVANS, R. & ZADEK, S. 1997. Struggling with the praxis of social 
accounting: Stakeholders, accountability, audits and procedures. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 10, 325-364. 
GREGORY‐SMITH, I., MAIN, B. G. & O'REILLY, C. A. 2014. Appointments, pay and performance in UK 
boardrooms by gender. The Economic Journal, 124, F109-F128. 
GREGORY, A., JEANES, E., THARYAN, R. & TONKS, I. 2013. Does the stock market gender stereotype 
corporate boards? Evidence from the market's reaction to directors' trades. British Journal of 
Management, 24, 174-190. 
 
 
 
 
200 
GRIFFITHS, A. 2018. Record number of women on FTSE 100 boards [Online]. Department of Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/record-
number-of-women-on-ftse-100-boards [Accessed 12 January 2019 2019]. 
GROSVOLD, J. & BRAMMER, S. 2011. National institutional systems as antecedents of female board 
representation: An empirical study. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19, 116-
135. 
GROYSBERG, B. & BELL, D. 2013. Dysfunction in the boardroom. Harvard Business Review, 91, 89-97. 
GUEST, G., BUNCE, A. & JOHNSON, L. 2006. How many interviews are enough? An experiment with 
data saturation and variability. Field methods, 18, 59-82. 
GUEST, P. M. 2009. The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK. The 
European Journal of Finance, 15, 385-404. 
GUGLER, K., MUELLER, D. C. & YURTOGLU, B. B. 2004. Corporate governance and globalization. 
Oxford review of economic policy, 20, 129-156. 
GULATI, P. 2009. Research Management: Fundamental & Applied Research, Busca Inc. 
GUO, L., SMALLMAN, C. & RADFORD, J. 2013. A critique of corporate governance in China. 
International Journal of Law and Management, 55, 257-272. 
GUTNER, T. 2001. Wanted: More diverse directors. Business Week, 30, 2001. 
HALL, B. H. 2002. The financing of research and development. Oxford review of economic policy, 18, 
35-51. 
HANSFORD, B., TENNENT, L. & EHRICH, L. C. 2002. Business mentoring: help or hindrance? 
Mentoring and Tutoring, 10, 101-115. 
HARJOTO, M., LAKSMANA, I. & LEE, R. 2015. Board diversity and corporate social responsibility. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 132, 641-660. 
HARRISON, J. S. & WICKS, A. C. 2013. Stakeholder theory, value, and firm performance. Business 
ethics quarterly, 23, 97-124. 
HERBST, J. & OLUKOSHI, A. 1994. Nigeria: economic and political reforms at cross purposes. Voting 
for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, 453-502. 
HERMALIN, B. E. 2005. Trends in corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 60, 2351-2384. 
HERMALIN, B. E. & WEISBACH, M. S. 2001. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: A survey of the economic literature. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
HERRING, C. J. A. S. R. 2009. Does diversity pay?: Race, gender, and the business case for diversity. 
74, 208-224. 
HILLMAN, A. J., CANNELLA, A. A. & HARRIS, I. C. 2002. Women and racial minorities in the 
boardroom: how do directors differ? Journal of Management, 28, 747-763. 
HILLMAN, A. J. & DALZIEL, T. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and 
resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management review, 28, 383-396. 
HILLMAN, A. J., WITHERS, M. C. & COLLINS, B. J. 2009. Resource dependence theory: A review. 
Journal of management. 
HILSON, G. 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility in the extractive industries: Experiences from 
developing countries. Resources Policy, 37, 131-137. 
HITT, M. A., XU, K. & CARNES, C. M. J. J. O. O. M. 2016. Resource based theory in operations 
management research. 41, 77-94. 
HOLLOWAY, I. & TODRES, L. 2003. The status of method: flexibility, consistency and coherence. 
Qualitative research, 3, 345-357. 
HOLLOWAY, I. & WHEELER, S. 2013. Qualitative research in nursing and healthcare, John Wiley & 
Sons. 
HOPKINS, A. G. 2014. An economic history of West Africa, Routledge. 
HOROWITZ, D. L. 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict, Univ of California Press. 
 
 
 
 
201 
HUANG, S. & HILARY, G. J. J. O. A. R. 2018. Zombie board: Board tenure and firm performance. 56, 
1285-1329. 
HUGHES, M. M. 2011. Intersectionality, quotas, and minority women's political representation 
worldwide. American Political Science Review, 105, 604-620. 
HUSE, M. 2005. Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for exploring behavioural 
perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of Management, 16, S65-S79. 
HUSE, M., GROSCHL, S. & TAKAGI, J. 2012. The ‘golden skirts’: lessons from Norway about women on 
corporate boards of directors. Diversity quotas, diverse perspectives: The case of gender, 11-
24. 
HUSE, M. & SOLBERG, A. G. 2006. Gender-related boardroom dynamics: How Scandinavian women 
make and can make contributions on corporate boards. Women in Management Review, 21, 
113-130. 
HWANG, B.-H. & KIM, S. 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of financial economics, 93, 138-158. 
HYDE, K. F. 2000. Recognising deductive processes in qualitative research. Qualitative market 
research: An international journal, 3, 82-90. 
IANNOTTA, M., GATTI, M. & HUSE, M. 2015. Institutional Complementarities and Gender Diversity 
on Boards: A Configurational Approach. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 
IBRAHIM, U. A. 2016a. Corporate Governance in Nigeria. Corporate Governance in Africa. Springer. 
IBRAHIM, U. A. 2016b. Corporate Governance in Nigeria. In: HOWELL, K. E. & SOROUR, M. K. (eds.) 
Corporate Governance in Africa: Assessing Implementation and Ethical Perspectives. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
IFEANYI CHRIS, O., OKORO OKORO, E., AMUJIRI, B. A. & ONODUGO, V. A. 2016. Impact Of Monetary 
Policy Regimes On Performance Of Commercial Banks In Nigeria. Management Strategies 
Journal, 32, 15-29. 
IGBUZOR, O. 2003. Privatization in Nigeria: critical issues of concern to civil society. A Paper 
Presented at A Power Mapping Roundtable Discussion on the Privatisation Programme in 
Nigeria organised by Socio-economic rights Initiative (SERI) held at Nigeria Links Hotel Abuja 
on 3rd September. 
IMOBIGHE, T. A. 2003. Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria: an Overview. Civil society and ethnic 
conflict management in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum. 
INDEPENDENT. 2016. Nigerian Senate votes down gender equlity bill due to 'religious beliefs' 
[Online]. Available: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nigerian-senate-
votes-down-gender-equality-bill-due-to-religious-beliefs-a6936021.html [Accessed 11 Nov. 
2016 2016]. 
INTERNATIONAL, T. 2013. Global Corruption Report: Climate Change, Routledge. 
INTERNATIONAL, T. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015?gclid=CJyJle7lyc8CFQxmGwodrHgPrA [Accessed 07 
October 2016 2016]. 
ISIDRO, H. & SOBRAL, M. J. J. O. B. E. 2015. The effects of women on corporate boards on firm value, 
financial performance, and ethical and social compliance. 132, 1-19. 
IZRAELI, D. N. & ADLER, N. J. 1994. Competitive frontiers: Women managers in a global economy, 
Blackwell Cambridge, MA. 
JACKLING, B. & JOHL, S. 2009. Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from India's top 
companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17, 492-509. 
JENSEN, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems. the Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880. 
JENSEN, M. C. 2002. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. 
Business ethics quarterly, 235-256. 
 
 
 
 
202 
JENSEN, M. C. 2017. Value maximisation, stakeholder theory and the corporate objective function. 
Unfolding stakeholder thinking. Routledge. 
JENSEN, M. C. & MECKLING, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3, 305-360. 
JOECKS, J., PULL, K. & VETTER, K. 2013. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance: 
What exactly constitutes a “critical mass?”. Journal of business ethics, 118, 61-72. 
JOHANNISSON, B. & HUSE, M. 2000. Recruiting outside board members in the small family business: 
An ideological challenge. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 12, 353-378. 
JOHNSON, R. B. & ONWUEGBUZIE, A. J. 2004. Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose 
time has come. Educational researcher, 33, 14-26. 
JOHNSON, R. B., ONWUEGBUZIE, A. J. & TURNER, L. A. 2007. Toward a definition of mixed methods 
research. Journal of mixed methods research, 1, 112-133. 
JONES, T. M. & WICKS, A. C. 1999. Convergent stakeholder theory. Academy of management review, 
24, 206-221. 
JOSEPH, J., OCASIO, W. & MCDONNELL, M.-H. 2014. The structural elaboration of board 
independence: Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption of CEO-only board 
structures in US corporate governance. Academy of Management Journal, 57, 1834-1858. 
JUSTESEN, M. K. & BJØRNSKOV, C. 2014. Exploiting the poor: Bureaucratic corruption and poverty in 
Africa. World Development, 58, 106-115. 
KADAFA, A. A. 2012. Oil exploration and spillage in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Civil and 
Environmental Research, 2, 38-51. 
KAJOLA, S. O. 2008. Corporate governance and firm performance: The case of Nigerian listed firms. 
European journal of economics, finance and administrative sciences, 14, 16-28. 
KAJOLA, S. O., DESU, A. & AGBANIKE, T. 2015. Factors influencing dividend payout policy decisions of 
Nigerian listed firms. International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management, 3, 
539-557. 
KANG, D. L. & SORENSEN, A. B. 1999. Ownership organization and firm performance. Annual review 
of sociology, 121-144. 
KANTER, J. 1977a. Management-oriented management information systems, Englewood Cliffs ; 
London (etc.), Prentice-Hall. 
KANTER, R. M. 1977b. Men and women of the corporation, New York, Basic Books. 
KATO, T., KIM, W. & LEE, J. H. 2007. Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in 
Korea: Evidence from new panel data. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 15, 36-55. 
KAUFFELD, S., JONAS, E. & FREY, D. 2004. Effects of a flexible work-time design on employee-and 
company-related aims. European journal of work and organizational psychology, 13, 79-100. 
KAUFMAN, G. 2000. Do gender role attitudes matter? Family formation and dissolution among 
traditional and egalitarian men and women. Journal of Family Issues, 21, 128-144. 
KAUFMANN, D. & VICENTE, P. C. 2011. Legal corruption. Economics & Politics, 23, 195-219. 
KEENE, J. R. & REYNOLDS, J. R. 2005. The job costs of family demands gender differences in negative 
family-to-work spillover. Journal of family Issues, 26, 275-299. 
KIEL, G. C. & NICHOLSON, G. J. 2003. Board composition and corporate performance: how the 
Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11, 189-205. 
KIM, E. H. & KIM, W. 2008. Changes in Korean corporate governance: a response to crisis. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 20, 47-58. 
KIM, K.-H., AL-SHAMMARI, H. A., KIM, B. & LEE, S.-H. 2009. CEO duality leadership and corporate 
diversification behavior. Journal of Business Research, 62, 1173-1180. 
 
 
 
 
203 
KITTLES, R. A. & WEISS, K. M. 2003. Race, ancestry, and genes: implications for defining disease risk. 
Annual review of genomics and human genetics, 4, 33-67. 
KLEIN, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. 
Journal of accounting and economics, 33, 375-400. 
KOLADE, O. J. & KEHINDE, O. 2013. Glass ceiling and women career advancement: Evidence from 
Nigerian construction industry. Iranian Journal of Management Studies, 6, 79. 
KONDRACKI, N. L., WELLMAN, N. S. & AMUNDSON, D. R. 2002. Content analysis: review of methods 
and their applications in nutrition education. Journal of nutrition education and behavior, 34, 
224-230. 
KRAUSE, R., SEMADENI, M. & CANNELLA, A. A. 2014. CEO Duality A Review and Research Agenda. 
Journal of Management, 40, 256-286. 
KVALE, S. 2008. Doing interviews, Sage. 
LAMONICA, C. & OMOTOLA, J. S. 2014. Horror in paradise: frameworks for understanding the crises 
of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Carolina Academic Press. 
LAOWORAPONG, M., SUPATTARAKUL, S. & SWIERCZEK, F. W. 2018. Corporate Governance, Board 
Effectiveness, and Performance of Thai Listed Firms. AU Journal of Management, 13, 25-40. 
LARMOU, S. & VAFEAS, N. 2010. The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with 
a history of poor operating performance. Journal of Management & Governance, 14, 61-85. 
LEE, L.-E., MARSHALL, R., RALLIS, D. & MOSCARDI, M. 2015. Women on Boards: Global Trends in 
Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards. MSCI, Nov. 
LEE, S. M. 1993. Racial classifications in the US Census: 1890–1990. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 16, 75-
94. 
LEECH, B. L. 2002. Asking questions: techniques for semistructured interviews. PS-WASHINGTON-, 
35, 665-668. 
LEHN, K. M., PATRO, S. & ZHAO, M. 2009. Determinants of the size and composition of US corporate 
boards: 1935‐2000. Financial Management, 38, 747-780. 
LI, L. & NAUGHTON, T. 2007. Going public with good governance: Evidence from China. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15, 1190-1202. 
LINCOLN, A. & ADEDOYIN, O. 2012a. Corporate governance and gender diversity in Nigerian 
boardrooms. governance, 1, 5. 
LINCOLN, A. A. & ADEDOYIN, O. 2012b. Corporate Governance and Gender Diversity in Nigerian 
Boardrooms. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 71. 
LIPS, H. M. 2013. The gender pay gap: Challenging the rationalizations. Perceived equity, 
discrimination, and the limits of human capital models. Sex Roles, 68, 169-185. 
LIPTON, M. & LORSCH, J. W. 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The 
Business Lawyer, 59-77. 
LORD DAVIES OF ABERSOCH, C. 2014. Women on Boards: Davies Review Annual Report 2014. 
LÜCKERATH-ROVERS, M. 2013. Women on boards and firm performance. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 17, 491-509. 
MACHOLD, S., HUSE, M., HANSEN, K. & BROGI, M. 2013. Getting women on to corporate boards: A 
snowball starting in Norway, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
MALIBARI, A. M. 2013. Digital instructional models: its effect on creating leadership training 
programs. 
MATSA, D. A. & MILLER, A. R. 2013. A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from quotas. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5, 136-69. 
MATTHEWS, B. & ROSS, L. 2014. Research methods, Pearson Higher Ed. 
MAUME, D. J. 1999. Glass ceilings and glass escalators occupational segregation and race and sex 
differences in managerial promotions. Work and Occupations, 26, 483-509. 
 
 
 
 
204 
MAUME, D. J. 2004. Is the glass ceiling a unique form of inequality? Evidence from a random-effects 
model of managerial attainment. Work and occupations, 31, 250-274. 
MAUME, M. O. 2016. Breaking Women: Gender, Race, and the New Politics of Imprisonment. SAGE 
Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA. 
MAYLOR, H. & BLACKMON, K. 2005. Researching business and management: a roadmap for success, 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
MCNULTY, T., FLORACKIS, C. & ORMROD, P. 2013. Boards of directors and financial risk during the 
credit crisis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, 58-78. 
MENYAH, K., NAZLIOGLU, S. & WOLDE-RUFAEL, Y. 2014. Financial development, trade openness and 
economic growth in African countries: New insights from a panel causality approach. 
Economic Modelling, 37, 386-394. 
MEYERSON, D. & TOMPKINS, M. 2007. Tempered radicals as institutional change agents: The case of 
advancing gender equity at the University of Michigan. Harv. JL & Gender, 30, 303. 
MIKAILU, S. 2005. Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Financial Performance in Nigeria, 
AERC Research Paper 
149. 
MINICHILLI, A., ZATTONI, A., NIELSEN, S. & HUSE, M. 2012. Board task performance: An exploration 
of micro‐and macro‐level determinants of board effectiveness. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 33, 193-215. 
MOLLOY, L. E., GEST, S. D. & RULISON, K. L. 2010. Peer influences on academic motivation: Exploring 
multiple methods of assessing youths' most" influential" peer relationships. The Journal of 
Early Adolescence, 0272431610384487. 
MOMOH, S. O., MOSES, A. I. & UGIOMOH, M. M. 2013. Women and the HIV/AIDS epidemic: The 
issue of school age girls’ awareness in Nigeria. Journal of International Women's Studies, 8, 
212-218. 
MOONEY, S. & RYAN, I. 2009. A woman's place in hotel management: upstairs or downstairs? 
Gender in Management: An International Journal, 24, 195-210. 
MORDI, C., SIMPSON, R., SINGH, S. & OKAFOR, C. 2010. The role of cultural values in understanding 
the challenges faced by female entrepreneurs in Nigeria. Gender in Management: An 
International Journal, 25, 5-21. 
MORSE, J. M. 2000. Determining sample size. Qualitative health research, 10, 3-5. 
MULCAHY, M. & LINEHAN, C. 2014. Females and precarious board positions: Further evidence of the 
glass cliff. British Journal of Management, 25, 425-438. 
NAIRAMETRICS. 2017. The top 5 stock exchanges in Africa | Nairametrics [Online]. Available: 
https://nairametrics.com [Accessed 01/04/2018 2017]. 
NAKPODIA, F., ADEGBITE, E., AMAESHI, K. & OWOLABI, A. 2016. Neither principles nor rules: Making 
corporate governance work in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-18. 
NCAA. 2006. Aacoalition.org [Online]. Available: 
http://www.aacoalition.org/national_policy_women.htm [Accessed 20/11/2016 2016]. 
NCAA. 2016. National Coalition on Affirmative Action, National Gender Policy [Online]. Available: 
http://www.aacoalition.org/national_policy_women.htm [Accessed 20 Nov. 2016 2016]. 
NDIC. 2016. NDIC | Mandate, Powers & Functions [Online]. Available: http://ndic.gov.ng/about-ndic-
3/mandate-powers-functions/ [Accessed 21/11/16 2016]. 
NECK, C. 2015. Disappearing women: Why do women leave senior roles in finance? Australian 
Journal of Management, 40, 488-510. 
NEMETH, C. J. 1986. Differential contributions of majority and minority influence. Psychological 
review, 93, 23. 
 
 
 
 
205 
NICHOLSON, G. J. & KIEL, G. C. 2004. A framework for diagnosing board effectiveness. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 12, 442-460. 
NIELSEN, S. & HUSE, M. 2010. The contribution of women on boards of directors: Going beyond the 
surface. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18, 136-148. 
NIGERIA, B. C. 2012. Gender in Nigeria Report 2012: improving the lives of girls and women in 
Nigeria. Abuja: British Council Nigeria. 
NKOMO, S. M. & NGAMBI, H. 2009. African women in leadership: Current knowledge and a 
framework for future studies. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies, 4, 49-68. 
NNOROM, V. I. 2015. AN ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY LEGAL FRAME WORK FOR FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES. 
NORRIS, P. & INGLEHART, R. 2001. Cultural obstacles to equal representation. Journal of democracy, 
12, 126-140. 
NOY, C. 2008. Sampling knowledge: The hermeneutics of snowball sampling in qualitative research. 
International Journal of social research methodology, 11, 327-344. 
OAKLEY, J. G. 2000. Gender-based barriers to senior management positions: Understanding the 
scarcity of female CEOs. Journal of business ethics, 27, 321-334. 
OBI, C. I. 2001. Introduction: Some Critical Issues in Women’s Political Participation Through 
Economic Empowerment. 
ODUBOGUN, K. 1995. Institutional reforms and the management of exchange rate policy in Nigeria, 
Citeseer. 
OECD 1999. OECD principles of corporate governance, OECD. 
OECD 2004. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
OGBECHIE, C. 2016. 10. Corporate governance practices in the Nigerian banking industry. Handbook 
on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions, 230. 
OGBECHIE, C. & KOUFOPOULOS, D. N. 2007. Corporate governance practices in publicly quoted 
companies in Nigeria. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 3, 350-381. 
OGBECHIE, C. & KOUTOPOULOS, D. 2010. Corporate governance and board Practices in the Nigerian 
banking industry. January. 
OGBECHIE, C. I. 2012. Key determinants of effective board of directors-evidence from Nigeria. Brunel 
University Brunel Business School PhD Theses. 
OGBU, C. 1998. LBN’s account set to open a can of worms. Ahunwan, B.(2002) Corporate governance 
in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 37, 269-287. 
OKARO, S. & OKAFOR, O. 2009. Creative Accounting. Corporate Governance Watch dog Institutions 
and Systems-The Case of Cadbury (Nig.) Plc. SSRN, 1-12. 
OKEAHALAM, C. C. 2004. Corporate governance and disclosure in Africa: Issues and challenges. 
Journal of Financial Regulation and compliance, 12, 359-370. 
OKEKE, O. J.-P. 2017. Nigerian culture: A barrier to the career progress of women in Nigeria. Global 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 5, 1-11. 
OKIKE, E. N. 2007. Corporate governance in Nigeria: The status quo. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15, 173-193. 
OKIRO, K., ADUDA, J. & OMORO, N. 2015. The effect of corporate governance and capital structure 
on performance of firms listed at the East African community securities exchange. European 
Scientific Journal, ESJ, 11. 
OKONJO-IWEALA, N. & OSAFO-KWAAKO, P. 2007. Nigeria's economic reforms: Progress and 
challenges. Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper. 
OKPARA, J. O. 2006. Gender and the relationship between perceived fairness in pay, promotion, and 
job satisfaction in a sub-Saharan African economy. Women in Management Review, 21, 224-
240. 
 
 
 
 
206 
OLANIYI, T. A., SAKARIYAHU, O. R. & ARIYO, A. A. 2016. Impact of Globalization on Performance of 
Nigeria Capital Market. Amity Business Review, 17. 
OLSEN, J. B. & EADIE, D. C. 1982. The game plan: Governance with foresight, Natl Governors Assn. 
OMOTOLA, S. J. 2007a. What is this Gender Talk All About After All? Gender, Power and Politics in 
Cotemporary Nigeria. African Study Monographs, 28, 34-46. 
OMOTOLA, S. J. 2007b. What is this Gender Talk All About After All? Gender, Power and Politics in 
Cotemporary Nigeria. African Study Monographs, 28. 
ORJI, I. E. 2001. Issues on ethnicity and governance in Nigeria: A universal human rights perspective. 
Fordham Int'l LJ, 25, 431. 
OSAGHAE, E. E. & SUBERU, R. T. 2005. A history of identities, violence and stability in Nigeria, Centre 
for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford. 
OSAYAWE EHIGIE, B. & CLEMENT AKPAN, R. 2004. Roles of perceived leadership styles and rewards 
in the practice of total quality management. Leadership & Organization Development 
Journal, 25, 24-40. 
OTUSANYA, O. J., LAUWO, S. & AJIBOLADE, S. O. 2013. An investigation of corporate executive fraud 
by CEOs in the Nigerian banking sector. African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 
2, 65-89. 
OUTLOOK, A. E. 2016. Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation. 
OYEFUGA, E., SALIHU, A. & YUSUF, B. 2013. Voices for Change (V4C) Programme Study. 
OYEJIDE, T. A. & ADEWUYI, A. O. 2011. Enhancing linkages of oil and gas industry in the Nigerian 
economy. pdf], MMCP. 
OZKAN, N. 2011. CEO compensation and firm performance: An empirical investigation of UK panel 
data. European Financial Management, 17, 260-285. 
PALMON, O. & WALD, J. K. 2002. Are two heads better than one? The impact of changes in 
management structure on performance by firm size. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 213-
226. 
PANDE, R., AND DEANNA FORD 2012. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012: GENDER EQUALITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT. 
PARBOTEEAH, K. P., HOEGL, M. & CULLEN, J. B. 2008. Managers' gender role attitudes: a country 
institutional profile approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 795-813. 
PATTON, W. & MCMAHON, M. 2014. Career development and systems theory: Connecting theory 
and practice, Springer. 
PAUL, G. 2009. The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK. 15, 385-404. 
PAYNE, G. T., BENSON, G. S. & FINEGOLD, D. L. 2009. Corporate board attributes, team effectiveness 
and financial performance. Journal of Management Studies, 46, 704-731. 
PAYTON, M. 2016. Nigerian Senate votes down gender equality bill due to 'religious beliefs'. 
PERRYMAN, A. A., FERNANDO, G. D. & TRIPATHY, A. J. J. O. B. R. 2016. Do gender differences persist? 
An examination of gender diversity on firm performance, risk, and executive compensation. 
69, 579-586. 
PETERSEN, T., SAPORTA, I. & SEIDEL, M. D. L. 2000. Offering a Job: Meritocracy and Social 
Networks1. American Journal of Sociology, 106, 763-816. 
PETERSON, C. A. & PHILPOT, J. 2013. The Finance Committee of the Board and Financial 
Performance: A Resource Dependence Perspective. Journal of Leadership, Accountability and 
Ethics, 10, 16. 
PETTIGREW, A. M. 1992. On studying managerial elites. Strategic management journal, 13, 163-182. 
PFEFFER, J. & SALANCIK, G. R. 2003. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective, Stanford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
207 
PHILLIPS, R., FREEMAN, R. E. & WICKS, A. C. 2003. What stakeholder theory is not. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 13, 479-502. 
POOLE, M. A. & O'FARRELL, P. N. 1971. The assumptions of the linear regression model. Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers, 145-158. 
POPPO, L. & ZENGER, T. 1998. Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost, knowledge‐
based, and measurement explanations for make‐or‐buy decisions in information services. 
Strategic management journal, 19, 853-877. 
PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. W. 1997. Legal determinants of external 
finance. The journal of finance, 52, 1131-1150. 
PORTA, R. L., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. W. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of 
political economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
POST, C. & BYRON, K. 2015. Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-analysis. 
Academy of Management Journal, 58, 1546-1571. 
POWELL, G. N., BUTTERFIELD, D. A. & PARENT, J. D. 2002. Gender and managerial stereotypes: have 
the times changed? Journal of Management, 28, 177-193. 
POWELL, G. N. & GRAVES, L. M. 2003. Women and men in management, Sage. 
PREMIUMTIMES 2016. Reworked’ Gender Equality Bill gets second reading in Nigerian Senate. 22 
Nov. 2016 ed. 
PREVOST, A. K., RAO, R. P. & HOSSAIN, M. 2002. Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: 
a simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Empirical Finance, 9, 373-397. 
QUADRI, H. A. 2010. Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance in Nigeria-Challenges and 
Panaceas. PM World Today, 12, 1-8. 
RANDØY, T. & JENSSEN, J. I. 2004. Board independence and product market competition in Swedish 
firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 281-289. 
RASHEED, H. S. & GEIGER, S. W. 2001. Determinants of governance structure for the electronic value 
chain: Resource dependency and transaction costs perspectives. Journal of Business 
Strategies, 18, 159. 
RECHNER, P. L. & DALTON, D. R. 1991. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal 
analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 155-160. 
REED, D. 2002. Corporate governance reforms in developing countries. Journal of Business Ethics, 37, 
223-247. 
REINSTEIN, A. & WEIRICH, T. R. 1996. Testing for bias in the audit committee. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 11, 28-35. 
RENNEBOOG, L. & SZILAGYI, P. G. 2015. How relevant is dividend policy under low shareholder 
protection? Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money. 
RHODE, D. & PACKEL, A. K. 2010. Diversity on corporate boards: How much difference does 
difference make? Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working 
Paper. 
RHODE, D. L. & PACKEL, A. K. 2014. Diversity on corporate boards: How much difference does 
difference make. Del. J. Corp. L., 39, 377. 
RICHARD IYIOLA, A. 2011. Gender and Racial Differentials in the Nigerian Banking Industry. 
International Journal of Business and Management, 6. 
RICHARD, O. C. 2000. Racial diversity, business strategy, and firm performance: A resource-based 
view. Academy of management journal, 43, 164-177. 
ROBERTS, J. 2005. Agency theory, ethics and corporate governance. Advances in Public Interest 
Accounting, 11, 249-269. 
ROSE-ACKERMAN, S. 1999. Political corruption and democracy. Conn. J. Int'l L., 14, 363. 
 
 
 
 
208 
ROSE, C. 2007. Does female board representation influence firm performance? The Danish evidence. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15, 404-413. 
ROSS, M. L. 2003. Nigeria’s oil sector and the poor. Position Paper for DFID-Nigeria, UCLA, Los 
Angeles. 
ROSSOUW, G. J., VAN DER WATT, A. & ROSSOUW, D. M. 2002. Corporate governance in South Africa. 
Journal of Business ethics, 37, 289-302. 
ROTIMI, E., OBASAJU, B., LAWAL, A. & ISEOLORUNKANMI, J. 2013. Analysis of corruption and 
economic growth in Nigeria. Analysis of corruption and economic growth in Nigeria, 4, 1-19. 
RUBIN, H. J. & RUBIN, I. S. 2011. Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data, Sage. 
RUDMAN, L. A. & GLICK, P. 2001. Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash toward agentic 
women. Journal of social issues, 57, 743-762. 
RUGGIE, M. 2014. The state and working women: A comparative study of Britain and Sweden, 
Princeton University Press. 
RYAN, H. E. & WIGGINS, R. A. 2004. Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board 
independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 497-
524. 
RYCHLEWSKI, R. 2010. Board of directors in emerging markets. uniwien. 
SALANCIK, G. R. & PFEFFER, J. 1978. A social information processing approach to job attitudes and 
task design. Administrative science quarterly, 224-253. 
SANUSI, L. S. 2012. Banking reform and its impact on the Nigerian economy. CBN Journal of Applied 
Statistics, 2, 115-122. 
SANUSI, L. S. & GOVERNOR, C. Banks in Nigeria and national economic development: A critical 
review.  Being a keynote Address at the seminar on “Becoming an Economic Driver While 
Applying Banking Regulations”, organized by the Canadian High Commission in Joint 
Collaboration with the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN) and the Royal Bank of 
Canada (RBC) on March, 2011. 
SARBANES, P. Sarbanes-oxley act of 2002.  The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act. Washington DC: US Congress, 2002. 
SAVAGE, G. T., NIX, T. W., WHITEHEAD, C. J. & BLAIR, J. D. 1991. Strategies for assessing and 
managing organizational stakeholders. The executive, 5, 61-75. 
SEC 1972. SEC accounting practice and procedure, John Wiley & Sons. 
SEC 1985. LEXIS 2756, Investment Company Act of 1940—Section 3 (a)(1), 2 (a)(36); Securities Act of 
1933—Section 2 (1), Nov. 29, 1985, Kemper Financial Services. Inc. 
SEC. 2008. Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria [Online]. Available: 
http://www.sec.gov.ng/code-of-corporate-governance-.html [Accessed 26-09-14 2014]. 
SEC. 2011. Code of Corporate Governance, Nigeria Securities and Exchange Commission, Abuja. 
[Online]. Available: 21 Nov. 2016 [Accessed 21 Nov. 2016 2016]. 
SEIDMAN, I. 2012. Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education and the 
social sciences, Teachers college press. 
SELBY, C. C. 2000. From male locker room to co-ed board room: A twenty-five year perspective. 
Women on corporate boards of directors. Springer. 
SEN, G. & GROWN, C. 2013. Development crises and alternative visions: Third world women's 
perspectives, Routledge. 
SHANKMAN, N. A. 1999. Reframing the debate between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 19, 319-334. 
SHANTZ, A., WRIGHT, K., LATHAM, G. J. E., DIVERSITY & JOURNAL, I. A. I. 2011. Networking with 
boundary spanners: a quasi-case study on why women are less likely to be offered an 
engineering role. 30, 217-232. 
 
 
 
 
209 
SHARMA, A., ALTINAY, L. & O'NEILL, J. W. 2012. Using focus groups as a tool to develop a hospitality 
work-life research study. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 
24, 873-885. 
SHERIDAN, A. & MILGATE, G. 2005. Accessing board positions: A comparison of female and male 
board members’ views. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13, 847-855. 
SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52, 
737-783. 
SHRADER, C. B., BLACKBURN, V. L. & ILES, P. 1997. Women in management and firm financial 
performance: An exploratory study. Journal of managerial issues, 9, 355-372. 
SILA, V., GONZALEZ, A. & HAGENDORFF, J. 2016. Women on board: Does boardroom gender 
diversity affect firm risk? Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 26-53. 
SINGH, V. & VINNICOMBE, S. 2004. Why so few women directors in top UK boardrooms? Evidence 
and theoretical explanations. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 479-488. 
SLINGER, G. 1999. Spanning the gap–the theoretical principles that connect stakeholder policies to 
business performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 7, 136-151. 
SMITH, N., SMITH, V. & VERNER, M. 2006. Do women in top management affect firm performance? 
A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms. International Journal of productivity and Performance 
management, 55, 569-593. 
SOLUDO, C. C. Consolidating the Nigerian banking industry to meet the development challenges of 
the 21st century.  An address delivered to the special meeting of Bankers' Committee-CBN, 
Abuja, 2004. 
SOWELL, T. 2004. Affirmative action around the world: an empirical study, Yale University Press. 
SPIRA, L. F. 1999. Ceremonies of governance: perspectives on the role of the audit committee. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 3, 231-260. 
STAHL, G. K., MAZNEVSKI, M. L., VOIGT, A. & JONSEN, K. 2010. Unraveling the effects of cultural 
diversity in teams: A meta-analysis of research on multicultural work groups. Journal of 
international business studies, 41, 690-709. 
STATISTICS, N. B. O. 2016. Nigerianstat.gov.ng [Online]. Available: http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/ 
[Accessed 21/10/2016]. 
STEGER, M. B. 2010. Globalization, Wiley Online Library. 
STEPHEN, A. 2014. From structural adjustment to privatisation in Nigeria. 
STERNBERG, E. 1997. The defects of stakeholder theory. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 5, 3-10. 
STEVENSON, W. B. & RADIN, R. F. 2009. Social capital and social influence on the board of directors. 
Journal of Management Studies, 46, 16-44. 
STILES, P. 2001. The impact of the board on strategy: An empirical examination. Journal of 
Management Studies, 38, 627-650. 
SUNDARAM, A. K. & INKPEN, A. C. 2004. Stakeholder theory and “The corporate objective revisited”: 
A reply. Organization science, 15, 370-371. 
SYED, J. & VAN BUREN, H. J. 2014. Global business norms and Islamic views of women’s 
employment. Business Ethics Quarterly, 24, 251-276. 
TAJFEL, H. 1986. Turner, JC (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. Psychology of 
intergroup relations, 7-24. 
TASHAKKORI, A. & TEDDLIE, C. 2010. Sage handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral 
research, Sage. 
TEIGEN, M. 2012. Gender quotas on corporate boards: On the diffusion of a distinct national policy 
reform. Comparative Social Research, 29, 115-146. 
 
 
 
 
210 
TERJESEN, S., AGUILERA, R. V. & LORENZ, R. 2013. Legislating a woman’s seat on the board: 
Institutional factors driving gender quotas for boards of directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 
1-19. 
TERJESEN, S., AGUILERA, R. V. & LORENZ, R. 2015a. Legislating a woman’s seat on the board: 
Institutional factors driving gender quotas for boards of directors. Journal of Business Ethics, 
128, 233-251. 
TERJESEN, S., COUTO, E. B. & FRANCISCO, P. M. 2015b. Does the presence of independent and 
female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity. Journal 
of Management & Governance, 1-37. 
TERJESEN, S., COUTO, E. B. & FRANCISCO, P. M. 2016. Does the presence of independent and female 
directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity. Journal of 
Management & Governance, 20, 447-483. 
TERJESEN, S., SEALY, R. & SINGH, V. 2009. Women directors on corporate boards: A review and 
research agenda. Corporate governance: an international review, 17, 320-337. 
TERJESEN, S. & SINGH, V. 2008. Female presence on corporate boards: A multi-country study of 
environmental context. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 55-63. 
TERJESEN, S., VINNICOMBE, S. & FREEMAN, C. 2007. Attracting Generation Y graduates: 
Organisational attributes, likelihood to apply and sex differences. Career Development 
International, 12, 504-522. 
TONGCO, M. D. C. 2007. Purposive sampling as a tool for informant selection. 
TORCHIA, M., CALABRO, A. & HUSE, M. 2011a. Women directors on corporate boards: From 
tokenism to critical mass. Journal of Business Ethics, 102, 299-317. 
TORCHIA, M., CALABRÒ, A. & HUSE, M. J. J. O. B. E. 2011b. Women directors on corporate boards: 
From tokenism to critical mass. 102, 299-317. 
TRAVLOS, N. G., TRIGEORGIS, L. & VAFEAS, N. 2015. Shareholder wealth effects of dividend policy 
changes in an emerging stock market: The case of Cyprus. 
TRICKER, B. 2015. Corporate governance: Principles, policies, and practices, Oxford University Press, 
USA. 
TRICKER, R. I. 1996. Pocket Director: The Essentials of Corporate Governance from AZ, Profile Books. 
TSAI, W. & GHOSHAL, S. 1998. Social capital and value creation: The role of intrafirm networks. 
Academy of management Journal, 41, 464-476. 
TUGGLE, C. S., SIRMON, D. G., REUTZEL, C. R. & BIERMAN, L. 2010. Commanding board of director 
attention: investigating how organizational performance and CEO duality affect board 
members' attention to monitoring. Strategic Management Journal, 31, 946-968. 
UADIALE, O. M. 2012. Earnings management and corporate governance in Nigeria. Research Journal 
of Finance and Accounting, 3, 1-10. 
UDEGBE, I. & UDEGBE, I. 2003. The realities of Nigerian organisational health policies and practicies 
for female employees. Transforming Health Policies for Gender Equity in Nigerian 
Organisations, 1-24. 
UJUNWA 2011. RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA. CORPORATE OWNERSHIP & 
CONTROL, 514. 
UJUNWA, A. 2012. Board characteristics and the financial performance of Nigerian quoted firms. 
Corporate Governance, 12, 656-674. 
UJUNWA, A., OKOYEUZU, C. & NWAKOBY, I. 2012. Corporate board diversity and firm performance: 
Evidence from Nigeria. Revista de Management Comparat International, 13, 605. 
UKIWO, U. 2003. Politics, ethno-religious conflicts and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 115-138. 
 
 
 
 
211 
UNODC. 2017. Corruption in Nigeria. Bribery: public experience and response [Online]. Available: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6jj-ulM0cLrOXFpMDh1Q1l1bm8/view [Accessed 
22/12/2017 2017]. 
UPADHYAY, A. & ZENG, H. 2014. Gender and ethnic diversity on boards and corporate information 
environment. Journal of Business Research. 
UVIEGHARA, E. E. 2001. Labour law in Nigeria, Malthouse Press. 
VAISMORADI, M., TURUNEN, H. & BONDAS, T. 2013. Content analysis and thematic analysis: 
Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study. Nursing & health sciences, 15, 
398-405. 
VALICKOVA, P., HAVRANEK, T. & HORVATH, R. 2015. Financial development and economic growth: A 
meta‐analysis. Journal of Economic Surveys, 29, 506-526. 
VAN DEN BERGHE, L. A. & LEVRAU, A. 2004. Evaluating Boards of Directors: what constitutes a good 
corporate board? Corporate Governance: an international review, 12, 461-478. 
VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, A. & BOONE, C. 2006. A resource-based theory of market structure and 
organizational form. Academy of Management Review, 31, 409-426. 
VAUGIRARD, V. 2005. Crony capitalism and sovereign default. Open economies review, 16, 77-99. 
VINNICOMBE, S., DOLDOR, E., SEALY, R., PRYCE, P. & TURNER, C. 2015. The Female FTSE Board 
Report 2015. 
VINNICOMBE, S. & SINGH, V. 2002. Sex role stereotyping and requisites of successful top managers. 
Women in management review, 17, 120-130. 
VITOLS, S. 2005. Changes in Germany's Bank‐Based Financial System: implications for corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13, 386-396. 
WACHUDI, E. J. & MBOYA, J. 2012. Effect of board gender diversity on the performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. European Scientific Journal, 8. 
WALLACE, R. S. O. 1987. Disclosure of accounting information in developing countries: A case study 
of Nigeria. University of Exeter. 
WALSH, A. M. & BORKOWSKI, S. C. 2006. Professional associations in the health industry: Factors 
affecting female executive participation. Women in Management Review, 21, 365-375. 
WANG, M. & KELAN, E. 2013. The gender quota and female leadership: Effects of the Norwegian 
gender quota on board chairs and CEOs. Journal of Business Ethics, 117, 449-466. 
WARTHER, V. A. 1998. Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to 
management and shareholders. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4, 53-70. 
WEFORUM. 2015. Global Gender Gap Report 2015 [Online]. Available: 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=NGA 
[Accessed 12 Oct. 2016 2016]. 
WIERDA‐BOER, H. H., GERRIS, J. R. & VERMULST, A. A. 2008. Adaptive strategies, gender ideology, 
and work‐family balance among Dutch dual earners. Journal of Marriage and Family, 70, 
1004-1014. 
WILLIAMS, S. M. 2001. Corporate governance diversity and its impact on intellectual capital 
performance in an emerging economy, Citeseer. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. 1988. Corporate finance and corporate governance. The journal of finance, 43, 
567-591. 
WILSON, J. 2014. Essentials of business research: A guide to doing your research project, Sage. 
WILSON, N. & ALTANLAR, A. 2009a. Director characteristics, gender balance and insolvency risk: an 
empirical study. Gender Balance and Insolvency Risk: An Empirical Study (September 22, 
2009). 
WILSON, N. & ALTANLAR, A. 2009b. Director characteristics, gender balance and insolvency risk: an 
empirical study. Gender Balance and Insolvency Risk: An Empirical Study (May 30, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
212 
WISEMAN, R. M. & GOMEZ-MEJIA, L. R. 1998. A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking. 
Academy of management Review, 23, 133-153. 
WOLDIE, A. & ADERSUA, A. 2004. Female entrepreneurs in a transitional economy: Businesswomen 
in Nigeria. International Journal of Social Economics, 31, 78-93. 
WOOD, G. J. 2006. Career advancement in Australian middle managers: a follow-up study. Women in 
Management Review, 21, 277-293. 
WU, X. 2005. Corporate governance and corruption: A cross‐country analysis. Governance, 18, 151-
170. 
XIA, J., MA, X., LU, J. W. & YIU, D. W. 2014. Outward foreign direct investment by emerging market 
firms: A resource dependence logic. Strategic Management Journal, 35, 1343-1363. 
YAKASAI, A. G. 2001. Corporate governance in a third world country with particular reference to 
Nigeria. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9, 238-253. 
YAP, M. & KONRAD, A. M. 2009. Gender and Racial Differentials in Promotions: Is There a Sticky 
Floor, a Mid-Level Bottleneck, or a Glass Ceiling? Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations, 
64, 593-619. 
YERMACK, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of 
financial economics, 40, 185-211. 
YERMACK, D. 2006. Board members and company value. Financial Markets and Portfolio 
Management, 20, 33-47. 
YEROKUN, O. 1992. The changing investment climate through law and policy in Nigeria. Ahunwan, 
B.(2002). Corporate governance in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 37, 269-287. 
YORK, G. 2019. Nigeria's oil-dependent economy plagued by plunging crude prices [Online]. 
Available: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-
business/nigerias-capital-feels-the-pinch-from-the-plunge-in-oil-prices/article22847527/ 
[Accessed 12 January 2019 2019]. 
YOUNG, M. N., PENG, M. W., AHLSTROM, D., BRUTON, G. D. & JIANG, Y. 2008. Corporate governance 
in emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of 
management studies, 45, 196-220. 
ZAHRA, S. A. & PEARCE, J. A. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A 
review and integrative model. Journal of management, 15, 291-334. 
ZELECHOWSKI, D. D. & BILIMORIA, D. 2004. Characteristics of women and men corporate inside 
directors in the US. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 337-342. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 213 
Appendix 1.1 Letter of invitation for fieldwork.............................................................. 214 
Appendix 1.2 Semi-structured questions for interviews ................................................ 215 
Appendix 1.3 Questionnaire ......................................................................................... 218 
Appendix 2.0 Regression results ................................................................................... 227 
Appendix 2.1: OLS regression results all firms Tobin’s Q ........................................................ 227 
Appendix 2.2: Fixed effects result for all firms ....................................................................... 228 
Appendix 2.3: Random effects result for all firms .................................................................. 229 
Appendix 2.4: Hausman fixed and random effects results ...................................................... 230 
Appendix 2.5: OLS regression results all firms ROA ................................................................ 231 
Appendix 2.6: Fixed effects result for all firms ....................................................................... 232 
Appendix 2.7: Random effects result for all firms .................................................................. 233 
Appendix 2.8: Hausman fixed and random effects results Tonin’s Q ...................................... 234 
Appendix 2.9: Hausman fixed and random effects results ROA .............................................. 234 
Appendix 2.10: Descriptive statistics for Banking Sector ........................................................ 235 
Appendix 2.11: Descriptive statistics for Oil and Gas Sector ................................................... 236 
Appendix 2.12: OLS square regression results for Financial sector Tobin’s Q........................... 237 
Appendix 2.13: OLS regression results for Financial sector ROA ............................................. 237 
Appendix 2.14: OLS regression results for Oil and Gas sector Tobin’s Q .................................. 238 
Appendix 2.15: Ordinary least square regression results for Oil and Gas sector ROA .............. 238 
Appendix 2.16: Hausman fixed and random effects results: before 2009 Tobin’s Q ................ 239 
Appendix 2.17:Hausman fixed effects and random effects: before 2009 ROA ......................... 240 
Appendix 2.18: Huasman fixed and random effects results: After 2009 Tobin’s Q ................... 240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1.1 Letter of invitation for fieldwork 
 
 
 
 
31 May 2019   
Dear Sir: 
 
I am Olumide David Okeyide a PhD student in the Norwich Business School, University of East 
Anglia, United Kingdom. I am writing to request your permission to undertake research fieldwork in 
your most reputable organisation. 
 
My research is primarily focused on how Human Resources are best managed and optimally utilised 
by firms and my case study is the corporate firms in Nigeria. My plan is to look at your your firm’s 
strategy in recruiting world class staff, how your organisation helps employees manage their careers 
and whether career trajectories differ. I also intend to look at the demographic diversity represented 
within your organisation and how that enhances organisational performance.  This research would 
also be of benefit to your company as it would identify which of your organisational practices are the 
most effective.  
 
I hereby solicit the help of your company in undertaking this research by allowing me to conduct  
interviews with key stakeholders within your organisation. 
 
I understand how important it is that any information collected as part of this research should be kept 
confidential. From research design to the dissemination of its results, ethical principles will be 
accounted for and I will comply with all institutional, international regulations and codes of practice 
regarding research ethics. I will seek approval for the project from UEA’s Research Ethics Committee 
(http://www.uea.ac.uk/research/research-integrity) prior to any data collection. 
 
I shall be delighted to supply further information on request.  You may also contact my Supervisors, 
Dr Sara Connolly at  Sara.Connolly@uea.ac.uk and Dr Susan Sayce at S.Sayce@uea.ac.uk.   
 
I would be very grateful and honoured get a positive response to this proposition. 
 
Yours sincerely 
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Olumide David Okeyide 
+234 9093170011 
+44 (0) 7411632051 
 
hollymide_01@yahoo.com 
O.Okeyide@uea.ac.uk  
 
Appendix 1.2 Semi-structured questions for 
interviews  
INTERVIEW 
DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF BOARD COMPOSITION OF NIGERIAN 
QUOTED FIRMS 
This Interview is conducted as part of my research project, which I am doing for my PhD at 
the Norwich Business School (NBS) at the University of East Anglia. This study aims to 
investigate the impact of corporate board characteristics on the performance of Nigerian 
quoted firms. The results of this study would be expected to help academics understand 
practices in the Nigerian corporate world and policy makers know which best practices can 
be employed in other sectors of the economy to improve performance and maximize 
human resource productivity. All the personal information collected will be kept in a secure 
place to protect the confidence of participants. Therefore, your anonymity is maintained 
throughout the work. Thank you for your assistance. 
 
Semi-structured questions for interviews and the academic sources 
Question Probes Source 
1.1 In what academic field did you study at 
different level of academic attainment?  
1.2 Did you study abroad for any of these 
qualifications? 
1.3 How many years have you worked in 
your professional career? 
1.4 What organizations have you worked 
for? 
Exploring demographic details Adams et. al. 2005., 
Ayeomeni 2012., 
Bear 2010., Carter 
et al., 2010, 
Ujunwa, 2012. 
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Question Probes Source 
1.5 How many years have you worked for 
your current organization? 
1.6 What position did you start with in your 
current organization? 
1.7 Do you have any international work 
experience? 
1.8 How old are you? 
1.9 What is your marital status? 
2.1 What in your opinion are the skills and 
expertise that are essential for 
appointment into board position in your 
organization? 
2.2 What is the process for appointments 
into board position in your 
organization? 
2.3 Do all candidates for appointment to 
board level know this?  
2.4 Has this criteria changed overtime? 
Is the same standard for 
promotion applied evenly in 
your organization, or does it 
vary? 
Difference executive and non-
executive? 
Are they advertised or in 
further particulars? 
Carter et al., 2010, 
Ujunwa, 2012. 
3.1 In your opinion what do you think are 
the strengths of having diverse 
membership on your board  
3.2 Are there any weaknesses of having 
diverse membership on your board? 
3.3 What do you think of a quota system 
for gender on board? 
How is gender diversity 
significant to board 
performance? 
Perception of quota system on 
corporate boards in Nigeria. 
  
Bear 2010., Carter 
et al., 2010, 
Maume 2004, 
Ujunwa, 2012.  
4.1 Are there other elements of diversity 
that you think might be important? i.e. 
same school membership on board, 
elite school, study abroad, international 
experience etc.  
What other forms of diversity 
are on board? 
Carter et al., 2010, 
Maume 2004 
5.1 Ethnic diversity is a feature of Nigerian 
life. What is the significance of ethnic 
diversity in organisational life?  
5.2 What is the representation of your 
kinsmen on your organization’s board? 
5.3 Do you think this helps you settle and 
make better contribution on board, or it 
doesn’t? 
How is ethnic, language and 
regional diversity significant to 
board performance? 
 
Ayeomeni 2012, 
Maume 2004. 
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Question Probes Source 
5.4 Is there any advantage to having a good 
representation of all tribes (3 major 
tribe at least) on your organization’s 
board? 
6.1 How is leadership perceived within your 
organisation  
6.2 How is succession managed. 
6.3 Do you perceive an impact of leadership 
on organisational performance? 
Is there any significance of 
leadership structure on 
Nigerian corporate boards? 
Adams et. al. 2005, 
2012., Carter et al., 
2010, Maume 
2004, Ujunwa, 
2012. 
7.1 To what extent do you think that 
boards within your sector and industry 
are similar to your own? 
7.2 Are there any recent regulations 
affecting boards within your sector 
7.3 What policy would you recommend to 
you organisation from other sector?  
Exploring sectoral specific 
issues 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 Were there any questions that you were expecting that I haven’t ask? 
Any suggestions on other people for me to talk to? 
Thank-you! 
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Appendix 1.3 Questionnaire 
 
  
QUESTIONNAIRE 
GLASS CEILING: A CASE STUDY OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR 
This questionnaire is conducted as part of my research project, which I am doing for my PhD at the 
Norwich Business School (NBS) at the University of East Anglia. This study aims to explore disparity in 
career advancement in the Nigerian banking sector as a result of the glass ceiling. The results of this 
study would be expected to help academics understand practices in the Nigerian banking sector and 
how it affects career advancement of men and women and for policy makers to help eradicate 
policies that restricts fully utilization of human resources through glass ceiling. I would like to invite 
you to take part in this research study. All the personal information collected will be kept in a secure 
place to protect the confidence of participants. Therefore, your anonymity is maintained throughout 
the work. Thank you for your assistance in providing the information requested. 
The questionnaire is divided into 7 parts (60 items) 
Part 1 Career information 
Part 2 Personal information 
Part 3 Social roles and responsibilities  
Part 4 Career performance 
Part 5 Factors influencing career progression 
Part 6 Perception about work environments related to academic careers  
Part 7 Attitude towards intention to stay in academic careers 
 
Please complete each item by marking √ in  or fill in the blanks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 Career information  
1.1.        In which field are you working? (Select the most appropriate response only one)  
 Academic fields  Physical sciences and Mathematical   
 Medical sciences   
 Chemistry and Pharmacology 
 Biological Sciences and related fields 
 Engineering and Industry  
 Information Technology/ Computing sciences 
 Other (please specify) ……………. 
 Non - academic fields (end of questionnaire, and thank you very much) 
1.2.       Your organisation ………………………… department ………………… 
1.3.       How many hours do you devote for work? …………… hours a week 
1.4. Please indicate the proportion of your time that you have spent for work. 
Academic job      ………………… %  
 Management/administration    ………………… %  
 Cooperate with stakeholder (client/academics) ………………… % 
 Others (document work, non-related academic work)…………………%  
1.5 How many years have you worked in your organization? …… years 
1.6 Position at start in your current organization 
  Level 1 - director/ senior executive/ professor/ president 
  Level 2 - principal researcher / associate director/ associate professor/ associate   president 
  Level 3 - senior researcher/ team or project manager / assistant professor/ faculty dean 
  Level 4 - researcher/ lecturer/graduate trainee 
 Other (please specify) …………………….. 
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 Official level at start ……………................ 
 Monthly income at start   , 000 Baht 
1.7 Position at present  in your current organisation 
  Level 1 - director/ senior executive/ professor/ president 
  Level 2 - principal researcher / associate director/ associate professor/ associate   president 
  Level 3 - senior researcher/ team or project manager / assistant professor/ faculty dean 
  Level 4 - researcher/ lecturer/graduate trainee 
 Other (please specify) …………………….. 
 Official level at present …………................... 
 Monthly income at present   , 000 Baht 
1.8 Period of appointment to higher level of each level 
 1.8.1 Promotion from level 4 up to level 3 ………… years 
1.8.2 Promotion from level 3 up to level 2 ………… years 
1.8.3  Promotion from level 2 up to level 1 ………… years 
1.9 How many years have you worked at the level of staff?       …….. years 
 
1.10 During your academic career, have you been project manager/ leader? 
 Yes ………….. project (s)  No   
1.11 In your current job, how many do you manage/have responsibility for other staff?  
……………….. person (s) 
1.12 Have you taken any career breaks?  
 Maternity leave  Yes    No 
 Become a monk Yes    No 
 
Part 2 Personal Information 
2.1 Gender   Male  Female  
2.2 Year of birth …………… 
2.3 Marital status  Single  Married  Widowed  Divorced 
2.4 Number of children …………… person (s) 
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2.5 Occupation of your spouse  
  Worked in academic career   Worked in non-academic career 
  Self employed            Homemaker, retired, or not employed 
2.6 The educational background of your spouse 
  Lower than bachelor’s degree    Bachelor’s degree    
  Master’s degree     Doctoral degree  
2.7 The total monthly income of your family    , 000 Baht  
2.8  The occupation of your parents     
                                                                      Father     Mother 
 Worked in academic career     
 Worked in non-academic career    
 Self employed       
 Homemaker or not employed      
2.9 The educational background of your parents    
                                                                                 Father     Mother 
 Finished lower than bachelor’s degree    
 Finished bachelor’s degree      
 Finished master’s degree      
 Finished doctoral degree     
2.10 Highest degree earned 
 Bachelor’s degree   Master’s degree   Doctoral degree  
2.11 Foreign degree earned 
 Yes   No   
2.12 Educational background 
Bachelor’s degree  Master’s degree  Doctoral degree 
Field  ……………… ……………… ……………… 
University ……………… ……………… ……………… 
Country ……………… ……………… ……………… 
GPA  ……………… ……………… ……………… 
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Holding an Honors’ degree  Yes   No 
2.13 How many years in total have you worked in an academic career?  
…….. years (Exclude years in full time study) 
  
 2.14 During your academic career, have you worked or trained abroad? 
(excluding postgraduate study/training) 
 Yes   No 
1.15. If Yes, for how long in total? …….. years 
2.16 What has been beneficial to your career from work experience in abroad?  
[Select all that apply] 
 Good for the CV   Improving skills    Increased salary    Getting 
higher position  Getting well known Other (please specify) 
 
Part 3 Social roles and responsibilities  
3.1 Have you work experience with any sectors outside your institution?  
[Select all that apply] 
 None     Worked with higher education  
 Worked with public sectors   Worked with non-public sectors 
3.2 Are you/have you been      
   Yes No 
Member of an international committee?       
Member of a national committee?       
Member of an editorial board of an academic journal?   
3.3 How many academic associations are you a member of or have positions in? 
3.4 Your activity out of working time.  
Item 
Participation level 
Least Most 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. You go to party association with your colleagues.      
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2. You accompany your colleagues to provinces or 
abroad. 
     
3. You attend professional activities.      
4. Family care      
5. Further knowledge training      
 
3.5 What has been beneficial to your career from collaborating with any particular professional 
activities? [Select all that apply] 
 Good for the CV    Improving skills  
  Increased salary     Getting higher position 
  Getting well known    Other (please specify) ……………… 
 
 
Part 4 Career performance 
4.1 In the last 3 years, how much research output have you had? 
(Include accepted publications that have a publication date, but not those that are still at the 
revision stage)  
 Published paper   …………..  
      (books, book chapters, journal articles, instructors’ manuals, research reports) 
 Conference presentations …………..  
 Patents   …………..  
 Other (please specify) ………….. 
4.2 What has been beneficial to your career from good academic performance?  
[Select all that apply] 
 Good for the CV    Improving skills  
  Increased salary     Getting higher position 
  Getting well known    Other (please specify) ……………… 
 
Part 5 Factors supporting academic careers 
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What will help you to progress in your career? [Select all that apply] 
Item 
Level of Opinion 
Strongl
y 
disagre
e 
Disagr
ee 
Neithe
r agree 
nor 
disagre
e 
Agree 
Strongl
y agree 
1.1. Parents support      
1.1. Spouse/ partner support      
1.1. Educational degree      
1.1. Elite university graduated      
1.1. Earning a foreign degree      
1.1. Work experience abroad      
1.1. Academic career years      
1.1. Research performance (publication, conference, 
etc.) 
     
1.1. Specialist skills        
1.1. Good relation with colleagues in organisation      
1.1. Good connection with stakeholder outside 
organisation 
     
1.1. Old boy network      
1.1. Non-career break      
1.1. Other (please specify) …………………………      
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Part 6 Perception of work environments related to academic careers  
 
Item 
Level of Opinion 
Strongl
y 
disagre
e 
Disagr
ee 
Neithe
r agree 
nor 
disagre
e 
Agree 
Strongl
y agree 
1.1. My organization has a good and fair 
performance evaluation process. 
     
1.1. Getting promotion in my organization is based 
upon personal accomplishments on the job.  
     
1.1. Employees in my department are given equal 
opportunities in promotion.  
     
1.1. In my organization, males were promoted more 
than females. 
     
1.1. In my organization, if the capability of males is 
equivalent to females, males were promoted 
than females. 
     
1.1. In my opinion, on the whole men make better 
leaders than women do.  
     
 
 
Part 7 Attitude toward intention to stay in academic careers 
7.1 Do you ‘aim’ to become a top manager in your career life? 
  Yes  No  
7.2 What is your long-range career plan? (Select the most appropriate response and only one)  
 Remain in academic career 
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 Employment in non-academic career (please specify) ……..…  
 Self employed (please specify) ………..  
 Homemaker, retired, or not employed  
7.3 Why do you plan not to remain in your academic career? [Select all that apply]  
 Lack of career opportunity in promotion 
 Marriage/family obligations 
 Health reasons 
  Other (please specify) ………………………… 
7.4 Are there any other issues those come to your mind when you think about what factors or 
circumstances would enable you to advance in academic career in terms of increasing salary and 
higher promotion?  
………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………… 
7.5 Do you think gender discrimination still remain in academic career, how do you know, what 
factors lead to gender discrimination in academic career, and what is needed to solve this issue?  
………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 2.0 Regression results 
Appendix 2.1: OLS regression results all firms Tobin’s Q 
Table 1: Ordinary least square regression results 
. regress tobinsq nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets Quota sector1 
sector2 sector3 sector4 sector5 sector7 sector8 sector9 sector10 
 
Source                    SS                       df                           MS                               Number of obs   =     1,101 
Model               108.772346           18                  6.04290811                        F(18, 1082)     =      4.42 
Residual           1479.86058            1,082            1.36770849                        Prob > F        =    0.0000 
 Total                1588.63293            1,100            1.44421175                        R-squared       =    0.0685 
                                                                                                                               Adj R-squared   =    0.0530 
                                                                                                                               Root MSE        =    1.1695 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
tobinsq                    Coef.                    Std. Err.          T              P>t          [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd                    .0318948          .0179542         1.78        0.076         -.0033341    .0671237 
pwob                        -.0079968         .0090565        -0.88       0.377         -.025767    .0097734 
pnexwob                  -.0093682         .0099385        -0.94       0.346        -.028869    .0101326 
dirG                            .0011195         .0018857         0.59       0.553        -.0048196    .0025805 
dirH                            .0019047         .0024912         0.76       0.445        -.0067928    .0029834 
dirInt                         -.0069273         .0019599        -3.53       0.000        -.0107729   -.0030818 
audi                            .0002791         .0005495         0.51       0.612        -.0013572     .000799 
logfirmassets           -.0581498         .013059          -4.45       0.000        -.0837737    -.032526 
Quota                         .0041922         .1417392        0.03        0.976        -.2739225     .282307 
sector1                       .0797112         .2512105        0.32        0.751        -.4132037     .572626 
sector2                       .7188589         .2044946        3.52        0.000         .317608     1.12011 
sector3                       .1389082         .2567385        0.54        0.589        -.3648536    .6426701 
sector4                       .0989535         .2068112        0.48        0.632        -.3068429    .5047499 
sector5                       .3792994         .1716271        2.21        0.027         .0425399     .716059 
sector7                       .1327545         .1767014        0.75        0.453        -.2139617    .4794707 
sector8                       .2713431         .2861305        0.95        0.343        -.2900903    .8327766 
sector9                       .6369523         .2190653        2.91        0.004          .2071114    1.066793 
sector10                     .0849228         .1861981        0.46        0.648        -.2804275    .4502732 
_cons                          .4919498         .2286226        2.15        0.032          .0433559    .9405437 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.2: Fixed effects result for all firms 
 
Table 2: Fixed-effects results 
.xtreg tobinsq nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets, fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,101 
Group variable: newid                           Number of groups  =        130 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
within  = 0.0456                                         min =          1 
between = 0.0007                                         avg =        8.5 
overall = 0.0025                                         max =         10 
F(8,963)          =       5.75 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7861                        Prob > F          =     0.0000 
tobinsq                    Coef.                   Std. Err.              t              P>t                 [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd              -.0007667            .0271447           -0.03        0.977             -.0540364    .0525029 
pwob                   .0041905            .0106499           0.39          0.694             -.0167092    .0250902 
pnexwob            -.026458             .0125013            -2.12        0.035             -.0509909   -.0019251 
dirG                      .0076992           .0038219            2.01         0.044               .000199    .0151995 
dirH                      .0044649           .0050609            0.88         0.378              -.0054667    .0143966 
dirInt                   -.0020897           .0039064           -0.53        0.593              -.0097558    .0055764 
auditw                 .0047204            .0035232           1.34         0.181              -.0021936    .0116345 
logfirmassets    -.2618114            .0632381          -4.14         0.000              -.3859117   -.1377111 
_cons                  2.329274             .6003155           3.88         0.000              1.151196    3.507351 
sigma_u             1.2596004 
sigma_e               .99509703 
rho                        .61571959             (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Notes: F test that all u_i=0: F(129, 963) = 4.63                    Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.3: Random effects result for all firms 
Table 3: Random-effects results 
.xtreg tobinsq nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets Quota sector1 sector2 
sector3 sector4 sector5 sector7 sector8 sector9 sector10, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =      1,101 
Group variable: newid                           Number of groups  =        130 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
within  = 0.0362                                         min =          1 
between = 0.1236                                         avg =        8.5 
overall = 0.0623                                         max =         10 
Wald chi2(18)     =      48.68 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0001 
tobinsq                     Coef.                  Std. Err.              z               P>z                    [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd                .0299181             .0221443          1.35          0.177                -.013484    .0733202 
pwob                    .0004438             .0096126          0.05          0.963                -.0183965    .0192842 
pnexwob             -.0205843            .0109034         -1.89          0.059                -.0419545    .0007859 
dirG                       .0020263            .0026182           0.77         0.439                 -.0031052    .0071579 
dirH                       .0004554            .0035359           0.13         0.898                 -.0064747    .0073856 
dirInt                    -.0058195            .0027488          -2.12        0.034                 -.011207    -.000432 
auditw                 -.0000825            .0008566          -0.10        0.923                 -.0017615    .0015965 
logfirmassets      -.0741936           .0202499           -3.66        0.000                 -.1138828   -.0345044 
Quota                    .2359107           .1557374           1.51         0.130                 -.069329    .5411504 
sector1                  .0811495           .4447257           0.18         0.855                 -.7904968    .9527958 
sector2                 .5884587            .3138392           1.88         0.061                 -.0266549    1.203572 
sector3                -.0647909            .4017523          -0.16        0.872                 -.8522109     .722629 
sector4                 .1276645            .3562331           0.36         0.720                 -.5705396    .8258685 
sector5                 .3714501            .2944463           1.26         0.207                 -.2056541    .9485543 
sector7                 .1423264            .3106591           0.46         0.647                 -.4665542     .751207 
sector8                 .2609538            .467688             0.56         0.577                 -.6556977    1.177605 
sector9                 .5873581            .3840408           1.53         0.126                 -.165348    1.340064 
sector10               .0797208            .3212183           0.25         0.804                -.5498555    .7092971 
_cons                    .4742851            .3476979           1.36         0.173                -.2071902     1.15576 
sigma_u                .62804878 
sigma_e                .9968656 
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rho                         .28414433   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.4: Hausman fixed and random effects results 
Hausman fixed and 
random effects 
results 
    
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
No of Directors .20 -.14 -.07 .02 
% Women on BD  .01 -.00 .01 .01 
NonExe Women -.04 -.02 -.02 .01 
Igbo Directors .02 .01 .01 .00 
Hausa Directors .00 .00 .00 .01 
Int. Directors .00 -.00 .01 .00 
Women on Audit 
Com 
.01 -.00 .01 .00 
Log of firm asset .17 -.03 .14 .07 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =      296.85 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.5: OLS regression results all firms ROA 
Table 7: Ordinary least square regression results 
. regress roa nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets Quota sector1 sector2 
sector3 sector4 sector5 sector7 sector8 sector9 sector10 
Source                        SS                            df                              MS                                Number of obs   =     
1,102 
Model                  102.750966                18                         5.70838701                     F(18, 1083)     =      3.48 
Residual               1774.55977                1,083                   1.63855934                     Prob > F        =    0.0000 
Total                     1877.31073                1,101                   1.70509603                     R-squared       =    0.0547 
                                                                                                                                           Adj R-squared   =    0.0390 
                                                                                                                                           Root MSE        =    1.2801 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
ROA                           Coef.                    Std. Err.          T              P>t          [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd                -.1133413            .0195553        -5.80        0.000      -.1517117   -.0749708 
pwob                    -.0031921            .0099123        -0.32        0.747      -.0226416    .0162575 
pnexwob             -.011503               .0108745        -1.06        0.290      -.0328404    .0098344 
dirG                       .0035643             .002064            1.73        0.084      -.0004856    .0076142 
dirH                       .0014447             .0027252          0.53        0.596      -.0039027    .0067921 
dirInt                    -.0043158            .0021451         -2.01        0.044      -.0085248   -.0001068 
auditw                 -.0005333            .0006013         -0.89        0.375      -.0017131    .0006465 
logfirmassets       .0232225            .0142035          1.63        0.102       -.004647     .051092 
Quota                  -.2455062             .1551382        -1.58        0.114       -.5499117    .0588992 
sector1                -.0737766             .2749527        -0.27        0.789       -.6132769    .4657238 
sector2                 .1505482             .2237947          0.67       0.501        -.2885722    .5896685 
sector3                 .1015664             .2810064          0.36       0.718        -.4498121     .652945 
sector4                 .4569192             .2263628          2.02       0.044          .0127599    .9010784 
sector5                 .0596555             .1878176          0.32       0.751        -.3088721    .4281831 
sector7                -.0556035             .1934028         -0.29       0.774       -.4350901    .3238832 
sector8                -.3415252             .3131594         -1.09       0.276        -.955993    .2729426 
sector9                 .198764                .2397414          0.83       0.407        -.2716463    .6691742 
sector10              -.1143452             .2037778         -0.56      0.575         -.5141892    .2854987 
_cons                  1.369986               .2501363           5.48      0.000          .879179    1.860792 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.6: Fixed effects result for all firms 
Table 8: Fixed-effects regression results 
. xtreg roa nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets, fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,102 
Group variable: newid                           Number of groups  =        130 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
within  = 0.0776                                         min =          1 
between = 0.0027                                         avg =        8.5 
overall = 0.0048                                         max =         10 
F(8,964)          =      10.14 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7661                        Prob > F          =     0.0000 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
ROA                           Coef.                   Std. Err.              t              P>t                 [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd                -.2025299             .0317278         -6.38        0.000             -.2647934   -.1402663 
pwob                      .0068245            .0126558           0.54        0.590             -.0180115    .0316605 
pnexwob              -.0384395            .0148468          -2.59        0.010             -.0675753   -.0093036 
dirG                        .0187791            .0045545            4.12        0.000              .0098414    .0277169 
dirH                        .0024394            .0060176            0.41        0.685             -.0093697    .0142484 
dirInt                      .0017558            .00465                0.38        0.706             -.0073695    .0108811 
auditw                   .0066461             .0041901           1.59        0.113             -.0015767    .0148688 
logfirmassets        .1733372             .0750137           2.31        0.021              .0261283    .3205462 
_cons                      .3925252            .7052649           0.56         0.578            -.9915062    1.776557 
sigma_u                1.113174 
sigma_e                1.1858439 
rho                           .46842244           (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
F test that all u_i=0: F(129, 964) = 2.45                    Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.7: Random effects result for all firms 
Table 9: Random-effects results 
.xtreg roa nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets Quota sector1 sector2 
sector3 sector4 sector5 sector7 sector8 sector9 sector10, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =      1,102 
Group variable: newid                           Number of groups  =        130 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
within  = 0.0676                                         min =          1 
between = 0.0688                                         avg =        8.5 
overall = 0.0534                                         max =         10 
Wald chi2(18)     =      62.28 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
ROA                           Coef.                  Std. Err.              z               P>z                    [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd                 -.1366824            .0223876          -6.11        0.000                 -.1805613   -.0928036 
pwob                     -.0022919            .0105213          -0.22        0.828                 -.0229132    .0183294 
pnexwob               -.01598                .0117233          -1.36        0.173                 -.0389573    .0069973 
dirG                         .0057328            .0024734           2.32        0.020                   .000885    .0105806 
dirH                         .0014545            .0033146           0.44        0.661                  -.0050421     .007951 
dirInt                     -.0035219             .0025978         -1.36        0.175                  -.0086135    .0015697 
auditw                   -.0005229            .0007362          -0.71       0.478                  -.0019657      .00092 
logfirmassets         .0336721            .0176294           1.91       0.056                  -.0008808     .068225 
Quota                    -.2597872            .1685182          -1.54       0.123                  -.5900768    .0705024 
sector1                  -.1441465            .358771            -0.40       0.688                  -.8473248    .5590319 
sector2                   .112123               .2737744           0.41       0.682                  -.424465    .6487111 
sector3                   .0523773            .3477935            0.15      0.880                   -.6292854    .7340399 
sector4                   .4258438            .2930158            1.45      0.146                   -.1484566    1.000144 
sector5                   .0163625            .2425502            0.07      0.946                   -.4590272    .4917521 
sector7                  -.0864212           .2521507           -0.34      0.732                   -.5806274     .407785 
sector8                  -.3444062           .3995473           -0.86      0.389                   -1.127505    .4386922 
sector9                   .1630257           .3130382             0.52      0.603                    -.4505179    .7765694 
sector10                -.1374119          .2626054            -0.52      0.601                    -.6521089    .3772852 
_cons                    1.483751             .3069435             4.83      0.000                     .8821528    2.085349 
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sigma_u                 .38939457 
sigma_e               1.1882678 
rho                          .09697321   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.8: Hausman fixed and random effects results Tonin’s Q 
Table 6: Hausman fixed and random effects result Tobin’s Q 
                                             ---- Coefficients ---- 
                                        (b)                                (B)                        (b-B)                    sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
                                      fixed                          random               Difference                     S.E. 
No of Directors                  -.0007667                  .0299181               -.0306848                  .0156992 
% Women on BD                 .0041905                  .0004438                 .0037467                  .0045845 
 Non-Exe Women              -.026458                   -.0205843                -.0058737                  .0061155 
 Igbo Directors                     .0076992                  .0020263                  .0056729                  .0027843 
Hausa Directors                   .0044649                  .0004554                  .0040095                  .0036208 
Int. Directors                      -.0020897                 -.0058195                  .0037298                  .0027757 
Audit Women                      .0047204                 -.0000825                  .0048029                  .0034175 
Log of Firm Assets             -.2618114                 -.0741936                -.1876178                   .0599082 
  
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =       20.79 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0077 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
Appendix 2.9: Hausman fixed and random effects results ROA 
Table 10: Hausman fixed and random effects results ROA 
                                             ---- Coefficients ---- 
                                        (b)                                (B)                        (b-B)                    sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
                                      fixed                          random               Difference                     S.E. 
No. of Directors            -.2025299                  -.1366824              -.0658474                  .0224822 
% of Women on BD       .0068245                   -.0022919               .0091165                  .0070336 
Non Exe. Women         -.0384395                   -.01598                   -.0224595                  .00911 
Igbo Directors                 .0187791                     .0057328                .0130464                  .0038243 
Hausa Directors              .0024394                     .0014545                .0009849                  .0050224 
Int. Directors                   .0017558                    -.0035219                .0052777                  .0038567 
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Audit Women                  .0066461                    -.0005229               .0071689                  .0041249 
Log of Firm Assets           .1733372                      .0336721              .1396651                   .0729127 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =       32.02 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0001 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
 
Appendix 2.10: Descriptive statistics for Banking Sector 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for Banking Sector 
Variable                           Obs           Mean              Std. Dev.           Min Max 
year                                  480           2008.5              2.875278          2004 2013 
tobinsq                            436          .617884              1.542475              0 14.22002 
roa                                    450          .3076491              1.33103                  -2.558213 17.30288 
nodirbd                            431         9.983759              3.319038              3 22 
pwob                                431         9.496273              10.30481              0 42.85714 
pnexwob                         430         7.723915              9.251033              0 37.5 
pmob                               431        90.65129              11.11035     33.33333 100 
pnexmob                        427        60.45178              19.52877             0              133.3333 
dirY                                  419        40.40154               23.33688              0 100 
dirG                                 419        31.30077              24.36193              0 92.30769 
dirH                                 419        15.52563                16.1797              0 75 
dirInt                               419        12.77206              19.00961              0 100 
auditw                            372        11.96941              14.83683              0 75 
auditm                           374         100               0                           100 100 
prmcomf                        337        10.51322              14.65479              0 50 
prmcomm                      337        89.48678       14.65479             50 100 
pcfcomf                          337        10.51322               14.65479              0 50 
pcfcomm                        337        89.48678               14.65479             50 100 
logfirmass~s                  449        10.75104               5.823071    3.658326 24.93765 
Quota                             480          .83125               .3749217              0 1 
newid                             480            29.4                13.8711              5 53 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.11: Descriptive statistics for Oil and Gas Sector 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics for Oil and Gas Sector 
Variable                           Obs    
        Mean              Std. Dev.           Min Max 
year                                80    2008.5              2.890403       2004 2013 
tobinsq                          79 .5903715              2.402252 -.1103005 18.493 
roa                                 79 .3707328              1.414977 -.6453287 12.15244 
nodirbd                         79 8.481013              1.831776              5 12 
pwob                             79 7.957605              9.341941              0 30 
pnexwob                       79 7.451276              8.338635              0 30 
pmob                             79 92.94655              9.377425            70 100 
pnexmob                      79 57.59996              15.37428           25 85.71429 
dirY                                75 44.78413              24.94673 8.333333 88.88889 
dirG                                75 23.53228              20.15165              0 71.42857 
dirH                                75 13.59471              13.69757              0 44.44444 
dirInt                              75 18.08889              19.63638              0 55.55556 
auditw                           53 7.726864              8.756967              0 20 
auditm                           53 100                              0                         100 100 
prmcomf                       58 15.08621              15.45342              0 50 
prmcomm                     58 84.91379              15.45342           50 100 
pcfcomf                         58 15.08621              15.45342              0 50 
pcfcomm                       58 84.91379              15.45342           50 100 
logfirmass~s                 79 7.992068              .9079169            6.146128 9.702687 
Quota                            80 .1                            .3018928              0 1 
newid                            80 126.4                            2.325424          122 130 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
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Appendix 2.12: OLS square regression results for Financial sector 
Tobin’s Q 
Table 13: Ordinary least square regression results for Financial sector (Tobin’s Q) 
by sector: regress tobinsq nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets 
Source                            SS df                    MS             Number of obs   = 355 
Model                  83.2940055 8              10.4117507                   F(8, 346)       = 4.15 
Residual              867.03912 346          2.50589341                       Prob > F        = 0.0001 
Total                    950.333126 354          2.68455685                R-squared       = 0.0876 
                                                                         Adj R-squared   = 0.0666 
                                                                                                       Root MSE        = 1.583 
tobinsq                     Coef. Std. Err.              t P>t               [95% Conf. Interval] 
Nodirbd    .1125653 .0415441     2.71 0.007              .0308545 .194276 
pwob               .0327618 .0176587     1.86 0.064             -.0674937 .00197 
pnexwob .0032462 .0194565     0.17 0.868             -.0350216 .041514 
dirG                .0044318 .0043182     1.03 0.305             -.0129251 .0040615 
dirH               .0159174 .0061104     2.60 0.010             -.0279356 -.0038991 
dirInt              -.0152703 .0050964    -3.00 0.003             -.0252941 -.0052466 
auditw               -.0006637 .0062516    -0.11 0.916             -.0116321 .0129596 
logfirmassets -.0862588 .0229548    -3.76 0.000             -.1314073 -.0411103 
_cons               1.260643 .3572251     3.53 0.000               .5580368 1.963249 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
 
Appendix 2.13: OLS regression results for Financial sector ROA 
Table 14: Ordinary least square regression results for Financial sector (ROA) 
by sector: regress roa nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets 
Source                            SS df                    MS                Number of obs   = 356 
Model                36.2390459 8              4.52988074             F(8, 347)       = 2.10  
Residual            749.013892 347         2.15854147             Prob > F        = 0.0353 
Total                  785.252938 355         2.21198011                R-squared       = 0.0461 
                                                                                                            Adj R-squared   = 0.0242 
                                                                                                 Root MSE        = 1.4692 
roa                      Coef. Std. Err.               t P>t               [95% Conf. Interval] 
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Nodirbd   -.1255039 .0380749         -3.30       0.001            -.2003906 -.0506172 
pwob                 .0083441 .0163891          0.51       0.611            -.0238904 .0405785 
pnexwob  .0193585 .0180451          1.07       0.284            -.0548501 .0161331 
dirG                 .0028243 .0040051          0.71       0.481            -.005053 .0107015 
dirH                 .0016786 .0056629         0.30        0.767            -.0094593 .0128164 
dirInt                -.0023961 .0047287        -0.51        0.613           -.0116967 .0069045 
auditw                -.0004723 .005791          -0.08        0.935            -.0118622 .0109175 
logfirmassets   .0273772 .0209497         1.31        0.192            -.0138272 .0685816 
_cons                  1.32042 .3306992         3.99        0.000             .6699931 1.970847 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
 
Appendix 2.14: OLS regression results for Oil and Gas sector Tobin’s 
Q 
Table 15: Ordinary least square regression results for Oil and Gas sector (Tobin’s Q) 
by sector: regress tobinsq nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets 
Source             SS        df                    MS             Number of obs   = 53 
Model         54.560319        8                6.82003987                F(8, 44)        = 0.90 
Residual     334.764528       44               7.60828473               Prob > F        = 0.5277 
Total           389.324847       52               7.48701629                       R-squared       = 0.1401 
                                                                      Adj R-squared   = -0.0162 
                                                                                                    Root MSE        = 2.7583 
tobinsq                     Coef. Std. Err.          t              P>t                 [95% Conf. Interval] 
nodirbd                -.0433929 .342066        -0.13          0.900             -.7327815 .6459958 
pwob                  .0994981 .1880614       0.53 0.599           -.2795147 .4785108 
pnexwob  -.1275911 .2232361      -0.57 0.571           -.5774938 .3223117 
dirG                  .0324177 .0736015       0.44 0.662           -.1159164 .1807519 
dirH                  .0511902 .0313096       1.63 0.109           -.0119101 .1142905 
dirInt                 -.0112821 .0261041      -0.43 0.668           -.0638915 .0413273 
auditw           -.0793244 .0726703      -1.09 0.281            -.2257818 .067133 
logfirmassets   -.0042279 .8782217      -0.00 0.996            -1.774167 1.765712 
_cons                   .772492   6.947969      0.11 0.912            -13.23022 14.7752 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result    
 
Appendix 2.15: Ordinary least square regression results for Oil and 
Gas sector ROA 
Table 16: Ordinary least square regression results for Oil and Gas sector (ROA) 
by sector: regress roa nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets 
Source                            SS df                    MS             Number of obs   = 53 
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Model                   26.8075859    8             3.35094824                    F(8, 44)        = 1.17 
Residual                126.219197   44            2.86861811                   Prob > F        = 0.3396  
Total                      153.026783   52            2.94282275                R-squared       = 0.1752 
                                                                                                                  Adj R-squared   = 0.0252 
                                                                                                                    Root MSE        = 1.6937 
roa                 Coef.               Std. Err.           T       P>t              [95% Conf. Interval] 
Nodirbd             -.1323402         .2100404         -0.63 0.532         -.5556488 .2909684 
pwob              .0164133           .1154762          0.14 0.888         -.2163137 .2491403 
pnexwob          -.0239701           .1370747        -0.17 0.862         -.300226 .2522858 
dirG              .0462368            .0451939         1.02 0.312         -.0448455 .1373191 
dirH             -.0294446            .0192252        -1.53 0.133         -.0681904 .0093011 
dirInt             -.0167524            .0160288        -1.05 0.302         -.0490564 .0155516 
auditw             -.0117954            .0446221        -0.26 0.793         -.1017253 .0781346 
logfirmassets   -.2816542            .5392587        -0.52 0.604         -1.368459 .8051502 
_cons             3.974278 4           .266295            0.93 0.357          -4.623874 12.57243 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on Stata analytical software result 
Appendix 2.16: Hausman fixed and random effects results: before 
2009 Tobin’s Q 
Hausman fixed and 
random effects 
results: before 2009 
(Tobin’s Q) 
 
    
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
No of Directors -.05 .01 -.05 .04 
% Women on BD  .01 .01 -.00 .00 
NonExe Women -.01 -.01 -.00  
Igbo Directors .02 .00 .01 .01 
Hausa Directors -.00 -.01 .00 .00 
Int. Directors -.00 -.00 .00 .00 
Log of firm asset -.05 -.08 .03 .04 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2 (7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        8.88   Prob>chi2 =      0.2612 
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Appendix 2.17:Hausman fixed effects and random effects: before 
2009 ROA 
: Hausman fixed and 
random effects 
results: before 2009 
(ROA) 
 
    
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
No of Directors -.05 .01 -.05 .04 
% Women on BD  .01 .01 -.00 .00 
NonExe Women -.01 -.01 -.00  
Igbo Directors .02 .00 .01 .01 
Hausa Directors -.00 -.01 .00 .00 
Int. Directors -.00 -.00 .00 .00 
Log of firm asset -.05 -.08 .03 .04 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =       20.79 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0077 
 
Appendix 2.18: Huasman fixed and random effects results: After 2009 
Tobin’s Q 
Hausman fixed and 
random effects 
results: After 2009 
(Tobin’s Q) 
 
    
 (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
S.E. 
No of Directors -.05 .01 -.05 .04 
% Women on BD  .01 .01 -.00 .00 
NonExe Women -.01 -.01 -.00  
Igbo Directors .02 .00 .01 .01 
Hausa Directors -.00 -.01 .00 .00 
Int. Directors -.00 -.00 .00 .00 
Log of firm asset -.05 -.08 .03 .04 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
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                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       22.43 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.19: Testing for time-fixed effects Tobin’s Q 
. testparm tobinsq nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets Qu 
> ota sector1 sector2 sector3 sector4 sector5 sector7 sector8 sector10 
 
( 1)  nodirbd = 0 
( 2)  pwob = 0 
( 3)  pnexwob = 0 
( 4)  dirG = 0 
( 5)  dirH = 0 
( 6)  dirInt = 0 
( 7)  auditw = 0 
( 8)  logfirmassets = 0 
( 9)  Quota = 0 
(10)  sector2 = 0 
(11)  sector3 = 0 
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(12)  sector4 = 0 
(13)  sector5 = 0 
(14)  sector7 = 0 
(15)  sector8 = 0 
 
F( 15,   956) =    3.29 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Appendix 2.20: Testing for time-fixed effects Tobin’s Q 
. testparm roa nodirbd pwob pnexwob dirG dirH dirInt auditw logfirmassets Quota  
> sector1 sector2 sector3 sector4 sector5 sector7 sector8 sector10 
 
( 1)  nodirbd = 0 
( 2)  pwob = 0 
( 3)  pnexwob = 0 
( 4)  dirG = 0 
( 5)  dirH = 0 
( 6)  dirInt = 0 
( 7)  auditw = 0 
( 8)  logfirmassets = 0 
( 9)  Quota = 0 
(10)  sector2 = 0 
(11)  sector3 = 0 
(12)  sector4 = 0 
(13)  sector5 = 0 
(14)  sector7 = 0 
(15)  sector8 = 0 
 
F( 15,   957) =    5.59 
Prob > F =    0.0000 
